Solomon Jones v. Kankakee County Sheriff's Department

                                In the

     United States Court of Appeals
                  For the Seventh Circuit
                      ____________________

No. 25-1251
SOLOMON A. JONES,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                   v.

KANKAKEE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, et al.,
                                   Defendants-Appellees.
               ____________________

           Appeal from the United States District Court for
                     the Central District of Illinois.
          No. 2:23-cv-02253-CSB-EIL — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.
                      ____________________

SUBMITTED DECEMBER 22, 2025 ∗ — DECIDED JANUARY 21, 2026
                ____________________

   Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE,
Circuit Judges.
   SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Solomon Jones is representing
himself in a civil rights action he filed in federal court in Illi-
nois. The issues presented by his appeal are straightforward

    ∗ We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because

the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments,
and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P.
34(a)(2)(C).
2                                                    No. 25-1251

and lead us without difficulty to return the case to the district
court to account for a recent development in state court litiga-
tion relevant to Jones’s federal claims. What is less straight-
forward is what to make of legal representations in the reply
brief Jones filed on appeal. Though he tells us he did not use
artificial intelligence to prepare the brief, we are skeptical, as
his brief attributed quotations to two cases that do not appear
in those cases. Our skepticism leads us not to sanction Jones,
but instead to offer some observations on considerations
unique to the use of AI by pro se litigants.
                                I
    Jones filed a sprawling lawsuit in November 2023, invok-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleging that several municipal and
county entities in Kankakee, Illinois violated his constitu-
tional rights. The bulk of Jones’s allegations arose from a se-
ries of 2023 incidents in which local authorities ticketed and
arrested him for trespassing and disorderly conduct.
    After initiating the lawsuit, Jones peppered the district
court with motions, including one seeking the district judge’s
recusal. In February 2025, the district court denied the recusal
motion and, on its own initiative, determined that it must ab-
stain from adjudicating Jones’s claims under Younger v. Har-
ris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The court explained that one of the
criminal matters referenced in Jones’s complaint remained
pending in Illinois state court. From there the court concluded
that proceeding further in this litigation may interfere with
the pending state court proceeding because Jones’s complaint
involved constitutional issues that might be litigated in the
state criminal case. So the district court stayed the case and
directed Jones to file a status report once the state criminal
proceeding had concluded.
No. 25-1251                                                     3

    Jones appeals, focusing primarily on the district court’s
denial of his recusal motion. But we lack jurisdiction to con-
sider that decision because the district court has not entered a
final judgment in this case. The jurisdiction Congress gave us
in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 extends only to final decisions—those re-
solving all claims against all parties. Grunt Style LLC v. TWD,
LLC, 140 F.4th 839, 844 (7th Cir. 2025). Although on occasion
we have reviewed the denial of a motion to recuse before final
judgment through a writ of mandamus, see e.g., In re Gibson,
950 F.3d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 2019), we will not treat Jones’s ap-
peal as such a petition because it fails to meet the require-
ments of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 21(a),
see United States v. Henderson, 915 F.3d 1127, 1132 (7th Cir.
2019).
    The district court’s decision to abstain under Younger and
stay the case, on the other hand, is appealable now because it
requires “an essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in
a state forum.” Loughran v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2 F.4th 640,
646 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Jones primarily contests
the manner of his arrest and the charges of trespassing and
disorderly conduct, which the state court may consider dur-
ing his criminal trial.
   While this appeal was pending, Jones informed the district
court that the pertinent state court proceeding had concluded.
Indeed, he reported that the proceeding ended with his being
acquitted of the charges.
   This intervening development eliminates our need to re-
solve whether the district court’s decision to abstain under
Younger was appropriate. See Sykes v. Cook County Cir. Ct.
Prob. Div., 837 F.3d 736, 740–41 (7th Cir. 2016). The proper ap-
proach in these circumstances is to vacate the district court’s
4                                                     No. 25-1251

order staying the case and to return the case for further pro-
ceedings.
    One final point. Beyond reporting his recent acquittal,
Jones also told the district court that he now faces a new set
of charges in state court for disorderly conduct and aggra-
vated assault of a transit employee. See Illinois v. Jones, No. 25-
CM-215 (Kankakee County Cir. Ct. May 7, 2025). Although
these charges came over a year after the initiation of this ac-
tion, Jones says they demonstrate ongoing harassment. We
leave it to the district court to assess the relevance, if any, of
this new set of state criminal charges, including whether the
development warrants renewed consideration of Younger ab-
stention or allowing Jones to file an amended complaint.
                                II
    We close with a few words on non-existent quotations
Jones attributed to cases he relied on in his appellate brief. To
our eye, the error has all the hallmarks of a so-called AI “hal-
lucination,” a circumstance where an AI large language
model generates an output that is fictional, inaccurate, or non-
sensical. News accounts over the last few years leave no doubt
that the consequences of AI hallucinations can be very serious
and worrisome. Equally clear is the enormous investment of
human and financial capital to enhance the accuracy of AI
generally and LLM output.
    While AI presents great overall promise, the experience so
far in litigation has revealed instances of inaccurate factual
and legal representations to courts. How to respond both in
individual cases and at the broader level of court rules and
policies is a challenge fully upon the judiciary, federal and
state. Where all of this lands for pro se litigants—parties who
No. 25-1251                                                    5

represent themselves and who do so almost always without
any legal training—is an important component of the ongoing
dialogue and one implicated by our reaction to the quotation
errors in Jones’s brief.
     In response to a show cause order, Jones insists that he did
not use AI to prepare his brief and, even more, that
“[m]isattributed quotations and incorrect citations happen all
of the time.” At one level, Jones’s observation is fair, for we
often see inaccurate legal representations from pro se litigants.
And most of the time, absent an indication of knowledge of
falsity or an intent to mislead, we move past the misstate-
ments and resolve the appeals, mindful that pro se litigants al-
most always lack legal training. Approximately 60% of our
caseload in recent years includes at least one party appearing
pro se. We have learned how to resolve those cases with the
care all litigants deserve without getting bogged down in un-
witting misstatements or untidy filings. In our experience, pro
se litigants do their best with the resources available to them.
    At another level, however, we doubt Jones’s representa-
tion and continue to believe he used a generative AI applica-
tion to prepare his brief. His brief is meticulous in its presen-
tation—very cleanly and professionally formatted, employ-
ing prose and citation formats we rarely see from pro se liti-
gants, and, above all else, attributing non-existent quotations
to real cases falling within the area of law implicated by the
issues Jones presents on appeal.
    Whether we are right or Jones is right need not detain us,
for we have no reason to believe his misstatements of law
were knowing or intentional. Nor do we have any reason to
believe he has the training necessary or resources available to
check the accuracy of legal citations. In the circumstances
6                                                     No. 25-1251

before us, then, and mindful that before today’s decision we
have not supplied any guidance on the use of AI by pro se lit-
igants, we stop short of imposing any form of sanction on
Jones.
     A few broader observations seem warranted, though. AI
presents great promise for enhancing access to justice for
those without the resources to retain counsel or to represent
themselves effectively. Many important initiatives are under-
way on this front, for AI has many different uses, within and
well beyond litigation. Different areas of law and the require-
ments and challenges they present differ in their suitability to
benefit from the use of AI. On the litigation front, we have
little doubt that litigants and courts alike will arrive over time
at sound and workable practices, policies, and rules that ac-
count for these realities and the nuanced consideration they
deserve.
     As pro se litigants employ AI to assist with court filings, a
basic reminder seems wise. Accuracy and honesty matter. In-
deed, the submission of a legal filing constitutes a representa-
tion to a court and, as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure put
the point, both attorneys and unrepresented parties are certi-
fying “that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the cir-
cumstances,” the “factual contentions have evidentiary sup-
port” and the “legal contentions are warranted by existing
law or a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(b)(2), (3); see also Fed. R. App. P. 38. Right to it, all
litigants—represented and unrepresented—must read their
filings and take reasonable care to avoid misrepresentations,
factual and legal.
No. 25-1251                                                   7

    No doubt the inquiry is different for pro se and represented
parties. Indeed, our reaction to what we saw in Jones’s brief
may have been quite different if the non-existent quotations
came in a brief submitted by a lawyer—an officer of the court
with professional responsibilities and the training necessary
to avoid such a misrepresentation. But pro se litigants shoul-
der responsibility too and, while our understanding of honest
mistakes and common presentational foot faults will remain,
in no way will we allow a court filing to include misrepresen-
tations on legal or factual points that an unrepresented party
reasonably knows or should know exist. For today, then, suf-
fice it to say nothing about the many efficiencies and promises
offered by AI eliminates the peril that may well accompany a
serious abdication of the care the law demands of even unrep-
resented parties.
   With these observations, we VACATE the district court’s
order and REMAND for further proceedings.