AI Case Brief
Generate an AI-powered case brief with:
đź“‹Key Facts
⚖️Legal Issues
đź“šCourt Holding
đź’ˇReasoning
🎯Significance
Estimated cost: $0.10–$0.50 per brief, depending on opinion length and retries
Full Opinion
PRELIMINARY PRINT
Volume 603 U. S. Part 1
Pages 520–592
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
THE SUPREME COURT
June 28, 2024
Page Proof Pending Publication
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
520 OCTOBER TERM, 2023
Syllabus
CITY OF GRANTS PASS, OREGON v. JOHNSON et al.,
ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 23–175. Argued April 22, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024
Grants Pass, Oregon, is home to roughly 38,000 people, about 600 of whom
are estimated to experience homelessness on a given day. Like many
local governments across the Nation, Grants Pass has public-camping
laws that restrict encampments on public property. The Grants Pass
Municipal Code prohibits activities such as camping on public property
or parking overnight in the city's parks. See §§ 5.61.030, 6.46.090(A)–
(B). Initial violations can trigger a fne, while multiple violations can
result in imprisonment. In a prior decision, Martin v. Boise, the Ninth
Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause bars cities from enforcing public-camping ordinances like
these against homeless individuals whenever the number of homeless
Page Proof Pending Publication
individuals in a jurisdiction exceeds the number of “practically avail-
able” shelter beds. 920 F. 3d 584, 618. After Martin, suits against
Western cities like Grants Pass proliferated.
Plaintiffs (respondents here) fled a putative class action on behalf of
homeless people living in Grants Pass, claiming that the city's ordi-
nances against public camping violated the Eighth Amendment. The
district court certifed the class and entered a Martin injunction prohib-
iting Grants Pass from enforcing its laws against homeless individuals
in the city. App. to Pet. for Cert. 182a–183a. Applying Martin's rea-
soning, the district court found everyone without shelter in Grants Pass
was “involuntarily homeless” because the city's total homeless popula-
tion outnumbered its “practically available” shelter beds. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 179a, 216a. The beds at Grants Pass's charity-run shelter did
not qualify as “available” in part because that shelter has rules requir-
ing residents to abstain from smoking and to attend religious services.
Id., at 179a–180a. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affrmed the
district court's Martin injunction in relevant part. 72 F. 4th 868, 874–
896. Grants Pass fled a petition for certiorari. Many States, cities,
and counties from across the Ninth Circuit urged the Court to grant
review to assess Martin.
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 521
Syllabus
Held: The enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping
on public property does not constitute “cruel and unusual punishment”
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Pp. 541–561.
(a) The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
“has always been considered, and properly so, to be directed at the
method or kind of punishment” a government may “impos[e] for the
violation of criminal statutes.” Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 531–532
(plurality opinion). It was adopted to ensure that the new Nation
would never resort to certain “formerly tolerated” punishments consid-
ered “cruel” because they were calculated to “ `superad[d]' ” “ `terror,
pain, or disgrace,' ” and considered “unusual” because, by the time of
the Amendment's adoption, they had “long fallen out of use.” Bucklew
v. Precythe, 587 U. S. 119, 130. All that would seem to make the Eighth
Amendment a poor foundation on which to rest the kind of decree the
plaintiffs seek in this case and the Ninth Circuit has endorsed since
Martin. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause focuses on the
question what “method or kind of punishment” a government may im-
pose after a criminal conviction, not on the question whether a govern-
ment may criminalize particular behavior in the frst place. Powell, 392
U. S., at 531–532.
The Court cannot say that the punishments Grants Pass imposes here
Page Proof Pending Publication
qualify as cruel and unusual. The city imposes only limited fnes for
frst-time offenders, an order temporarily barring an individual from
camping in a public park for repeat offenders, and a maximum sentence
of 30 days in jail for those who later violate an order. See Ore. Rev.
Stat. §§ 164.245, 161.615(3). Such punishments do not qualify as cruel
because they are not designed to “superad[d]” “terror, pain, or dis-
grace.” Bucklew, 587 U. S., at 130 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nor are they unusual, because similarly limited fnes and jail terms have
been and remain among “the usual mode[s]” for punishing criminal of-
fenses throughout the country. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475,
480. Indeed, cities and States across the country have long employed
similar punishments for similar offenses. Pp. 541–543.
(b) Plaintiffs do not meaningfully dispute that, on its face, the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause does not speak to questions like what
a State may criminalize or how it may go about securing a conviction.
Like the Ninth Circuit in Martin, plaintiffs point to Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 370 U. S. 660, as a notable exception. In Robinson, the Court
held that under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, California
could not enforce a law providing that “ `[n]o person shall . . . be addicted
to the use of narcotics.' ” Id., at 660, n 1. While California could not
make “the `status' of narcotic addiction a criminal offense,” id., at 666,
522 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Syllabus
the Court emphasized that it did not mean to cast doubt on the States'
“broad power” to prohibit behavior even by those, like the defendant,
who suffer from addiction. Id., at 664, 667–668. The problem, as the
Court saw it, was that California's law made the status of being an
addict a crime. Id., at 666–667 The Court read the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause (in a way unprecedented in 1962) to impose a limit
on what a State may criminalize. In dissent, Justice White lamented
that the majority had embraced an “application of `cruel and unusual
punishment' so novel that” it could not possibly be “ascribe[d] to the
Framers of the Constitution.” 370 U. S., at 689. The Court has not
applied Robinson in that way since.
Whatever its persuasive force as an interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment, Robinson cannot sustain the Ninth Circuit's Martin proj-
ect. Robinson expressly recognized the “broad power” States enjoy
over the substance of their criminal laws, stressing that they may crimi-
nalize knowing or intentional drug use even by those suffering from
addiction. 370 U. S., at 664, 666. The Court held that California's stat-
ute offended the Eighth Amendment only because it criminalized addic-
tion as a status. Ibid.
Grants Pass's public-camping ordinances do not criminalize status.
The public-camping laws prohibit actions undertaken by any person,
Page Proof Pending Publication
regardless of status. It makes no difference whether the charged de-
fendant is currently a person experiencing homelessness, a backpacker
on vacation, or a student who abandons his dorm room to camp out in
protest on the lawn of a municipal building. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 159.
Because the public-camping laws in this case do not criminalize status,
Robinson is not implicated. Pp. 543–547.
(c) Plaintiffs insist the Court should extend Robinson to prohibit the
enforcement of laws that proscribe certain acts that are in some sense
“involuntary,” because some homeless individuals cannot help but do
what the law forbids. See Brief for Respondents 24–25, 29, 32. The
Ninth Circuit pursued this line of thinking below and in Martin, but
this Court already rejected it in Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514. In
Powell, the Court confronted a defendant who had been convicted under
a Texas statute making it a crime to “ `get drunk or be found in a state
of intoxication in any public place.' ” Id., at 517 (plurality opinion).
Like the plaintiffs here, Powell argued that his drunkenness was an “ `in-
voluntary' ” byproduct of his status as an alcoholic. Id., at 533. The
Court did not agree that Texas's law effectively criminalized Powell's
status as an alcoholic. Writing for a plurality, Justice Marshall observed
that Robinson's “very small” intrusion “into the substantive criminal
law” prevents States only from enforcing laws that criminalize “a mere
status.” Id., at 532–533. It does nothing to curtail a State's
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 523
Syllabus
authority to secure a conviction when “the accused has committed some
act . . . society has an interest in preventing.” Id., at 533. That re-
mains true, Justice Marshall continued, even if the defendant's conduct
might, “in some sense” be described as “ `involuntary' or `occasioned
by' ” a particular status. Ibid.
This case is no different. Just as in Powell, plaintiffs here seek to
extend Robinson's rule beyond laws addressing “mere status” to laws
addressing actions that, even if undertaken with the requisite mens rea,
might “in some sense” qualify as “ `involuntary.' ” And as in Powell,
the Court can fnd nothing in the Eighth Amendment permitting that
course. Instead, a variety of other legal doctrines and constitutional
provisions work to protect those in the criminal justice system from a
conviction. Pp. 547–550.
(d) Powell not only declined to extend Robinson to “involuntary” acts
but also stressed the dangers of doing so. Extending Robinson to
cover involuntary acts would, Justice Marshall observed, effectively
“impe[l]” this Court “into defning” something akin to a new “insanity
test in constitutional terms.” Powell, 392 U. S., at 536. That is be-
cause an individual like the defendant in Powell does not dispute that
he has committed an otherwise criminal act with the requisite mens rea,
yet he seeks to be excused from “moral accountability” because of his
Page Proof Pending Publication
“ `condition.' ” Id., at 535–536. Instead, Justice Marshall reasoned,
such matters should be left for resolution through the democratic proc-
ess, and not by “freez[ing]” any particular, judicially preferred approach
“into a rigid constitutional mold.” Id., at 537. The Court echoed that
last point in Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U. S. 271, in which the Court stressed
that questions about whether an individual who committed a proscribed
act with the requisite mental state should be “reliev[ed of] responsibil-
ity,” id., at 283, due to a lack of “moral culpability,” id., at 286, are
generally best resolved by the people and their elected representatives.
Though doubtless well intended, the Ninth Circuit's Martin experi-
ment defed these lessons. Answers to questions such as what consti-
tutes “involuntary” homelessness or when a shelter is “practically avail-
able” cannot be found in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
Nor do federal judges enjoy any special competence to provide them.
Cities across the West report that the Ninth Circuit's involuntariness
test has created intolerable uncertainty for them. By extending Robin-
son beyond the narrow class of pure status crimes, the Ninth Circuit
has created a right that has proven “impossible” for judges to delin-
eate except “by fat.” Powell, 392 U. S., at 534. As Justice Marshall
anticipated in Powell, the Ninth Circuit's rules have produced confusion
and they have interfered with “essential considerations of feder-
alism,” by taking from the people and their elected leaders diffcult
524 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Syllabus
questions traditionally “thought to be the[ir] province.” Id., at 535–
536. Pp. 550–560.
(e) Homelessness is complex. Its causes are many. So may be the
public policy responses required to address it. The question this case
presents is whether the Eighth Amendment grants federal judges pri-
mary responsibility for assessing those causes and devising those re-
sponses. A handful of federal judges cannot begin to “match” the col-
lective wisdom the American people possess in deciding “how best to
handle” a pressing social question like homelessness. Robinson, 370
U. S., at 689 (White, J., dissenting). The Constitution's Eighth Amend-
ment serves many important functions, but it does not authorize fed-
eral judges to wrest those rights and responsibilities from the American
people and in their place dictate this Nation's homelessness policy.
Pp. 560–561.
72 F. 4th 868, reversed and remanded.
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined.
Thomas, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 561. Sotomayor, J., fled
a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ., joined, post, p. 563.
Page Proof
Theane D. Pending
Evangelis Publication
argued the cause for petitioner.
With her on the briefs were Bradley J. Hamburger, Daniel
R. Adler, Patrick J. Fuster, Jonathan C. Bond, and Aaron
P. Hisel.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging vacatur and re-
mand. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Pre-
logar, Assistant Attorney General Clarke, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral Fletcher, Charles L. McCloud, Mark B. Stern, Bonnie
I. Robin-Vergeer, and Joshua M. Koppel.
Kelsi Brown Corkran argued the cause for respondents.
With her on the brief were Shelby Calambokidis, Alexandra
Lichtenstein, Joseph W. Mead, William Powell, Edward
Johnson, and Walter Fonseca.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Idaho
et al. by RaĂşl R. Labrador, Attorney General of Idaho, Alan M. Hurst,
Solicitor General, Joshua N. Turner, Chief of Constitutional Litigation and
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 525
Opinion of the Court
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.
Many cities across the American West face a homelessness
crisis. The causes are varied and complex, the appropriate
Policy, Michael A. Zarian, Deputy Solicitor General, Austin Knudsen,
Attorney General of Montana, Christian B. Corrigan, Solicitor General,
Brent Mead, Deputy Solicitor General, and Peter M. Torstensen, Jr., Dep-
uty Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Tim Griffn of Arkansas,
Ashley Moody of Florida, Chris Carr of Georgia, Theodore E. Rokita of
Indiana, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Kris W. Kobach of Kansas, Russell Cole-
man of Kentucky, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi,
Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Drew H.
Wrigley of North Dakota, Dave Yost of Ohio, Gentner Drummond of Okla-
homa, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty Jackley of South Dakota,
Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, Sean D. Reyes of
Utah, Jason S. Miyares of Virginia, and Patrick Morrisey of West Vir-
ginia; for California Governor Gavin Newsom by David R. Carpenter and
Collin P. Wedel; for Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives Ben
Toma et al. by Brunn W. Roysden III, Rusty D. Crandell, and Linley
Page Proof Pending Publication
Wilson; for the County of Orange, California, by Marianne Van Riper,
Laura D. Knapp, and Golnaz Zandieh; for the City and County of San
Francisco et al. by Tara M. Steeley; for the City of Chico by Eric G. Sal-
bert; for the City of Phoenix et al. by Justin S. Pierce; for the City of San
Clemente by Yaakov M. Roth and Alex Potapov; for Thirteen California
Cities by Tiffany J. Israel; for the Bay Area Council et al. by David C.
Casarrubias and Samantha D. Wolff; for the Brentwood Community
Council by Fred Heather; for the California State Association of Counties
et al. by Jennifer Bacon Henning; for the California State Sheriffs' Asso-
ciation et al. by Denise Lynch Rocawich and James R. Touchstone; for the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Robert
E. Dunn; for the Cicero Institute by Jeffrey M. Harris; for the Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger; for the District Attor-
ney of Sacramento County by Thien Ho, pro se, Colin Jones, Amanda L.
Iler, and Albert C. Locher; for the Goldwater Institute by Timothy Sande-
fur; for the League of Oregon Cities et al. by Anit K. Jindal; for the
Local Government Legal Center et al. by Ann Davison, Brandon Rain,
Amanda Karras, Erich Eiselt, Anne R. Helzer, Wynetta Massey, and Mi-
chael Webb; for the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce et al. by
Eric S. Boorstin and Jeremy B. Rosen; for the Manhattan Institute et al.
by Ilya Shapiro; for Members of Congress by John M. Reeves; for Neigh-
bors for a Better San Francisco et al. by Christopher G. Michel and Rachel
526 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
public policy responses perhaps no less so. Like many local
governments, the city of Grants Pass, Oregon, has pursued a
multifaceted approach. Recently, it adopted various policies
aimed at “protecting the rights, dignity[,] and private prop-
G. Frank; for the Offce of the San Diego County District Attorney by
Ronald A. Jakob; for the Pacifc Legal Foundation et al. by Mark Miller;
for the Retail Litigation Center, Inc., et al. by Michelle S. Kallen, Deborah
White, and Larissa M. Whittingham; for the Venice Stakeholders Associa-
tion by Jeffrey Lewis; for Michael J. Z. Mannheimer by Richard A. Simp-
son and Michael J. Z. Mannheimer, pro se; for John F. Stinneford by Mat-
thew A. Schwartz; and for Tiana Tozer et al. by John A. DiLorenzo, Jr.,
and Seth R. Tangman.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Maryland et al. by Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General of Maryland, and
Joshua M. Segal, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys Gen-
eral for their respective States as follows: Kwame Raoul of Illinois, An-
drea Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Letitia
James of New York, and Charity R. Clark of Vermont; for Advocates for
Empowerment CA by Hunter Pyle; for Advocates for Survivors of
Page Proof Pending Publication
Gender-Based Violence by Katherine Walz; for the American Civil Liber-
ties Union et al. by Jennifer A. Wedekind and David D. Cole; for the
American Psychiatric Association et al. by Aaron M. Panner; for the Cen-
ter for Constitutional Rights et al. by Andrea Chinyere Ezie; for the Chi-
cago Coalition for the Homeless et al. by Steven P. Blonder and Josh M.
Leavitt; for Congressional Members by William H. Knight; for the Consti-
tutional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod,
and Brian R. Frazelle; for the Corporation for Supportive Housing et al.
by Michelle Pallak and Jaynee LaVecchia; for Criminal Law and Punish-
ment Scholars by Gregory Cui and Andrea Lewis Hartung; for Current
and Former San Francisco Offcials et al. by Rachel Sheridan; for Current
U. N. Special Rapporteurs by David Venderbush; for the Disability Rights
Education and Defense Fund et al. by Jonathan Rosenberg, David A.
Lash, and Maria Michelle Uzeta; for the Emory Civil Rights Society by
Paul Koster; for the Fines and Fees Justice Center et al. by Hyland Hunt
and Ruthanne M. Deutsch; for the Fund for Empowerment by Andrew
Kim and Benjamin L. Rundall; for the Juvenile Law Center et al. by
Marsha L. Levick, Jessica R. Feierman, Richard Saenz, Karen L. Loewy,
Angela C. Vigil, and Nicholas O. Kennedy; for the Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Damon Hewitt, Jon Greenbaum, and
Thomas Silverstein; for the Local Progress Impact Lab et al. by Michael
P. Abate and Heather Gatnarek; for The Los Angeles Catholic Worker
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 527
Opinion of the Court
erty of the homeless.” App. 152. It appointed a “homeless
community liaison” offcer charged with ensuring the home-
less receive information about “assistance programs and
other resources” available to them through the city and its
et al. by Carol A. Sobel, Paul L. Hoffman, and Mark Rosenbaum; for the
National Alliance to End Homelessness et al. by Lauren Willard Zehmer;
for the National Coalition for Homeless Veterans et al. by David Vender-
bush; for the National Coalition for Men by James E. Preston; for the
National Homelessness Law Center by Angela M. Liu and William H.
Knight; for the National Police Accountability Project et al. by Jim Davy;
for the National Women's Shelter Network, Inc., et al. by Brigid Cech
Samole, Sheila Oretsky, Emily A. Fitzgerald, and Jonathan S. Z. Her-
mann; for the Oregon Food Bank et al. by David B. Conrad; for Oregon
Quakers: South Mountain Friends Meeting et al. by James E. Lobsenz and
Isaac Prevost; for Public Health Professionals et al. by Laura E. Powell,
Gilbert T. Smolenski, and Kevin S. Prussia; for the Safety Net Project of
the Urban Justice Center by David Venderbush; for Services Providers
by Lila Miller and Valerie D. Comenencia Ortiz; for the Southern Pov-
erty Law Center et al. by Kirsten Anderson, Ellen Degnan, Micah West,
Page Proof Pending Publication
and Crystal McElrath; for the StrongHearts Native Helpline et al. by
Deborah Greenspan; for the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
by Clifford M. Sloan, Jaime A. Santos, and Rohiniyurie Tashima; for the
Western Regional Advocacy Project by Justin Olson; for Matthew Doh-
erty et al. by Ricardo J. Bonilla; for William P. Quigley et al. by Carmen
Iguina González and Joshua Matz; and for 57 Social Scientists with Pub-
lished Research on Homelessness by Leslie Bailey and Brian
Hardingham.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the State of California by Rob
Bonta, Attorney General, Michael J. Mongan, Solicitor General, Teresa A.
Reed Dippo, Deputy Solicitor General, Christina Bull Arndt, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Kristin A. Liska and Mitchell Rishe, Deputy
Attorneys General, and Alice X. Wang, Associate Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral; for the County of Los Angeles by Mira Hashmall and Nadia A.
Sarkis; for San Bernardino County, California, by Cale Jaffe and Thomas
Bunton; for the City of Los Angeles by Michael M. Walsh, Valerie Flores,
Scott Marcus, Michael Dundas, and Shaun Dabby Jacobs; for the Becket
Fund for Religious Liberty by Eric C. Rassbach; for Better Days Ahead
Outreach Inc., et al. by Mary H. Tolbert, Kevin Quisenberry, and Marielle
Macher; for the Formerly Incarcerated, Convicted People and Families
Movement et al. by David J. Chizewer; for the Grants Pass Gospel Rescue
Mission by William F. Gary; for the International Downtown Association
528 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
local shelter. Id., at 152–153; Brief for Grants Pass Gospel
Rescue Mission as Amicus Curiae 2–3. And it adopted cer-
tain restrictions against encampments on public property.
App. 155–156. The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause barred that last measure. With support from States
and cities across the country, Grants Pass urged this Court
to review the Ninth Circuit's decision. We take up that
task now.
I
A
Some suggest that homelessness may be the “defning pub-
lic health and safety crisis in the western United States”
today. 72 F. 4th 868, 934 (CA9 2023) (Smith, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc). According to the federal
government, homelessness in this country has reached its
highest levels since the government began reporting data on
Page Proof Pending Publication
the subject in 2007. Dept. of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, Offce of Community Planning & Development, T. de
Sousa et al., The 2023 Annual Homelessness Assessment Re-
port (AHAR) to Congress 2–3 (2023). California alone is
home to around half of those in this Nation living without
shelter on a given night. Id., at 30. And each of the fve
States with the highest rates of unsheltered homelessness in
the country—California, Oregon, Hawaii, Arizona, and Ne-
vada—lies in the American West. Id., at 17.
Those experiencing homelessness may be as diverse as the
Nation itself—they are young and old and belong to all races
and creeds. People become homeless for a variety of rea-
sons, too, many beyond their control. Some have been af-
et al. by Matthew Donald Umhofer and Elizabeth A. Mitchell; for the
Kairos Center for Religions, Rights and Social Justice et al. by Charles F.
Smith; for the LONANG Institute by Kerry Lee Morgan and Randall A.
Pentiuk; for the Pacifc Research Institute by Erik S. Jaffe; and for Peter
W. Low et al. by Joel S. Johnson and Peter W. Low, both pro se.
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 529
Opinion of the Court
fected by economic conditions, rising housing costs, or natu-
ral disasters. Id., at 37; see Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 2–3. Some have been forced from their
homes to escape domestic violence and other forms of exploi-
tation. Ibid. And still others struggle with drug addiction
and mental illness. By one estimate, perhaps 78 percent of
the unsheltered suffer from mental-health issues, while 75
percent struggle with substance abuse. See J. Rountree,
N. Hess, & A. Lyke, Health Conditions Among Unsheltered
Adults in the U. S., Calif. Policy Lab, Policy Brief 5 (2019).
Those living without shelter often live together. L. Dun-
ton et al., Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Offce
of Policy Development & Research, Exploring Homelessness
Among People Living in Encampments and Associated Cost
1 (2020) (2020 HUD Report). As the number of homeless
individuals has grown, the number of homeless encampments
across the country has increased as well, “in numbers not
Page Proof Pending Publication
seen in almost a century.” Ibid. The unsheltered may co-
alesce in these encampments for a range of reasons. Some
value the “freedom” encampment living provides compared
with submitting to the rules shelters impose. Dept. of
Housing and Urban Development, Offce of Policy Develop-
ment and Research, R. Cohen, W. Yetvin, & J. Khadduri, Un-
derstanding Encampments of People Experiencing Home-
lessness and Community Responses 5 (2019). Others report
that encampments offer a “sense of community.” Id., at 7.
And still others may seek them out for “dependable access
to illegal drugs.” Ibid. In brief, the reasons why someone
will go without shelter on a given night vary widely by the
person and by the day. See ibid.
As the number and size of these encampments have grown,
so have the challenges they can pose for the homeless and
others. We are told, for example, that the “exponential in-
crease in . . . encampments in recent years has resulted in
an increase in crimes both against the homeless and by the
homeless.” Brief for California State Sheriffs' Association
530 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
et al. as Amici Curiae 21 (California Sheriffs Brief). Cali-
fornia's Governor reports that encampment inhabitants face
heightened risks of “sexual assault” and “subjugation to sex
work.” Brief for California Governor Gavin Newsom as
Amicus Curiae 11 (California Governor Brief). And by one
estimate, more than 40 percent of the shootings in Seattle in
early 2022 were linked to homeless encampments. Brief for
Washington State Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs
as Amicus Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 10 (Washington Sher-
iffs Brief).
Other challenges have arisen as well. Some city offcials
indicate that encampments facilitate the distribution of
drugs like heroin and fentanyl, which have claimed the lives
of so many Americans in recent years. Brief for Offce of
the San Diego County District Attorney as Amicus Curiae
17–19. Without running water or proper sanitation facili-
ties, too, diseases can sometimes spread in encampments and
Page Proof Pending Publication
beyond them. Various States say that they have seen ty-
phus, shigella, trench fever, and other diseases reemerge on
their city streets. California Governor Brief 12; Brief for
Idaho et al. as Amici Curiae 7 (States Brief).
Nor do problems like these affect everyone equally.
Often, encampments are found in a city's “poorest and most
vulnerable neighborhoods.” Brief for City and County of
San Francisco et al. as Amici Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 5 (San
Francisco Cert. Brief); see also 2020 HUD Report 9. With
encampments dotting neighborhood sidewalks, adults and
children in these communities are sometimes forced to navi-
gate around used needles, human waste, and other hazards
to make their way to school, the grocery store, or work. San
Francisco Cert. Brief 5; States Brief 8; California Governor
Brief 11–12. Those with physical disabilities report this can
pose a special challenge for them, as they may lack the mobil-
ity to maneuver safely around the encampments. San Fran-
cisco Cert. Brief 5; see also Brief for Tiana Tozer et al. as
Amici Curiae 1–6 (Tozer Brief).
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 531
Opinion of the Court
Communities of all sizes are grappling with how best to
address challenges like these. As they have throughout the
Nation's history, charitable organizations “serve as the back-
bone of the emergency shelter system in this country,” ac-
counting for roughly 40 percent of the country's shelter beds
for single adults on a given night. See National Alliance To
End Homelessness, Faith-Based Organizations: Fundamental
Partners in Ending Homelessness 1 (2017). Many private
organizations, city offcials, and States have worked, as well,
to increase the availability of affordable housing in order to
provide more permanent shelter for those in need. See
Brief for Local Government Legal Center et al. as Amici
Curiae 4, 32 (Cities Brief). But many, too, have come to the
conclusion that, as they put it, “[j]ust building more shelter
beds and public housing options is almost certainly not the
answer by itself.” Id., at 11.
As many cities see it, even as they have expanded shelter
Page Proof Pending Publication
capacity and other public services, their unsheltered popula-
tions have continued to grow. Id., at 9–11. The city of Se-
attle, for example, reports that roughly 60 percent of its
offers of shelter have been rejected in a recent year. See
id., at 28, and n. 26. Offcials in Portland, Oregon, indicate
that, between April 2022 and January 2024, over 70 percent
of their approximately 3,500 offers of shelter beds to home-
less individuals were declined. Brief for League of Oregon
Cities et al. as Amici Curiae 5 (Oregon Cities Brief). Other
cities tell us that “the vast majority of their homeless popula-
tions are not actively seeking shelter and refuse all serv-
ices.” Brief for Thirteen California Cities as Amici Curiae
3. Surveys cited by the Department of Justice suggest that
only “25–41 percent” of “homeless encampment residents”
“willingly” accept offers of shelter beds. See Dept. of Jus-
tice, Offce of Community Oriented Policing Services, S. Cha-
mard, Homeless Encampments 36 (2010).
The reasons why the unsheltered sometimes reject offers
of assistance may themselves be many and complex. Some
532 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
may reject shelter because accepting it would take them fur-
ther from family and local ties. See Brief for 57 Social Sci-
entists as Amici Curiae 20. Some may decline offers of as-
sistance because of concerns for their safety or the rules
some shelters impose regarding curfews, drug use, or reli-
gious practices. Id., at 22; see Cities Brief 29. Other fac-
tors may also be at play. But whatever the causes, local
governments say, this dynamic signifcantly complicates their
efforts to address the challenges of homelessness. See id.,
at 11.
Rather than focus on a single policy to meet the challenges
associated with homelessness, many States and cities have
pursued a range of policies and programs. See 2020 HUD
Report 14–20. Beyond expanding shelter and affordable
housing opportunities, some have reinvested in mental-
health and substance-abuse treatment programs. See Brief
for California State Association of Counties et al. as Amici
Page Proof Pending Publication
Curiae 20, 25; see also 2020 HUD Report 23. Some have
trained their employees in outreach tactics designed to im-
prove relations between governments and the homeless they
serve. Ibid. And still others have chosen to pair these ef-
forts with the enforcement of laws that restrict camping
in public places, like parks, streets, and sidewalks. Cities
Brief 11.
Laws like those are commonplace. By one count, “a ma-
jority of cities have laws restricting camping in public
spaces,” and nearly forty percent “have one or more laws
prohibiting camping citywide.” See Brief for Western Re-
gional Advocacy Project as Amicus Curiae 7, n. 15 (emphasis
deleted). Some have argued that the enforcement of these
laws can create a “revolving door that circulates individuals
experiencing homelessness from the street to the criminal
justice system and back.” U. S. Interagency Council on
Homelessness, Searching Out Solutions 6 (2012). But many
cities take a different view. According to the National
League of Cities (a group that represents more than 19,000
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 533
Opinion of the Court
American cities and towns), the National Association of
Counties (which represents the Nation's 3,069 counties), and
others across the American West, these public-camping regu-
lations are not usually deployed as a front-line response “to
criminalize homelessness.” Cities Brief 11. Instead, they
are used to provide city employees with the legal authority
to address “encampments that pose signifcant health and
safety risks” and to encourage their inhabitants to accept
other alternatives like shelters, drug treatment programs,
and mental-health facilities. Ibid.
Cities are not alone in pursuing this approach. The fed-
eral government also restricts “the storage of . . . sleeping
bags,” as well as other “sleeping activities,” on park lands.
36 CFR §§ 7.96(i), ( j)(1) (2023). And it, too, has exercised
that authority to clear certain “dangerous” encampments.
National Park Service, Record of Determination for Clearing
the Unsheltered Encampment at McPherson Square and
Temporary Park Closure for Rehabilitation (Feb. 13, 2023).
Page Proof Pending Publication
Different governments may use these laws in different
ways and to varying degrees. See Cities Brief 11. But
many broadly agree that “policymakers need access to the
full panoply of tools in the policy toolbox” to “tackle the com-
plicated issues of housing and homelessness.” California
Governor Brief 16; accord, Cities Brief 11; Oregon Cities
Brief 17.
B
Five years ago, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit took one of those tools off the table. In Martin v.
Boise, 920 F. 3d 584 (2019), that court considered a public-
camping ordinance in Boise, Idaho, that made it a misde-
meanor to use “streets, sidewalks, parks, or public places” for
“camping.” Id., at 603 (internal quotation marks omitted).
According to the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause barred Boise from
enforcing its public-camping ordinance against homeless indi-
viduals who lacked “access to alternative shelter.” Id., at
534 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
615. That “access” was lacking, the court said, whenever
“ `there is a greater number of homeless individuals in a ju-
risdiction than the number of available beds in shelters.' ”
Id., at 617 (alterations omitted). According to the Ninth
Circuit, nearly three quarters of Boise's shelter beds were
not “practically available” because the city's charitable shel-
ters had a “religious atmosphere.” Id., at 609–610, 618.
Boise was thus enjoined from enforcing its camping laws
against the plaintiffs. Ibid.
No other circuit has followed Martin's lead with respect to
public-camping laws. Nor did the decision go unremarked
within the Ninth Circuit. When the full court denied re-
hearing en banc, several judges wrote separately to note
their dissent. In one statement, Judge Bennett argued that
Martin was inconsistent with the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause. That provision, Judge Bennett contended,
prohibits certain methods of punishment a government may
Page Proof Pending Publication
impose after a criminal conviction, but it does not “impose
[any] substantive limits on what conduct a state may crimi-
nalize.” Id., at 599–602. In another statement, Judge
Smith lamented that Martin had “shackle[d] the hands of
public offcials trying to redress the serious societal concern
of homelessness.” Id., at 590. He predicted the decision
would “wrea[k] havoc on local governments, residents, and
businesses” across the American West. Ibid.
After Martin, similar suits proliferated against Western
cities within the Ninth Circuit. As Judge Smith put it, “[i]f
one picks up a map of the western United States and points
to a city that appears on it, there is a good chance that city
has already faced” a judicial injunction based on Martin or
the threat of one “in the few short years since [the Ninth
Circuit] initiated its Martin experiment.” 72 F. 4th, at 940;
see, e. g., Boyd v. San Rafael, 2023 WL 7283885, *1–*2 (ND
Cal., Nov. 2, 2023); Fund for Empowerment v. Phoenix, 646
F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1132 (Ariz. 2022); Warren v. Chico, 2021
WL 2894648, *3 (ED Cal., July 8, 2021).
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 535
Opinion of the Court
Consider San Francisco, where each night thousands sleep
“in tents and other makeshift structures.” Brief for City
and County of San Francisco et al. as Amici Curiae 8 (San
Francisco Brief). Applying Martin, a district court entered
an injunction barring the city from enforcing “laws and ordi-
nances to prohibit involuntarily homeless individuals from
sitting, lying, or sleeping on public property.” Coalition on
Homelessness v. San Francisco, 647 F. Supp. 3d 806, 841
(ND Cal. 2022). That “misapplication of this Court's Eighth
Amendment precedents,” the Mayor tells us, has “severely
constrained San Francisco's ability to address the homeless-
ness crisis.” San Francisco Brief 7. The city “uses enforce-
ment of its laws prohibiting camping” not to criminalize
homelessness, but “as one important tool among others to
encourage individuals experiencing homelessness to accept
services and to help ensure safe and accessible sidewalks and
public spaces.” Id., at 7–8. Judicial intervention restrict-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ing the use of that tool, the Mayor continues, “has led to
painful results on the streets and in neighborhoods.” Id., at
8. “San Francisco has seen over half of its offers of shelter
and services rejected by unhoused individuals, who often
cite” the Martin order against the city “as their justifcation
to permanently occupy and block public sidewalks.” Id., at
8–9.
An exceptionally large number of cities and States have
fled briefs in this Court reporting experiences like San
Francisco's. In the judgment of many of them, the Ninth
Circuit has inappropriately “limit[ed] the tools available to
local governments for tackling [what is a] complex and diff-
cult human issue.” Oregon Cities Brief 2. The threat of
Martin injunctions, they say, has “paralyze[d]” even com-
monsense and good-faith efforts at addressing homelessness.
Brief for City of Phoenix et al. as Amici Curiae 36 (Phoenix
Brief). The Ninth Circuit's intervention, they insist, has
prevented local governments from pursuing “effective solu-
tions to this humanitarian crisis while simultaneously pro-
536 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
tecting the remaining community's right to safely enjoy pub-
lic spaces.” Brief for International Municipal Lawyers
Association et al. as Amici Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 27 (Cities
Cert. Brief); States Brief 11 (“State and local governments
in the Ninth Circuit have attempted a variety of solutions to
address the problems that public encampments infict on
their communities,” only to have those “efforts . . . shut down
by federal courts”).
Many cities further report that, rather than help alleviate
the homelessness crisis, Martin injunctions have inadvert-
ently contributed to it. The numbers of “[u]nsheltered
homelessness,” they represent, have “increased dramatically
in the Ninth Circuit since Martin.” Brief for League of Or-
egon Cities et al. as Amici Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 7 (bold-
face and capitalization deleted). And, they say, Martin in-
junctions have contributed to this trend by “weaken[ing]”
the ability of public offcials “to persuade persons experienc-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ing homelessness to accept shelter beds and [other] services.”
Brief for Ten California Cities et al. as Amici Curiae on Pet.
for Cert. 2. In Portland, for example, residents report some
unsheltered persons “often return within days” of an en-
campment's clearing, on the understanding that “Martin . . .
and its progeny prohibit the [c]ity from implementing more
effcacious strategies.” Tozer Brief 5; Washington Sheriffs
Brief 14 (Martin divests offcers of the “ability to compel
[unsheltered] persons to leave encampments and obtain nec-
essary services”). In short, they say, Martin “make[s] solv-
ing this crisis harder.” Cities Cert. Brief 3.
All acknowledge “[h]omelessness is a complex and serious
social issue that cries out for effective . . . responses.” Ibid.
But many States and cities believe “it is crucial” for local
governments to “have the latitude” to experiment and fnd
effective responses. Id., at 27; States Brief 13–17. “In-
junctions and the threat of federal litigation,” they insist,
“impede this democratic process,” undermine local govern-
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 537
Opinion of the Court
ments, and do not well serve the homeless or others who live
in the Ninth Circuit. Cities Cert. Brief 27–28.
C
The case before us arises from a Martin injunction issued
against the city of Grants Pass. Located on the banks of
the Rogue River in southwestern Oregon, the city is home
to roughly 38,000 people. Among them are an estimated 600
individuals who experience homelessness on a given day. 72
F. 4th, at 874; App. to Pet. for Cert. 167a–168a; 212a–213a.
Like many American cities, Grants Pass has laws restrict-
ing camping in public spaces. Three are relevant here.
The frst prohibits sleeping “on public sidewalks, streets,
or alleyways.” Grants Pass Municipal Code § 5.61.020(A)
(2023); App. to Pet. for Cert. 221a. The second prohibits
“[c]amping” on public property. § 5.61.030; App. to Pet. for
Cert. 222a (boldface deleted). Camping is defned as “set-
Page Proof Pending Publication
[ting] up . . . or . . . remain[ing] in or at a campsite,” and a
“[c]ampsite” is defned as “any place where bedding, sleeping
bag[s], or other material used for bedding purposes, or any
stove or fre is placed . . . for the purpose of maintaining a
temporary place to live.” §§ 5.61.010(A)–(B); App. to Pet.
for Cert. 221a. The third prohibits “[c]amping” and “[o]ver-
night parking” in the city's parks. §§ 6.46.090(A)–(B); 72
F. 4th, at 876. Penalties for violating these ordinances esca-
late stepwise. An initial violation may trigger a fne.
§§ 1.36.010(I)–(J). Those who receive multiple citations may
be subject to an order barring them from city parks for 30
days. § 6.46.350; App. to Pet. for Cert. 174a. And, in turn,
violations of those orders can constitute criminal trespass,
punishable by a maximum of 30 days in prison and a $1,250
fine. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 164.245, 161.615(3), 161.635(1)(c)
(2023).
Neither of the named plaintiffs before us has been sub-
jected to an order barring them from city property or to
538 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
criminal trespass charges. Perhaps that is because the city
has traditionally taken a light-touch approach to enforce-
ment. The city's offcers are directed “to provide law en-
forcement services to all members of the community while
protecting the rights, dignity[,] and private property of the
homeless.” App. 152, Grants Pass Dept. of Public Safety
Policy Manual ¶428.1.1 (Dec. 17, 2018). Officers are in-
structed that “[h]omelessness is not a crime.” Ibid. And
they are “encouraged” to render “aid” and “support” to the
homeless whenever possible. Id., at 153, ¶428.3.1
Still, shortly after the panel decision in Martin, two home-
less individuals, Gloria Johnson and John Logan, fled suit
challenging the city's public-camping laws. App. 37, Third
Amended Complaint ¶¶6–7. They claimed, among other
things, that the city's ordinances violated the Eighth Amend-
ment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Id., at 51,
¶66. And they sought to pursue their claim on behalf of a
class encompassing “all involuntarily homeless people living
Page Proof Pending Publication
in Grants Pass.” Id., at 48, ¶52.2
1
The dissent cites minutes from a community roundtable meeting to
suggest that offcials in Grants Pass harbored only punitive motives when
adopting their camping ban. Post, at 575–576 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.).
But the dissent tells at best half the story about that meeting. In his
opening remarks, the Mayor stressed that the city's goal was to “fnd a
balance between providing the help [homeless] people need and not en-
abling . . . aggressive negative behavior” some community members had
experienced. App. 112. And, by all accounts, the “purpose” of the meet-
ing was to “develo[p] strategies to . . . connect [homeless] people to serv-
ices.” Ibid. The city manager and others explained that the city was
dealing with problems of “harassment” and “defecation in public places”
by those who seemingly “do not want to receive services.” Id., at 113,
118–120. At the same time, they celebrated “the strong commitment”
from “faith-based entities” and a “huge number of people” in the city, who
have “come together for projects” to support the homeless, including by
securing “funding for a sobering center.” Id., at 115, 123.
2
Another named plaintiff, Debra Blake, passed away while this case was
pending in the Ninth Circuit, and her claims are not before us. 72 F. 4th
868, 880, n. 12 (2023). Before us, the city does not dispute that the re-
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 539
Opinion of the Court
The district court certifed the class action and enjoined
the city from enforcing its public-camping laws against the
homeless. While Ms. Johnson and Mr. Logan generally
sleep in their vehicles, the court held, they could adequately
represent the class, for sleeping in a vehicle can sometimes
count as unlawful “ `camping' ” under the relevant ordi-
nances. App. to Pet. for Cert. 219a (quoting Grants Pass
Municipal Code § 5.61.010). And, the court found, everyone
without shelter in Grants Pass was “involuntarily homeless”
because the city's total homeless population outnumbered its
“ `practically available' ” shelter beds. App. to Pet. for Cert.
179a, 216a. In fact, the court ruled, none of the beds at
Grants Pass's charity-run shelter qualifed as “available.”
They did not, the court said, both because that shelter offers
something closer to transitional housing than “temporary
emergency shelter,” and because the shelter has rules re-
quiring residents to abstain from smoking and attend reli-
Page Proof Pending Publication
gious services. Id., at 179a–180a. The Eighth Amend-
ment, the district court thus concluded, prohibited Grants
Pass from enforcing its laws against homeless individuals in
the city. Id., at 182a–183a.
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affrmed in relevant
part. 72 F. 4th, at 874–896. The majority agreed with the
district court that all unsheltered individuals in Grants Pass
qualify as “involuntarily homeless” because the city's home-
less population exceeds “available” shelter beds. Id., at 894.
And the majority further agreed that, under Martin, the
homeless there cannot be punished for camping with “rudi-
mentary forms of protection from the elements.” 72 F. 4th,
at 896. In dissent, Judge Collins questioned Martin's con-
sistency with the Eighth Amendment and lamented its “dire
practical consequences” for the city and others like it. 72
F. 4th, at 914 (internal quotation marks omitted).
maining named plaintiffs face a credible threat of sanctions under its
ordinances.
540 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
The city sought rehearing en banc, which the court denied
over the objection of 17 judges who joined fve separate opin-
ions. Id., at 869, 924–945. Judge O'Scannlain, joined by 14
judges, criticized Martin's “jurisprudential experiment” as
“egregiously fawed and deeply damaging—at war with con-
stitutional text, history, and tradition.” 72 F. 4th, at 925,
926, n. 2. Judge Bress, joined by 11 judges, contended that
Martin has “add[ed] enormous and unjustifed complication
to an already extremely complicated set of circumstances.”
72 F. 4th, at 945. And Judge Smith, joined by several oth-
ers, described in painstaking detail the ways in which, in
his view, Martin had thwarted good-faith attempts by cities
across the West, from Phoenix to Sacramento, to address
homelessness. 72 F. 4th, at 934, 940–943.
Grants Pass fled a petition for certiorari. A large num-
ber of States, cities, and counties from across the Ninth Cir-
cuit and the country joined Grants Pass in urging the Court
to grant review to assess the Martin experiment. See Part
Page Proof Pending Publication
I–B, supra. We agreed to do so. 601 U. S. 994 (2024).3
3
Supporters of Grants Pass's petition for certiorari included: The cities
of Albuquerque, Anchorage, Chico, Chino, Colorado Springs, Fillmore,
Garden Grove, Glendora, Henderson, Honolulu, Huntington Beach, Las
Vegas, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Murrieta, Newport Beach, Orange, Phoe-
nix, Placentia, Portland, Providence, Redondo Beach, Roseville, Saint
Paul, San Clemente, San Diego, San Francisco, San Juan Capistrano, Seat-
tle, Spokane, Tacoma, and Westminster; the National League of Cities,
representing more than 19,000 American cities and towns; the League of
California Cities, representing 477 California cities; the League of Oregon
Cities, representing Oregon's 241 cities; the Association of Idaho Cities,
representing Idaho's 199 cities; the League of Arizona Cities and Towns,
representing all 91 incorporated Arizona municipalities; the North Dakota
League of Cities, comprising 355 cities; the Counties of Honolulu, San Ber-
nardino, San Francisco, and Orange; the National Association of Counties,
which represents the Nation's 3,069 counties; the California State Associa-
tion of Counties, representing California's 58 counties; the Special Dis-
tricts Association of Oregon, representing all of Oregon's special districts;
the Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys, a nonproft cor-
poration comprising attorneys representing Washington's 281 cities and
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 541
Opinion of the Court
II
A
The Constitution and its Amendments impose a number of
limits on what governments in this country may declare to
be criminal behavior and how they may go about enforcing
their criminal laws. Familiarly, the First Amendment pro-
hibits governments from using their criminal laws to abridge
the rights to speak, worship, assemble, petition, and exercise
the freedom of the press. The Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prevents governments from
adopting laws that invidiously discriminate between persons.
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments ensure that offcials may not displace certain
rules associated with criminal liability that are “so old and
venerable,” “ `so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people[,] as to be ranked as fundamental.' ” Kahler v.
Kansas, 589 U. S. 271, 279 (2020) (quoting Leland v. Oregon,
Page Proof Pending Publication
343 U. S. 790, 798 (1952)). The Fifth and Sixth Amendments
require prosecutors and courts to observe various proce-
dures before denying any person of his liberty, promising for
example that every person enjoys the right to confront his
accusers and have serious criminal charges resolved by a
jury of his peers. One could go on.
But if many other constitutional provisions address what
a government may criminalize and how it may go about se-
curing a conviction, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
towns; the International Municipal Lawyers Association, the largest asso-
ciation of attorneys representing municipalities, counties, and special dis-
tricts across the country; the District Attorneys of Sacramento and San
Diego Counties, the California State Sheriffs' Association, the California
Police Chiefs Association, and the Washington State Association of Sher-
iffs and Police Chiefs; California Governor Gavin Newsom and San Fran-
cisco Mayor London Breed; and a group of 20 States: Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia.
542 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
against “cruel and unusual punishments” focuses on what
happens next. That Clause “has always been considered,
and properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of pun-
ishment” a government may “impos[e] for the violation of
criminal statutes.” Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 531–532
(1968) (plurality opinion).
We have previously discussed the Clause's origins and
meaning. In the 18th century, English law still “formally
tolerated” certain barbaric punishments like “disembowel-
ing, quartering, public dissection, and burning alive,” even
though those practices had by then “fallen into disuse.”
Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. 119, 130 (2019) (citing 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 370
(1769) (Blackstone)). The Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause was adopted to ensure that the new Nation would
never resort to any of those punishments or others like them.
Punishments like those were “cruel” because they were cal-
Page Proof Pending Publication
culated to “ `superad[d]' ” “ `terror, pain, or disgrace.' ” 587
U. S., at 130 (quoting 4 Blackstone 370). And they were
“unusual” because, by the time of the Amendment's adoption,
they had “long fallen out of use.” 587 U. S., at 130. Per-
haps some of those who framed our Constitution thought, as
Justice Story did, that a guarantee against those kinds of
“atrocious” punishments would prove “unnecessary” because
no “free government” would ever employ anything like them.
3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States § 1896, p. 750 (1833). But in adopting the Eighth
Amendment, the framers took no chances.
All that would seem to make the Eighth Amendment a
poor foundation on which to rest the kind of decree the plain-
tiffs seek in this case and the Ninth Circuit has endorsed
since Martin. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
focuses on the question what “method or kind of punishment”
a government may impose after a criminal conviction, not on
the question whether a government may criminalize particu-
lar behavior in the frst place or how it may go about secur-
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 543
Opinion of the Court
ing a conviction for that offense. Powell, 392 U. S., at 531–
532. To the extent the Constitution speaks to those other
matters, it does so, as we have seen, in other provisions.
Nor, focusing on the criminal punishments Grants Pass im-
poses, can we say they qualify as cruel and unusual. Recall
that, under the city's ordinances, an initial offense may trig-
ger a civil fne. Repeat offenses may trigger an order tem-
porarily barring an individual from camping in a public park.
Only those who later violate an order like that may face a
criminal punishment of up to 30 days in jail and a larger fne.
See Part I–C, supra. None of the city's sanctions qualifes
as cruel because none is designed to “superad[d]” “terror,
pain, or disgrace.” Bucklew, 587 U. S., at 130 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). Nor are the city's sanctions unusual,
because similar punishments have been and remain among
“the usual mode[s]” for punishing offenses throughout the
country. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475, 480 (1867);
see 4 Blackstone 371–372; Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. 146,
Page Proof Pending Publication
165 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (describing
fnes as “ `the drudge-horse of criminal justice, probably the
most common form of punishment' ” (some internal quotation
marks omitted)). In fact, large numbers of cities and States
across the country have long employed, and today employ,
similar punishments for similar offenses. See Part I–A,
supra; Brief for Professor John F. Stinneford as Amicus Cu-
riae 7–13 (collecting historical and contemporary examples).
Notably, neither the plaintiffs nor the dissent meaningfully
contests any of this. See Brief for Respondents 40.4
B
Instead, the plaintiffs and the dissent pursue an entirely
different theory. They do not question that, by its terms,
4
This Court has never held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause extends beyond criminal punishments to civil fnes and orders, see
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 666–668 (1977), nor does this case pres-
ent any occasion to do so for none of the city's sanctions defy the Clause.
544 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause speaks to the
question what punishments may follow a criminal conviction,
not to antecedent questions like what a State may criminal-
ize or how it may go about securing a conviction. Yet, echo-
ing the Ninth Circuit in Martin, they insist one notable
exception exists.
In Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962), the plain-
tiffs and the dissent observe, this Court addressed a chal-
lenge to a criminal conviction under a California statute
providing that “ `[n]o person shall . . . be addicted to the use
of narcotics.' ” Ibid., n. 1. In response to that challenge,
the Court invoked the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause to hold that California could not enforce its law mak-
ing “the `status' of narcotic addiction a criminal offense.”
Id., at 666. The Court recognized that “imprisonment for
ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is
either cruel or unusual.” Id., at 667. But, the Court rea-
Page Proof Pending Publication
soned, when punishing “ `status,' ” “[e]ven one day in prison
would be . . . cruel and unusual.” Id., at 666–667.
In doing so, the Court stressed the limits of its decision.
It would have ruled differently, the Court said, if California
had sought to convict the defendant for, say, the knowing
or intentional “use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale, or
possession, or for antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting
from their administration.” Id., at 666. In fact, the Court
took pains to emphasize that it did not mean to cast doubt
on the States' “broad power” to prohibit behavior like that,
even by those, like the defendant, who suffered from addic-
tion. Id., at 664, 667–668. The only problem, as the Court
saw it, was that California's law did not operate that way.
Instead, it made the mere status of being an addict a crime.
Id., at 666–667. And it was that feature of the law, the
Court held, that went too far.
Reaching that conclusion under the banner of the Eighth
Amendment may have come as a surprise to the litigants.
Mr. Robinson challenged his conviction principally on the
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 545
Opinion of the Court
ground that it offended the Fourteenth Amendment's guar-
antee of due process of law. As he saw it, California's law
violated due process because it purported to make unlawful
a “status” rather than the commission of any “volitional act.”
See Brief for Appellant in Robinson v. California, O. T. 1961,
No. 61–554, p. 13 (Robinson Brief).
That framing may have made some sense. Our due proc-
ess jurisprudence has long taken guidance from the “settled
usage[s] . . . in England and in this country.” Hurtado v.
California, 110 U. S. 516, 528 (1884); see also Kahler, 589
U. S., at 279. And, historically, crimes in England and this
country have usually required proof of some act (or actus
reus) undertaken with some measure of volition (mens rea).
At common law, “a complete crime” generally required “both
a will and an act.” 4 Blackstone 21. This view “took deep
and early root in American soil” where, to this day, a crime
ordinarily arises “only from concurrence of an evil-meaning
Page Proof Pending Publication
mind with an evil-doing hand.” Morissette v. United States,
342 U. S. 246, 251–252 (1952). Measured against these
standards, California's law was an anomaly, as it required
proof of neither of those things.
Mr. Robinson's resort to the Eighth Amendment was com-
paratively brief. He referenced it only in passing, and only
for the proposition that forcing a drug addict like himself to
go “ `cold turkey' ” in a jail cell after conviction entailed such
“intense mental and physical torment” that it was akin to
“the burning of witches at the stake.” Robinson Brief 30.
The State responded to that argument with barely a para-
graph of analysis, Brief for Appellee in Robinson v. Califor-
nia, O. T. 1961, No. 61–554, pp. 22–23, and it received virtu-
ally no attention at oral argument. By almost every
indication, then, Robinson was set to be a case about the
scope of the Due Process Clause, or perhaps an Eighth
Amendment case about whether forcing an addict to with-
draw from drugs after conviction qualifed as cruel and un-
usual punishment.
546 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
Of course, the case turned out differently. Bypassing
Mr. Robinson's primary Due Process Clause argument, the
Court charted its own course, reading the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause to impose a limit not just on what pun-
ishments may follow a criminal conviction but what a State
may criminalize to begin with. It was a view unprece-
dented in the history of the Court before 1962. In dissent,
Justice White lamented that the majority had embraced an
“application of `cruel and unusual punishment' so novel that”
it could not possibly be “ascribe[d] to the Framers of the
Constitution.” 370 U. S., at 689. Nor, in the 62 years since
Robinson, has this Court once invoked it as authority to de-
cline the enforcement of any criminal law, leaving the Eighth
Amendment instead to perform its traditional function of ad-
dressing the punishments that follow a criminal conviction.
Still, no one has asked us to reconsider Robinson. Nor
do we see any need to do so today. Whatever its persuasive
Page Proof Pending Publication
force as an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, it can-
not sustain the Ninth Circuit's course since Martin. In Rob-
inson, the Court expressly recognized the “broad power”
States enjoy over the substance of their criminal laws,
stressing that they may criminalize knowing or intentional
drug use even by those suffering from addiction. 370 U. S.,
at 664, 666. The Court held only that a State may not crimi-
nalize the “ `status' ” of being an addict. Id., at 666. In
criminalizing a mere status, Robinson stressed, California
had taken a historically anomalous approach toward criminal
liability. One, in fact, this Court has not encountered since
Robinson itself.
Public-camping ordinances like those before us are nothing
like the law at issue in Robinson. Rather than criminalize
mere status, Grants Pass forbids actions like “occupy[ing] a
campsite” on public property “for the purpose of maintaining
a temporary place to live.” Grants Pass Municipal Code
§§ 5.61.030, 5.61.010; App. to Pet. for Cert. 221a–222a.
Under the city's laws, it makes no difference whether the
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 547
Opinion of the Court
charged defendant is homeless, a backpacker on vacation
passing through town, or a student who abandons his dorm
room to camp out in protest on the lawn of a municipal build-
ing. See Part I–C, supra; Blake v. Grants Pass, No. 1:18–
cv–01823 (D Ore.), ECF Doc. 63–4, pp. 2, 16; Tr. of Oral Arg.
159. In that respect, the city's laws parallel those found in
countless jurisdictions across the country. See Part I–A,
supra. And because laws like these do not criminalize mere
status, Robinson is not implicated.5
C
If Robinson does not control this case, the plaintiffs and
the dissent argue, we should extend it so that it does. Per-
haps a person does not violate ordinances like Grants Pass's
simply by being homeless but only by engaging in certain
acts (actus rei) with certain mental states (mentes reae).
Still, the plaintiffs and the dissent insist, laws like these seek
to regulate actions that are in some sense “involuntary,” for
Page Proof Pending Publication
some homeless persons cannot help but do what the law for-
bids. See Brief for Respondents 24–25, 29, 32; post, at 578–
579 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). And, the plaintiffs and the
dissent continue, we should extend Robinson to prohibit the
enforcement of laws that operate this way—laws that don't
proscribe status as such but that proscribe acts, even acts
undertaken with some required mental state, the defendant
cannot help but undertake. Post, at 578–579. To rule other-
wise, the argument goes, would “ `effectively' ” allow cities to
5
At times, the dissent seems to suggest, mistakenly, that laws like
Grants Pass's apply only to the homeless. See post, at 575. That view
fnds no support in the laws before us. Perhaps the dissent means to
suggest that some cities selectively “enforce” their public-camping laws
only against homeless persons. See post, at 579–581. But if that's the
dissent's theory, it is not one that arises under the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Instead, if anything, it may im-
plicate due process and our precedents regarding selective prosecution.
See, e. g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456 (1996). No claim like
that is before us in this case.
548 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
punish a person because of his status. Post, at 586. The
Ninth Circuit pursued just this line of thinking below and
in Martin.
The problem is, this Court has already rejected that view.
In Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968), the Court confronted
a defendant who had been convicted under a Texas statute
making it a crime to “ `get drunk or be found in a state of
intoxication in any public place.' ” Id., at 517 (plurality opin-
ion). Like the plaintiffs here, Mr. Powell argued that his
drunkenness was an “ `involuntary' ” byproduct of his status
as an alcoholic. Id., at 533. Yes, the statute required proof
of an act (becoming drunk or intoxicated and then proceed-
ing into public), and perhaps some associated mental state
(for presumably the defendant knew he was drinking and
maybe even knew he made his way to a public place). Still,
Mr. Powell contended, Texas's law effectively criminalized
his status as an alcoholic because he could not help but doing
Page Proof Pending Publication
as he did. Ibid. Justice Fortas embraced that view, but
only in dissent: He would have extended Robinson to cover
conduct that fows from any “condition [the defendant] is
powerless to change. ” 392 U. S., at 567 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting).
The Court did not agree. Writing for a plurality, Justice
Marshall observed that Robinson had authorized “a very
small” intrusion by courts “into the substantive criminal
law” “under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment[s] Clause.” 392 U. S., at 533. That small intrusion,
Justice Marshall said, prevents States only from enforcing
laws that criminalize “a mere status.” Id., at 532. It does
nothing to curtail a State's authority to secure a conviction
when “the accused has committed some act . . . society has
an interest in preventing.” Id., at 533. That remains true,
Justice Marshall continued, regardless whether the defend-
ant's act “in some sense” might be described as “ `involun-
tary' or `occasioned by' ” a particular status. Ibid. (empha-
sis added). In this, Justice Marshall echoed Robinson itself,
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 549
Opinion of the Court
where the Court emphasized that California remained free to
criminalize intentional or knowing drug use even by addicts
whose conduct, too, in some sense could be considered invol-
untary. See Robinson, 370 U. S., at 664, 666. Based on all
this, Justice Marshall concluded, because the defendant be-
fore the Court had not been convicted “for being” an “alco-
holic, but for [engaging in the act of] being in public while
drunk on a particular occasion,” Robinson did not apply.
Powell, 392 U. S., at 532.6
This case is no different from Powell. Just as there, the
plaintiffs here seek to expand Robinson's “small” intrusion
“into the substantive criminal law.” Just as there, the plain-
tiffs here seek to extend its rule beyond laws addressing
“mere status” to laws addressing actions that, even if under-
taken with the requisite mens rea, might “in some sense”
qualify as “ `involuntary.' ” And just as Powell could fnd
nothing in the Eighth Amendment permitting that course,
neither can we. As we have seen, Robinson already sits
Page Proof Pending Publication
uneasily with the Amendment's terms, original meaning, and
our precedents. Its holding is restricted to laws that crimi-
nalize “mere status.” Nothing in the decision called into
question the “broad power” of States to regulate acts under-
taken with some mens rea. And, just as in Powell, we dis-
6
Justice White, who cast the ffth vote upholding the conviction, con-
curred in the result. Writing only for himself, Justice White expressed
some sympathy for Justice Fortas's theory, but ultimately deemed that
“novel construction” of the Eighth Amendment “unnecessary to pursue”
because the defendant hadn't proven that his alcoholism made him “unable
to stay off the streets on the night in question.” 392 U. S., at 552, n. 4,
553–554 (White, J., concurring in result). In Martin, the Ninth Circuit
suggested Justice White's solo concurrence somehow rendered the Powell
dissent controlling and the plurality a dissent. See Martin v. Boise, 920
F. 3d 584, 616–617 (2019). Before us, neither the plaintiffs nor the dissent
defend that theory, and for good reason: In the years since Powell, this
Court has repeatedly relied on Justice Marshall's opinion, as we do today.
See, e.g., Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U. S. 271, 280 (2020); Clark v. Arizona,
548 U. S. 735, 768, n. 38 (2006); Jones v. United States, 463 U. S. 354, 365,
n. 13 (1983).
550 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
cern nothing in the Eighth Amendment that might provide
us with lawful authority to extend Robinson beyond its nar-
row holding.
To be sure, and once more, a variety of other legal doc-
trines and constitutional provisions work to protect those in
our criminal justice system from a conviction. Like some
other jurisdictions, Oregon recognizes a “necessity” defense
to certain criminal charges. It may be that defense extends
to charges for illegal camping when it comes to those with
nowhere else to go. See State v. Barrett, 302 Ore. App. 23,
28, 460 P. 3d 93, 96 (2020) (citing Ore. Rev. Stat. § 161.200).
Insanity, diminished-capacity, and duress defenses also may
be available in many jurisdictions. See Powell, 392 U. S.,
at 536. States and cities are free as well to add additional
substantive protections. Since this litigation began, for ex-
ample, Oregon itself has adopted a law specifcally address-
ing how far its municipalities may go in regulating public
camping. See, e. g., Ore. Rev. Stat. § 195.530(2) (2023). For
Page Proof Pending Publication
that matter, nothing in today's decision prevents States,
cities, and counties from going a step further and declining
to criminalize public camping altogether. For its part, the
Constitution provides many additional limits on state prose-
cutorial power, promising fair notice of the laws and equal
treatment under them, forbidding selective prosecutions, and
much more besides. See Part II–A, supra; and n. 5, supra.
All this represents only a small sample of the legion protec-
tions our society affords a presumptively free individual from
a criminal conviction. But aside from Robinson, a case di-
rected to a highly unusual law that condemned status alone,
this Court has never invoked the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause to perform that function.
D
Not only did Powell decline to extend Robinson to “invol-
untary” acts, it stressed the dangers that would likely attend
any attempt to do so. Were the Court to pursue that path
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 551
Opinion of the Court
in the name of the Eighth Amendment, Justice Marshall
warned, “it is diffcult to see any limiting principle that
would serve to prevent this Court from becoming . . . the
ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility,
in diverse areas of the criminal law, throughout the country.”
Powell, 392 U. S., at 533. After all, nothing in the Amend-
ment's text or history exists to “confne” or guide our review.
Id., at 534. Unaided by those sources, we would be left “to
write into the Constitution” our own “formulas,” many of
which would likely prove unworkable in practice. Id., at
537. Along the way, we would interfere with “essential con-
siderations of federalism” that reserve to the States primary
responsibility for drafting their own criminal laws. Id., at
535.
In particular, Justice Marshall observed, extending Robin-
son to cover involuntary acts would effectively “impe[l]” this
Court “into defning” something akin to a new “insanity test
Page Proof Pending Publication
in constitutional terms.” 392 U. S., at 536. It would be-
cause an individual like the defendant in Powell does not
dispute that he has committed an otherwise criminal act with
the requisite mens rea, yet he seeks to be excused from
“moral accountability” because of his “ `condition.' ” Id., at
535–536. And “[n]othing,” Justice Marshall said, “could be
less fruitful than for this Court” to try to resolve for the
Nation profound questions like that under a provision of the
Constitution that does not speak to them. Id., at 536. In-
stead, Justice Marshall reasoned, such matters are generally
left to be resolved through “productive” democratic “dia-
logue” and “experimentation,” not by “freez[ing]” any partic-
ular, judicially preferred approach “into a rigid constitutional
mold.” Id., at 537.
We recently reemphasized that last point in Kahler v.
Kansas in the context of a Due Process Clause challenge.
Drawing on Justice Marshall's opinion in Powell, we ac-
knowledged that “a state rule about criminal liability” may
violate due process if it departs from a rule “so rooted in the
552 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
traditions” of this Nation that it might be said to “ran[k] as
fundamental.” 589 U. S., at 279 (internal quotation marks
omitted). But, we stressed, questions about whether an in-
dividual who has committed a proscribed act with the requi-
site mental state should be “reliev[ed of] responsibility,” id.,
at 283, due to a lack of “moral culpability,” id., at 286, are
generally best resolved by the people and their elected rep-
resentatives. Those are questions, we said, “of recurrent
controversy” to which history supplies few “entrenched” an-
swers, and on which the Constitution generally commands
“no one view.” Id., at 296.
The Ninth Circuit's Martin experiment defed these les-
sons. Under Martin, judges take from elected representa-
tives the questions whether and when someone who has com-
mitted a proscribed act with a requisite mental state should
be “relieved of responsibility” for lack of “moral culpability.”
589 U. S., at 283, 286. And Martin exemplifes much of what
Page Proof Pending Publication
can go wrong when courts try to resolve matters like those
unmoored from any secure guidance in the Constitution.
Start with this problem. Under Martin, cities must allow
public camping by those who are “involuntarily” homeless.
72 F. 4th, at 877 (citing Martin, 920 F. 3d, at 617, n. 8). But
how are city offcials and law enforcement offcers to know
what it means to be “involuntarily” homeless, or whether
any particular person meets that standard? Posing the
questions may be easy; answering them is not. Is it enough
that a homeless person has turned down an offer of shelter?
Or does it matter why? Cities routinely confront individu-
als who decline offers of shelter for any number of reasons,
ranging from safety concerns to individual preferences. See
Part I–A, supra. How are cities and their law enforcement
offcers on the ground to know which of these reasons are
suffciently weighty to qualify a person as “involuntarily”
homeless?
If there are answers to those questions, they cannot be
found in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Nor
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 553
Opinion of the Court
do federal judges enjoy any special competence to provide
them. Cities across the West report that the Ninth Circuit's
ill-defned involuntariness test has proven “unworkable.”
Oregon Cities Brief 3; see Phoenix Brief 11. The test, they
say, has left them “with little or no direction as to the scope
of their authority in th[eir] day-to-day policing contacts,”
California Sheriffs Brief 6, and under “threat of federal liti-
gation . . . at all times and in all circumstances,” Oregon
Cities Brief 6–7.
To be sure, Martin attempted to head off these complexi-
ties through some back-of-the-envelope arithmetic. The
Ninth Circuit said a city needs to consider individuals “invol-
untarily” homeless (and thus entitled to camp on public prop-
erty) only when the overall homeless population exceeds the
total number of “adequate” and “practically available” shel-
ter beds. See 920 F. 3d, at 617–618, and n. 8. But as some-
times happens with abstract rules created by those far from
the front lines, that test has proven all but impossible to
Page Proof Pending Publication
administer in practice.
City offcials report that it can be “monumentally diffcult”
to keep an accurate accounting of those experiencing home-
lessness on any given day. Brief for City of Los Angeles as
Amicus Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 14. Often, a city's home-
less population “fuctuate[s] dramatically,” in part because
homelessness is an inherently dynamic status. Brief for
City of San Clemente as Amicus Curiae 16 (San Clemente
Brief). While cities sometimes make rough estimates based
on a single point-in-time count, they say it would be “impos-
sibly expensive and diffcult” to undertake that effort with
any regularity. Id., at 17. In Los Angeles, for example, it
takes three days to count the homeless population block-by-
block—even with the participation of thousands of volun-
teers. Martin, 920 F. 3d, at 595 (Smith, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
Beyond these complexities, more await. Suppose even
large cities could keep a running tally of their homeless citi-
zens forevermore. And suppose further that they could
554 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
keep a live inventory of available shelter beds. Even so,
cities face questions over which shelter beds count as “ade-
quate” and “available” under Martin. Id., at 617, and n. 8.
Rather than resolve the challenges associated with defning
who qualifes as “involuntarily” homeless, these standards
more nearly return us to them. Is a bed “available” to a
smoker if the shelter requires residents to abstain from nico-
tine, as the shelter in Grants Pass does? 72 F. 4th, at 896;
App. 39, Third Amended Complaint ¶13. Is a bed “avail-
able” to an atheist if the shelter includes “religious” messag-
ing? 72 F. 4th, at 877. And how is a city to know whether
the accommodations it provides will prove “adequate” in
later litigation? 920 F. 3d, at 617, n. 8. Once more, a large
number of cities in the Ninth Circuit tell us they have no
way to be sure. See, e. g., Phoenix Brief 28; San Clemente
Brief 8–12; Brief for City of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae
22–23 (“What may be available, appropriate, or actually ben-
Page Proof Pending Publication
efcial to one [homeless] person, might not be so to another”).
Consider an example. The city of Chico, California,
thought it was complying with Martin when it constructed
an outdoor shelter facility at its municipal airport to accom-
modate its homeless population. Warren v. Chico, 2021 WL
2894648, *3 (ED Cal., July 8, 2021). That shelter, we are
told, included “protective fencing, large water totes, hand-
washing stations, portable toilets, [and] a large canopy for
shade.” Brief for City of Chico as Amicus Curiae on Pet.
for Cert. 16. Still, a district court enjoined the city from
enforcing its public-camping ordinance. Why? Because, in
that court's view, “appropriate” shelter requires “ `indoo[r],' ”
not outdoor, spaces. Warren, 2021 WL 2894648, *3 (quoting
Martin, 920 F. 3d, at 617). One federal court in Los Angeles
ruled, during the COVID pandemic, that “adequate” shelter
must also include nursing staff, testing for communicable dis-
eases, and on-site security, among other things. See LA Al-
liance for Hum. Rights v. Los Angeles, 2020 WL 2512811, *4
(CD Cal., May 15, 2020). By imbuing the availability of shel-
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 555
Opinion of the Court
ter with constitutional signifcance in this way, many cities
tell us, Martin and its progeny have “paralyzed” communi-
ties and prevented them from implementing even policies de-
signed to help the homeless while remaining sensitive to the
limits of their resources and the needs of other citizens.
Cities Cert. Brief 4 (boldface and capitalization deleted).
There are more problems still. The Ninth Circuit held
that “involuntarily” homeless individuals cannot be punished
for camping with materials “necessary to protect themselves
from the elements.” 72 F. 4th, at 896. It suggested, too,
that cities cannot proscribe “life-sustaining act[s]” that fow
necessarily from homelessness. Id., at 921 ( joint statement
of Silver and Gould, JJ., regarding denial of rehearing). But
how far does that go? The plaintiffs before us suggest a
blanket is all that is required in Grants Pass. Brief for Re-
spondents 14. But might a colder climate trigger a right to
permanent tent encampments and fres for warmth? Be-
Page Proof Pending Publication
cause the contours of this judicial right are so “uncertai[n],”
cities across the West have been left to guess whether Mar-
tin forbids their offcers from removing everything from
tents to “portable heaters” on city sidewalks. Brief for City
of Phoenix et al. on Pet. for Cert. 19, 29 (Phoenix Cert.
Brief). There is uncertainty, as well, over whether Martin
requires cities to tolerate other acts no less “attendant [to]
survival” than sleeping, such as starting fres to cook food
and “public urination [and] defecation.” Phoenix Cert. Brief
29–30; see also Mahoney v. Sacramento, 2020 WL 616302, *3
(ED Cal., Feb. 10, 2020) (indicating that “the [c]ity may not
prosecute or otherwise penalize the [homeless] for eliminat-
ing in public if there is no alternative to doing so”). By
extending Robinson beyond the narrow class of status
crimes, the Ninth Circuit has created a right that has proven
“impossible” for judges to delineate except “by fat.” Pow-
ell, 392 U. S., at 534.
Doubtless, the Ninth Circuit's intervention in Martin was
well-intended. But since the trial court entered its injunc-
556 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
tion against Grants Pass, the city shelter reports that utiliza-
tion of its resources has fallen by roughly 40 percent. See
Brief for Grants Pass Gospel Rescue Mission as Amicus Cu-
riae 4–5. Many other cities offer similar accounts about
their experiences after Martin, telling us the decision has
made it more diffcult, not less, to help the homeless accept
shelter off city streets. See Part I–B, supra (recounting ex-
amples). Even when “policymakers would prefer to invest
in more permanent” programs and policies designed to bene-
ft homeless and other citizens, Martin has forced these
“overwhelmed jurisdictions to concentrate public resources
on temporary shelter beds.” Cities Brief 25; see Oregon
Cities Brief 17–20; States Brief 16–17. As a result, cities
report, Martin has undermined their efforts to balance con-
ficting public needs and mired them in litigation at a time
when the homelessness crisis calls for action. See States
Brief 16–17.
All told, the Martin experiment is perhaps just what Jus-
Page Proof Pending Publication
tice Marshall anticipated ones like it would be. The Eighth
Amendment provides no guidance to “confne” judges in de-
ciding what conduct a State or city may or may not proscribe.
Powell, 392 U. S., at 534. Instead of encouraging “produc-
tive dialogue” and “experimentation” through our demo-
cratic institutions, courts have frozen in place their own “for-
mulas” by “fat.” Id., at 534, 537. Issued by federal courts
removed from realities on the ground, those rules have
produced confusion. And they have interfered with “es-
sential considerations of federalism,” taking from the people
and their elected leaders diffcult questions traditionally
“thought to be the[ir] province.” Id., at 535–536.7
7
The dissent suggests we cite selectively to the amici and “see only
what [we] wan[t]” in their briefs. Post, at 586. In fact, all the States,
cities, and counties listed above (n. 3, supra) asked us to review this case.
Among them all, the dissent purports to identify just two public offcials
and two cities that, according to the dissent, support its view. Post, at 586–
587. But even among that select group, the dissent overlooks the fact
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 557
Opinion of the Court
E
Rather than address what we have actually said, the dis-
sent accuses us of extending to local governments an “unfet-
tered freedom to punish,” post, at 587, and stripping away
any protections “the Constitution” has against “criminalizing
sleeping,” post, at 567. “Either stay awake,” the dissent
warns, “or be arrested.” Post, at 564. That is gravely mis-
taken. We hold nothing of the sort. As we have stressed,
cities and States are not bound to adopt public-camping laws.
They may also choose to narrow such laws (as Oregon itself
has recently). Beyond all that, many substantive legal pro-
tections and provisions of the Constitution may have impor-
tant roles to play when States and cities seek to enforce their
laws against the homeless. See Parts II–A, II–C, supra.
The only question we face is whether one specifc provision
of the Constitution—the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause of the Eighth Amendment—prohibits the enforce-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ment of public-camping laws.
Nor does the dissent meaningfully engage with the rea-
sons we have offered for our conclusion on that question. It
claims that we “gratuitously” treat Robinson “as an outlier.”
Post, at 574, and n. 2. But the dissent does not dispute that
the law Robinson faced was an anomaly, punishing mere sta-
tus. The dissent does not dispute that Robinson's decision
to address that law under the rubric of the Eighth Amend-
that each expresses strong dissatisfaction with how Martin has been ap-
plied in practice. See San Francisco Brief 15, 26 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit
and its lower courts have repeatedly misapplied and overextended the
Eighth Amendment” and “hamstrung San Francisco's balanced approach
to addressing the homelessness crisis”); Brief for City of Los Angeles as
Amicus Curiae 6 (“[T]he sweeping rationale in Martin . . . calls into ques-
tion whether cities can enforce public health and safety laws”); California
Governor Brief 3 (“In the wake of Martin, lower courts have blocked ef-
forts to clear encampments while micromanaging what qualifes as a suit-
able offer of shelter”). And for all the reasons we have explored and so
many other cities have suggested, we see no principled basis under the
Eighth Amendment for federal judges to administer anything like Martin.
558 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
ment is itself hard to square with the Amendment's text and
this Court's other precedents interpreting it. And the dis-
sent all but ignores Robinson's own insistence that a differ-
ent result would have obtained in that case if the law there
had proscribed an act rather than status alone.
Tellingly, too, the dissent barely mentions Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in Powell. There, reasoning exactly as we do
today, Justice Marshall refused to extend Robinson to ac-
tions undertaken, “in some sense, `involuntar[ily].' ” 392
U. S., at 533. Rather than confront any of this, the dissent
brusquely calls Powell a “strawman” and seeks to distin-
guish it on the inscrutable ground that Grants Pass penalizes
“status[-defining]” (rather than “involuntary”) conduct.
Post, at 584–585. But whatever that might mean, it is no
answer to the reasoning Justice Marshall offered, to its obvi-
ous relevance here, or to the fact this Court has since en-
dorsed Justice Marshall's reasoning as correct in cases like
Page Proof Pending Publication
Kahler and Jones, cases that go undiscussed in the dissent.
See n. 6, supra. The only extraordinary result we might
reach in this case is one that would defy Powell, ignore the
historical reach of the Eighth Amendment, and transform
Robinson's narrow holding addressing a peculiar law punish-
ing status alone into a new rule that would bar the enforce-
ment of laws that are, as the dissent puts it, “ `pervasive' ”
throughout the country. Post, at 577; Part I–A, supra.
To be sure, the dissent seeks to portray the new rule it
advocates as a modest, “limited,” and “narrow” one address-
ing only those who wish to fulfll a “biological necessity” and
“keep warm outside with a blanket” when they have no other
“adequate” place “to go.” Post, at 563, 567, 572, 583–584, 586.
But that reply blinks the diffcult questions that necessarily
follow and the Ninth Circuit has been forced to confront: What
does it mean to be “involuntarily” homeless with “no place to
go”? What kind of “adequate” shelter must a city provide to
avoid being forced to allow people to camp in its parks and on
its sidewalks? And what are people entitled to do and use
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 559
Opinion of the Court
in public spaces to “keep warm” and fulfll other “biological
necessities”? 8
Those unavoidable questions have plunged courts and
cities across the Ninth Circuit into waves of litigation. And
without anything in the Eighth Amendment to guide them,
any answers federal judges can offer (and have offered) come,
as Justice Marshall foresaw, only by way of “fat.” Powell,
392 U. S., at 534. The dissent cannot escape that hard truth.
Nor can it escape the fact that, far from narrowing Martin,
it would expand its experiment from one circuit to the entire
country—a development without any precedent in this
Court's history. One that would authorize federal judges to
freeze into place their own rules on matters long “thought
to be the province” of state and local leaders, 392 U. S., at
536, and one that would deny communities the “wide lati-
8
The dissent brushes aside these questions, declaring that “available
Page Proof Pending Publication
answers” exist in the decisions below. Post, at 584. But the dissent
misses the point. The problem, as Justice Marshall discussed, is not that
it is impossible for someone to dictate answers to these questions. The
problem is that nothing in the Eighth Amendment gives federal judges
the authority or guidance they need to answer them in a principled way.
Take just two examples. First, the dissent says, a city seeking to ban
camping must provide “adequate” shelter for those with “no place to go.”
Post, at 583–584. But it never says what qualifes as “adequate” shelter.
Ibid. And, as we have seen, cities and courts across the Ninth Circuit
have struggled mightily with that question, all with nothing in the Eighth
Amendment to guide their work. Second, the dissent seems to think that,
if a city lacks enough “adequate” shelter, it must permit “ `bedding' ” in
public spaces, but not campfres, tents, or “ `public urination or defeca-
tion.' ” Post, at 576, 583–584, 586. But where does that rule come from,
the federal register? See post, at 584. After Martin, again as we have
seen, many courts have taken a very different view. The dissent never
explains why it disagrees with those courts. Instead, it merely quotes
the district court's opinion in this case that announced a rule it seems the
dissent happens to prefer. By elevating Martin over our own precedents
and the Constitution's original public meaning, the dissent faces diffcult
choices that cannot be swept under the rug—ones that it can resolve not
by anything found in the Eighth Amendment, only by fat.
560 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Opinion of the Court
tude” and “fexibility” even the dissent acknowledges they
need to address the homelessness crisis, post, at 564, 567.
III
Homelessness is complex. Its causes are many. So may
be the public policy responses required to address it. At
bottom, the question this case presents is whether the
Eighth Amendment grants federal judges primary responsi-
bility for assessing those causes and devising those re-
sponses. It does not. Almost 200 years ago, a visitor to
this country remarked upon the “extreme skill with which
the inhabitants of the United States succeed in proposing a
common object to the exertions of a great many men, and in
getting them voluntarily to pursue it.” 2 A. de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America 129 (H. Reeve transl. 1961). If the
multitude of amicus briefs before us proves one thing, it is
that the American people are still at it. Through their vol-
Page Proof Pending Publication
untary associations and charities, their elected representa-
tives and appointed offcials, their police offcers and mental-
health professionals, they display that same energy and skill
today in their efforts to address the complexities of the
homelessness challenge facing the most vulnerable among us.
Yes, people will disagree over which policy responses are
best; they may experiment with one set of approaches only
to fnd later another set works better; they may fnd certain
responses more appropriate for some communities than oth-
ers. But in our democracy, that is their right. Nor can a
handful of federal judges begin to “match” the collective wis-
dom the American people possess in deciding “how best to
handle” a pressing social question like homelessness. Rob-
inson, 370 U. S., at 689 (White, J., dissenting). The Consti-
tution's Eighth Amendment serves many important func-
tions, but it does not authorize federal judges to wrest those
rights and responsibilities from the American people and in
their place dictate this Nation's homelessness policy. The
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 561
Thomas, J., concurring
judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion in full because it correctly re-
jects the respondents' claims under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. As the Court observes, that Clause
“focuses on the question what method or kind of punishment
a government may impose after a criminal conviction.”
Ante, at 542 (internal quotation marks omitted). The re-
spondents, by contrast, ask whether Grants Pass “may crimi-
nalize particular behavior in the frst place.” Ibid. I write
separately to make two additional observations about the re-
spondents' claims.
First, the precedent that the respondents primarily rely
upon, Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962), was
Page Proof Pending Publication
wrongly decided. In Robinson, the Court held that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the en-
forcement of laws criminalizing a person's status. Id., at
666. That holding conficts with the plain text and history
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See ante, at
541–543. That fact is unsurprising given that the Robinson
Court made no attempt to analyze the Eighth Amendment's
text or discern its original meaning. Instead, Robinson's
holding rested almost entirely on the Court's understanding
of public opinion: The Robinson Court observed that “in the
light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made
a criminal offense of . . . a disease [such as narcotics addic-
tion] would doubtless be universally thought to be an infic-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 370 U. S., at 666.
Modern public opinion is not an appropriate metric for inter-
preting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause—or any
provision of the Constitution for that matter.
562 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Thomas, J., concurring
Much of the Court's other Eighth Amendment precedents
make the same mistake. Rather than interpret our written
Constitution, the Court has at times “proclaim[ed] itself sole
arbiter of our Nation's moral standards,” Roper v. Simmons,
543 U. S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and has set
out to enforce “evolving standards of decency,” Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). “In a
system based upon constitutional and statutory text demo-
cratically adopted, the concept of `law' ordinarily signifes
that particular words have a fxed meaning.” Roper, 543
U. S., at 629 (opinion of Scalia, J.). I continue to believe that
we should adhere to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause's fxed meaning in resolving any challenge brought
under it.
To be sure, we need not reconsider Robinson to resolve
this case. As the Court explains, the challenged ordinances
regulate conduct, not status, and thus do not implicate Rob-
Page Proof Pending Publication
inson. Ante, at 546–547. Moreover, it is unclear what, if
any, weight Robinson carries. The Court has not once ap-
plied Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. And, today the Court rightly ques-
tions the decision's “persuasive force.” Ante, at 546. Still,
rather than let Robinson's erroneous holding linger in the
background of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, we
should dispose of it once and for all. In an appropriate case,
the Court should certainly correct this error.
Second, the respondents have not established that their
claims implicate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
in the frst place. The challenged ordinances are enforced
through the imposition of civil fnes and civil park exclusion
orders, as well as through criminal trespass charges. But,
“[a]t the time the Eighth Amendment was ratifed, the word
`punishment' referred to the penalty imposed for the commis-
sion of a crime.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U. S. 25, 38
(1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see ante, at 541–543. The
respondents have yet to explain how the civil fnes and park
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 563
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
exclusion orders constitute a “penalty imposed for the com-
mission of a crime.” Helling, 509 U. S., at 38.
For its part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause governs these civil penal-
ties because they can “later . . . become criminal offenses.”
72 F. 4th 868, 890 (CA9 2023). But, that theory rests on
layer upon layer of speculation. It requires reasoning that
because violating one of the ordinances “could result in civil
citations and fnes, [and] repeat violators could be excluded
from specifed City property, and . . . violating an exclusion
order could subject a violator to criminal trespass prosecu-
tion,” civil fnes and park exclusion orders therefore must be
governed by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
Id., at 926 (O'Scannlain, J., statement respecting denial of re-
hearing en banc) (emphasis added). And, if this case is any
indication, the possibility that a civil fne turns into a crimi-
nal trespass charge is a remote one. The respondents assert
that they have been involuntarily homeless in Grants Pass
Page Proof Pending Publication
for years, yet they have never received a park exclusion order,
much less a criminal trespass charge. See ante, at 537–538.
Because the respondents' claims fail either way, the Court
does not address the merits of the Court of Appeals' theory.
See ante, at 542–543, and n. 4. Suffce it to say, we have
never endorsed such a broad view of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. Both this Court and lower courts
should be wary of expanding the Clause beyond its text and
original meaning.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan and
Justice Jackson join, dissenting.
Sleep is a biological necessity, not a crime. For some peo-
ple, sleeping outside is their only option. The City of Grants
Pass jails and fnes those people for sleeping anywhere in
public at any time, including in their cars, if they use as little
as a blanket to keep warm or a rolled-up shirt as a pillow.
For people with no access to shelter, that punishes them
564 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
for being homeless. That is unconscionable and unconstitu-
tional. Punishing people for their status is “cruel and un-
usual” under the Eighth Amendment. See Robinson v. Cal-
ifornia, 370 U. S. 660 (1962).
Homelessness is a reality for too many Americans. On
any given night, over half a million people across the country
lack a fxed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence.
Many do not have access to shelters and are left to sleep in
cars, sidewalks, parks, and other public places. They expe-
rience homelessness due to complex and interconnected is-
sues, including crippling debt and stagnant wages; domestic
and sexual abuse; physical and psychiatric disabilities; and
rising housing costs coupled with declining affordable hous-
ing options.
At the same time, States and cities face immense chal-
lenges in responding to homelessness. To address these
challenges and provide for public health and safety, local gov-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ernments need wide latitude, including to regulate when,
where, and how homeless people sleep in public. The deci-
sion below did, in fact, leave cities free to punish “littering,
public urination or defecation, obstruction of roadways, pos-
session or distribution of illicit substances, harassment, or
violence.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 200a. The only question
for the Court today is whether the Constitution permits pun-
ishing homeless people with no access to shelter for sleeping
in public with as little as a blanket to keep warm.
It is possible to acknowledge and balance the issues facing
local governments, the humanity and dignity of homeless peo-
ple, and our constitutional principles. Instead, the majority
focuses almost exclusively on the needs of local governments
and leaves the most vulnerable in our society with an impossi-
ble choice: Either stay awake or be arrested. The Constitu-
tion provides a baseline of rights for all Americans rich and
poor, housed and unhoused. This Court must safeguard those
rights even when, and perhaps especially when, doing so is un-
comfortable or unpopular. Otherwise, “the words of the Con-
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 565
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
stitution become little more than good advice.” Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 104 (1958) (plurality opinion).
I
The causes, consequences, and experiences of homeless-
ness are complex and interconnected. The majority paints
a picture of “cities across the American West” in “crisis” that
are using criminalization as a last resort. Ante, at 525.
That narrative then animates the majority's reasoning.
This account, however, fails to engage seriously with the pre-
cipitating causes of homelessness, the damaging effects of
criminalization, and the myriad legitimate reasons people
may lack or decline shelter.
A
Over 600,000 people experience homelessness in America
on any given night, meaning that they lack “a fxed, regular,
and adequate nighttime residence.” Dept. of Housing and
Page Proof Pending Publication
Urban Development, T. de Sousa et al., The 2023 Annual
Homelessness Assessment Report to Congress 4 (2023
AHAR). These people experience homelessness in different
ways. Although 6 in 10 are able to secure shelter beds, the
remaining 4 in 10 are unsheltered, sleeping “in places not
meant for human habitation,” such as sidewalks, abandoned
buildings, bus or train stations, camping grounds, and parked
vehicles. See id., at 2. “Some sleep alone in public places,
without any physical structures (like tents or shacks) or con-
nections to services. Others stay in encampments, which
generally refer to groups of people living semi-permanently
in tents or other temporary structures in a public space.”
Brief for California as Amicus Curiae 6 (California Brief)
(citation omitted). This is in part because there has been a
national “shortage of 188,000 shelter beds for individual
adults.” Brief for Service Providers as Amici Curiae 8
(Service Providers Brief).
People become homeless for many reasons, including some
beyond their control. “[S]tagnant wages and the lack of af-
566 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
fordable housing” can mean some people are one unexpected
medical bill away from being unable to pay rent. Brief for
Public Health Professionals and Organizations as Amici Cu-
riae 3. Every “$100 increase in median rental price” is “as-
sociated with about a 9 percent increase in the estimated
homelessness rate.” GAO, A. Cackley, Homelessness: Bet-
ter HUD Oversight of Data Collection Could Improve Esti-
mates of Homeless Populations 30 (GAO–20–433, 2020). In-
dividuals with disabilities, immigrants, and veterans face
policies that increase housing instability. See California
Brief 7. Natural disasters also play a role, including in Ore-
gon, where increasing numbers of people “have lost housing
because of climate events such as extreme wildfres across
the state, foods in the coastal areas, [and] heavy snow-
storms.” 2023 AHAR 52. Further, “mental and physical
health challenges,” and family and domestic “violence and
abuse” can be precipitating causes of homelessness. Califor-
Page Proof Pending Publication
nia Brief 7.
People experiencing homelessness are young and old, live
in families and as individuals, and belong to all races, cul-
tures, and creeds. Given the complex web of causes, it is
unsurprising that the burdens of homelessness fall dispro-
portionately on the most vulnerable in our society. People
already in precarious positions with mental and physical
health, trauma, or abuse may have nowhere else to go if
forced to leave their homes. Veterans, victims of domestic
violence, teenagers, and people with disabilities are all at an
increased risk of homelessness. For veterans, “those with a
history of mental health conditions, including post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) . . . are at greater risk of homeless-
ness.” Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as
Amici Curiae 6. For women, almost 60% of those experi-
encing homelessness report that feeing domestic violence
was the “immediate cause.” Brief for Advocates for Survi-
vors of Gender-Based Violence as Amici Curiae 9. For
young people, “family dysfunction and rejection, sexual
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 567
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
abuse, juvenile legal system involvement, `aging out' of
the foster care system, and economic hardship” make them
particularly vulnerable to homelessness. Brief for Juvenile
Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae 2. For American Indi-
ans, “policies of removal and resettlement in tribal lands”
have caused displacement, resulting in “a disproportionately
high rate of housing insecurity and unsheltered homeless-
ness.” Brief for StrongHearts Native Helpline et al. as
Amici Curiae 10, 24. For people with disabilities, “[l]ess
than 5% of housing in the United States is accessible for mod-
erate mobility disabilities, and less than 1% is accessible for
wheelchair use.” Brief for Disability Rights Education and
Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae 2 (Disability Rights
Brief).
B
States and cities responding to the homelessness crisis face
the diffcult task of addressing the underlying causes of
Page Proof Pending Publication
homelessness while also providing for public health and
safety. This includes, for example, dealing with the hazards
posed by encampments, such as “a heightened risk of disease
associated with living outside without bathrooms or wash
basins,” “deadly fres” from efforts to “prepare food and cre-
ate heat sources,” violent crime, and drug distribution and
abuse. California Brief 12.
Local governments need fexibility in responding to home-
lessness with effective and thoughtful solutions. See infra,
at 581–583. Almost all of these policy solutions are beyond
the scope of this case. The only question here is whether
the Constitution permits criminalizing sleeping outside when
there is nowhere else to go. That question is increasingly
relevant because many local governments have made crimi-
nalization a frontline response to homelessness. “[L]ocal
measures to criminalize `acts of living' ” by “prohibit[ing]
sleeping, eating, sitting, or panhandling in public spaces”
have recently proliferated. U. S. Interagency Council on
Homelessness, Searching Out Solutions 1 (2012).
568 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Criminalizing homelessness can cause a destabilizing cas-
cade of harm. “Rather than helping people to regain hous-
ing, obtain employment, or access needed treatment and
services, criminalization creates a costly revolving door that
circulates individuals experiencing homelessness from the
street to the criminal justice system and back.” Id., at 6.
When a homeless person is arrested or separated from their
property, for example, “items frequently destroyed include
personal documents needed for accessing jobs, housing, and
services such as IDs, driver's licenses, fnancial documents,
birth certifcates, and benefts cards; items required for work
such as clothing and uniforms, bicycles, tools, and computers;
and irreplaceable mementos.” Brief for 57 Social Scientists
as Amici Curiae 17–18 (Social Scientists Brief). Consider
Erin Spencer, a disabled Marine Corps veteran who stores
items he uses to make a living, such as tools and bike parts,
in a cart. He was arrested repeatedly for illegal lodging.
Each time, his cart and belongings were gone once he re-
Page Proof Pending Publication
turned to the sidewalk. “[T]he massive number of times the
City or State has taken all I possess leaves me in a vacuous
déjà vu.” Brief for National Coalition for Homeless Veter-
ans et al. as Amici Curiae 28.
Incarceration and warrants from unpaid fnes can also re-
sult in the loss of employment, benefts, and housing options.
See Social Scientists Brief 13, 17 (incarceration and warrants
can lead to “termination of federal health benefts such as
Social Security, Medicare, or Medicaid,” the “loss of a shelter
bed,” or disqualifcation from “public housing and Section 8
vouchers”). Finally, criminalization can lead homeless peo-
ple to “avoid calling the police in the face of abuse or theft
for fear of eviction from public space.” Id., at 27. Consider
the tragic story of a homeless woman “who was raped almost
immediately following a police move-along order that pushed
her into an unfamiliar area in the dead of night.” Id., at 26.
She described her hesitation in calling for help: “What's the
point? If I called them, they would have made all of us
move [again].” Ibid.
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 569
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
For people with nowhere else to go, fnes and jail time do
not deter behavior, reduce homelessness, or increase public
safety. In one study, 91% of homeless people who were sur-
veyed “reported remaining outdoors, most often just moving
two to three blocks away” when they received a move-along
order. Id., at 23. Police offcers in these cities recognize as
much: “ `Look we're not really solving anybody's problem.
This is a big game of whack-a-mole.' ” Id., at 24. Consider
Jerry Lee, a Grants Pass resident who sleeps in a van. Over
the course of three days, he was woken up and cited six times
for “camping in the city limits” just because he was sleeping
in the van. App. 99 (capitalization omitted). Lee left the
van each time only to return later to sleep. Police reports
eventually noted that he “continues to disregard the city or-
dinance and returns to the van to sleep as soon as police
leave the area. Dayshift needs to check on the van this
morning and . . . follow up for tow.” Ibid. (same).
Shelter beds that are available in theory may be practi-
Page Proof Pending Publication
cally unavailable because of “restrictions based on gender,
age, income, sexuality, religious practice, curfews that con-
fict with employment obligations, and time limits on stays.”
Social Scientists Brief 22. Studies have shown, however,
that the “vast majority of those who are unsheltered would
move inside if safe and affordable options were available.”
Service Providers Brief 8 (collecting studies). Consider
CarrieLynn Hill. She cannot stay at Gospel Rescue Mis-
sion, the only entity in Grants Pass offering temporary beds,
because “she would have to check her nebulizer in as medical
equipment and, though she must use it at least once every
four hours, would not be able to use it in her room.” Dis-
ability Rights Brief 18. Similarly, Debra Blake's “disabili-
ties prevent her from working, which means she cannot com-
ply with the Gospel Rescue Mission's requirement that its
residents work 40-hour work weeks.” Ibid.
Before I move on, consider one last example of a Nashville
man who experienced homelessness for nearly 20 years.
When an outreach worker tried to help him secure housing,
570 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
the worker had diffculty fnding him for his appointments
because he was frequently arrested for being homeless. He
was arrested 198 times and had over 250 charged citations,
all for petty offenses. The outreach worker made him a t-
shirt that read “Please do not arrest me, my outreach worker
is working on my housing.” Service Providers Brief 16.
Once the worker was able to secure him stable housing, he
“had no further encounters with the police, no citations, and
no arrests.” Ibid.
These and countless other stories refect the reality of
criminalizing sleeping outside when people have no other
choice.
II
Grants Pass, a city of 38,000 people in southern Oregon,
adopted three ordinances (Ordinances) that effectively make
it unlawful to sleep anywhere in public, including in your car,
at any time, with as little as a blanket or a rolled-up shirt
Page Proof Pending Publication
as a pillow. The Ordinances prohibit “[c]amping” on “any
sidewalk, street, alley, lane, public right of way, park, bench,
or any other publicly-owned property or under any bridge
or viaduct.” Grants Pass, Ore., Municipal Code § 5.61.030
(2023). A “[c]ampsite” is defned as “any place where bed-
ding, sleeping bag, or other material used for bedding pur-
poses, or any stove or fre is placed, established, or main-
tained for the purposes of maintaining a temporary place to
live.” § 5.61.010(B). Relevant here, the defnition of “camp-
site” includes sleeping in “any vehicle.” Ibid. The Ordi-
nances also prohibit camping in public parks, including the
“[o]vernight parking” of any vehicle. § 6.46.090(B).1
1
The City's “sleeping” ordinance prohibits sleeping “on public side-
walks, streets, or alleyways at any time as a matter of individual and
public safety.” § 5.61.020(A). That ordinance is not before the Court
today because, after the only class representative with standing to chal-
lenge this ordinance died, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the District
Court “to determine whether a substitute representative is available as
to that challenge alone.” 72 F. 4th 868, 884 (2023).
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 571
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
The City enforces these Ordinances with fnes starting at
$295 and increasing to $537.60 if unpaid. Once a person is
cited twice for violating park regulations within a 1-year pe-
riod, city offcers can issue an exclusion order barring that
person from the park for 30 days. See § 6.46.350. A person
who camps in a park after receiving that order commits
criminal trespass, which is punishable by a maximum of 30
days in jail and a $1,250 fne. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 164.245
(2023); see §§ 161.615(3), 161.635(1)(c).
In 2019, the Ninth Circuit held that “ `the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sit-
ting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for home-
less individuals who cannot obtain shelter.' ” Martin v.
Boise, 920 F. 3d 584, 616, cert. denied, 589 U. S. 1126 (2019).
Considering an ordinance from Boise, Idaho, that made it a
misdemeanor to use “streets, sidewalks, parks, or public
places” for “camping,” 920 F. 3d, at 603, the court concluded
Page Proof Pending Publication
that “as long as there is no option of sleeping indoors, the
government cannot criminalize indigent, homeless people for
sleeping outdoors, on public property,” id., at 617.
Respondents here, two longtime residents of Grants Pass
who are homeless and sleep in their cars, sued on behalf of
themselves and all other involuntarily homeless people in the
City, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinances. The
District Court eventually certifed a class and granted sum-
mary judgment to respondents. “As was the case in Mar-
tin, Grants Pass has far more homeless people than `practi-
cally available' shelter beds.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 179a.
The City had “zero emergency shelter beds,” and even count-
ing the beds at the Gospel Rescue Mission (GRM), which is
“the only entity in Grants Pass that offers any sort of tempo-
rary program for some class members,” “GRM's 138 beds
would not be nearly enough to accommodate the at least 602
homeless individuals in Grants Pass.” Id., at 179a–180a.
Thus, “the only way for homeless people to legally sleep on
public property within the City is if they lay on the ground
572 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
with only the clothing on their backs and without their items
near them.” Id., at 178a.
The District Court entered a narrow injunction. It con-
cluded that Grants Pass could “implement time and place
restrictions for when homeless individuals may use their be-
longings to keep warm and dry and when they must have
their belonging[s] packed up.” Id., at 199a. The City could
also “ban the use of tents in public parks,” as long as it did
not “ban people from using any bedding type materials to
keep warm and dry while they sleep.” Id., at 199a–200a.
Further, Grants Pass could continue to “enforce laws that
actually further public health and safety, such as laws re-
stricting littering, public urination or defecation, obstruction
of roadways, possession or distribution of illicit substances,
harassment, or violence.” Id., at 200a.
The Ninth Circuit largely agreed that the Ordinances vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment because they punished people
who lacked “some place, such as [a] shelter, they can lawfully
Page Proof Pending Publication
sleep.” 72 F. 4th 868, 894 (2023). It further narrowed the
District Court's already-limited injunction. The Ninth Cir-
cuit noted that, beyond prohibiting bedding, “the ordinances
also prohibit the use of stoves or fres, as well as the erection
of any structures.” Id., at 895. Because the record did not
“establis[h that] the fre, stove, and structure prohibitions
deprive homeless persons of sleep or `the most rudimentary
precautions' against the elements,” the court remanded for
the District Court “to craft a narrower injunction recogniz-
ing Plaintiffs' limited right to protection against the ele-
ments, as well as limitations when a shelter bed is avail-
able.” Ibid.
III
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infiction of “cruel
and unusual punishments.” Amdt. 8 (Punishments Clause).
This prohibition, which is not limited to medieval tortures,
places “ `limitations' on `the power of those entrusted with
the criminal-law function of government.' ” Timbs v. Indi-
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 573
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
ana, 586 U. S. 146, 151 (2019). The Punishments Clause “cir-
cumscribes the criminal process in three ways: First, it limits
the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those con-
victed of crimes; second, it proscribes punishment grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime; and third, it
imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and
punished as such.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667
(1977) (citations omitted).
In Robinson v. California, this Court detailed one sub-
stantive limitation on criminal punishment. Lawrence Rob-
inson was convicted under a California statute for “ `be[ing]
addicted to the use of narcotics' ” and faced a mandatory 90-
day jail sentence. 370 U. S., at 660. The California statute
did not “punis[h] a person for the use of narcotics, for their
purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial or disorderly
behavior resulting from their administration.” Id., at 666.
Instead, it made “the `status' of narcotic addiction a criminal
Page Proof Pending Publication
offense, for which the offender may be prosecuted `at any
time before he reforms.' ” Ibid.
The Court held that, because it criminalized the “ `status'
of narcotic addiction,” ibid., the California law “infict[ed] a
cruel and unusual punishment in violation” of the Punish-
ments Clause, id., at 667. Importantly, the Court did not
limit that holding to the status of narcotic addiction alone.
It began by reasoning that the criminalization of the “men-
tally ill, or a leper, or [those] afficted with a venereal dis-
ease” “would doubtless be universally thought to be an in-
fiction of cruel and unusual punishment.” Id., at 666. It
extended that same reasoning to the status of being an ad-
dict, because “narcotic addiction is an illness” “which may be
contracted innocently or involuntarily.” Id., at 667.
Unlike the majority, see ante, at 541–543, the Robinson
Court did not rely on the harshness of the criminal penalty
itself. It understood that “imprisonment for ninety days is
not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or
unusual.” 370 U. S., at 667. Instead, it reasoned that,
574 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
when imposed because of a person's status, “[e]ven one day
in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment.” Ibid.
Robinson did not prevent States from using a variety of
tools, including criminal law, to address harmful conduct re-
lated to a particular status. The Court candidly recognized
the “vicious evils of the narcotics traffc” and acknowledged
the “countless fronts on which those evils may be legiti-
mately attacked.” Id., at 667–668. It left untouched the
“broad power of a State to regulate the narcotic drugs traffc
within its borders,” including the power to “impose criminal
sanctions . . . against the unauthorized manufacture, pre-
scription, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics,” and the
power to establish “a program of compulsory treatment for
those addicted to narcotics.” Id., at 664–665.
This Court has repeatedly cited Robinson for the proposi-
tion that the “Eighth Amendment . . . imposes a substantive
limit on what can be made criminal and punished as such.”
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, 346, n. 12 (1981); see
Page Proof Pending Publication
also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 172 (1976) ( joint opinion
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (“The substantive
limits imposed by the Eighth Amendment on what can be
made criminal and punished were discussed in Robinson”).
Though it casts aspersions on Robinson and mistakenly
treats it as an outlier, the majority does not overrule or re-
consider that decision.2 Nor does the majority cast doubt
on this Court's frmly rooted principle that inficting “unnec-
essary suffering” that is “grossly disproportionate to the se-
verity of the crime” or that serves no “penological purpose”
violates the Punishments Clause. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
2
See ante, at 546 (“[N]o one has asked us to reconsider Robinson. Nor
do we see any need to do so today”); but see ante, at 549 (gratuitously
noting that Robinson “sits uneasily with the Amendment's terms, original
meaning, and our precedents”). The most important takeaway from these
unnecessary swipes at Robinson is just that. They are unnecessary.
Robinson remains binding precedent, no matter how incorrectly the ma-
jority applies it to these facts.
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 575
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
U. S. 97, 103, and n. 7 (1976). Instead, the majority sees
this case as requiring an application or extension of Robin-
son. The majority's understanding of Robinson, however, is
plainly wrong.
IV
Grants Pass's Ordinances criminalize being homeless.
The status of being homeless (lacking available shelter) is
defned by the very behavior singled out for punishment
(sleeping outside). The majority protests that the Ordi-
nances “do not criminalize mere status.” Ante, at 547.
Saying so does not make it so. Every shred of evidence
points the other way. The Ordinances' purpose, text, and en-
forcement confrm that they target status, not conduct. For
someone with no available shelter, the only way to comply
with the Ordinances is to leave Grants Pass altogether.
A
Page Proof
Start with Pending
their purpose. Publication
The Ordinances, as enforced,
are intended to criminalize being homeless. The Grants
Pass City Council held a public meeting in 2013 to “ `identify
solutions to current vagrancy problems.' ” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 168a. The council discussed the City's previous efforts
to banish homeless people by “buying the person a bus ticket
to a specifc destination,” or transporting them to a different
jurisdiction and “leaving them there.” App. 113–114. That
was unsuccessful, so the council discussed other ideas, includ-
ing a “ `do not serve' ” list or “a `most unwanted list' made by
taking pictures of the offenders . . . and then disseminating
it to all the service agencies.” Id., at 121. The council even
contemplated denying basic services such as “food, clothing,
bedding, hygiene, and those types of things.” Ibid.
The idea was deterrence, not altruism. “[U]ntil the pain
of staying the same outweighs the pain of changing, people
will not change; and some people need an external source to
motivate that needed change.” Id., at 119. One council-
member opined that “[m]aybe they aren't hungry enough or
576 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
cold enough . . . to make a change in their behavior.” Id., at
122. The council president summed up the goal succinctly:
“ `[T]he point is to make it uncomfortable enough for [home-
less people] in our city so they will want to move on down
the road.' ” Id., at 114.3
One action item from this meeting was the “ `targeted en-
forcement of illegal camping' ” against homeless people.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 169a. “The year following the [public
meeting] saw a signifcant increase in enforcement of the
City's anti-sleeping and anti-camping ordinances. From 2013
through 2018, the City issued a steady stream of tickets
under the ordinances.” 72 F. 4th, at 876–877.
B
Next consider the text. The Ordinances by their terms
single out homeless people. They defne “campsite” as “any
place where bedding, sleeping bag, or other material used
for bedding purposes” is placed “for the purpose of maintain-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ing a temporary place to live.” § 5.61.010. The majority
claims that it “makes no difference whether the charged de-
fendant is homeless.” Ante, at 546–547. Yet the Ordi-
nances do not apply unless bedding is placed to maintain a
temporary place to live. Thus, “what separates prohibited
conduct from permissible conduct is a person's intent to `live'
in public spaces. Infants napping in strollers, Sunday after-
noon picnickers, and nighttime stargazers may all engage in
the same conduct of bringing blankets to public spaces [and
3
The majority does not contest that the Ordinances, as enforced, are
intended to target homeless people. The majority observes, however,
that the council also discussed other ways to handle homelessness in
Grants Pass. See ante, at 538, n. 1. That is true. Targeted enforcement
of the Ordinances to criminalize homelessness was only one solution dis-
cussed at the meeting. See App. 131–132 (listing “[a]ctions to move for-
ward,” including increasing police presence, exclusion zones, “zero toler-
ance” signs, “do not serve” or “most unwanted” lists, trespassing letters,
and building a sobering center or youth center (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 577
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
sleeping], but they are exempt from punishment because
they have a separate `place to live' to which they presumably
intend to return.” Brief for Criminal Law and Punishment
Scholars as Amici Curiae 12.
Put another way, the Ordinances single out for punishment
the activities that defne the status of being homeless. By
most defnitions, homeless individuals are those that lack
“a fxed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence.” 42
U. S. C. § 11434a(2)(A); 24 CFR §§ 582.5, 578.3 (2023). Per-
mitting Grants Pass to criminalize sleeping outside with as
little as a blanket permits Grants Pass to criminalize home-
lessness. “There is no . . . separation between being without
available indoor shelter and sleeping in public—they are op-
posite sides of the same coin.” Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 25. The Ordinances use the defnition of
“campsite” as a proxy for homelessness because those lack-
ing “a fxed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence” are
Page Proof Pending Publication
those who need to sleep in public to “maintai[n] a temporary
place to live.”
Take the respondents here, two longtime homeless resi-
dents of Grants Pass who sleep in their cars. The Ordi-
nances define “campsite” to include “any vehicle. ”
§ 5.61.010(B). For respondents, the Ordinances as applied do
not criminalize any behavior or conduct related to encamp-
ments (such as fres or tents). Instead, the Ordinances tar-
get respondents' status as people without any other form of
shelter. Under the majority's logic, cities cannot criminalize
the status of being homeless, but they can criminalize the
conduct that defnes that status. The Constitution cannot
be evaded by such formalistic distinctions.
The Ordinances' defnition of “campsite” creates a situation
where homeless people necessarily break the law just by
existing. “[U]nsheltered people have no private place to
survive, so they are virtually guaranteed to violate these
pervasive laws.” S. Rankin, Hiding Homelessness: The
Transcarceration of Homelessness, 109 Cal. L. Rev. 559, 561
578 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
(2021); see also Disability Rights Brief 2 (“[T]he members of
Grants Pass's homeless community do not choose to be home-
less. Instead, in a city with no public shelters, they have no
alternative but to sleep in parks or on the street”). Every
human needs to sleep at some point. Even if homeless peo-
ple with no available shelter options can exist for a few days
in Grants Pass without sleeping, they eventually must leave
or be criminally punished.
The majority resists this understanding, arguing that
the Ordinances criminalize the conduct of being homeless
in Grants Pass while sleeping with as little as a blanket.
Therefore, the argument goes, “[r]ather than criminalize
mere status, Grants Pass forbids actions.” Ante, at 546.
With no discussion about what it means to criminalize “sta-
tus” or “conduct,” the majority's analysis consists of a few
sentences repeating its conclusion again and again in hopes
that it will become true. See ante, at 546–547 (proclaiming
Page Proof Pending Publication
that the Ordinances “forbi[d] actions” “[r]ather than crimi-
nalize mere status”; and that they “do not criminalize mere
status”). The best the majority can muster is the following
tautology: The Ordinances criminalize conduct, not pure sta-
tus, because they apply to conduct, not status.
The faw in this conclusion is evident. The majority coun-
tenances the criminalization of status as long as the City
tacks on an essential bodily function—blinking, sleeping,
eating, or breathing. That is just another way to ban the
person. By this logic, the majority would conclude that the
ordinance deemed unconstitutional in Robinson criminaliz-
ing “being an addict” would be constitutional if it criminal-
ized “being an addict and breathing.” Or take the example
in Robinson: “Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the `crime' of having a common cold.”
370 U. S., at 667. According to the majority, although it is
cruel and unusual to punish someone for having a common
cold, it is not cruel and unusual to punish them for sniffing
or coughing because of that cold. See Manning v. Caldwell,
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 579
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
930 F. 3d 264, 290 (CA4 2019) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“In
the rare case where the Eighth Amendment was found to
invalidate a criminal law, the law in question sought to pun-
ish persons merely for their need to eat or sleep, which are
essential bodily functions. This is simply a variation of Rob-
inson's command that the state identify conduct in crafting
its laws, rather than punish a person's mere existence” (cita-
tion omitted)).
C
The Ordinances are enforced exactly as intended: to crimi-
nalize the status of being homeless. City offcials sought to
use the Ordinances to drive homeless people out of town.
See supra, at 575–576. The message to homeless residents
is clear. As Debra Blake, a named plaintiff who passed
away while this case was pending, see n. 1, supra, shared:
“I have been repeatedly told by Grants Pass police
Page Proof Pending Publication
that I must `move along' and that there is nowhere in
Grants Pass that I can legally sit or rest. I have been
repeatedly awakened by Grants Pass police while sleep-
ing and told that I need to get up and move. I have
been told by Grants Pass police that I should leave town.
“Because I have no choice but to live outside and have
no place else to go, I have gotten tickets, fnes and have
been criminally prosecuted for being homeless.” App.
180–181.
Debra Blake's heartbreaking message captures the cruelty
of criminalizing someone for their status: “I am afraid at all
times in Grants Pass that I could be arrested, ticketed and
prosecuted for sleeping outside or for covering myself with
a blanket to stay warm.” Id., at 182. So, at times, when
she could, Blake “slept outside of the city.” Ibid. Blake,
who was disabled, unemployed, and elderly, “owe[d] the City
of Grants Pass more than $5000 in fnes for crimes and viola-
tions related directly to [her] involuntary homelessness and
580 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
the fact that there is no affordable housing or emergency
shelter in Grants Pass where [she could] stay.” Ibid.
Another homeless individual was found outside a nonproft
“in severe distress outside in the frigid air.” Id., at 109.
“[H]e could not breathe and he was experiencing acute pain,”
and he “disclosed fear that he would be arrested and tres-
passed again for being outside.” Ibid. Another, Carrie-
Lynn Hill, whose story you read earlier, see supra, at 7, was
ticketed for “lying down on a friend's mat” and “lying down
under a tarp to stay warm.” App. 134. She was “con-
stantly afraid” of being “cited and arrested for being outside
in Grants Pass.” Ibid. She is unable to stay at the only
shelter in the City because she cannot keep her nebulizer,
which she needs throughout the night, in her room. So she
does “not know of anywhere in the city of Grants Pass where
[she] can safely sleep or rest without being arrested, tres-
passed, or moved along.” Id., at 135. As she put it: “The
Page Proof Pending Publication
only way I have fgured out how to get by is try to stay out
of sight and out of mind.” Ibid. Stories like these fll the
record and confrm the City's success in targeting the status
of being homeless.
The majority proclaims, with no citation, that “it makes
no difference whether the charged defendant is homeless, a
backpacker on vacation passing through town, or a student
who abandons his dorm room to camp out in protest.” Ante,
at 546–547. That describes a fantasy. In reality, the deputy
chief of police operations acknowledged that he was not aware
of “any non-homeless person ever getting a ticket for illegal
camping in Grants Pass.” Tr. of Jim Hamilton in Blake v.
Grants Pass, No. 1:18–cr–01823 (D Ore., Oct. 16, 2019), ECF
Doc. 63–4, p. 16. Offcers testifed that “laying on a blanket
enjoying the park” would not violate the ordinances, ECF
Doc. 63–7, at 2; and that bringing a sleeping bag to “look at
stars” would not be punished, ECF Doc. 63–5, at 5. Instead,
someone violates the Ordinance only if he or she does not
“have another home to go to.” Id., at 6. That is the defni-
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 581
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
tion of being homeless. The majority does not contest any
of this. So much for the Ordinances applying to backpack-
ers and students.
V
Robinson should squarely resolve this case. Indeed, the
majority seems to agree that an ordinance that fned and
jailed “homeless” people would be unconstitutional. See
ante, at 547 (disclaiming that the Ordinances “criminalize
mere status”). The majority resists a straightforward appli-
cation of Robinson by speculating about policy considera-
tions and fxating on extensions of the Ninth Circuit's narrow
rule in Martin.
The majority is wrong on all accounts. First, no one con-
tests the power of local governments to address homeless-
ness. Second, the majority overstates the line-drawing
problems that this case presents. Third, a straightforward
application of Robinson does not confict with Powell v.
Page Proof Pending Publication
Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968). Finally, the majority draws the
wrong message from the various amici requesting this
Court's guidance.
A
No one contests that local governments can regulate the
time, place, and manner of public sleeping pursuant to their
power to “enact regulations in the interest of the public
safety, health, welfare or convenience.” Schneider v. State
(Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939). This power
includes controlling “the use of public streets and sidewalks,
over which a municipality must rightfully exercise a great
deal of control in the interest of traffc regulation and public
safety.” Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 152
(1969). When exercising that power, however, regulations
still “may not abridge the individual liberties secured by the
Constitution.” Schneider, 308 U. S., at 160.
The Ninth Circuit in Martin provided that “an ordinance
violates the Eighth Amendment insofar as it imposes crimi-
582 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
nal sanctions against homeless individuals for sleeping out-
doors, on public property, when no alternative shelter is
available to them.” 920 F. 3d, at 604. Martin was narrow.4
Consider these qualifcations:
“[O]ur holding does not cover individuals who do have
access to adequate temporary shelter, whether because
they have the means to pay for it or because it is realisti-
cally available to them for free, but who choose not to
use it. Nor do we suggest that a jurisdiction with insuf-
fcient shelter can never criminalize the act of sleeping
outside. Even where shelter is unavailable, an ordi-
nance prohibiting sitting, lying, or sleeping outside at
particular times or in particular locations might well be
constitutionally permissible. So, too, might an ordi-
nance barring the obstruction of public rights of way
or the erection of certain structures.” Id., at 617, n. 8
(citation omitted).
Page Proof Pending Publication
Upholding Martin does not call into question all the other
tools that a city has to deal with homelessness. “Some cities
have established approved encampments on public property
with security, services, and other resources; others have
sought to impose geographic and time-limited bans on public
sleeping; and others have worked to clear and clean particu-
larly dangerous encampments after providing notice and re-
minders to those who lived there.” California Brief 14.
Others might “limit the use of fres, whether for cooking or
other purposes” or “ban (or enforce already-existing bans on)
particular conduct that negatively affects other people, in-
cluding harassment of passersby, illegal drug use, and litter-
ing.” Brief for Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae 12. All of
4
Some district courts have since interpreted Martin broadly, relying on
it to enjoin time, place, and manner restrictions on camping outside. See
ante, at 533–537, 554–555. This Court is not asked today to consider any
of these interpretations or extensions of Martin.
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 583
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
these tools remain available to localities seeking to address
homelessness within constitutional bounds.
B
The scope of this dispute is narrow. Respondents do not
challenge the City's “restrictions on the use of tents or other
camping gear,” “encampment clearances,” “time and place
restrictions on sleeping outside,” or “the imposition of fnes
or jail time on homeless people who decline accessible shelter
options.” Brief for Respondents 18.
That means the majority does not need to answer most of
the hypotheticals it poses. The City's hypotheticals, echoed
throughout the majority opinion, concern “violent crime,
drug overdoses, disease, fres, and hazardous waste.” Brief
for Petitioner 47. For the most part, these concerns are not
implicated in this case. The District Court's injunction, for
example, permits the City to prohibit “littering, public urina-
Page Proof Pending Publication
tion or defecation, obstruction of roadways, possession or
distribution of illicit substances, harassment, or violence.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 200a. The majority's framing of the
problem as one involving drugs, diseases, and fres instead
of one involving people trying to keep warm outside with a
blanket just provides the Court with cover to permit the
criminalization of homeless people.
The majority also overstates the line-drawing problems
that a baseline Eighth Amendment standard presents.
Consider the “unavoidable” “diffcult questions” that discom-
bobulate the majority. Ante, at 558–559. Courts answer
such factual questions every day. For example, the majority
asks: “What does it mean to be `involuntarily' homeless with
`no place to go'?” Ibid. Martin's answer was clear: It is
when “ `there is a greater number of homeless individuals in
[a city] than the number of available beds [in shelters,]' ” not
including “individuals who do have access to adequate tem-
porary shelter, whether because they have the means to pay
for it or because it is realistically available to them for free.”
584 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
920 F. 3d, at 617, and n. 8. The District Court here found
that Grants Pass had “zero emergency shelter beds” and that
Gospel Rescue Mission's “138 beds would not be nearly
enough to accommodate the at least 602 homeless individuals
in Grants Pass.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 179a–180a. The
majority also asks: “[W]hat are people entitled to do and use
in public spaces to `keep warm' ”? Ante, at 558–559. The
District Court's opinion also provided a clear answer: They
are permitted “bedding type materials to keep warm and
dry,” but cities can still “implement time and place restric-
tions for when homeless individuals . . . must have their be-
longing[s] packed up.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 199a–200a.
Ultimately, these are not metaphysical questions but factual
ones. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 11302 (defning “homeless,”
“homeless individual,” and “homeless person”); 24 CFR
§ 582.5 (defning “[a]n individual or family who lacks a fxed,
regular, and adequate nighttime residence”).
Just because the majority can list diffcult questions that
Page Proof Pending Publication
require answers, see ante, at 559, n. 8, does not absolve fed-
eral judges of the responsibility to interpret and enforce the
substantive bounds of the Constitution. The majority pro-
claims that this dissent “blinks the diffcult questions.”
Ante, at 558. The majority should open its eyes to available
answers instead of throwing up its hands in defeat.
C
The majority next spars with a strawman in its discussion
of Powell v. Texas. The Court in Powell considered the dis-
tinction between status and conduct but could not agree on
a controlling rationale. Four Justices concluded that Robin-
son covered any “condition [the defendant] is powerless to
change,” 392 U. S., at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting), and four
Justices rejected that view. Justice White, casting the deci-
sive ffth vote, left the question open because the defendant
had “made no showing that he was unable to stay off the
streets on the night in question.” Id., at 554 (opinion con-
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 585
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
curring in judgment). So, in his view, it was “unnecessary
to pursue at this point the further defnition of the circum-
stances or the state of intoxication which might bar convic-
tion of a chronic alcoholic for being drunk in a public place.”
Id., at 553.
This case similarly called for a straightforward application
of Robinson. The majority fnds it telling that this dis-
sent “barely mentions” Justice Marshall's opinion in Powell.
Ante, at 558.5 The majority completely misses the point.
Even Justice Marshall's plurality opinion in Powell agreed
that Robinson prohibited enforcing laws criminalizing “a
mere status.” 392 U. S., at 532. The Powell Court consid-
ered a statute that criminalized voluntary conduct (getting
drunk) that could be rendered involuntary by a status (alco-
holism); here, the Ordinances criminalize conduct (sleeping
outside) that defnes a particular status (homelessness). So
unlike the debate in Powell, this case does not turn on
whether the criminalized actions are “ `involuntary' or `occa-
Page Proof Pending Publication
sioned by' ” a particular status. Id., at 533. For all the rea-
sons discussed above, see supra, at 575–581, these Ordi-
nances criminalize status and are thus unconstitutional
under any of the opinions in Powell.
D
The majority does not let the reader forget that a “large
number of States, cities, and counties” all “urg[ed] the Court to
grant review.” Ante, at 540; see also ante, at 535 (“An excep-
tionally large number of cities and States have fled briefs in
5
The majority claims that this dissent does not dispute that Robinson
is “hard to square” with the Eighth Amendment's “text and this Court's
other precedents.” Ante, at 558. That is wrong. See supra, at 574 (rec-
ognizing Robinson's well-established rule). The majority also claims that
this dissent “ignores Robinson's own insistence that a different result
would have obtained in that case if the law there had proscribed an act
rather than status alone.” Ante, at 558. That too is wrong. See supra,
at 573–574 (discussing Robinson's distinction between status and conduct).
586 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
this Court”); ante, at 560 (noting the “multitude of amicus
briefs before us”); ante, at 540, n. 3 (listing certiorari-stage
amici). No one contests that States, cities, and counties
could beneft from this Court's guidance. Yet the majority
relies on these amici to shift the goalposts and focus on pol-
icy questions beyond the scope of this case. It frst declares
that “[t]he only question we face is whether one specifc pro-
vision of the Constitution . . . prohibits the enforcement of
public-camping laws.” Ante, at 557. Yet it quickly shifts
gears and claims that “the question this case presents is
whether the Eighth Amendment grants federal judges pri-
mary responsibility for assessing those causes [of homeless-
ness] and devising those responses.” Ante, at 560. This
sleight of hand allows the majority to abdicate its responsi-
bility to answer the frst (legal) question by declining to an-
swer the second (policy) one.
The majority cites various amicus briefs to amplify Grants
Page Proof Pending Publication
Pass's belief that its homelessness crisis is intractable absent
the ability to criminalize homelessness. In so doing, the ma-
jority chooses to see only what it wants. Many of those
stakeholders support the narrow rule in Martin. See, e. g.,
Brief for City and County of San Francisco et al. as Amici
Curiae 4 (“[U]nder the Eighth Amendment. . . a local munici-
pality may not prohibit sleeping—a biological necessity—in
all public spaces at all times and under all conditions, if there
is no alternative space available in the jurisdiction for un-
housed people to sleep”); Brief for City of Los Angeles as
Amicus Curiae 1 (“The City agrees with the broad premise
underlying the Martin and Johnson decisions: when a person
has no other place to sleep, sleeping at night in a public space
should not be a crime leading to an arrest, criminal convic-
tion, or jail”); California Brief 2–3 (“[T]he Constitution does
not allow the government to punish people for the status
of being homeless. Nor should it allow the government to
effectively punish the status of being homeless by making it
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 587
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
a crime in all events for someone with no other options to
sleep outside on public property at night”).
Even the Federal Government, which restricts some sleep-
ing activities on park lands, see ante, at 533, has for nearly
three decades “taken the position that laws prohibiting
sleeping in public at all times and in all places violate the
Robinson principle as applied to individuals who have no
access to shelter.” Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-
riae 14. The same is true of States across the Nation. See
Brief for Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae 3–4 (“Taking these
policies [criminalizing homelessness] off the table does not
interfere with our ability to address homelessness (including
the effects of homelessness on surrounding communities)
using other policy tools, nor does it amount to an undue in-
trusion on state sovereignty”).
Nothing in today's decision prevents these States, cities,
and counties from declining to criminalize people for sleeping
in public when they have no available shelter. Indeed, al-
Page Proof Pending Publication
though the majority describes Martin as adopting an un-
workable rule, the elected representatives in Oregon codifed
that very rule. See infra, at 588. The majority does these
localities a disservice by ascribing to them a demand for un-
fettered freedom to punish that many do not seek.
VI
The Court wrongly concludes that the Eighth Amendment
permits Ordinances that effectively criminalize being home-
less. Grants Pass's Ordinances may still raise a host of
other legal issues. Perhaps recognizing the untenable posi-
tion it adopts, the majority stresses that “many substantive
legal protections and provisions of the Constitution may
have important roles to play when States and cities seek to
enforce their laws against the homeless.” Ante, at 557.
That is true. Although I do not prejudge the merits of
these other issues, I detail some here so that people experi-
588 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
encing homelessness and their advocates do not take the
Court's decision today as closing the door on such claims.6
A
The Court today does not decide whether the Ordinances
are valid under a new Oregon law that codifes Martin. In
2021, Oregon passed a law that constrains the ability of mu-
nicipalities to punish homeless residents for public sleeping.
“Any city or county law that regulates the acts of sitting,
lying, sleeping or keeping warm and dry outdoors on public
property that is open to the public must be objectively rea-
sonable as to time, place and manner with regards to persons
experiencing homelessness.” Ore. Rev. Stat. § 195.530(2).
The law also grants persons “experiencing homelessness” a
cause of action to “bring suit for injunctive or declaratory
relief to challenge the objective reasonableness” of an ordi-
nance. § 195.530(4). This law was meant to “ `ensure that
individuals experiencing homelessness are protected from
Page Proof Pending Publication
fnes or arrests for sleeping or camping on public property
when there are no other options.' ” Brief in Opposition 35
(quoting Speaker T. Kotek, Hearing on H. B. 3115 before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 2021 Reg. Sess. (Ore.,
Mar. 9, 2021)). The panel below already concluded that
“[t]he city ordinances addressed in Grants Pass will be su-
perseded, to some extent,” by this new law. 72 F. 4th, at
924, n. 7. Courts may need to determine whether and how
the new law limits the City's enforcement of its Ordinances.
B
The Court today also does not decide whether the Ordi-
nances violate the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause. That Clause separately “limits the government's
6
The majority does not address whether the Eighth Amendment re-
quires a more particularized inquiry into the circumstances of the individ-
uals subject to the City's ordinances. See Brief for United States as Ami-
cus Curiae 27. I therefore do not discuss that issue here.
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 589
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as
punishment for some offense.” United States v. Bajakajian,
524 U. S. 321, 328 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The
amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the
gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” Id.,
at 334.
The District Court in this case concluded that the fnes
here serve “no remedial purpose” but rather are “intended
to deter homeless individuals from residing in Grants Pass.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 189a. Because it concluded that the
fnes are punitive, it went on to determine that the fnes are
“ `grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense' ” and
thus excessive. Ibid. The Ninth Circuit declined to con-
sider this holding because the City presented “no meaningful
argument on appeal regarding the excessive fnes issue.” 72
F. 4th, at 895. On remand, the Ninth Circuit is free to con-
Page Proof Pending Publication
sider whether the City forfeited its appeal on this ground
and, if not, whether this issue has merit.
C
Finally, the Court does not decide whether the Ordinances
violate the Due Process Clause. “The Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ensure that off-
cials may not displace certain rules associated with criminal
liability that are `so old and venerable,' ` “so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people[,] as to be ranked as
fundamental.” ' ” Ante, at 541 (quoting Kahler v. Kansas,
589 U. S. 271, 279 (2020)). The majority notes that due pro-
cess arguments in Robinson “may have made some sense.”
Ante, at 545. On that score, I agree. “[H]istorically,
crimes in England and this country have usually required
proof of some act (or actus reus) undertaken with some meas-
ure of volition (mens rea).” Ibid. “This view `took deep and
early root in American soil' where, to this day, a crime ordi-
590 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
narily arises `only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind
with an evil-doing hand.' Morissette v. United States, 342
U. S. 246, 251–252 (1952).” Ibid. Yet the law at issue in
Robinson “was an anomaly, as it required proof of neither of
those things.” Ante, at 545.
Relatedly, this Court has concluded that some vagrancy
laws are unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 361–362 (1983) (invalidating Califor-
nia law that required people who loiter or wander on the
street to provide identifcation and account for their pres-
ence); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 161–162
(1972) (concluding that vagrancy law employing “ `archaic
language' ” in its defnition was “void for vagueness”); accord,
Desertrain v. Los Angeles, 754 F. 3d 1147, 1155–1157 (CA9
2014) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting the use of a ve-
hicle as “ `living quarters' ” was void for vagueness because
the ordinance did not defne “living quarters”). Other po-
Page Proof Pending Publication
tentially relevant due process precedents abound. See, e.g.,
Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 520 (1948) (“Where a
statute is so vague as to make criminal an innocent act, a
conviction under it cannot be sustained”); Chicago v. Mo-
rales, 527 U. S. 41, 57 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (invali-
dating ordinance that failed “to distinguish between innocent
conduct and conduct threatening harm”).
The Due Process Clause may well place constitutional lim-
its on antihomelessness ordinances. See, e. g., Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 263–264 (1974)
(considering statute that denied people medical care depend-
ing on duration of residency and concluding that “to the ex-
tent the purpose of the [statute] is to inhibit the immigration
of indigents generally, that goal is constitutionally impermis-
sible”); Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1580 (SD Fla.
1992) (concluding that “enforcement of laws that prevent
homeless individuals who have no place to go from sleep-
ing” might also unconstitutionally “burde[n] their right to
travel”); see also ante, at 547, n. 5 (noting that these Ordi-
Cite as: 603 U. S. 520 (2024) 591
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
nances “may implicate due process and our precedents re-
garding selective prosecution”).
D
The Ordinances might also implicate other legal issues.
See, e. g., Trop, 356 U. S., at 101 (plurality opinion) (conclud-
ing that a law that banishes people threatens “the total de-
struction of the individual's status in organized society”);
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21 (describing the
Ordinances here as “akin to a form of banishment, a measure
that is now generally recognized as contrary to our Nation's
legal tradition”); Lavan v. Los Angeles, 693 F. 3d 1022, 1029
(CA9 2012) (holding that a city violated homeless plaintiffs'
Fourth Amendment rights by seizing and destroying prop-
erty in an encampment, because “[v]iolation of a City ordi-
nance does not vitiate the Fourth Amendment's protection
of one's property”).
Page Proof Pending Publication
The Court's misstep today is confned to its application of
Robinson. It is quite possible, indeed likely, that these and
similar ordinances will face more days in court.
* * *
Homelessness in America is a complex and heartbreaking
crisis. People experiencing homelessness face immense
challenges, as do local and state governments. Especially
in the face of these challenges, this Court has an obligation
to apply the Constitution faithfully and evenhandedly.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishing homelessness
by criminalizing sleeping outside when an individual has no-
where else to go. It is cruel and unusual to apply any pen-
alty “selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who
are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but whom
society is willing to see suffer though it would not counte-
nance general application of the same penalty across the
board.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 245 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
592 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
I remain hopeful that our society will come together “to
address the complexities of the homelessness challenge fac-
ing the most vulnerable among us.” Ante, at 560. That re-
sponsibility is shared by those vulnerable populations, the
States and cities in which they reside, and each and every
one of us. “It is only after we begin to see a street as our
street, a public park as our park, a school as our school, that
we can become engaged citizens, dedicating our time and
resources for worthwhile causes.” M. Desmond, Evicted:
Poverty and Proft in the American City 294 (2016).
This Court, too, has a role to play in faithfully enforcing
the Constitution to prohibit punishing the very existence of
those without shelter. I remain hopeful that someday in the
near future, this Court will play its role in safeguarding con-
stitutional liberties for the most vulnerable among us. Be-
cause the Court today abdicates that role, I respectfully
dissent.
Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
Page Proof Pending Publication
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 523, line 11 from bottom: “involuntarily” is replaced with “involuntary”
p. 540, line 5: “the” is deleted
p. 565, line 11 from bottom: “connection” is replaced with “connections”
p. 580, line 2: “shelters” is replaced with “shelter”
p. 585, line 19: “(Marshall, J., dissenting)” is deleted
p. 588, line 18: “arrest” is replaced with “arrests”
p. 592, line 10: “Property” is replaced with “Poverty”
Case Information
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Decision Date
- June 28, 2024
- Citation
- 603 U.S. 520
- Docket
- 23-175
- Status
- Precedential
- Subject
- constitutional law