Andrew v. White

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BRENDA EVERS ANDREW v. TAMIKA WHITE,
WARDEN
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 23–6573. Decided January 21, 2025

PER CURIAM.
An Oklahoma jury convicted Brenda Andrew of murder-
ing her husband, Rob Andrew, and sentenced her to death.
The State spent significant time at trial introducing evi-
dence about Andrew’s sex life and about her failings as a
mother and wife, much of which it later conceded was irrel-
evant. In a federal habeas petition, Andrew argued that
this evidence had been so prejudicial as to violate the Due
Process Clause. The Court of Appeals rejected that claim
because, it thought, no holding of this Court established a
general rule that the erroneous admission of prejudicial ev-
idence could violate due process. That was wrong. By the
time of Andrew’s trial, this Court had made clear that when
“evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it
renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mecha-
nism for relief.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 825
(1991).
I
A
On November 20, 2001, Rob Andrew was fatally shot in
his garage. Brenda Andrew, who herself had been shot in
the arm during the incident, told the police that two armed
assailants had committed the shooting. Andrew further ex-
plained that she had separated from her husband and was
now dating James Pavatt, but that she and Rob continued
to see each other as they had two children together.
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Pavatt and Andrew traveled to Mexico together after Rob
Andrew’s death and soon became suspects in his murder.
Eventually, Pavatt confessed to committing the shooting
with a friend. Pavatt denied that Andrew had been in-
volved. The State thereafter charged both Pavatt and An-
drew with capital murder, and a jury convicted Pavatt and
sentenced him to death.
At Andrew’s trial, the prosecution sought to prove that
Andrew had conspired with Pavatt, an insurance agent, to
murder her husband for the proceeds of his life insurance
policy. Among other things, the prosecution elicited testi-
mony about Andrew’s sexual partners reaching back two
decades; about the outfits she wore to dinner or during gro-
cery runs; about the underwear she packed for vacation;
and about how often she had sex in her car. At least two of
the prosecution’s guilt-phase witnesses took the stand ex-
clusively to testify about Andrew’s provocative clothing,
and others were asked to comment on whether a good
mother would dress or behave the way Andrew had. In its
closing statement, the prosecution again invoked these
themes, including by displaying Andrew’s “thong under-
wear” to the jury, by reminding the jury of Andrew’s alleged
affairs during college, and by emphasizing that Andrew
“had sex on [her husband] over and over and over” while
“keeping a boyfriend on the side.” Tr. 4103, 4124–4125
(July 12, 2004). At both the guilt and sentencing phases,
prosecutors contrasted Andrew with the victim, whom they
asserted had been “committed to God.” Id., at 4124; see
also, e.g., Tr. 4402 (July 14, 2004) (suggesting nothing could
mitigate murder of Rob Andrew because he just “wanted to
love God”).1
——————
1 The dissent recites what it insists was substantial evidence of An-

drew’s guilt, contending in the process that this Court “inaccurately por-
trays” that evidence. Post, at 2 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). In doing so, it
prejudges the prejudice analysis by characterizing as fact the State’s nar-
rative at trial. That narrative, of course, was hotly contested then and
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B
The jury convicted Andrew and sentenced her to death.
On appeal, Andrew argued that the introduction of irrel-
evant evidence, including evidence “that she had extramar-
ital sexual affairs with two other men,” that she had “ ‘come
on to’ ” another witness’s sons, and that she had dressed
provocatively at a restaurant, Andrew v. State, 2007 OK CR
23, ¶¶42–59, 164 P. 3d 176, 190–193, violated Oklahoma
law as well as the Federal Due Process Clause. The Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) held that admis-
sion of evidence about Andrew’s extramarital affairs had
been proper because it showed that “[h]er co-defendant was
just the last in a long line of men that she seduced.” Id., at
192.2 The OCCA “struggl[ed],” however, “to find any rele-
vance . . . other than to show [Andrew’s] character” for the
——————
remains so now. For example, the defense elicited testimony from mul-
tiple witnesses that Andrew knew on the day of the murder that she was
not the beneficiary on the life insurance policy. The OCCA held that the
court also wrongly excluded evidence Andrew argued would cast doubt
on the theory that she had staged the shooting, though the OCCA held
that exclusion was harmless. Andrew v. State, 2007 OK CR 23, ¶¶89–
92, 164 P. 3d 176, 197. The Court today says nothing about the strength
of the evidence against Andrew because the issue of prejudice in both the
guilt and sentencing phases of the trial is one for the Tenth Circuit to
consider on remand. See infra, at 9. Similarly, the dissent asserts that
Andrew falsely accuses the prosecution of calling her a “slut puppy” in
closing argument. Post, at 7, n. 3 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Whether the
prosecution quoted something it believed Andrew once said to suggest to
the jury that Andrew herself was a “slut puppy,” or simply to recite an
alleged abusive phone call, is a question of fact for the Tenth Circuit to
resolve.
2 The dissent asserts that the OCCA held evidence of Andrew’s “ ‘close

personal relationship’ ” with two of her affair partners to be relevant be-
cause it gave credence to testimony that Andrew had “ ‘shared with both
of these men her hatred for Rob Andrew and her wish that he was dead.’ ”
Post, at 6 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (quoting 164 P. 3d, at 192). Andrew
never objected to evidence that she had a “close personal relationship”
with these men. In fact, defense counsel stipulated that she had affairs
with them. See, e.g., Tr. 338 (June 18, 2004) (“We’re not contesting the
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remaining challenged evidence. Ibid. By now, the State
“agree[d] that most of this evidence was irrelevant to any
issue in this case.” Ibid. The OCCA nonetheless denied
relief on the ground that the trial court’s errors had been
harmless.
Judge Johnson dissented in part. In his view, the “egre-
gious . . . pattern of introducing evidence that ha[d] no pur-
pose other than to hammer home that Brenda Andrew is a
bad wife, a bad mother, and a bad woman . . . trivialize[d]
the value of her life in the minds of the jurors.” Id., at 206–
207. He would therefore have vacated her sentence. Judge
Chapel dissented separately, indicating that he would have
reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Id.,
at 208.
In federal court, Andrew reiterated her claim that the ad-
mission of this evidence rendered the guilt and penalty
phases of her trial fundamentally unfair, in violation of due
process. 62 F. 4th 1299, 1312–1313 (CA10 2023). The Dis-
trict Court denied relief. A divided Tenth Circuit affirmed
because, it held, Andrew had failed to cite “clearly estab-
lished federal law governing her claim.” Id., at 1314. The
majority acknowledged that Andrew had cited Payne, in
which this Court said that the Due Process Clause “pro-
vides a mechanism for relief ” when the introduction of un-
duly prejudicial evidence “renders [a] trial fundamentally
unfair.” 501 U. S., at 825. According to the majority, how-
ever, that had been a “pronouncement,” not a “holding,” of
this Court. 62 F. 4th, at 1314. It therefore concluded An-
drew had failed to identify “clearly established federal law
governing her claim,” as required under the Antiterrorism
——————
affair. We have never contested the affair with Nunley or Higgins”). An-
drew’s claim instead concerned the extensive testimony about how she
flirted with these men, how she dressed around them, and how many
times (and where) she had sex with them. That testimony appears to
have no bearing on Andrew’s alleged expressions of hatred for her hus-
band.
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and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Id., at
1316; 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). As a result, the majority de-
clined to consider whether the OCCA unreasonably applied
Payne, i.e., whether a fairminded jurist could hold that the
admission of irrelevant evidence about Andrew’s demeanor
as a woman was not so prejudicial as to deprive her of a
fundamentally fair trial. 62 F. 4th, at 1316 (“ ‘The absence
of clearly established federal law is dispositive under
§2254(d)(1)’ ” (quoting House v. Hatch, 527 F. 3d 1010, 1018
(CA10 2008))).
In dissent, Judge Bacharach condemned the State’s focus
“from start to finish on Ms. Andrew’s sex life,” a move he
argued “portrayed Ms. Andrew as a scarlet woman, a mod-
ern Jezebel, sparking distrust based on her loose morals . . .
plucking away any realistic chance that the jury would se-
riously consider her version of events.” 62 F. 4th, at 1366.
Judge Bacharach therefore would have held that the com-
bination of evidentiary errors “deprived Ms. Andrew of a
fundamentally fair trial.” Id., at 1377.
II
A federal court may grant habeas relief as to a claim ad-
judicated on the merits in state court only if the state court
relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts or un-
reasonably applied “clearly established Federal law, as de-
termined by” this Court. 28 U. S. C. §§2254(d)(1)–(2). To
show that a state court unreasonably applied clearly estab-
lished federal law, a petitioner must show that the court
unreasonably applied “ ‘the holdings, as opposed to the
dicta, of this Court’s decisions.’ ” White v. Woodall, 572
U. S. 415, 419 (2014) (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U. S.
499, 505 (2012)). An unreasonable application, in turn, is
one with which no fairminded jurist would agree. Harring-
ton v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 101 (2011).
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A
When this Court relies on a legal rule or principle to de-
cide a case, that principle is a “holding” of the Court for pur-
poses of AEDPA. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 71–72
(2003) (“[C]learly established Federal law . . . is the govern-
ing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme
Court at the time the state court renders its decision” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). Following these princi-
ples, it is clear that Andrew properly identified clearly es-
tablished federal law.
In Payne, this Court considered whether to overrule a set
of prior cases that had categorically barred the introduction
of victim impact evidence during the sentencing phases of a
capital trial. The Court noted that, in many circumstances,
“victim impact evidence serves entirely legitimate pur-
poses,” 501 U. S., at 825, even though in others it could be
prejudicial. It then concluded that a categorical bar was not
necessary to protect against the risk of prejudicial testi-
mony because “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides a mechanism for relief ” against the
introduction of evidence “that is so unduly prejudicial that
it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.” Ibid. (citing
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 168, 179–183 (1986)). In
light of that protection, the Court held, it could permit vic-
tim impact evidence where appropriate without risking un-
due prejudice to defendants. 501 U. S., at 825. In other
words, the Court removed one protection for capital defend-
ants (the per se bar on victim impact statements) in part
because another protection (the Due Process Clause) re-
mained available against evidence that is so unduly preju-
dicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. The
legal principle on which Andrew relies, that the Due Pro-
cess Clause can in certain cases protect against the intro-
duction of unduly prejudicial evidence at a criminal trial,
was therefore indispensable to the decision in Payne. That
means it was a holding of this Court for purposes of
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AEDPA.
Importantly, Payne did not invent due process protec-
tions against unduly prejudicial evidence. The Court had
several times before held that prosecutors’ prejudicial or
misleading statements violate due process if they render a
trial or capital sentencing fundamentally unfair. Donnelly
v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637 (1974); Caldwell v. Missis-
sippi, 472 U. S. 320, 338–340 (1985); Darden, 477 U. S., at
178–183. Payne thus broke little new ground in this re-
spect. By the time of the OCCA’s decision in this case, it
was clear that the introduction of unduly prejudicial evi-
dence could, in certain cases, violate the Due Process
Clause.3
B
The Court of Appeals nonetheless held that Payne
“merely established that the Eighth Amendment did not
erect a ‘per se bar’ to the introduction of victim-impact
statements in capital cases.” 62 F. 4th, at 1314 (quoting
Payne, 501 U. S., at 827). As just explained, however,
Payne expressly relied on the availability of relief under the
Due Process Clause to reach that conclusion. This Court
——————
3 The dissent argues that Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62 (1991), shows

otherwise because it left open whether “ ‘it is a violation of the due pro-
cess guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment for evidence that is not
relevant to be received in a criminal trial.’ ” Post, at 16 (opinion of
THOMAS, J.) (quoting Estelle, 502 U. S., at 70). To be sure, this Court did
not hold in Payne that the introduction of all irrelevant evidence violates
the Due Process Clause. Payne established, rather, that due process pro-
tects defendants from the introduction of evidence so prejudicial as to
affect the fundamental fairness of their trials. This Court squarely
acknowledged that rule in Estelle, explaining that “the challenged evi-
dence” at issue there did not warrant relief because it did not “ ‘so infus[e]
the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law.’ ” 502 U. S., at 75
(quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 228 (1941), and citing Don-
nelly, 416 U. S., at 643). In any event, and as recounted below, this Court
has continued to rely on Payne’s fundamental fairness principle since Es-
telle.
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has accordingly applied Payne’s framework to a claim much
like Andrew’s: “that the introduction of [prejudicial] evi-
dence” at the sentencing phases “violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Romano v. Okla-
homa, 512 U. S. 1, 12 (1994). More recently, the Court re-
lied on Payne in the same way that Andrew sought to rely
on it here: for the proposition that “the Due Process Clause
. . . wards off the introduction of unduly prejudicial evi-
dence that would render the trial fundamentally unfair.”
Kansas v. Carr, 577 U. S. 108, 123 (2016) (quoting Payne,
501 U. S., at 825; internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). This Court has also relied on the underlying fun-
damental fairness principle in the jury-impartiality con-
text. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 726 (1963);
Skilling v. United States, 561 U. S. 358, 379 (2010).
To the extent that the Court of Appeals thought itself con-
strained by AEDPA to limit Payne to its facts, it was mis-
taken. General legal principles can constitute clearly es-
tablished law for purposes of AEDPA so long as they are
holdings of this Court. For example, the Eighth Amend-
ment principle that a sentence may not be grossly dispro-
portionate to the offense is “ ‘clearly established’ under
§2554(d)(1),” even though it arises out of a “thicket of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence” and lacks “ ‘precise con-
tours.’ ” Lockyer, 538 U. S., at 72. Although this Court has
not previously relied on Payne to invalidate a conviction for
improperly admitted prejudicial evidence, moreover, “cer-
tain principles are fundamental enough that when new fac-
tual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier
rule will be beyond doubt.” White, 572 U. S., at 427 (quoting
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652, 666 (2004)); see also
Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U. S. 7, 9 (2020) (per curiam) (“ ‘[A]
general constitutional rule already identified in the deci-
sional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific
conduct in question’ ” (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U. S. 730,
741 (2002))). The Court of Appeals thus erred by refusing
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even to consider whether the OCCA unreasonably applied
established due process principles to Andrew’s case.
The dissent maintains that a reasonable jurist could
agree with the Tenth Circuit’s understanding of our prece-
dent. That assertion conflates the deference federal habeas
courts must extend to a state court’s “application of ” this
Court’s precedent with the federal courts’ independent ob-
ligation to first identify the relevant “clearly established
Federal law.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1); Lockyer, 538 U. S., at
71 (identifying clearly established law “[a]s a threshold
matter”). A legal principle is clearly established for pur-
poses of AEDPA if it is a holding of this Court. White, 572
U. S., at 419. This Court has no occasion to defer to other
federal courts’ erroneous interpretations of its own prece-
dent. Nor is such double deference necessary to prevent ex-
pansion of federal habeas relief to those who rely on “debat-
able” interpretations or extensions of our holdings. Post at
17–18 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Andrew does not rely on an
interpretation or extension of this Court’s cases but on a
principle this Court itself has relied on over the course of
decades.
Because the Tenth Circuit nonetheless held that no rele-
vant clearly established law existed (a ruling this Court re-
views de novo) it never considered whether the state court’s
application of that law was reasonable. On remand, the
Court of Appeals should conduct that inquiry in the first
instance. Specifically, the question now is whether a fair-
minded jurist reviewing this record could disagree with An-
drew that the trial court’s mistaken admission of irrelevant
evidence was so “unduly prejudicial” as to render her trial
“fundamentally unfair.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 825.
The Court of Appeals must ask that question separately
for the guilt and sentencing phases. As to each phase, it
might consider the relevance of the disputed evidence to the
charges or sentencing factors, the degree of prejudice An-
drew suffered from its introduction, and whether the trial
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court provided any mitigating instructions. Cf. Romano,
512 U. S., at 13. The ultimate question is whether a fair-
minded jurist could disagree that the evidence “so infected
the trial with unfairness” as to render the resulting convic-
tion or sentence “a denial of due process.” Ibid.
* * *
At the time of the OCCA’s decision, clearly established
law provided that the Due Process Clause forbids the intro-
duction of evidence so unduly prejudicial as to render a
criminal trial fundamentally unfair. This Court accord-
ingly grants the petition for certiorari and the motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, vacates the judgment
below, and remands the case for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment because our case law establishes
that a defendant’s due-process rights can be violated when
the properly admitted evidence at trial is overwhelmed by
a flood of irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence that
renders the trial fundamentally unfair. See Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 501 U. S. 808, 825 (1991); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512
U. S. 1, 12 (1994); cf. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723,
726 (1963). I express no view on whether that very high
standard is met here.
Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins,
dissenting.
Our precedent under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) establishes several
rules for identifying clearly established federal law. 28
U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). We have instructed lower courts to
avoid framing our precedents at too high a level of general-
ity; to carefully distinguish holdings from dicta; and to re-
frain from treating reserved questions as though they have
already been answered. The Tenth Circuit followed these
rules. The Court today does not. Instead, it summarily va-
cates the opinion below for failing to elevate to “clearly es-
tablished” law the broadest possible interpretation of a one-
sentence aside in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991).
In doing so, the Court blows past Estelle v. McGuire, 502
U. S. 62 (1991), which, months after Payne, reserved the
very question that the Court says Payne resolved. And,
worst of all, it redefines “clearly established” law to include
debatable interpretations of our precedent. It is this Court,
and not the Tenth Circuit, that has deviated from settled
law. I respectfully dissent.
I
The Court’s errors begin with its recitation of the facts.
Contrary to the majority’s insinuations, the State presented
“overwhelming evidence” that Andrew participated in the
murder of her husband. See Andrew v. State, 2007 OK CR
23, ¶56, 164 P. 3d 176, 192; accord, id., at 207 (A. Johnson,
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THOMAS, J., dissenting

J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part). In
fact, the State presented an “unusually strong evidentiary
case, which leaves little or no doubt that [Andrew] is guilty
of the crimes charged, crimes committed after methodical
planning.” Id., at 206 (Lumpkin, P. J., concurring in result).
The Court inaccurately portrays the State’s evidence, the
prosecution’s closing arguments, and the reasoning of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA).
A
Brenda Andrew (Andrew) married Robert Andrew (Rob)
in 1984. In February 2000, Rob purchased an $800,000 life
insurance policy through agent Jim Pavatt, with Andrew as
the beneficiary. The Andrews and Pavatt attended the
same church. Pavatt and Andrew both served as Sunday
school teachers. But, by August 2001, they had begun an
affair. The affair caused the Andrews’ already strained
marriage to reach a breaking point. Around late September
Andrew initiated divorce proceedings and told Rob to move
out of the house.
One morning in October, Rob discovered that someone
had cut the brake lines in his car. Several hours later, he
received phone calls from two unknown callers—one of
whom turned out to be Pavatt’s adult daughter, Janna Lar-
son—falsely claiming that Andrew was in the hospital and
urgently needed him. Phone records reveal that Pavatt and
Andrew exchanged 82 phone calls that day and more than
50 calls the next day. The next day, Andrew told Rob she
had read in the newspaper about his brake lines being cut,
but no such news story existed. And, around this time,
Pavatt told Larson that Andrew had asked him to kill Rob.
Pavatt later threatened to kill her if she ever revealed this
information.
After the brake-line incident, Rob sought to remove An-
drew as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, explain-
ing to another insurance agent that he thought Pavatt and
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THOMAS, J., dissenting

Andrew were trying to kill him. But, Andrew and Pavatt
resorted to fraud to try to prevent this from happening,
forging Rob’s signature on a form transferring ownership of
the policy to Andrew. The policy then became a serious
point of contention in the divorce proceedings, even though
Rob was only 38 years old and healthy.
The Andrews had two young children who, after their
separation, continued to live with Andrew in the former
family home. Rob would sometimes meet them outside the
house and take them for visitation.
When Rob came to pick up the children for the Thanks-
giving holiday, however, Andrew asked him to come into
the garage to help her light the pilot light of her furnace.
As he started to do so, someone pointed a 16-gauge shotgun
at him from across the garage. Seeing this, Rob turned and
grabbed a trash bag filled with aluminum cans, apparently
in a desperate attempt to protect himself. The perpetrator
shot him through the bag. Reloading the shotgun, the per-
petrator (or an accomplice) then moved within three feet of
Rob, and shot him a second time as he lay on the floor. An-
drew was also shot with a .22-caliber weapon, but suffered
only a superficial wound on her arm.
Andrew called 911 after the shootings, claiming that two
masked men had come into the garage and attacked her and
Rob. She related on the call that Rob was still conscious
and trying to speak. By the time emergency responders ar-
rived, however, he was dead. During the shootings, the
children were in the master bedroom watching television
with the volume turned up high, unaware of what was hap-
pening in the garage. An ambulance then took Andrew to
the hospital, where witnesses described her demeanor as
unusually calm.
Police discovered substantial evidence linking Andrew
and Pavatt to the murder. Rob owned a 16-gauge shotgun,
but had told friends that Andrew refused to let him take it
with him when he moved out. One witness testified that,
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THOMAS, J., dissenting

eight days before the murder, he had seen Andrew in a ru-
ral area commonly used for target practice. The witness
also said that later he found 16-gauge shotgun shells at the
site. Pavatt owned a .22-caliber handgun, which he had
purchased about a week before the murder. The day of the
murder, he borrowed Larson’s car, claiming he would get it
serviced for her. When he returned it the following day, she
noticed the car had not been serviced. And, she found a .22-
caliber shell on the floorboard of her car.
Forensic evidence also undermined Andrew’s account
that she had been shot at a distance. Powder burns on her
clothes and body revealed the shot had been fired within
two inches of her arm. An expert witness later testified that
Andrew’s injury—a superficial, close-range gunshot
wound—was staged to make it look as if she had been a vic-
tim of the attack and thereby avoid suspicion.
The Andrews’ neighbors were out of town on the day of
the murder. When they returned, they found suspicious
items in their home and contacted the police. Police discov-
ered that someone had left a 16-gauge shotgun shell and
several .22-caliber bullets in the home, both the same brand
as those used in Rob’s murder. There was no evidence of a
break-in, but Andrew had a key to their home. Prosecutors
suggested that, after the shooting, Pavatt hid in the home
until police had left the crime scene.
Rather than attend her husband’s funeral, Andrew trav-
eled with Pavatt and her children to Mexico. She appar-
ently had no plans to return. Before the trip, Andrew tried
to transfer funds from her account to Larson’s, so that Lar-
son could wire money to her and Pavatt. The pair also
asked Larson to help them forge Rob’s signature on a docu-
ment granting Andrew permission to take the children
abroad. Andrew abandoned her car in an apartment com-
plex before leaving. She also stopped making payments on
her home. Pavatt researched traveling to Argentina after
hearing that Argentina did not extradite.
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THOMAS, J., dissenting

Larson, however, cooperated with the FBI and refused to
wire Pavatt or Andrew any money, despite their repeated
requests. When they ran out of money three months later,
they returned to the United States and were immediately
arrested.
While in Mexico, Pavatt wrote a letter addressed to An-
drew’s daughter claiming that he and an unnamed “friend”
had killed Rob, and that Andrew had nothing to do with it.
Ante, at 2. He stated he did so because Andrew had told
him four days before the murder that she planned to beg
Rob to take her back after Thanksgiving. This was a pecu-
liar claim, given that hours before the murder Pavatt had
moved his washer and dryer into her home. And, far from
adopting a conciliatory attitude toward Rob, the night be-
fore the murder Andrew had called a friend just to say, “I
hate him. I hate him. I hate him.” Tr. 2662–2663 (July 1,
2004). The friend recalled that the comment “made the
hairs on the back of my neck stand up. She hated that
man.” Id., at 2664.
B
A jury convicted Andrew of capital murder, and she was
sentenced to death. So too was Pavatt in a separate trial.
Sex and marriage were unavoidable issues at Andrew’s
trial, and the State introduced a variety of evidence about
her sexual behavior. On direct appeal, Andrew challenged
some of the sex-based evidence introduced during the guilt
phase of her trial, arguing that it was irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial.1 Given that “this trial was primarily about the
——————
1 As the Court notes, in federal habeas proceedings, Andrew has “reit-

erated her claim that the admission of this evidence” rendered both her
guilt and penalty phases fundamentally unfair. Ante, at 4. But, Andrew
also objects now to the admission of certain evidence from the penalty
phase, as well as items of guilt-phase evidence she did not challenge on
direct appeal. These challenges fail for lack of exhaustion. See 28
U. S. C. §2254(b)(1)(A). To preserve an evidentiary claim, an Oklahoma
defendant must raise a specific objection when the evidence in question
6 ANDREW v. WHITE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

motive and intent of [Andrew] to kill her husband with the
aid of Pavatt,” the OCCA held that much of this evidence,
particularly concerning her relationship with Pavatt, was
not just admissible, but “highly relevant” and “probative.”
Andrew, 164 P. 3d, at 194. But, not all of it was so. The
OCCA recognized that some evidence, like the sort of outfits
Andrew wore to dinner outings, was not relevant. Id., at
192. Given “the overwhelming evidence in this case,” how-
ever, it determined that the introduction of the irrelevant
evidence “was harmless.” Ibid.
The Court suggests that the OCCA permitted evidence of
Andrew’s two prior affairs simply because it showed she
had a penchant for adultery. See ante, at 3. In reality, the
OCCA concluded that this evidence helped to prove “motive
and intent.” Andrew, 164 P. 3d, at 192. Andrew had
“shared with both of these men her hatred for Rob Andrew
and her wish that he was dead.” Ibid. Evidence that An-
drew had “a close personal relationship” with these men
gave credence to their testimony that she had revealed to
them these “intimate details of [her] marriage.” Ibid.2
The Court also insinuates that there was something im-
proper about the State’s introduction of evidence on An-

——————
is admitted. Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4, ¶32, 994 P. 2d 61, 68–69.
The OCCA will review on direct appeal only those objections brought to
its attention. Stouffer v. State, 2006 OK CR 46, ¶126, 147 P. 3d 245, 270.
Because Andrew did not raise these new objections in her direct appeal,
she has not presented them in state court “in accordance with state pro-
cedures,” and so has not exhausted them. Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez,
596 U. S. 366, 378 (2022). Because the Court today does not address
exhaustion, the Tenth Circuit is free to do so on remand.
2 Faced with this reasonable holding by the OCCA, the majority insists

that Andrew’s claim concerned certain gratuitous details about these af-
fairs rather than the affairs’ existence. Ante, at 3–4, n. 2. The truth is
just the opposite. Andrew’s sole argument to the OCCA was that the fact
“[t]hat [she] had once had affairs with these men provided no evidence of
her motive” or “intent” or any other relevant fact. App. to Reply Brief
62a–64a.
Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 7

THOMAS, J., dissenting

drew’s “failings as a mother.” Ante, at 1. But, it conven-
iently omits the context. Andrew asserted that she was a
“good mother” as part of her defense in both the guilt and
penalty phases of her trial. Tr. 62–63 (June 17, 2004); Tr.
4179 (July 14, 2004); Andrew, 164 P. 3d, at 205. In present-
ing evidence to the contrary, the State was simply rebutting
a point that Andrew had placed in issue, as it clearly is en-
titled to do. See 1 R. Mosteller et al., McCormick on Evi-
dence §191, p. 1188 (8th ed. 2020) (“[O]nce the defendant
gives evidence of pertinent character traits to show that he
is not guilty, his claim of possession of these traits . . . is
open to rebuttal”).
During its closing argument, the prosecution did not rely
on any of the sexual evidence that the OCCA would later
find irrelevant.3 The prosecution’s reference to the under-
wear Andrew brought to Mexico, see ante, at 2, is no excep-
tion. The OCCA recognized that this evidence bore on
Pavatt’s and Andrew’s “intentions in fleeing to Mexico,” a
key issue in the case. Andrew, 164 P. 3d, at 194.
Finally, the Court is wrong to imply that the prosecution
drew any kind of “contras[t]” between Rob and Andrew in
terms of religious commitment. Ante, at 2. The prosecution
mentioned Rob’s religious faith to emphasize that the world
lost “a fine human being” when Rob was brutally murdered.
——————
3 Andrew’s briefing before this Court alleges that the prosecution

called her a “ ‘slut puppy’ ” who is not a “ ‘woman of God’ ” during its guilt-
stage closing argument. Pet. for Cert. i, 8, 11, 14 (quoting Tr. 4125 (July
12, 2004)); Pet. for Cert. Reply 5, 13 (same). This accusation—which An-
drew did not make until almost 20 years after her trial—is entirely false.
The prosecutor was not referring to Andrew. Instead, he was recounting
an abusive phone call from Andrew to Rob, during which Andrew base-
lessly “accused [Rob] . . . of having” an affair with a “slut puppy,” before
telling him that he “can’t be a man of God and [Rob’s supposed affair
partner] can’t be a woman of God because she’s sleeping with a married
man and even if you’re single that’s adultery, what a slut puppy she must
be.” Ibid. For all its efforts to portray Andrew sympathetically, even the
majority stops short of endorsing her accusation. See ante, at 2–3, n. 1.
8 ANDREW v. WHITE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Tr. 4401–4402 (July 14, 2004). But, the prosecution never
cast any sort of religious judgment against Andrew. Tell-
ingly, the Court is unable to cite even one example of the
prosecution condemning Andrew in religious terms.
The record makes clear that it was the defense, not the
prosecution, that repeatedly appealed to the jury’s religious
sentiments at sentencing. For example, the defense called
a pastor as a witness, who testified to the importance of
“mercy” as a “biblical” value. Id., at 4333. And, in its clos-
ing, the defense repeatedly quoted the Bible; said that, if
Rob could speak to the jury, he would ask them to “forgive”
Andrew as “Jesus Christ on the cross” forgave His killers;
and concluded with a prayer. Id., at 4429–4430, 4471–
4473. The prosecution simply asked the jury during rebut-
tal to ignore the defense’s attempts to “guilt trip” them. Id.,
at 4480.
II
The Court’s legal analysis fares no better. Under
AEDPA, Andrew may obtain federal habeas relief only if
the OCCA’s resolution of her due process claim “was con-
trary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by” the holdings of
this Court. 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1); see Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U. S. 63, 71 (2003). This “standard is,” and “was meant
to be,” “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S.
86, 102 (2011). It forecloses relief unless all “fairminded
jurists” would agree that the OCCA’s “decision conflicts
with this Court’s precedents.” Ibid.
The Court today asserts that the Due Process Clause for-
bids the admission of evidence so unduly prejudicial as to
render a defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair, and holds
that the Tenth Circuit erred in failing to recognize this rule
as clearly established under our precedents. In so holding,
the Court commits the error of “ ‘framing our precedents at’ ”
too “ ‘high [a] level of generality.’ ” Lopez v. Smith, 574 U. S.
Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 9

THOMAS, J., dissenting

1, 6 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Nevada v. Jackson, 569
U. S. 505, 512 (2013) (per curiam)). And, even setting that
aside, this reading of our precedents is one with which fair-
minded jurists could easily (and justifiably) disagree.
A
“[H]oldings that speak only at a high level of generality”
“cannot supply a ground for relief ” under AEDPA. Brown
v. Davenport, 596 U. S. 118, 136 (2022). We have repeat-
edly cautioned lower courts against “framing our prece-
dents” too generally. Lopez, 574 U. S., at 6 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); see, e.g., Woods v. Donald, 575 U. S.
312, 318–319 (2015) (per curiam); White v. Woodall, 572
U. S. 415, 426 (2014); Nevada, 569 U. S., at 512; Harring-
ton, 562 U. S., at 101; Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U. S. 111,
122 (2009). We have instead required courts to ask whether
our precedents “establish clearly the specific rule [the pris-
oner] needs.” Lopez, 574 U. S., at 6 (emphasis added). The
Tenth Circuit heeded our repeated warnings. The majority
disregards them.
Payne “h[e]ld” that “the Eighth Amendment erects no
per se bar” to “the admission of victim impact evidence” in
capital sentencing proceedings. 501 U. S., at 827. But, the
Court included a caveat: “In the event that evidence is in-
troduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the
trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.”
Id., at 825. Significantly, that caveat did not apply in Payne
itself. There, as in “the majority of cases,” the “victim im-
pact evidence serve[d] entirely legitimate purposes.” Ibid.
The Tenth Circuit correctly rejected Andrew’s claim that
Payne’s caveat clearly established that the admission of any
evidence so prejudicial as to render a trial fundamentally
unfair would violate due process. It held that Payne’s brief
discussion of due process only “appl[ied] to scenarios in
10 ANDREW v. WHITE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

which . . . victim impact statements” are “unfairly prejudi-
cial.” 62 F. 4th 1299, 1314 (2023) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Nevertheless, the Court today vacates the Tenth Circuit’s
decision, marking the first time it has ever summarily set
aside a lower court decision for failing to find that a legal
rule is clearly established under AEDPA. Yet, the Court
does not identify a specific on-point holding from Payne—or
any other decision—that the Tenth Circuit overlooked. In-
stead, it faults the Tenth Circuit for failing to distill a
“[g]eneral legal principl[e]” about fairness from Payne’s one-
sentence due process caveat. Ante, at 8. In the process, the
Court does not once mention, much less distinguish, our
many precedents admonishing lower courts not to define
clearly established law too abstractly.
This specificity requirement serves an important func-
tion. Defining clearly established law at an overly high
level of generality makes it virtually impossible to find an
unreasonable application warranting relief. See Brown,
596 U. S., at 136. It “is not ‘an unreasonable application
of ’ ” a more general rule “for a state court to decline to apply
a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established
by this Court.” Knowles, 556 U. S., at 122. “[I]f a habeas
court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts
at hand, then by definition the rationale was not clearly es-
tablished at the time of the state-court decision.” White,
572 U. S., at 426 (internal quotation marks omitted). When
a legal rule is defined at too high a level of generality, it
becomes impossible to apply it to the facts without articu-
lating subsidiary legal principles that are not themselves
clearly established, leaving no principled basis for granting
relief under §2254(d).
To the extent some courts nonetheless grant relief based
on an overly general principle, they defy AEDPA. As we
have explained, when courts use “a high level of generality”
to “transform even the most imaginative extension of case
Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 11

THOMAS, J., dissenting

law into ‘clearly established Federal law,’ ” they wrongly
perform ordinary error correction under the guise of apply-
ing §2254(d). Nevada, 569 U. S., at 512. Thus, at best, to-
day’s decision will simply create an extra, unnecessary step
judges must perform before they can deny a habeas claim
that is doomed to fail. At worst, it will confuse lower courts
into misapplying AEDPA’s standard of review.
Consider Andrew’s case. On remand, if the Tenth Circuit
properly applies AEDPA, it still will find that the state
court reasonably applied the principle the Court has iden-
tified, no matter what it thinks of the specific facts of An-
drew’s trial. Payne addressed the use of victim-impact evi-
dence at the penalty phase of a capital trial. 501 U. S., at
824–825. Andrew challenges the admission of evidence
from her guilt phase, as well as non-victim-impact evidence
from her penalty phase. “[I]t is not uncommon for a consti-
tutional rule to apply somewhat differently at the penalty
phase than it does at the guilt phase.” White, 572 U. S., at
421. And, a fairminded jurist could believe that victim-
impact evidence raises unique due process concerns; other-
wise, the specific question whether victim-impact evidence
categorically violates the Eighth Amendment would never
have arisen. So, it would be impossible for the Tenth Cir-
cuit to grant Andrew relief without impermissibly “ex-
tend[ing]” Payne’s “rationale.” Id., at 426 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
Andrew’s claim also cannot survive on remand because
Payne’s lone sentence on due process does not establish a
test for determining when a trial is so infected by prejudi-
cial evidence as to be fundamentally unfair. It does not
identify what factors a court should consider, how to weigh
them, or what the gap is between, say, a garden-variety
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 error and a fundamentally
unfair trial. To consider the specific facts of Andrew’s trial,
the Tenth Circuit would need to decide these matters for
itself. But it would then by definition be doing more than
12 ANDREW v. WHITE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

applying clearly established law. See Knowles, 556 U. S.,
at 122.
The Court defends its reliance on a broadly defined rule
of law by citing Lockyer, 538 U. S., at 73, which recognized
as clearly established the general principle that grossly dis-
proportionate sentences violate the Eighth Amendment.
Ante, at 8. But, in Lockyer the Court denied relief, so it did
not carefully consider the appropriate level of generality at
which to define clearly established law. Indeed, it denied
relief precisely because it had identified a “broad” legal prin-
ciple whose “precise contours” were “unclear.” 538 U. S., at
76–77 (internal quotation marks omitted). Lockyer also
was an early AEDPA decision. In our many subsequent de-
cisions, we have come to appreciate the need to ask whether
our precedents “establish clearly the specific rule [the pris-
oner] needs.” Lopez, 574 U. S., at 6 (emphasis added).
“[H]oldings that speak only at a high level of generality”
cannot “supply a ground for relief ” under AEDPA. Brown,
596 U. S., at 136.
In an effort to show that remand will not be futile, the
Court observes that clearly established law can apply to
“ ‘new factual permutations.’ ” Ante, at 8 (quoting White,
572 U. S., at 427). That is true, so long as one also keeps in
mind White’s admonition that AEDPA “does not require
state courts to extend [our] precedent” to any arguably dis-
tinct context, as would be necessary to grant Andrew relief.
Id., at 426. The Court attempts to escape White’s strict lim-
itation by invoking Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U. S. 7 (2020)
(per curiam), to suggest that a “ ‘general constitutional
rule’ ” can be a basis for relief in an “ ‘obvious’ ” case. Ante,
at 8–9. But, the majority omits that Taylor is a qualified
immunity decision, rendering it utterly inapposite. Alt-
hough both qualified immunity and AEDPA impose de-
manding standards based on “clearly established law,” the
two are meaningfully different. A plaintiff overcomes qual-
Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 13

THOMAS, J., dissenting

ified immunity by identifying case law “finding a [constitu-
tional] violation under similar circumstances,” except that
in “an obvious case . . . a body of relevant case law is not
needed.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 65
(2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Taylor, this
Court found that the obviousness exception applied. 592
U. S., at 8–9. AEDPA, by contrast, permits relief only when
a state-court decision undeniably “conflicts with this
Court’s precedents.” Harrington, 562 U. S., at 102.
Regardless of what we think of “the merits of the [due
process] principle” that Andrew asserts, it does not warrant
relief under AEDPA absent a prior Supreme Court holding
that the principle “applies to the circumstances presented
in this case.” Woods, 575 U. S., at 319 (internal quotation
marks omitted). There is no such holding here, and the
Tenth Circuit was right to insist on one.
B
Even setting aside the level-of-generality problem, the
Court is wrong to find a clearly established rule of law. For
at least three reasons, a fairminded jurist could disagree
with the Court’s reading of Payne. The Court holds other-
wise only by redefining “clearly established” law to include
debatable interpretations of our precedents.
1
First, a fairminded jurist could conclude that Payne’s lone
sentence on due process is not a holding at all. Although
Payne asserted that victim-impact evidence could violate
due process if it was unduly prejudicial, the Court found
that “in this case” the evidence “serves entirely legitimate
purposes,” and so declined to disturb the capital sentence
under review. 501 U. S., at 825. The Court’s statement
that a different case presenting different facts could violate
due process was thus dicta because it was not “ ‘necessary
to’ ” its “disposition of [the] case.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S.
14 ANDREW v. WHITE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

656, 663, n. 4 (2001) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Flor-
ida, 517 U. S. 44, 67 (1996)); see Stewart v. Winn, 967 F. 3d
534, 539 (CA6 2020) (describing Payne’s due process discus-
sion as a “snippe[t]” of “ ‘dicta’ ”). As we have previously rec-
ognized, because “ ‘clearly established [f]ederal law’ . . . ‘re-
fers to the holdings’ ” of this Court, Andrew cannot premise
her habeas claim on “a case in which we rejected a due pro-
cess claim.” Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U. S. 351, 367 (2013)
(alteration in original).
The Court insists Payne’s due process statement was “in-
dispensable” to its disposition, because without the exist-
ence of a due process backstop, the Payne Court might have
determined that a categorical Eighth Amendment bar on
victim-impact evidence is necessary to protect defendants.
Ante, at 7. But, this is hardly the only “reasonable inter-
pretatio[n]” of Payne, which nowhere sets forth the reason-
ing the Court ascribes to it. White, 572 U. S., at 423. The
Court’s interpretation makes sense only if we assume that
the Payne Court would have seriously considered holding
victim-impact evidence categorically unconstitutional de-
spite it “serv[ing] entirely legitimate purposes” in “the ma-
jority of cases.” 501 U. S., at 825. That would be a highly
unusual approach to constitutional litigation. Cf. United
States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) (requiring that
a law be valid in “no set of circumstances” to be facially un-
constitutional). Another reasonable interpretation—and
indeed, a far more plausible one—is that the Court simply
wanted to make clear that its rejection of a categorical rule
against victim-impact evidence did not rule out future fact-
specific challenges. That kind of dicta is common in cases
rejecting categorical challenges. See, e.g., United States v.
Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 784–785 (2023). A fairminded jurist
Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 15

THOMAS, J., dissenting

need not agree that Payne’s single-sentence caveat consti-
tutes a holding.
2
Even if we were to treat Payne’s sentence about due pro-
cess as a holding, a fairminded jurist need not read it as
broadly as the Court does. “[G]eneral expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which
those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they
. . . ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit.”
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821). This principle
applies with special force when a party claims “a single sen-
tence” in an opinion establishes a broad legal principle. See
Arkansas Game and Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568
U. S. 23, 35 (2012).
A fairminded jurist could believe that the scope of any
holding established by Payne’s cursory discussion of due
process is limited to Payne’s analysis. On the majority’s
telling, Payne eliminated a categorical Eighth Amendment
prohibition on victim-impact evidence because of the avail-
ability of an alternative due process protection against such
evidence. See ante, at 6–7. Because Payne was not consid-
ering the role of due process vis-à-vis any other kind of evi-
dence, a fairminded jurist could conclude that any due pro-
cess holding laid down by Payne extends only to victim-
impact evidence.
3
Finally, a fairminded jurist could rely on this Court’s
later decision in Estelle to conclude that Payne did not es-
tablish any general due process prohibition on the admis-
sion of unduly prejudicial evidence.
The Court of Appeals in Estelle granted habeas relief on
the ground that the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial
prior-bad-act evidence had helped render the prisoner’s
trial “fundamentally unfair in violation of due process.” 502
16 ANDREW v. WHITE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

U. S., at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court
reversed, holding the evidence in question “was relevant to
an issue in the case.” Id., at 70. Having reached this con-
clusion, the Court added that “we need not explore further
the apparent assumption of the Court of Appeals that it is
a violation of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment for evidence that is not relevant to be received
in a criminal trial.” Ibid. That is, the Estelle Court ex-
pressly reserved the very question the majority asserts
Payne resolved. This Court is “hardly in the habit of reserv-
ing separate questions that have already been definitively
answered.” White, 572 U. S., at 424 (citation, alteration,
and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “fairminded
jurists could conclude that [Estelle]’s reservation regarding”
unduly prejudicial evidence “would have served no mean-
ingful purpose if [Payne] had created [a] rule against” it al-
ready. Ibid.; accord, Kernan v. Cuero, 583 U. S. 1, 8 (2017)
(per curiam).
The law has not changed since we decided Estelle. The
Court cites several decisions postdating and predating
Payne and Estelle, but only for vague, atmospheric support.
See ante, at 7–8. The Court does not assert that any of them
establishes a general due process rule against unduly prej-
udicial evidence. And, the Court does not explain what
work, if any, these citations do in its analysis. Nor could it.
Our decision in Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U. S. 1, 13–14
(1994), cannot move the needle because Romano rejected a
due process claim. The reference to due process in Kansas
v. Carr, 577 U. S. 108, 123 (2016), also is not a holding. As
in Payne, it is a one-sentence aside in a case rejecting an
Eighth Amendment claim. Regardless, Carr has no possi-
ble bearing on this case, as it was decided after the conclu-
sion of Andrew’s direct appeal. See Lockyer, 538 U. S., at
71–72. So too, the Court’s remaining citations are clearly
inapposite, as none involves the admission of evidence. As
the Tenth Circuit correctly recognized, this Court has never
Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 17

THOMAS, J., dissenting

answered the question it reserved in Estelle. 62 F. 4th, at
1315.
4
Remarkably, the Court does not deny that “a reasonable
jurist could agree” that Payne does not establish the princi-
ple Andrew asserts. Ante, at 9. Instead, it maintains that
the potentially differing views of reasonable, fairminded ju-
rists do not matter. According to the majority, federal ha-
beas courts have an “independent obligation” to identify the
holdings of this Court. Ibid. Only afterward does “defer-
ence” kick in. Ibid.
That view is patently wrong. AEDPA requires state pris-
oners to base their claims on “ ‘clearly established’ ” law.
Ibid. (quoting §2254(d)(1)). A debatable holding does not
clearly establish anything. AEDPA permits relief only
when “the state court’s ruling . . . was so lacking in justifi-
cation that there was an error well understood and compre-
hended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-
minded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U. S., at 103. If
one could fairly disagree that the rule a prisoner invokes is
part of “existing law,” one could fairly disagree that the
state court erred under existing law.
Our precedents confirm that debatable readings of this
Court’s cases cannot be clearly established law. In White,
we held that Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981), did not
clearly establish the prisoner’s asserted rule, because other
“perfectly reasonable interpretations of Estelle” existed.
572 U. S., at 423. In other words, the prisoner’s claim failed
because “fairminded jurists could conclude” that Estelle had
not “created [the] across-the-board rule” he invoked. 572
U. S., at 424. To find clearly established law in the face of
these reasonable alternative interpretations would “con-
traven[e] §2254(d)’s deferential standard of review.” Id., at
423–424. Likewise, in Kernan, we reversed after the Ninth
Circuit held that our decision in Santobello v. New York,
18 ANDREW v. WHITE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

404 U. S. 257 (1971), clearly established the rule on which
the prisoner relied. See 583 U. S., at 6–9. Because “ ‘fair-
minded jurists could disagree’ with the Ninth Circuit’s
reading of Santobello,” we were “unable to find in Supreme
Court precedent that ‘clearly established federal law’ ” that
the Ninth Circuit had claimed to see. Id., at 7–8. Thus,
contrary to what the majority says, we have extended “def-
erence” both at the threshold step of identifying clearly es-
tablished law and at the subsequent step of applying it.
Ante, at 9. A contestable interpretation of precedent cannot
be clearly established law.
* * *
Summary vacatur “is a rare disposition.” Schweiker v.
Hansen, 450 U. S. 785, 791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). This Court has traditionally reserved it for the un-
common “situations in which the law is settled and stable,
the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly
in error.” Ibid. Today, however, the Court turns this ap-
proach on its head, steamrolling settled AEDPA principles
to set aside an entirely correct Tenth Circuit decision. I re-
spectfully dissent.

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