Agro Dynamics, LLC v. Drug Enforcement Administration

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7                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
8                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA                          
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10  AGRO DYNAMICS, LLC,                  Case No.:  20-cv-02082-JAH-KSC       

11                Plaintiff,                                                  
                                        ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND           
12  v.                                   DENYING IN PART FEDERAL              
                                        DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR               
13  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                 
                                        JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS            
   DRUG ENFORCEMENT                                                          
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   ADMINISTRATION, SAN DIEGO                                                 
                                        [ECF No. 45]                         
15  COUNTY, et. al.,                                                          
16               Defendant.                                                   
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        Before the Court is Defendants Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Special 
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   Agents Paul Gelles, Eric Ball, Kieran Garcia, Marsha Dawe, Ross Van Nostrand, and 
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   Jeremy Feuz, and DEA Task Force Officers (“TFO”) Frank Haskell, Andrew Aguilar, 
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   Jason Stein, Timothy Smith, Michael Astorga, and Christopher Morris’ (jointly “Federal 
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   Defendants”) motion for judgment on the pleadings.  ECF No. 45 (“Motion” or “Mot.”).  
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   Plaintiff Agro Dynamics, LLC (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion.  After a thorough review 
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   of the parties’ submissions and for the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN 
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   PART AND DENIES IN PART Federal Defendants’ Motion.                       
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1                              BACKGROUND                                    
2       Plaintiff originally filed this action in Superior Court of California, County of San 
3  Diego on September 22, 2020.  See Notice of Removal, Ex. A (ECF No. 1-2).  Federal 
4  Defendants removed the action to federal court on October 22, 2020.  Notice of Removal, 
5  (ECF No. 1).  On November 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 
6  asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, California Civil Code § 52.1, claims for violations 
7  of  the  United  States  Constitution  and  the  California  Constitution,  and  claims  for 
8  conversion, trespass to chattels, and negligence.  FAC (ECF No. 8).  Plaintiff named 
9  Federal Defendants and the County of San Diego, San Diego Sheriff Department officers 
10  Steve  Bodine,  Justin  Moore,  Dwayne  Prickett,  Christopher  Perez,  Ricardo  Andrade 
11  (collectively “County Defendants”), and Does 1 through 50 as defendants.  Id.  Plaintiff 
12  alleges  Federal  Defendants  along  with  certain  officers  of  the  San  Diego  Sheriff’s 
13  Department seized and destroyed over $3 million dollars’ worth of hemp plants pursuant 
14  to  an  invalid  search  warrant  executed  on  Plaintiff’s  property  located  in  Fallbrook, 
15  California on which Plaintiff legally cultivated industrial hemp.  Id. ¶¶ 36-64.   
16       County Defendants and Federal Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss.  See 
17  ECF Nos. 9, 11.  Thereafter, this Court granted in part and denied in part the motions.  See 
18  ECF No. 18.  The following claims by Plaintiff survived the motion to dismiss: § 1983 
19  claim against the County for failure to train,  § 1983 claims against County Officers in their 
20  individual capacities and Federal Officers in their individual capacities based on violations 
21  of the Fourth Amendment, a Bane Act claim against County Defendants premised on the 
22  Fourth Amendment and Article I Section 13 of the California Constitution, a claim under 
23  the U.S. Constitution against Federal Officers in their individual capacities based on 
24  violation of the Fourth Amendment, and conversion, trespass to chattels, and negligence 
25  against County Defendants.  Id.  Plaintiff was provided an opportunity but did not amend 
26  the complaint.  Federal Defendants and County Defendants filed separate answers to the 
27  First Amended Complaint on October 24, 2023.  See ECF Nos. 19, 21.        
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1       On April 2, 2024, Federal Defendants filed the instant motion along with a motion 
2  to file documents under seal.  See ECF Nos. 45, 46.  Plaintiff filed an opposition on May 
3  3, 2024 (“Opposition” or “Opp’n”) and Federal Defendants filed a reply on May 15, 2024 
4  (“Reply”).  See ECF Nos. 49, 50.  Finding the matter suitable for disposition without oral 
5  argument, the Court took the motion under submission on the parties’ briefs.      
6                            LEGAL STANDARD                                  
7       Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the 
8  pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay the trial.”  FED. 
9  R. CIV. P. 12(c).  Judgment on the pleadings is proper only when there is no unresolved 
10  issue of fact and no question remains that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
11  matter of law.  Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 
12  (9th Cir. 1989); Honey v. Distelrath, 195 F.3d 531, 532-33 (9th Cir. 1999).  The standard 
13  applied on a Rule 12(c) motion is essentially the same as that applied on Rule 12(b)(6) 
14  motions.  See Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1550, and see Fleming v. Pickard, 581 
15  F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009).  Thus, the allegations of the non-moving party are accepted 
16  as true, and all inferences reasonably drawn from those facts must be construed in favor of 
17  the responding party.  Fleming, 581 F.3d at 925.                          
18                               DISCUSSION                                   
19         Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s 
20  claims for two reasons, (1) they are not subject to suit under § 1983 because they were 
21  federal officers acting under color of federal law, not state law; and (2) this case presents a 
22  new context under Bivens and extensions of the remedy are not appropriate.  Mot. at 9-19.   
23    A. Judicial Notice                                                      
24       In their motion for judgment on the pleadings, Federal Defendants request that this 
25  Court take judicial notice of two facts: (1) the DEA San Diego Integrated Narcotic Task 
26  Force was established in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 873 and (2) that local peace officers 
27  assigned to the Narcotic Task Force were deputized as Task Force Officers of the DEA 
28  under  21 U.S.C. § 878(b).    Request  for  Judicial  Notice  (ECF  No.  45-1).    Federal 
1  Defendants contend that the two facts are not subject to reasonable dispute because they 
2  are supported by “sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”  Id. at 2.  In 
3  support of their request, they submit a Narcotic Task Force Agreement between the DEA 
4  and the San Diego Police Department, a Narcotic Task Force Agreement between the DEA 
5  and  the  San  Diego  Sheriff’s  Department,  “Deputization  Authorization/Request”  and 
6  Extension forms for individual Task Force Officers, and the declaration of Cynthia Cruz, 
7  a DEA Mission Support Specialist who serves as the custodian of records.1 
8       In response, Plaintiff argues consideration of extrinsic evidence on a motion for 
9  judgment on the pleadings is improper.  Opp’n at 14-17.  Plaintiff also argues Ms. Cruz’s 
10  declaration does not comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 because she attests the statements were 
11  made “to the best of [her] knowledge” under penalty of perjury, instead of being “true and 
12  correct” under penalty of perjury.  Id at 15.  Plaintiff further argues the two facts are not 
13  “adjudicative facts” and are neither generally known nor are from sources that cannot be 
14  reasonably  questioned  because  the  exhibits  submitted  by  Federal  Defendants  are  not 
15  matters of public record.  Id at 16-17.                                   
16       A court may, when addressing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, consider 
17  facts for which it takes judicial notice.  Heliotrope General, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 
18  F.3d 971, 981 n. 18 (9th Cir. 1999).  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, courts may take 
19  judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute.”  FED. R. EVID. 201(b).  
20  Facts are not subject to dispute if they are “generally known” within the court’s jurisdiction 
21  or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be 
22  reasonably questioned.”  Id.; Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th 
23  Cir. 2018).                                                               
24       Adjudicative facts are facts that involve the immediate parties of a case and describe 
25  “who did what, where, when, [and] how,” relevant to the resolution of the case.  United 
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   1 Federal Defendants motion to file the Narcotic Task Force Agreements and Deputization 
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1  States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 219 (8th Cir. 1976).  The formation of a task force pursuant 
2  to federal law between the DEA and local law enforcement agencies, and that local law 
3  enforcement officers were deputized as Task Force Officers, are adjudicative facts subject 
4  to judicial notice.                                                       
5       Ms. Cruz made her statements in support of the request for judicial notice “under 
6  penalty of perjury” and certified that her statements were true.  Cruz Decl. at 1-2 (ECF No. 
7  45-2).  Because the declaration includes the language “under penalty of perjury” and a 
8  representation  that  the  statements  therein  are  true,  the  declaration  complies  with  the 
9  verification requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746.  See Kersting v. United States, 865 F. Supp. 
10  669, 676 (D. Haw. 1994) (determining a declaration that is made “under penalty of perjury” 
11  and declares that the document is true complies with the verification requirements of 
12  28 U.S.C. § 1746).  Ms. Cruz attests that the two Narcotic Task Force Agreements are true 
13  and  accurate  copies  of  those  entered  into  between  the  DEA  and  San  Diego  Police 
14  Department in July 2018 and the DEA and San Diego Sheriff’s Department in August 
15  2018, and that the Deputization Request/Authorization and Extension documents are “true 
16  and  accurate  copies  of  the  deputization  paperwork  associated  with  DEA Task  Force 
17  Officers Andrew Aguilar, Michael Astorga, Frank Haskell, Christopher Morris, Timothy 
18  Smith and Jason Stein.”  Cruz Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 7.                           
19       While not publicly available, the documents are created and held by the government.  
20  Courts may take judicial notice of records of a government agency.  See Dent v. Holder, 
21  627 F.3d 365, 371 (taking judicial notice of applications for naturalization); see also 
22  Interstate Nat. Gas Co. v. Southern California Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1953) 
23  (determining courts may take judicial notice of “records and reports of administrative 
24  bodies”).  The Court finds, based on Ms. Cruz’s declaration, that the adjudicative facts are 
25  accurately determined by official government records and are therefore not subject to 
26  dispute.  Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice that (1) the DEA San Diego Integrated 
27  Narcotic Task Force was established in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 873 and (2) that local 
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1  peace officers assigned to the Narcotic Task Force were deputized as Task Force Officers 
2  of the DEA under 21 U.S.C. § 878(b).                                      
3    B. Section 1983 Liability                                               
4       Federal Defendants argue that judgment on the pleadings is properly entered in their 
5  favor because, as federal agents and Task Force Officers serving on the Narcotic Task 
6  Force, they were not acting under color of state law for purposes § 1983 liability.  Mot. at 
7  9-10.  They contend the DEA Task Force was founded in and implemented under federal 
8  authority and the allegations of the FAC create no inference they exercised power under 
9  the authority of state law.  Id.  Plaintiff responds that the law of the case doctrine precludes 
10  Defendants from revisiting the § 1983 issue.  Opp’n at 12-14.  Plaintiff also argues that 
11  federal officers may be held liable under § 1983 when they are joint participants with state 
12  actors in the specific conduct at issue.  Id at 17-20.                    
13       1.  Law of the Case                                                  
14       Plaintiff argues that the law of the case doctrine precludes this Court from addressing 
15  Federal Defendants’ argument that they are not subject to suit under § 1983 because the 
16  Court found that Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 may proceed against both County and 
17  Federal Defendants in its previous order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ 
18  motions to dismiss.  Opp’n at 12-14.  Plaintiff argues that Federal Defendants’ argument 
19  on § 1983 liability in the present motion is a refined version of an earlier argument it 
20  presented to this Court in its motion to dismiss.  Id at 13.  Under the law of the case doctrine, 
21  a  court  may  decline  to  revisit  an  issue  that  was  decided  explicitly  or  by  necessary 
22  implication in a previous disposition.  See United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 
23  443, 452 (9th Cir. 2000).                                                 
24       In a footnote in their motion to dismiss, Federal Defendants asserted they were acting 
25  in their capacity as agents and TFOs of the DEA and explained, if the Court did not dismiss 
26  the § 1983 claim based on their motion to dismiss, they would later seek judgment on the 
27  claim because they were not acting under color of state law.  Federal Defendant’s Mot. to 
28  Dismiss at 16 (ECF No. 11).  The Court noted Defendant’ assertion in its order addressing 
1  Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Order at 22 (ECF No. 18).  However, the Court 
2  did not discuss, make any findings nor decide the issue of whether Federal Defendants 
3  were acting under color of state law.  Accordingly, the law of the case doctrine does not 
4  preclude consideration of the issue here.                                 
5       2.  Merits of the Motion                                             
6       Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
7  or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States.  Wyatt v. Cole, 
8  504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).  To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a 
9  right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 
10  alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.  West v. Atkins, 
11  487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).                                                   
12       Plaintiff alleges Defendants executed a search warrant issued by the Superior Court 
13  of the County of San Diego pursuant to California Penal Code § 1524 on Plaintiff’s 
14  property on September 12, 2019.  FAC ¶¶ 41, 47.  The affidavit in support of the warrant 
15  asserts Special Agent Gelles conducted an aerial reconnaissance flight and observed a 
16  marijuana cultivation operation on the property in violation of provisions of the California 
17  Health & Safety Code.  Id ¶¶ 42, 43.  Plaintiff alleges the affidavit contained material 
18  misrepresentations and omissions.  Id ¶¶ 45-46.  When Defendants executed the warrant, 
19  Plaintiff’s tenant notified Defendants the crops were hemp legally cultivated under a 
20  registration from the County of San Diego.  Id ¶¶ 57-58.  Instead of taking any steps to 
21  assess whether the crops involved were marijuana or hemp, Plaintiff contends, Defendants 
22  destroyed Plaintiff’s industrial hemp plants valued at more than $3 million.  Id ¶¶ 58-60, 
23  63-64.                                                                    
24            a.  TFOs                                                        
25       Defendants argue that TFOs may not be held liable under § 1983 because they acted 
26  within the scope of their assignment on the Narcotic Task Force.  Mot. at 10.  Plaintiff 
27  responds that TFOs may be found liable under § 1983 for working in concert with state 
28  actors to deprive Plaintiff of its constitutional rights.  Opp’n at 19.   
1       According to the judicially noticed facts, the TFOs were deputized as officers of the 
2  DEA serving on the task force established pursuant to federal law.  To determine whether 
3  local law enforcement officers assigned to a joint federal-state task force act under color of 
4  state law, courts look to the totality of the circumstances, including the source of authority 
5  for the program and supervision of the participants.  Thai v. County of Los Angeles, 127 
6  F.4th 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2025).  Although the task force was established pursuant to 
7  federal law, Plaintiff alleges the TFOs participated in executing a search warrant issued 
8  under state law.  The pleadings are silent as to whether state and/or federal officials exerted 
9  oversight, management, or regulation of the joint task force.  As such, the Court finds there 
10  are unresolved issue of facts pertinent to whether the TFOs were acting under color of state 
11  law.  Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to TFOs’ liability under § 1983 
12  is DENIED.                                                                
13            b. DEA Special Agents                                           
14       Defendants argue that federal agents on the Narcotic Task Force may not be held 
15  liable under § 1983 because they acted under federal authority, not state authority, during 
16  the events giving rise to this action.  Mot. at 10-11.  Defendants argue that federal agents 
17  did not lose their federal authority while executing a state warrant on Plaintiff’s property.  
18  Id.  Citing Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986), Plaintiff argues that 
19  federal officers acting under federal authority are not immune from suit under § 1983 if 
20  they conspired or substantially acted in concert with state actors.  Opp’n at 17-19.  Plaintiff 
21  contends it alleges Federal Defendants worked closely with the San Diego County Sheriff’s 
22  Department to execute the fraudulent state warrant to seize Plaintiff’s crops. 
23       Federal agents act under color of state law if a “symbiotic relationship” exists 
24  between the federal agents and state actors and the conduct at issue “can be fairly attributed 
25  to the state.”  Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing to Johnson 
26  v. Orr, 780 F.2d 386, 390 (3rd Cir. 1986)).  A symbiotic relationship is one marked by the 
27  sharing of mutual interests, actions taken in concert, and a relationship that is productive 
28  to both parties.  See Id., at 743.  “[F]ederal officials can only be liable under section 1983 
1  where there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the 
2  federal actors so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”  
3  Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Cabrera, 
4  973 F.2d at 744).                                                         
5       Plaintiff  alleges  that  Defendants,  including  TFOs  and  federal  agents,  worked 
6  together  in  investigating  Plaintiff’s  property,  obtaining  the  warrant,  and  destroying 
7  Plaintiff’s crops.  FAC ¶¶ 41-46, 49-50, 55.  Plaintiff also alleges that federal agents worked 
8  with other state actors who were not TFOs in obtaining and executing the faulty warrant.  
9  Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that DEA Special Agent Gelles obtained the warrant at issue 
10  from a state court judge by alleging Plaintiff’s violation of California’s Health & Safety 
11  Code.  Id ¶ 42.  Plaintiff also alleges that all Defendants, including federal agents, TFOs, 
12  and San Diego Sheriff Department officers who were not designated on the Task Force, 
13  planned for and executed the raid on Plaintiff’s property that caused the destruction of 
14  Plaintiff’s hemp crop.  FAC ¶¶ 5-21, 55-64.                               
15       There remains unresolved factual issues on the extent of participation by state actors 
16  in the raid and the nature of the federal agents’ relationship with state actors in the conduct 
17  at  issue.    Whether  federal  agents  and  state  actors  had  a  “symbiotic  relationship”  in 
18  convening the Narcotic Task Force and implementing the program is unresolved at this 
19  stage of the proceedings.  See Cabrera, 973 F.2d at 742-43.  As a result, Defendants’ 
20  motion for judgment on the pleadings under § 1983 for federal agents is DENIED.  
21            c.  Bivens Claim                                                
22       In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, the Supreme Court held that the 
23  victim of a Fourth Amendment violation by federal drug enforcement agents had a claim 
24  for damages, even when Congress had not legislated a statute providing the injured person 
25  with such a cause of action.  See 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971).  Since then, however, the 
26  Court has limited the application of Bivens and only twice recognized causes of action for 
27  violations of the Constitution, a Fifth Amendment sex-discrimination claim, and a federal 
28  prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate care.  Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 
1  490 (2022).  When presented with a Bivens action under a “new context”, one that differs 
2  from the three the Supreme Court has recognized, courts must determine whether special 
3  factors indicate that the “[j]udiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to 
4  weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.”  Id at 492 (internal 
5  quotation and citation omitted).  Expanding the Bivens remedy is a “‘disfavored’ judicial 
6  activity,” and “even a modest extension is still an extension.”  Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 
7  120, 135, 147 (2017).                                                     
8       Defendants argue that the facts in this case are not squarely covered by a recognized 
9  Bivens precedent, and therefore present a new context.  Mot. at 12-19.  Plaintiff argues that 
10  judicial deception in obtaining a warrant is a recognized Bivens context under Ninth Circuit 
11  precedent.  Opp’n at 21-22.                                               
12       While this Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s claim for Fourth Amendment violations 
13  by federal agents involves the same legal claim and almost identical defendants as those 
14  found in Bivens itself, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s case involves a “new context.”2  In 
15  the present case, Plaintiff alleges that its Fourth Amendment rights were violated when 
16  federal agents obtained a warrant that was invalid due to material omissions that would 
17  have prevented issuance of the warrant if they were included, and in the alternative, that 
18  the probable cause supporting the warrant vanished when law enforcement agents were 
19  placed on notice by Plaintiff’s tenant that a County permit existed for Plaintiff’s hemp 
20  cultivation.  FAC ¶¶ 74-92.  Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 
21  Federal Defendants’ conduct in proceeding to destroy all of Plaintiff’s hemp constituted an 
22  unreasonable seizure.                                                     
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26  2 In Bivens, the defendants were agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics who were pursuing alleged 
   violations of drug laws.  See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.  Here, Federal Defendants include federal DEA 
27  agents who were pursuing alleged violations of drug laws.  The DEA inherited the duties of the Federal 
   Bureau  of  Narcotics.  See  21  C.F.R.  Ch.  2  §§  1300-1399  (establishing  the  Drug  Enforcement 
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1       In Bivens, the Fourth Amendment violation was a warrantless search and seizure at 
2  a home, where federal drug enforcement agents entered the plaintiff’s house without a 
3  warrant and then arrested him.  See 403 U.S. at 389.  The plaintiff sought damages for 
4  “embarrassment” and other emotional harms, whereas here, Plaintiff seeks damages related 
5  to commercial harm due to destruction of agricultural goods.  See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389-
6  90.  Because a warrantless entry into a home followed by the arrest of the individual differs 
7  from Federal Defendants’ act of obtaining and relying on an invalid warrant and proceeding 
8  to destroy Plaintiff’s agricultural goods, this Court finds Plaintiff’s claim presents a “new 
9  context.”  See Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, at 147-48 (recognizing that “potential special factors 
10  that were not considered in previous Bivens cases” can present a new context).  
11       Furthermore, authorizing liability under Bivens in this case would expand liability 
12  to Plaintiff’s lost property, which is a different category of damage than the emotional and 
13  mental harms recognized in Bivens.  Plaintiff’s damages are entirely focused on lost 
14  agricultural profit, not emotional harms associated with the seizure.  FAC ¶¶ 65-73.  
15  Congress is better equipped to expand the damages action in this case because courts 
16  “likely cannot predict the ‘systemwide’ consequences of recognizing a cause of action 
17  under Bivens.”  See Egbert, 596 U.S. at 493.                              
18       Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Federal Defendants’ motion for judgment on the 
19  pleadings as to the Bivens claim.                                         
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I                                     CONCLUSION 
2         Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
3         1.  Federal  Defendants’  motion  to  file  documents  under  seal  (ECF  No.  46)  is 
4            GRANTED. 
5         2.  Federal  Defendants’  motion  for judgment  on  the  pleadings  (ECF  No.  45)  is 
6            GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED 
7            as to the request for judicial notice and Plaintiff's Bivens claim.  The motion is 
8            DENIED as to the §  1983 claim. 
?         IT IS SO ORDERED. 
    DATED: March 27, 2025 

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13                                           /SOHNA.HOUSTON 
14                                          /   UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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