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Full Opinion
FILED
Sep 26 2025, 8:45 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Akeenen Anton Lamar Hunt,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
September 26, 2025
Court of Appeals Case No.
24A-CR-1876
Appeal from the Hancock Circuit Court
The Honorable R. Scott Sirk, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
30C01-2312-F2-002169
Opinion by Judge Felix
Judge Mathias concurs.
Judge Foley concurs in result with separate opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 1 of 19
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Akeenen Hunt repeatedly rammed his vehicle into his ex-girlfriend A.R.’s
vehicle until her vehicle broke down. When A.R. attempted to flee on foot,
Hunt chased her down, struck her, and dragged her back to her vehicle.
Ultimately, the pair returned to A.R.’s residence where he struck her with a belt
before raping her. The State charged Hunt with 17 criminal counts arising from
this protracted episode of domestic violence. A jury convicted Hunt of 15
counts—among them, rape and intimidation. Hunt now appeals, presenting
four issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following two
issues:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion regarding certain evidence at
trial; and
2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hunt’s rape
and intimidation convictions.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Hunt and A.R. dated for approximately 18 months before ending their
relationship in July 2023. After the relationship ended, A.R. told Hunt she was
moving to Texas, but she secretly moved to Greenfield, Indiana instead. On
December 12, A.R. returned home from work and fell asleep on her couch.
Around midnight, Hunt called A.R. and said, “[Y]ou’re not going to tell me
Happy Birthday[?]” Tr. Vol. III at 220. The two spoke for a short time, and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 2 of 19
A.R. recalled that Hunt sounded angry. A.R. went back to sleep but awoke to
the sound of Hunt kicking in her front door. With bare feet and wearing shorts
and a t-shirt, A.R. made it to her vehicle and attempted to flee. Hunt followed
A.R. in his vehicle and proceeded to ram his vehicle into A.R.’s Jeep “several
times in several different locations,” with sufficient force to deploy his air bags.
Id. at 225.
[4] A.R. was in a parking lot when her Jeep would no longer move. A.R. then got
out of the Jeep and “ran towards a building that . . . had lights on.” Tr. Vol. III
at 205. Hunt followed A.R. and “hit [her] in the face,” causing her to fall. Id.
Hunt then “grabbed [her] by [the] hair.” Id. A.R. racked her brain to “think[]
of anything [she] could say to have [Hunt] calm down,” so after retrieving her
boots from her Jeep, A.R. walked with Hunt back to her home. Id. at 206
[5] On the walk back to the house, Hunt struck A.R. in the head again. When they
arrived at the home, Hunt struck A.R. “three to four times” with a belt. Tr.
Vol. III at 233. Fearful Hunt would kill her because of “how angry he was,” id.
at 235, A.R. wiped blood off her face and body, before she initiated sexual
intercourse with Hunt, believing “it would calm [Hunt] down,” id. at 208. A.R.
said she “felt like [she] did have to do it” and “did what [she] did to . . . keep
[Hunt] calm and not anger him so much.” Id. “[A]fter maybe the second time
of sex,” A.R. asked if she could use the restroom, and Hunt agreed. Id. at 235.
Inside the restroom, A.R. called a friend and requested that the police be called
and sent to her house. After the call, A.R. returned to bed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 3 of 19
[6] The State charged Hunt with 17 counts, among them, rape as a Level 3 felony 1
and intimidation as a Level 6 felony 2. Hunt subpoenaed A.R. for a deposition,
which took place on May 23, 2024. The State attended the deposition, during
which it served A.R. with a subpoena that required her appearance at Hunt’s
jury trial. Ahead of trial, A.R. failed to appear for a scheduled meeting with the
prosecutor, and the prosecutor’s office was unable to contact her via phone,
text, or e-mail. On July 15—the day before trial—an investigator with the
prosecutor’s office drove to A.R.’s residence and knocked on the door, but
“nobody answered the door.” Tr. Vol. II at 216–17. That same day, Hunt’s
counsel emailed the trial court and the prosecutor, relaying that A.R. left the
United States, was in Dubai, and would not be coming to the jury trial. The
State confirmed with Homeland Security that A.R. flew to Dubai at 8:00 p.m.
on July 14.
[7] On July 16, the trial began as scheduled. The following day, the State filed a
written motion to admit A.R.’s deposition testimony on the basis that A.R. was
unavailable. The trial court granted the motion. On the third day of trial,
Hunt’s counsel alerted the trial court that counsel recently spoke with A.R.,
who said she was available to give remote video testimony between 12:00 p.m.
and 1:00 p.m. that afternoon. The trial court took a brief recess, giving the
State the opportunity to speak with A.R. The State then contacted A.R., who
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1).
2
I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 4 of 19
answered from a noisy environment with traffic and music in the background.
Within one minute, the State’s call with A.R. dropped, and A.R. did not
answer subsequent calls. The trial court agreed with the State that A.R. was
unavailable, and therefore, the State could read admissible portions of A.R.’s
deposition testimony into the record. The trial court granted the State’s request
to redact excerpts from A.R.’s responses where she stated that she did not “feel
like” she was raped. Tr. Vol. III at 183, 185. The deposition testimony with
the requested redactions was ultimately read into the record.
[8] The jury found Hunt guilty of 15 of the 17 counts, including rape as a Level 3
felony and intimidation as a Level 6 felony. The trial court sentenced Hunt to a
total of 46 years, with 30 years executed and 16 years suspended to probation.
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion Regarding Certain
Evidence at Trial
[9] Hunt claims that the trial court erred in admitting and excluding certain
evidence at trial. We review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v.
State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied. “[W]e may affirm the trial
court’s decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201
N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2
(Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 858
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 5 of 19
(quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)). Hunt claims that the
trial court abused its discretion by (a) admitting A.R.’s deposition testimony
and (b) excluding portions of A.R.’s deposition testimony. We address each
argument in turn.
a. Admission of A.R.’s Deposition Testimony
[10] Hunt argues the admission of A.R.’s deposition testimony violated his rights
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Appellant’s Br. at 17. The Confrontation Clause provides
criminal defendants the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004). However, a witness’s prior
testimony may be admitted if (1) the witness is unavailable at the time of trial
and (2) the defendant had the prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
Howard v. State, 853 N.E.2d 461, 465 (Ind. 2006) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at
68). Hunt does not dispute that he had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
A.R. during her deposition testimony. Rather, Hunt maintains that A.R. was
available to testify remotely via Zoom, and therefore, the trial court erred in
determining A.R. was unavailable to testify.
[11] “Whether a witness is unavailable for purposes of the Confrontation Clause is a
question of law” that we review de novo. Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 465–
66 (Ind. 2005). A witness is unavailable if she is “absent from the trial” and the
proponent of the witness’s deposition testimony has been unable “by process or
by other reasonable means” to “procure . . . the declarant’s attendance.” Ind.
Evidence Rule 804(a)(5)(A). In a criminal prosecution, a witness for the State
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 6 of 19
is unavailable for purposes of the Confrontation Clause requirement only if the
prosecution “made a good faith effort to obtain the absent witness[’s]
attendance at trial.” Garner v. State, 777 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Ind. 2002). To make
a good faith effort, the State must exhaust reasonable means to procure the
witness’s attendance. Id. at 725.
[12] Here, A.R. was subpoenaed to appear in person at Hunt’s July 16 jury trial.
Rather than comply with the subpoena, A.R. flew to Dubai on July 14. Before
trial, the State tried to contact A.R. multiple times, at one point dispatching an
investigator to visit A.R.’s residence. Once the State was informed that A.R.
went to Dubai, the State worked with Homeland Security to confirm that A.R.
was indeed not present in the United States. At trial, the State contacted A.R.
on the day she claimed to be available, but the call dropped within one minute
and A.R. failed to answer subsequent attempts to contact her. We conclude the
State demonstrated it made diligent efforts to secure A.R.’s participation at trial
through all reasonable means such that, under the circumstances, the trial court
did not err in determining A.R. was unavailable. Therefore, the admission of
A.R.’s deposition testimony was not inconsistent with the Confrontation
Clause 3.
3
Although not addressed by the parties, we note that the trial court gave Hunt the option to have A.R. testify
as a defense witness via Zoom but Hunt declined to call her as a witness. Hunt therefore forfeited any rights
to further confrontation. See Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 470 (Ind. 2005) (choosing not to recall a witness
declared unavailable for refusing to testify “after her statement was admitted through [another’s] testimony,”
resulted in Fowler’s right to further confrontation being forfeited.), cert. denied, abrogated in part on other grounds
by Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 36 (2004).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 7 of 19
b. Exclusion of Portions of A.R.’s Deposition Testimony
[13] Hunt argues the trial court erred in permitting the State to redact A.R.’s
deposition testimony, removing excerpts from A.R.’s responses where she
stated that she did not believe she was raped. These responses are detailed
below. At trial, the jury was tasked with determining whether Hunt committed
rape as a Level 3 felony. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-42-4-1(a)(1), a
person commits rape when the person “knowingly or intentionally has sexual
intercourse with another person” when “the other person is compelled by force
or imminent threat of force[.]” Here, the trial court agreed with the State that
A.R.’s statements were inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b),
which prohibits witnesses from testifying to “opinions concerning intent, guilt,
or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether a
witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions.” Hunt argued below—and
maintains on appeal—that A.R.’s statements fell outside of Evidence Rule
704(b) because A.R. was “not making a legal conclusion or giving an opinion
regarding Hunt’s guilt or innocence” and was not referring to the “legal
definition of rape” but instead the “common understanding of what the term
means,” with A.R. “expressing that she did not believe she was raped because
she initiated the sexual activity, she was not forced, and she was not compelled
by a threat of force.” Appellant’s Br. at 37–38. Additionally, Hunt argues that
if victims may testify that they were raped, victims should also be able to testify
that they were not raped.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 8 of 19
[14] The State relies on Williams v. State, 43 N.E.3d 578 (Ind. 2015), to argue that
the excluded statements constituted impermissible legal conclusions under
Evidence Rule 704(b) and that the trial court properly excluded them. In
Williams, the defendant challenged a detective’s testimony that he had “zero
doubt in [his] mind that that was a transaction for cocaine.” 43 N.E.3d at 580.
In determining the admissibility of this statement, the Indiana Supreme Court
explained, “[o]pinion testimony concerning guilt ‘invades the province of the
jury[.]’” Id. at 581 (quoting Blanchard v. State, 802 N.E.2d 14, 34 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004)). Concluding that the detective’s testimony “satisfied every element of
the dealing offense[,]” the court in Williams held that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting the detective’s statement because nothing remained for
the jury to decide. Id. at 582. Specifically, the detective’s use of the term
“transaction” established the delivery element, and his use of “for cocaine”
established the defendant’s “knowledge or intent that cocaine was the subject of
the exchange.” Id.
[15] Williams is distinguishable from the instant case because neither of A.R.’s
statements was sufficient to satisfy every element of the rape offense. The first
excluded statement appears 4 to have come from A.R.’s response to a question
about where she stood in relation to her car.
4
It is not entirely clear from the record where the excluded language appeared in the deposition transcript,
especially because we do not have an unredacted copy of A.R.’s deposition. We have only what the parties
described to the trial court and what was read into the record for the jury.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 9 of 19
Q How far away was your car from where you were standing?
A Like walking distance probably a couple feet like not that far.
Q Okay.
A . . . I feel like some of this is kind of blurry with um I think
makes trying to keep this out of my head so much that I mix a lot
of our um fights up together. So I’m at the house it’s really hard
to explain everything that went like verbatim. Um (is this still
me) no I was telling the detectives and stuff that I initially –
initially initiated sex and it was under the yes it was under the
impression that it would calm him down. You know but it was
me that initiated it and um that’s the part I was telling him that
this has nothing to do with that. Yes, I felt like I did have to do it.
I felt like I did what I did to you know keep him calm and not
anger him so much but um my – [I don’t feel like it was Rape and
I’m not saying that I don’t want that as a charge because I don’t feel
like that was a that that was Rape].
Tr. Vol. III at 207–08, 183 (excluded statement added and emphasized). The
second excluded statement appears 5 to have been part of A.R.’s answer to a
question about how she responded to the hospital’s offer of a rape kit. A.R.
stated that she did not want to partake in a rape kit because she did not feel like
she was raped.
5
As with the first excluded statement, it is not entirely clear from the record where the excluded language
appeared in the deposition transcript, especially because we do not have an unredacted copy of A.R.’s
deposition. See supra n.4.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 10 of 19
[16] Both excluded statements were framed as A.R.’s feelings or beliefs about the
incident, and neither was the result of questioning intended to establish or
disprove any specific elements of rape. Read in context, A.R.’s statements
about not feeling like the encounter was rape described her subjective
experience of the circumstances and did not remove the question of whether
Hunt’s conduct satisfied the elements of the offense of rape, as defined by the
Indiana Code, from the jury’s province to decide. Notably, there is no suitable
word a witness can use to describe conduct that may or may not be rape
without using the word “rape".
[17] Even with A.R.’s subjective layperson’s statement that she did not believe she
was raped, the jury would still have been free to decide whether there was force
or imminent threat of force and whether Hunt acted knowingly. See I.C. § 35-
42-4-1(a)(1). We find support for this interpretation from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in its analysis of Federal Rule of
Evidence 704. In United States v. Baskes, the Court distinguishes “well-
established lay meanings” like “agreement”, “understanding”, “promise”, or
“commitment” from “conclusion[s] as to the legal implications of conduct.”
649 F.2d 471, 478 n.5 (7th Cir. 1980). In other words, there can be a distinction
between the colloquial use of a word from its legal meaning. In this instance,
where a layperson is describing her opinion of whether a particular act occurred
to her, we do not believe her opinion amounts to a legal conclusion as
prohibited by Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b). Instead, her opinion is one
permitted by Evidence Rules 701 and 704(a). Therefore, A.R.’s statements
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 11 of 19
characterizing the sexual encounter did not constitute an impermissible legal
conclusion under Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b), and the trial court abused its
discretion in permitting redaction of A.R.’s statements about whether Hunt had
raped her.
[18] Having made the determination that it was error to redact the aforementioned
statements, we now must decide whether reversal is necessitated. Errors made
by the trial court are not grounds for relief on appeal if they are harmless. Ind.
Appellate Rule 66(A). “An error is harmless when it results in no prejudice to
the ‘substantial rights’ of a party.” Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1197 (Ind.
2021) (quoting Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018)); see also Ind.
Appellate Rule 66(A). In conducting our harmless error analysis, factors we
consider are “the presence or absence of other, corroborating evidence on
material points; whether the impermissibly admitted evidence was cumulative;
the overall strength of the prosecution’s case; the importance of the
impermissible evidence in the prosecution’s case; and the extent of cross-
examination or questioning on the impermissibly admitted evidence.” Hall, 177
N.E.3d at 1197 (quoting Zanders v. State, 118 N.E.3d 736, 745–46 (Ind. 2019)).
[19] Here, the trial court’s error was harmless. Even though A.R. stated, “I don’t
feel like it was Rape . . . ,” Tr. Vol. III at 183, A.R. testified that, although she
was the one who initiated the sexual encounter, she felt like she “ha[d] to do it”
to calm down Hunt, id. at 208. A.R. further testified, “I . . . didn’t know
whether I was going to live or die in that moment and so it was scary.” Id. at
209. As a result, considering these facts along with those emphasized in the
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next section, the error in excluding A.R.’s statements that she did not feel like
she was raped was so minor that it likely would not have had any impact on a
reasonable jury. See Hall, 177 N.E.3d at 1197.
2. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Hunt’s
Convictions
[20] Hunt argues there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for rape
and intimidation. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:
“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is
substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element
of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Hancz-
Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis
v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews
only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the
reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is
shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State],
226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].
Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the
evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226
N.E.3d at 783).
a. Rape
[21] In order to convict Hunt of rape, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Hunt knowingly or intentionally had sexual intercourse with A.R.
when she was “compelled by . . . imminent threat of force[.]” Ind. Code § 35-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 13 of 19
42-4-1(a)(1). Force may be physical or implied and “may be shown even
without evidence of the attacker’s oral statement of intent or willingness to use
a weapon and cause injury, if from the circumstances it is reasonable to infer
the attacker was willing to do so.” Jones v. State, 589 N.E.2d 241, 243 (Ind.
1992) (quoting Lewis v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1125, 1127 (Ind. 1982)), cert. denied.
Hunt argues that “there is no evidence that Hunt forced A.R. to engage in
intercourse, . . . threatened to harm her if she did not engage in intercourse, [or]
. . . suggested that he would change his behavior if she engaged in
intercourse[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 35. This is a clear request to reweigh the
evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we will not do. See Teising, 226
N.E.3d at 783. The jury heard A.R.’s testimony that she initiated sexual
intercourse but still found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hunt committed rape.
[22] Here, the probative evidence supporting the verdict and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom show that the sexual contact occurred just after
Hunt violently broke into A.R.’s home, repeatedly crashed his vehicle into
A.R.’s vehicle as she attempted to flee, followed her on foot, pulled her by the
hair, made her walk through the woods with limited clothing on, struck her on
the head, and struck her with a belt. A.R. testified that she believed Hunt was
going to kill her and that she initiated sexual intercourse because she was
“under the impression that it would calm [Hunt] down[,] . . . felt like [she] did
have to do it[, and] . . . did what [she] did to . . . keep [Hunt] calm and not
anger him so much.” Tr. Vol. III p. 208. Meanwhile, A.R. secretly called for
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 14 of 19
help when Hunt gave her permission to use the restroom. From the evidence
presented, it was not unreasonable to infer that, when A.R. initiated the sexual
intercourse, she was compelled by Hunt’s imminent threat of force. Therefore,
we cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support Hunt’s
rape conviction.
b. Intimidation
[23] Hunt argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
intimidation as a Level 6 felony because there was no evidence he
“communicated a threat to commit murder.” Appellant’s Br. at 30. However,
a threat of murder was not required. Rather, to convict Hunt of intimidation,
the State had to prove that Hunt communicated a threat to “commit a forcible
felony” with the intent that A.R. be placed in fear that Hunt would carry out
the threat. I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(1)(A). A forcible felony is “a felony that
involves the use or threat of force against a human being, or in which there is
imminent danger of bodily injury to a human being.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-138. Our
legislature defined the term “threat” to mean “an expression, by words or
action, of an intention to . . . commit a crime.” I.C. § 35-45-2-1(c)(3). 6 Threat
6
In his reply brief, Hunt cites to Gaddis v. State, 680 N.E.2d 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), for the proposition that
“[a]cts of violence” and “events that place an individual in fear” cannot “satisfy the communication element
of intimidation.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 6. But Gaddis does not stand for that broad proposition. Rather,
the Gaddis court merely held that briefly displaying the profile of a handgun through a car window when a
driver does not point the handgun at the other driver or vehicle does not communicate a threat. 680 N.E.2d
at 861–62.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 15 of 19
may be inferred from a defendant’s conduct. See Merriweather v. State, 128
N.E.3d 503, 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
[24] Here, the probative evidence supporting the verdict shows that Hunt (1)
discerned where A.R. was living, went to her residence in the middle of the
night, and angrily called her from outside before he kicked his way in; (2)
followed her in his vehicle, rammed, and disabled her Jeep; (3) thwarted A.R.’s
attempt to seek safety; and (4) struck and grabbed A.R. before forcing her to
walk through the woods with him in her pajamas while ruminating about A.R.
living in a residence without him. During this extended violent assault, A.R.
believed Hunt was going to kill her. Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for
the jury to infer that Hunt intended to place A.R. in fear that he would commit
a forcible felony. Additionally, Hunt told A.R., “I should kill both of us,” St.
Ex. 144 at 9:16–9:18, while they were walking through the woods and after they
returned to A.R.’s home where Hunt continued to be violent. (St. Ex. 145 at
1:29–1:47). This was also sufficient to support his conviction for intimidation.
See Rhodes v. State, 144 N.E.3d 787, 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (affirming
conviction for intimidation where defendant told victim he was going to kill
her). We therefore conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to
support Hunt’s conviction on intimidation as a Level 6 felony.
Conclusion
[25] The admission of A.R.’s deposition testimony was consistent with the
Confrontation Clause, the trial court’s exclusion of portions of A.R.’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 16 of 19
statements was harmless, and the State presented sufficient evidence supporting
Hunt’s convictions. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.
[26] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., concurs.
Foley, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Lisa M. Johnson
Law Office of Lisa M. Johnson
Brownsburg, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Alexandria N. Sons
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 17 of 19
Foley, Judge, concurring in result.
[27] I concur in all respects with the majority, except that I part ways with the
analysis of the exclusion of portions of A.R.’s deposition testimony (Section
1.b.), and therefore respectfully concur in result.
[28] The majority distinguishes Williams v. State, 43 N.E.3d 578 (Ind. 2015),
concluding that A.R.’s statement that she didn’t feel like she was raped was a
description of her subjective experience of the event rather than the
pronouncement of a prohibited legal conclusion under Evidence Rule 704(b).
Critically, however, there is a lack of record support for the majority’s
conclusion that A.R.’s use of the term “rape” was an expression of her
perception of force rather than a legal conclusion. As noted by the majority, the
record did not include an unredacted version of the deposition, so it is unclear
exactly where the statement appeared within the deposition testimony.
Nonetheless, what is clear is that A.R.’s use of the term “rape” was in direct
reference to the criminal act of rape—the offense for which Hunt stood accused
of committing at trial—rather than a colloquial use of the term, in that A.R.
referenced the “charge” of rape in the redacted statement: “I don’t feel like it
was Rape and I’m not saying that I don’t want that as a charge because I don’t feel
like that . . . was Rape.” Tr. Vol. III p. 183 (emphasis added). A.R.’s redacted
statement did not reference her perception of force, compulsion, or threat. In
contrast, elsewhere in her testimony, A.R. ably described her subjective
experience when she testified that she initiated sex with Hunt in order to “calm
him down,” adding that she “felt like I did have to do it” and “did what I did to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 18 of 19
you know keep him calm and not anger him so much[.]” Id. at 208. 7 As the
Indiana Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he jury, not the witness, is
responsible for deciding the ultimate issues in a trial, and opinion testimony
concerning guilt ‘invades the province of the jury[.]’” Williams, 43 N.E.3d at 58
(quoting Blanchard v. State, 802 N.E.2d 14, 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). Here, the
ultimate question of whether Hunt committed rape was within the jury’s
province to decide. A.R.’s characterization of Hunt’s conduct in legal terms
constituted an impermissible legal conclusion under Evidence Rule 704(b),
which the trial court correctly applied in excluding the inadmissible statement.
7
Independent of the excluded statement, there was ample evidence A.R. equivocated about Hunt’s
responsibility for all charges brought against him. Indeed, A.R. testified at length about when she learned of
the charges, recounting that she thought certain charges were “absurd” and “exaggerated probably,” and that
she “wasn’t understanding the charges compared to [her] statements” and struggled to “understand[] where
[the police] got a lot of the charges from.” Tr. Vol. III p. 211. Later in her deposition, A.R. emphasized that,
when it came to the sexual encounter at the residence, “it wasn’t [Hunt] that originally mentioned it you
know” and that “[i]t was definitely [her] decision to change the dynamics of . . . the situation.” Id. at 234.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1876 | September 26, 2025 Page 19 of 19
Case Information
- Court
- Ind. Ct. App.
- Decision Date
- September 26, 2025
- Status
- Precedential