Amaya v. Sentry Credit Inc

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 ALEJANDRO OSORIO AMAYA, 11 Plaintiff, C24-0196 TSZ 12 v. ORDER SENTRY CREDIT, INC., 13 14 Defendant. 15 16 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 17 judgment, docket no. 34, Plaintiff’s motion to strike, docket no. 49, Defendant’s motion 18 for summary judgment, docket no. 36, and Defendant’s motion to strike, docket no. 42. 19 Having reviewed all papers filed in support of, and in opposition to, the motions, the 20 Court enters the following order. 21 / / / 22 / / / 1 Background 2 In early August 2023, Plaintiff Alejandro Osario Amaya learned that Defendant 3 Sentry Credit, Inc. had reported to three major credit bureaus that he owed approximately 4 $14,000.00 in debt1 related to a residential lease with Vista Property Management. First 5 Amaya Decl. at ¶ 4, Ex. A (docket no. 34-1); see also Notice of Removal, Ex. 1 at ¶ 5 6 (docket no. 1-1) (hereafter “Compl.”). Plaintiff was surprised to learn about this debt 7 collection because he did not owe the debt assigned to him. First Amaya Decl. at ¶ 5, Ex. 8 A (docket no. 34-1). On August 14, 2023, Plaintiff called Defendant’s office and 9 informed a representative that the assigned debt did not belong to him. Id. at ¶ 7. The 10 representative asked him to electronically send to Defendant his identifying documents. 11 Id. at ¶ 8. Wanting to keep his identifying information as private as possible, Plaintiff 12 drove to Defendant’s office that same day and provided the representative with forms of 13 identification. Id. at ¶ 9. During the visit, Plaintiff was given the “Collection Letter,” see 14 First Amaya Decl., Ex. A (docket no. 34-1), which was assigned to “Alex Osario-Amaya 15 Gomez,” and in which a copy of a lease agreement signed by “Alex O. Gomez Amaya” 16 was contained, see Dep. at 117:1–5 (docket no. 43). He was also provided the “Identity 17 Theft Affidavit” for him to fill out, see First Amaya Decl., Ex. B (docket no. 34-1), which 18 was addressed to “Alex Osario-Amaya Gomez,” see id. Plaintiff was informed that the 19 debt Defendant reported was “linked” to his name and social security number. See 20 Compl. at ¶ 13 (docket no. 1-1). 21 22 1 This debt had been reported in February 2023. See Compl. at ¶ 6 (docket no. 1-1). 1 Over the next month, Plaintiff had multiple calls with Defendant’s representatives. 2 See First Mathis Decl., Ex. 1 (docket no. 36-2). He also spoke with the individual named 3 on the Collection Letter and Identity Theft Affidavit, see Dep. at 128:1–6 (docket no. 43), 4 and with Vista Property Management, see id. at 136:23. During one call with Defendant, 5 Plaintiff was told that the entry of the debt had been deleted from his credit report. First 6 Amaya Decl. at ¶ 19 (docket no. 34-1). 7 Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against Defendant for alleged violations of the Fair 8 Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., Washington’s 9 Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), Revised Code of Washington (“RCW”) 19.86.090, 10 and the Washington Collection Agency Act (“WCAA”), RCW 19.16.250. See Compl. 11 (docket no. 1-1). Plaintiff initially filed this suit in King County Superior Court on 12 January 10, 2024, and on February 12, 2024, the case was removed to this Court. See 13 Notice of Removal (docket no. 1). On June 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial 14 summary judgment2 (“Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motion”), requesting the Court find 15 Defendant liable under the FDCPA, CPA, and WCAA. See Pl. Mot. (docket no. 34). On 16 June 20, 2025, Defendant filed a cross motion for summary judgment (“Defendant’s 17 Summary Judgment Motion”) as to all claims. See Def. Mot. (docket no. 36). In its reply 18 to its Summary Judgment Motion, Defendant moved to strike an exhibit included by 19 Plaintiff, see docket no. 42. Plaintiff filed a surreply, docket no. 49, in which he moved to 20 strike documents and arguments by Defendant. 21 22 2 Plaintiff does not seek summary judgment on damages. See Pl. Mot. (docket no. 34). 1 Discussion 2 A. Motions to Strike 3 1. Legal Standard 4 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), “[t]he court may strike from a 5 pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous 6 matter.” “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time 7 and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues 8 prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). 9 Motions to strike under Rule 12(f) are disfavored and are infrequently granted. Ocean 10 Garden Products Inc. v. Blessings Inc., 2019 WL 396873, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 29, 2019). 11 “Requests to strike material contained in or attached to submission of opposing parties 12 shall not be presented in a separate motion to strike, but shall instead be included in the 13 responsive brief, and will be considered with the underlying motion.” Local Civil Rule 14 7(g). The decision to strike said material rests solely in the court’s discretion. See Ski 15 Lifts, Inc. v. Schaeffer Mfg. Co., 2020 WL 1128207, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2020) 16 (citing Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH, 307 F. Supp. 2d 2, 7 (D.D.C. 2004)). 17 In this case, both Defendant’s motion to strike and Plaintiff’s motion to strike were 18 properly brought under the Local Rules. The Court addresses both motions in turn. 19 2. Defendant’s Motion to Strike 20 In its response to Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motion, Defendant moves to 21 strike Exhibit C of the First Amaya Declaration pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(g). See 22 Def. Resp. at 7–8 (docket no. 42). Exhibit C appears to depict a screenshot of an online 1 notification generated on September 3, 2023, that reads “SENTRY CREDIT INC” and 2 “The information you disputed has been verified as accurate[].” See First Amaya Decl., 3 Ex. C (docket no. 34-1). 4 Because the Court did not rely on Exhibit C in resolving the cross motions for 5 summary judgment, Defendant’s motion to strike, docket no. 42, is DENIED as MOOT. 6 3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike 7 Plaintiff’s surreply, docket no. 49, is construed as a motion to strike. See Min. Ord. 8 (docket no. 50). Defendant responded, docket no. 51, and Plaintiff replied, docket no. 53. 9 In the Motion to Strike, Plaintiff requests the Court strike the copy of an alleged call 10 transcript between Plaintiff and a representative of Defendant, the copy of the collection 11 letter sent by Defendant on February 10, 2023, and any references to either document. 12 See Second Mathis Decl., Exs. 1 & 2 (docket no. 46). Plaintiff also requests the Court 13 strike Defendant’s arguments related to the bona fide error defense under the FDCPA it 14 raised in its reply. 15 The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike as to pages 10–13 of Exhibit 1 16 because they are a transcript of a call between an agent and a non-party. See Resp. at 7 17 (docket no. 51). As to the remaining pages of Exhibit 1 and all of Exhibit 2, the Court 18 DENIES the Motion to Strike as MOOT because it did not rely on these materials in 19 resolving the cross motions for summary judgment. 20 Plaintiff also moves to strike Defendant’s bona fide error defense arguments raised 21 in its reply, docket no. 45, arguing that Defendant raised these particular arguments for 22 the first time in its reply and as a result, Plaintiff did not have an opportunity to respond 1 to them. In his Motion to Strike and reply, Plaintiff addressed Defendant’s arguments. 2 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike as to this request is DENIED as MOOT. 3 B. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment 4 1. Legal Standard 5 The Court shall grant summary judgment if no genuine issue of material fact exists 6 and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 7 The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue 8 of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is material if 9 it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty 10 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the 11 adverse party must present affirmative evidence, which “is to be believed” and from 12 which all “justifiable inferences” are to be favorably drawn. Id. at 255, 257. When the 13 record, however, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 14 non-moving party, summary judgment is warranted. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 15 529 (2006) (“Rule 56 ‘mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for 16 discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to 17 establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 18 party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)). 19 On cross motions for summary judgment, courts evaluate each motion 20 independently, giving the nonmovant in each instance the benefit of all reasonable 21 inferences. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016). 22 / / / 1 2. The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act 2 Congress enacted the FDCPA to protect consumers from abusive debt collection 3 practices. 15 U.S.C. § 1692. The statute imposes strict liability on debt collectors, 4 meaning violations do not have to be “knowing or intentional.” Reichert v. Nat’l Credit 5 Sys., Inc., 531 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008). “A single violation of any provision of 6 the Act is sufficient to establish civil liability under the FDCPA.” Williams v. Columbia 7 Debt Recovery, LLC, 579 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1208 (W.D. Wash. 2022) (quoting Taylor v. 8 Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand, 103 F.3d 1232, 1238 (5th Cir. 1997)). The FDCPA 9 is a remedial statute construed liberally in favor of the consumer. Tourgeman v. Collins 10 Fin. Servs, Inc., 755 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2014); Clark v. Capital Credit & 11 Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e wish to reinforce that 12 the broad remedial purpose of the FDCPA is concerned primarily with the likely effect of 13 various collection practices on the minds of unsophisticated debtors.”). Whether a debt 14 collector’s conduct violates FDCPA “requires an objective analysis that considers 15 whether the least sophisticated debtor would likely be misled by a communication.” 16 Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 17 marks omitted). Whether an FDCPA violation has occurred is a question of law. 18 Tourgeman, 755 F.3d at 1119. 19 In this case, the parties do not dispute that Defendant is a debt collector under the 20 FDCPA and that the debt Defendant sought to collect falls within the statute’s purview. 21 The parties do dispute, however, whether Defendant is liable under Sections 1692e & f. 22 Section 1692e prohibits the use by a debt collector of “any false, deceptive, or misleading 1 representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Donohue, 592 2 F.3d at 1030. Section 1692f prohibits a debt collector from using “unfair or 3 unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” Id. 4 i. Section 1692e 5 Defendant admits that it erroneously attempted to collect on a debt it later 6 discovered was not owed by Plaintiff. See Def. Mot. at 2 (docket no. 36) (“After Sentry 7 was assigned the debt, but before Sentry became aware of the incorrect information 8 associated with the debt, Sentry began attempting to collect on the debt.”). Because a 9 single violation can lead to liability under Section 1692e, the Court need not consider 10 other sources of liability under this statute. See Dawson v. Genesis Credit Mgmt., LLC, 11 2017 WL 5668073, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 27, 2017). 12 The fact that Defendant reported a debt that was not Plaintiff’s is sufficient to meet 13 the materiality standard. Under the FDCPA, a misrepresentation is material if it could 14 “cause the least sophisticated debtor to suffer a disadvantage in charting a course of 15 action in response to the collection effort.” Tourgeman, 755 F.3d at 1121. A tradeline 16 reporting that Plaintiff owed a debt is not a trivial misstatement but one that directly 17 affects creditworthiness and could prompt a consumer to pay an invalid debt, refrain from 18 seeking credit, or otherwise alter his financial decisions. The record also shows that 19 Plaintiff actually expended time and effort investigating the debt, including repeated 20 phone calls and an in-person visit to Defendant’s office, underscoring that the 21 misrepresentation influenced his conduct. Accordingly, factual disputes over whether 22 Defendant continued reporting the debt after representing it would delete it, or whether it 1 “doubled down,” see Pl. Mot. at 12 (docket no. 34), on its collection efforts in presenting 2 Plaintiff with the Collection Letter and the Identity Theft Affidavit are not material. The 3 initial false report coupled with the investigative burden it imposed is sufficient to 4 establish materiality under the FDCPA. 5 ii. Section 1692f 6 Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of Section 1692f because 7 he relies on the same facts as his Section 1692e claim, an approach that some courts in 8 this circuit have rejected. See Def. Resp. at 11–12 (docket no. 42) (citing Thomas v. 9 Loomis-Therrien, 2014 WL 5335913, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014); Muzyka v. Rash 10 Curtis & Assocs., 2019 WL 2869114, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2019)). Plaintiff disagrees 11 and argues that some courts in this circuit have found that the same conduct by a debt 12 collector that violated Section 1692e also violated Section 1692f. See Pl. Repl. at 7–8 13 (docket no. 48) (citing Creager v. Columbia Debt Recovery, 618 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1103 14 (W.D. Wash. 2022); Williams v. Columbia Debt Recovery, LLC, 579 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 15 1211 (W.D. Wash. 2022); Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1516 n.10 16 (9th Cir. 1994)). 17 The Court finds the authorities cited by Plaintiff to be persuasive. In this case, 18 Plaintiff argues that Defendant violated Section 1692f(1), which prohibits a debt collector 19 from collecting on any amount “unless such amount is expressly authorized by the 20 agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). Based on the 21 undisputed facts, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that he has established a violation of 22 Section 1692f(1) “for the same reason as Defendant’s violations of Section[] 1692e.” 1 Creager, 618 F. Supp. at 1103; see also Clark, 460 F.3d at 1177 (“Although we have 2 never squarely addressed the issue of overlapping liability under the FDCPA, our prior 3 cases leave us convinced that one action can give rise to multiple violations of the Act.”). 4 Accordingly, Defendant’s attempt to collect the debt also constitutes a violation of 5 Section 1692f(1) as a matter of law. 6 3. The Bona Fide Error Defense 7 Having found that Defendant’s conduct constitutes violations of sections 1692e 8 and f, the Court turns to whether Defendant is nonetheless protected by the bona fide 9 error defense under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). 10 To qualify for such defense, the defendant must prove that “(1) it violated the 11 FDCPA unintentionally; (2) the violation resulted from a bona fide error; and (3) it 12 maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the violation.” McCollough v. 13 Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2011). “The bona 14 fide error defense is a ‘narrow exception to strict liability under the FDCPA,’ so 15 defendants bear the burden of proof at summary judgment.” Engelen v. Erin Cap. Mgmt., 16 LLC, 544 F. App’x 707, 709 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Clark, 460 F.3d at 1177). The 17 parties dispute only whether bona fide errors caused Defendant’s violations and whether 18 Defendant maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such errors. 19 Defendant contends that any violation of the FDCPA resulted from a bona fide 20 error because it relied in good faith on information from Vista Property Management, 21 which incorrectly identified Plaintiff as a debtor. Defendant characterizes this reliance as 22 a bona fide error under the second prong of Section 1692k(c), emphasizing that the 1 misreporting was not deliberate but stemmed from erroneous data provided by Vista. As 2 to the third prong, Defendant maintains that it had procedures reasonably adapted to 3 prevent such mistakes because its contract with Vista required Vista to covenant, 4 represent, and warrant that all debts referred were valid and enforceable. 5 According to the Ninth Circuit, “[w]hen we spoke . . . of the nonliability of a debt 6 collector who ‘reasonably relies’ on the reported debt, we were referring to a reliance on 7 the basis of procedures maintained to avoid mistakes.” Reichert, 531 F.3d at 1007. “To 8 qualify for the bona fide error defense,” the Reichert court explained, “the debt collector 9 has an affirmative obligation to maintain procedures designed to avoid discoverable 10 errors.” Id. Indeed, Defendant would have to show that it “(1) actually employed or 11 implemented the procedures; and (2) the procedures are reasonably adapted to avoid the 12 specific errors at issue.” Frias v. Patenaude & Felix APC, 2022 WL 136816, at *5 (W.D. 13 Wash. Jan. 14, 2022) (citing Reichert, 531 F.3d at 1006). As the Ninth Circuit noted, “[i]f 14 the bona fide error defense is to have any meaning in the context of the strict liability 15 statute, then a showing of ‘procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error’ must 16 require more than a mere assertion to that effect. The procedures themselves must be 17 explained, along with the manner in which they were adapted to avoid the error.” 18 Reichert, 531 F.3d at 1007 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c)). 19 Defendant fails as a matter of law to establish that it employed procedures 20 reasonably adapted to avoid mistakenly listing Plaintiff as a debtor. Its reliance on Vista’s 21 contractual warranty that debts referred for collection were valid does not constitute a 22 procedure under the FDCPA. See Reichert, 531 F.3d at 1006–07 (discussing Wilhelm v. 1 Credico, Inc., 519 F.3d 416, 421 (8th Cir. 2008), in which the Eighth Circuit affirmed 2 summary judgment for a debt collection agency that demonstrated employees had been 3 instructed to segregate principal and interest to avoid “interest on interest” errors, and 4 contrasting that showing with defendant National Credit Systems’ reliance on a creditor’s 5 past accuracy and a manager’s affidavit, which the Ninth Circuit held insufficient). 6 Unlike the concrete safeguards in Wilhelm, Defendant here identifies no internal 7 procedure designed to prevent the reporting of a debt not owed; rather, it attempts to 8 outsource responsibility to the creditor. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to establish its 9 bona fide error defense, and Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on his FDCPA 10 claims as to liability. 11 4. The Washington Collection Agency Act and The Washington Consumer Protection Act 12 Plaintiff also asserts per se CPA claims3 predicated on Defendant’s alleged 13 violation of the WCAA. A CPA claim requires a plaintiff to establish: (1) an unfair or 14 deceptive act or practice, (2) occurring in trade or commerce, (3) which impacts the 15 public interest, (4) an injury to the plaintiff’s business or property, and (5) legal 16 causation. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 17 778, 780, 719 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 1986). “When a violation of debt collection 18 regulations occurs,” including WCAA violations, such a violation “constitutes a per se 19 violation of the CPA.” Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 166 Wash. 2d 27, 53, 204 20 21 3 Plaintiff has withdrawn any claim related to RCW 19.86.140 and the statutory penalty related to CPA 22 claims. See Pl. Resp. at 14 (docket no. 41). 1 P.3d 885, 897 (Wash. 2009). If Plaintiff establishes such a per se CPA claim, the first 2 three prongs of the Hangman test are satisfied. See Panag, 204 P.3d at 897; see also 3 Hangman, 719 P.2d at 535–37. 4 Under RCW 19.16.250(21), a debt collector is prohibited from attempting to 5 collect “in addition to the principal amount of the claim any sum” other than statutorily 6 permitted interest, costs, or handling fees. Here, the parties do not dispute that Defendant 7 attempted to collect on a debt assigned to Plaintiff. See Def. Mot. at 2 (docket no. 36). 8 Defendant argues that the statute applies only to unauthorized add-ons to a valid principal 9 amount, and it states it did not apply any add-ons to the principal amount it was 10 attempting to collect. Plaintiff responds to this argument by pointing out that Defendant’s 11 evidence shows that fees were added to the principal amount, and any attempt to collect a 12 debt Plaintiff did not owe violates the statute because the principal of his debt was zero. 13 See Pl. Resp. at 15–16 (docket no. 41); First Mathis Decl. at Ex. 2 at 25 (docket no. 36- 14 2); see also RCW 19.16.250(21). 15 The Court need not resolve this interpretative dispute because the undisputed 16 record shows that, even accepting Defendant’s narrower reading, it sought to collect fees 17 in addition to the claimed principal. See First Mathis Decl., Ex. 2 at 25 (docket no. 36-2); 18 see also Amaya Decl., Ex. A (docket no. 41-1). Defendant has not identified any 19 statutory or contractual authority to explain the additional fees depicted in Exhibit 2 to 20 the principal debt. See First Mathis Decl., Ex. 2 at 25 (docket no. 36-2). The inclusion of 21 an unauthorized “collection fee” constitutes a violation of Section 250(21) as a matter of 22 1 law. As a result, the first three elements of the Hangman Ridge test are satisfied here. See 2 Panag, 204 P.3d at 897. 3 To establish injury, the injury need not be great, and monetary damages are not 4 required; unquantifiable damages may suffice. Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp., 992 F. 5 Supp. 2d 1116, 1128 (W.D. Wash. 2012). Plaintiff points to the fuel costs he incurred 6 when driving to meet with counsel and to Defendant’s office, and to the time he took off 7 from work to determine his legal rights and to drive to Defendant’s office to provide 8 information. See First Amaya Decl. at ¶ 3 (docket no. 34-1); Flynn Decl. at Ex. 4 (docket 9 no. 36-1). Plaintiff also alleges emotional distress, including loss of sleep, stress, and 10 financial anxiety. 11 Defendant “is right that Plaintiff’s feelings of anxiety, uncertainty, and distress are 12 not cognizable.” Frias, 2022 WL 136816, at *7. The same is not so, however, for lost 13 time and expenses Plaintiff incurred in seeking legal counsel and responding to 14 Defendant’s actions. See, e.g., id. (finding time taken away from work and expenses 15 incurred in seeking legal counsel cognizable injuries); see also Frias v. Asset Foreclosure 16 Servs., Inc., 181 Wash. 2d 412, 431, 334 P.3d 529, 538 (Wash. 2014) (citing Panag, 116 17 Wash. 2d at 55–57) (“Where a business demands payment not lawfully due, the 18 consumer can claim injury for expenses he or she incurred in responding, even if the 19 consumer did not remit the payment demanded.”). Plaintiff thus established the injury 20 and causation elements and is entitled to summary judgment on his CPA and therefore 21 WCAA claims as a matter of law. 22 1 Conclusion 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS: 3 (1) Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, docket no. 34, is 4 GRANTED, and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, docket no. 36, is 5 DENIED4. 6 (2) Defendant’s motion to strike, docket no. 42, is DENIED as MOOT. 7 Plaintiff’s motion to strike, docket no. 49, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as 8 MOOT. 9 (3) Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file, by September 12, 2025, an offer of proof of 10 any actual and statutory damages in this matter. 11 (4) The current trial date, November 3, 2025, and all remaining deadlines are 12 VACATED. The parties are DIRECTED to meet and confer and attempt to settle this 13 case within 30 days of the entry of this Order. The parties are ORDERED to submit a 14 joint status report addressing the status of the case on or before October 14, 2025. 15 (5) The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 Dated this 4th day of September, 2025. 18 19 20 4 In Plaintiff’s Complaint, he also asserted a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, see Compl. at 7 (docket no. 21 1-1), and requested injunctive relief under the CPA, RCW 19.86.090, see id. at 8–9. Neither party addressed either of these claims in their summary judgment briefing. See Mots. (docket nos. 34 & 36). 22 The Court therefore does not address either claim in this Order. 1 A 2 Thomas S. Zilly United States District Judge 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22