Andrea Wood v. Jansen Wood, et al.

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 ANDREA WOOD, Case No. 3:25-cv-00180-ART-CSD 5 Plaintiff, v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 6 JANSEN WOOD, et al., (ECF No. 23) 7 Defendants. 8 9 Pro se Plaintiff Andrea Wood sues her siblings Jansen Wood and Melissa 10 Wood over the management of their father’s estate, bringing claims sounding in 11 tort, contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and the federal Constitution. (ECF No. 7.) 12 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss claiming, among other things, that the Court 13 lacks personal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 23.) Plaintiff has since submitted multiple 14 filings responsive to the motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 32, 33, 34, 95, 112, 116, 15 129), including a motion to strike (ECF No. 38). The Court now denies Plaintiff’s 16 motion to strike (ECF No. 38) and grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (ECF 17 No. 23.) 18 I. DISCUSSION 19 A. Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s motion to dismiss is 20 denied. (ECF No. 38.) 21 Under Rule 12(f), “The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient 22 defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” “The 23 function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money 24 that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues 25 prior to trial....” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir.1993) 26 (quotation marks, citation, and first alteration omitted), rev'd on other grounds by 27 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 28 1 The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to strike. (ECF No. 38.) Construing 2 Plaintiff’s pro se motion liberally, she alleges in essence that Defendants’ motion 3 to dismiss constitutes an “insufficient defense.” See Hall v. Turner, 924 F.2d 1062 4 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). Judge Denney has found that Defendants’ motion to dismiss 5 raises substantial and persuasive arguments regarding personal jurisdiction, 6 subject matter jurisdiction, service, and compliance with Rule 8. (ECF No. 54.) 7 Taking into account the parties’ heavy briefing of both the procedural and 8 substantive aspects of the motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 32, 33, 34, 37, 95, 112, 9 116, 129), and their briefing of Plaintiff’s motion to strike (ECF Nos. 37, 47), the 10 Court concurs with Judge Denney. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is far from 11 “spurious.” Fantasy, 984 F.2d at 1527. It should be evaluated on the merits, and 12 in fact, on the merits it succeeds. See infra, Section I.B. 13 B. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. (ECF No. 23.) 14 Although the defendant is the moving party on a motion to dismiss, the 15 plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. See KVOS, Inc. 16 v. Assoc. Press, 299 U.S. 269, 278 (1936). The plaintiff need only make a prima 17 facie showing of jurisdiction to avoid the defendant's motion to dismiss. Omeluk 18 v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 268 (9th Cir.1995); Data Disc, 19 Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir.1977). In determining 20 whether Plaintiff has met this burden, uncontroverted allegations in Plaintiff’s 21 complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in 22 the parties' affidavits must be resolved in Plaintiff’s favor. AT & T v. Compagnie 23 Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir.1996). 24 Personal jurisdiction must comport with the state long-arm statute, and 25 with the requirements of due process. Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 269. Because Nevada's 26 long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction to the same extent as the 27 Constitution, it is sufficient to show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 28 1 would comply with due process. Nev.Rev.Stat. § 14.065 (2001); see id. 2 Courts have general jurisdiction over individuals where they live. See 3 Vontress v. Nevada, No. 218CV01746RFBPAL, 2019 WL 2503948, at *1 (D. Nev. 4 June 17, 2019) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462–64 (1940)). Specific 5 jurisdiction “exists when there are sufficient minimal contacts with the forum 6 such that the assertion of personal jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional 7 notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Waterfall Homeowners Ass'n v. 8 Viega, Inc., 283 F.R.D. 571, 576 (D. Nev. 2012) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of 9 Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In 10 the Ninth Circuit, a three-part test dictates whether specific jurisdiction can be 11 exercised over the defendant: (1) Defendants must have performed some act or 12 consummated some transaction with the forum by which they purposefully 13 availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Nevada; (2) Plaintiff’s 14 claims must arise out of or result from Defendants’ forum-related activities; and 15 (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Burger King Corp. v. 16 Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. 17 Reimbursement Fund, 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir.1986). 18 In the absence of general or specific jurisdiction, courts may also exercise 19 personal jurisdiction over defendants who have given “express or implied consent 20 to the personal jurisdiction of the court,” Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des 21 Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982). These arrangements often take the 22 form of a contractual forum-selection clause or a stipulation. Burger King Corp. 23 v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) 24 This Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants. General jurisdiction 25 does not lie because Defendants reside in Florida. (ECF Nos. 7, 23.) There is no 26 dispute on that point. As for specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff has not met her burden 27 to show that the complaint relates to Defendants’ purposeful contacts with the 28 1 state of Nevada. Many of the acts giving rise to the complaint relate to a trust 2 apparently governed by the state law of Florida, and a Florida state court trial 3 and appeal. (ECF Nos. 7, 23). As for the rest of the alleged acts, it is not clear 4 where they occurred, but there has been no allegation that they took place in 5 Nevada. (ECF No. 7.) In one of Plaintiff’s filings, she argues that personal 6 jurisdiction is proper because Defendants “purposefully stole and directed their 7 actions,” and that exercising jurisdiction over their claims would serve 8 “substantial justice.” (ECF No. 38.) Nevertheless, the intentionality of Defendants’ 9 conduct and the strength of Plaintiff’s claims cannot establish personal 10 jurisdiction where Plaintiff has not alleged that the supposed wrongs arise out of 11 or result from Defendants’ purposeful Nevada-related activities, or indeed that 12 Defendants have ever purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of 13 conducting business in Nevada. 14 Defendants have not consented to the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this 15 case. Plaintiff argues that the Defendants consented to jurisdiction, referencing 16 Defendants’ case management report and pointing out that Defendants have 17 made filings and participated in the case. (ECF No. 95.) A defendant does not 18 consent to personal jurisdiction merely by participating in the litigation, and 19 nothing shows that Defendants have otherwise entered into an agreement to 20 litigate in Nevada. See, e.g. Siren Gaming, LLC v. Arviso, 153 F. App'x 420, 421 21 (9th Cir. 2005); Pfister v. Selling Source, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1116 (D. 22 Nev. 2013). Defendants’ case management report states that “Defendants do not 23 believe this Court has either personal or subject matter jurisdiction to decide the 24 issues raised by Plaintiff’s Complaint, as discussed more thoroughly in 25 Defendants’ pending Motion to Dismiss.” (ECF No. 49.) 26 As this case is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, dismissal is without 27 prejudice. Fiorani v. Berenzweig, 441 F. App'x 540, 541 (9th Cir. 2011) 28 1 (“dismissals for failure to effect service and for lack of personal jurisdiction must 2 be without prejudice”). 3 II. CONCLUSION 4 It is therefore ordered that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 23) is 5 GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk 6 of the Court is instructed to ENTER JUDGMENT accordingly and to CLOSE this 7 case. 8 It is furthermore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendants’ 9 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 38) is denied. 10 It is furthermore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Defendants’ 11 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 129) is denied as moot. 12 It is furthermore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions for default judgment 13 (ECF Nos. 41, 44) are denied as moot. 14 It is furthermore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendants’ 15 response to the first motion for default judgement (ECF No. 58) is denied as moot. 16 It is furthermore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendants 17 to respond to the complaint (ECF No. 119) is denied as moot. 18 It is furthermore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s demand for discovery (ECF No. 19 126) is denied as moot. 20 It is furthermore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 21 (ECF No. 74) is denied as moot. 22 It is furthermore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for submission of 23 summary judgment (ECF No. 102) is denied as moot. 24 It is furthermore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion regarding the personal 25 liability of the defendants (ECF No. 26) is denied as moot. 26 It is furthermore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for the federal court to 27 implement certain laws (ECF No. 112) is denied as moot. 28 1 It is furthermore ORDERED that Plaintiff's request to consider criminal 2 || charges (ECF No. 103) is denied as moot. 3 It is furthermore ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to calendar for a trial 4 || (ECF No. 91) is denied as moot. 5 It is furthermore ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for treble damages (ECF 6 || No. 28) is denied as moot. 7 It is furthermore ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to consolidate (ECF 8 || No. 80) is denied as moot. 9 It is furthermore ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to stay (ECF No. 59) 10 || is denied as moot. 11 It is furthermore ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs 12 || excess responses to the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 35) is denied as moot. 13 DATED: November 26, 2025 14 16 ANNER TRAUM 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28