Anonymous Media Research Holdings LLC v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.

              IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                        
               FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS                         
                      MARSHALL DIVISION                                  

ANONYMOUS MEDIA RESEARCH       §                                         
HOLDINGS, LLC,                 §                                         
                               §                                         
          Plaintiff,                                                     
                               §                                         
v.                             §                                         
                                   CASE NO. 2:23-CV-00439-JRG-RSP        
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,   §                                         
INC. and SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS   §                                         
CO., LTD.,                     §                                         
                               §                                         
          Defendants.                                                    
                               §                                         
                     MEMORANDUM ORDER                                    
    Before the Court is Defendants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung Electronics 
America, Inc.’s Motion to Exclude the Apportionment-Related Opinions of Mr. W. Leo Hoarty. 
Dkt. No. 132. In the Motion, Samsung asks the Court to exclude apportionment-related opinions 
of Plaintiff’s technical benefits expert, Mr. Hoarty, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Parties have fully briefed the 
Motion. Dkt. Nos. 147, 167, 176. The Motion is DENIED for the following reasons.  
                     I.   APPLICABLE LAW                                 
    An expert witness may provide opinion testimony if “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product 
of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and 
methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702.                     
    Rule 702 requires a district court to make a preliminary determination, when requested, as 
to whether the requirements of the rule are satisfied regarding a particular expert’s proposed 
testimony. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 
592-93. District courts are accorded broad discretion in making Rule 702 determinations of 
admissibility. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (“[T]he trial judge must have considerable leeway in 
deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is 
reliable”). Although the Fifth Circuit and other courts have identified various factors that the court 

may consider in determining whether an expert’s testimony should be admitted, the nature of the 
factors that are appropriate for the court to consider is dictated by the ultimate inquiry—whether 
the expert’s testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to be helpful to the finder of fact and 
thus to warrant admission at trial. United States v. Valencia, 600 F.3d 389, 424 (5th Cir. 2010). 
    Importantly, in a jury trial setting, the Court’s role under Daubert is not to weigh the expert 
testimony to the point of supplanting the jury’s fact-finding role; instead, the Court’s role is limited 
to that of a gatekeeper, ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently reliable and 
relevant to the issue before the jury that it is appropriate for the jury’s consideration. See Micro 
Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391-92 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying Fifth Circuit law) 
(“When, as here, the parties’ experts rely on conflicting sets of facts, it is not the role of the trial 

court  to  evaluate  the  correctness  of  facts  underlying  one  expert’s  testimony.”);  Pipitone  v. 
Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2002) (“‘The trial court’s role as gatekeeper [under 
Daubert] is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.’ . . . Thus, while 
exercising its role as a gate-keeper, a trial court must take care not to transform a Daubert hearing 
into a trial on the merits” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee note)). As the Supreme 
Court explained in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of 
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate 
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” See Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461 
(5th Cir. 2002).                                                          
    Despite the above, however, “[e]ven if testimony is reliable, it may still be excluded if it 
relies on information that violates the [Federal] [R]ules [of Civil Procedure].” Estech Sys. IP, LLC 
v. Carvana LLC, 2023 WL 3292881, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 5, 2023).           
                         II.  ANALYSIS                                   

    Samsung argues that the Court should exclude Mr. Hoarty’s apportionment opinions for 
several reasons. The Court addresses each in turn.                        
 A.  Inclusion of Prior Art Features in Incremental Value                
    Samsung argues that Mr. Hoarty’s apportionment rate fails to account for the incremental 
benefits of the Asserted Patents, as required by Omega Patents LLC v. CalAmp Corp., 13 F.4th 
1361, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2021), and Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Rsch. Organisation v. Cisco 
Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2015), because it “includes the value of . . . features 
known in the prior art.” Dkt. No. 132 at 8. Specifically, Samsung takes issue with two things Mr. 
Hoarty does in his analysis: (1) his analysis concludes that the Asserted Patents provide “a key 
enabling step,” but does not explain why or identify any claim elements that provide such a step, 

and (2) in place of what should be the incremental value of the sub-features that accomplish the 
accused functionality, his analysis uses the “incremental contribution of the Asserted Patents to 
those sub-features,” thus capturing the value of prior art features. Id. at 8–9 (citing Dkt. No. 132-
1 ¶¶ 47–48, 55). Therefore, Samsung argues, Mr. Hoarty “failed to apportion . . . between the 
patented features and . . . non-patented features” and did not tie “damages to the claimed 
invention’s” market demand, as required by VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2014). And, as Samsung concludes, the apportionment rate analysis should 
therefore be excluded. Id. at 10.                                         
    AMRH advances two arguments in response. First, as AMRH contends, Mr. Hoarty’s 
apportionment methodology is “more detailed than” other methodologies that this Court allowed 
in Correct Transmission, LLC v. Nokia of Am. Corp., No. 22-CV-343, 2024 WL 1289784, at *3 
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2024) (allowing a “technique of counting entire [infringing] features” 

because the expert “has apportioned to individual features at the level [defendant] advertises”), 
Smart Path Connections, LLC v. Nokia of Am. Corp., No. 22-CV-296, 2024 WL 1096093, at *3 
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2024) (allowing “feature counting apportionment” because the expert 
“apportioned to individual features at the level [defendant] advertises.”). Dkt. No. 147 at 6. In 
AMRH’s view, Mr. Hoarty’s method is more detailed because he not only accounts for the 
percentage of infringing features versus non-infringing features, but also weighs them in a 
manner tied to the facts of the case using Samsung’s “internal cost allocating percentages,” his 
own expertise, and his analysis of how the infringing features contribute. Id. at 6–7. Second, 
AMRH argues that Omega Patents and Cisco only stand for the proposition that a patentee must 
apportion to “only the patented features of an accused product,” and the Court rejected 

Samsung’s argument that an apportionment “must exclude [prior art] components included in the 
claims of the patented invention.” Id. at 7–8 (citing SB IP Holdings v. Vivint, No. 4:20-CV-886, 
2023 WL 6601415, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2023)).                        
    In reply, Samsung first points to the “schematics on which Hoarty relied,” and argues that 
he failed to properly apportion because the “system architectural schematics” he relied on do not 
distinguish between patented and unpatented features, and he failed to account for the unpatented 
features within the “sub-features” he counted as infringing. Dkt. No. 167 at 1. By way of 
example, Samsung points to Mr. Hoarty’s counting of the Fingerprints Database, a sub-feature 
which Samsung contends the inventors admitted “existed in the prior art,” and Mr. Hoarty 
admitted was “well known before[hand].” Id. (first citing Dkt. No. 132-1 ¶¶ 53–55 (Fingerprints 
Database), 57–59 (fingerprint capture, identification, and matching) (Mr. Hoarty’s Report); then 
citing Dkt. 132-5 at 54:21–55:8, 157:18–158:7, 212:21–25, 213:1–5 (Mr. Hoarty’s Deposition); 
and then citing Dkt. No. 132-2 at 37:9–17, 62:16–64:4, 97:21–24, 101:18–102:3 (The Inventors’ 

Deposition). Samsung next points out that both Correct Transmission and Smart Path 
Connections were dependent upon the expert’s apportionment based on “individual features at 
the level [defendant] advertised,” but argues that Mr. Hoarty did not apportion to the level of 
Samsung’s advertising because the advertising referenced discusses ACR generally. Id. at 2. 
Samsung finally argues that Vivint did not address “admissions that counted features” that were 
“in the prior art,” which it contends is at issue here. Id.               
    In sur-reply, AMRH argues that the point of Correct Transmission and Smart Path 
Connections was that “it is acceptable to apportion to features at the level defendant itself 
purports,” and Mr. Hoarty’s methodology is consistent with that point. Dkt. No. 176 at 1.  
    The Court finds Samsung’s arguments unpersuasive. Mr. Hoarty’s apportionment is 

sufficiently reliable. “[A]pportionment can be addressed in a variety of ways, including ‘by 
careful selection of the royalty base to reflect the value added by the patented feature [or] . . . by 
adjustments to the royalty rate so as to discount the value of a product’s non-patented features; or 
by a combination thereof.’” Exmark Mfg. Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Prod. Grp., LLC, 879 
F.3d 1332, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Here, Mr. Hoarty’s technique of counting entire features that 
infringe to reach his opinion rather than attempting to further apportion within the features is 
reasonable given the facts of this case. There is no perfect apportionment, and Mr. Hoarty has 
apportioned from the level at which Samsung advertises the ACR System to individual 
infringing features. The Court finds this sufficiently reliable.          
 B.  General Methodology                                                 
    Samsung next argues that Mr. Hoarty’s methodology consists of (1) determining the costs 
of the Matching and Analytics Servers, (2) identifying the sub-features within those servers that 
implicate the Asserted Patents to attain a “percentage” that do, and (3) applying that percentage 

to the server costs. Dkt. No. 132 at 10. Samsung first takes issue with Mr. Hoarty’s failure to cite 
authority to support that this is a reliable methodology. Id. Then, beginning with the first step, 
Samsung takes issue with Mr. Hoarty’s assumption that the costs of the Matching and Analytics 
Servers represent all ACR costs, when ACR costs are in fact “composed of additional 
components not included in his cost calculation.” Id. at 11 (citing Dkt. No. 132-1 ¶¶ 51, 53, 57). 
In the second step, Samsung criticizes Mr. Hoarty’s counting, and specifically his assumption 
“that the full value of the identified sub-features is attributable to the Asserted Patents”—
pointing again to his inclusion of fingerprinting, searching, and matching, which he admits is in 
the prior art. Id. at 11–12.  Also in the second step, Samsung takes issue with Mr. Hoarty’s 
conclusion that “the identified sub-features are at least as valuable as the other sub-features” 

because he does not explain the premises on which that conclusion relies, namely how the 
Asserted Patents are “critical” to fingerprint recognition or provide benefits to processing ACR 
data. Id. at 12 (citing Dkt. 132-1 ¶ 55). Samsung finally cites Stragent, LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 
6:11-CV-421, 2014 WL 1389304, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2014) (“[A]ttribution of equal value 
to all 19 RAS features is not based on any theory that meets the Daubert criteria . . . .”) and 
Eidos Display, LLC v. Chi Mei Innolux Corp., No. 6:11-CV-201, 2017 WL 1322550, at *6 (E.D. 
Tex. Apr. 6, 2017) (“[T]his approach is inherently flawed because it assumes that all ten steps of 
claim 1 are of equal value . . . .”) for the proposition that “this District ha[s] excluded similarly 
arbitrary approaches to apportionment.”                                   
    In response, AMRH first argues that the Correct Transmission, Smart Path Connections, 
and SB IP Holdings cases support Mr. Hoarty’s methodology. Dkt. No. 147 at 8. AMRH then 
argues that criticisms that attack allegedly mistaken factual assumptions go to weight, not 
admissibility. Id. at 8–9 (citations omitted). To Samsung’s first step, AMRH argues that (1) the 

Samsung document Mr. Hoarty relied on identifies cost categories beyond the two servers, (2) he 
verified that two categories were associated with the two servers, and (3) his analysis accounted 
for Samsung’s categorization of the costs of each ACR feature, not all ACR costs. Id. at 9–10 
(citing Dkt. No. 147-7). To Samsung’ second step, AMRH argues that (1) although Mr. Hoarty 
did not explain what sub-features were implicated, he relied on Dr. Malek’s analysis that did, (2) 
his alleged failure to separate out prior art sub-features re-hashes Samsung’s prior argument, and 
(3) he rebuts Samsung’s expert’s opinion that some features can be removed from ACR, 
explaining why they cannot be “without sacrificing the core benefits,” and (4) he explains why 
the Asserted Patents enable the full benefits. Id. at 10–12 (citing Dkt. No. 132-1 ¶¶ 54, 58 
(pointing to Dr. Malek’s analysis), 12–13, 15–32 (rebutting Samsung’s expert), 46, 48 

(explaining benefits)). AMRH finally argues that Stragent and Eidos Display do not support 
Samsung: in Stragent, the expert admitted he is not a “technical expert in these technologies,” 
2014 WL 1389304, at *4, and Dr. Hoarty is an expert in the technologies at issue; and in Eidos 
Display, the court found that identifying a distinguishing claimed step over prior art, and 
apportioning to only that claimed step, “failed to pass muster,” 2017 WL 1322550, at *6, which 
is the approach Samsung now complains that Mr. Hoarty did not take. Dkt. No. 147 at 12–14.  
    In reply, Samsung begins by arguing that Mr. Hoarty counted features only with respect 
to the two servers, rather than with respect to the entire ACR system, thereby inflating his 
calculation. Dkt. No. 167 at 2–3 (citing Dkt. No. 132-1 ¶¶ 51, 53, 57, 56 n.14, 61 n.16). Samsung 
next argues that Mr. Hoarty counted sub-features as though the entirety of each practices the 
Asserted Patents, when neither he nor Dr. Malek opined that. Id. at 3 (citing Dkt. No. 132-1 ¶ 
54). Samsung continues that Mr. Hoarty, in his deposition, testified that he did not perform a 
claim-specific benefits analysis, and, in his report, he still does not explain what the “key 

enabling step” is. Id. at 3–4 (first citing Dkt. No. 132-1 ¶¶ 45–63; and then citing Dkt. No. 132-5 
at 190:5–192:11, 192:24–194:18, 195:8–198:8). Finally, Samsung argues that Stragent does 
apply because Mr. Hoarty does not rely on Dr. Malek’s analysis to support the value of the 
identified sub-features, equal value among all sub-features, or exclusion of other aspects of 
Samsung’s ACR system outside of the two servers. Id. at 4 (citing Dkt. No. 132-5 at 190:5–
192:11, 192:24–194:18, 195:8–198:8).                                      
    In sur-reply, AMRH begins by reiterating its arguments regarding Stragent, Eidos 
Display, and SB IP Holdings, concluding that there is no rule requiring apportionment 
distinguishing key inventive aspects over the prior art. Dkt. No. 176 at 1–2. AMRH then argues 
that Samsung allocates costs between the two servers, so this is a proper starting point for Mr. 

Hoarty’s analysis, and Samsung has not provided another way to allocate that includes all costs. 
Id. at 2–3 (first citing Dkt. No. 132-1 ¶¶ 51–54, 57–58; and then citing Dkt. No. 147-7). AMRH 
next argues that Samsung has not explained how sub-features could have been granulated 
further, and this is no basis for exclusion under Correct Transmissions and Smart Path 
Connections. Id. at 3. AMRH then concedes that Mr. Hoarty did not apportion by claim, but 
argues that this is not required. Id. at 3–4. AMRH continues that Mr. Hoarty only relied on Dr. 
Malek to identify which ACR features were infringing and then completed his own analysis on 
the value of those features. Id. at 4 (citing Dkt. 132-1 at ¶¶ 50, 54, 58). Lastly, AMRH reiterates 
that Samsung’s criticisms on Mr. Hoarty’s “inputs and steps” are properly made on cross.  Id. at 
4–5.                                                                      
    Addressing each argument in turn, the Court begins by noting that the Supreme Court in 
Daubert clarified that “[g]eneral acceptance is not a necessary precondition” to admissibility. 

509 U.S. at 597. Mr. Hoarty is not required to cite some authority providing for the general 
acceptance of his methodology, as Samsung contends. Second, although Mr. Hoarty’s analysis 
begins with the costs of the two servers, which, when he counts features, takes account only of 
the server costs in lieu of total costs, thereby increasing the valuation, AMRH is correct that 
Samsung’s spreadsheet allocates expenses in terms of those two servers. Dkt. No. 147-7. 
Moreover, in view of that spreadsheet, Samsung has not explained how Mr. Hoarty could 
otherwise have apportioned to total costs. Third, to Samsung’s argument that Mr. Hoarty does 
not apportion out features included in the prior art, the Court has already addressed and rejected 
this argument in Section A. Fourth, the Court rejects Samsung’s arguments that Mr. Hoarty 
should have done a claim-specific benefits analysis and weighed the features more appropriately 

to the benefits provided. The Court finds his methodology to be sufficiently reliable for the jury 
to make further determinations as to the weight and credibility of his testimony.  
 C.  One-Valuation-Fits-All Approach                                     
    Samsung’s final independent argument for striking the entire apportionment opinion is 
that Mr. Hoarty unreliably opines that his apportionment would remain unchanged if less than all 
of the patents are infringed. Dkt. No. 132 at 13–14. Specifically, Samsung argues that Mr. 
Hoarty’s “one-valuation-for-all theory fails to account for the incremental value of the Asserted 
Patents,” as required by Omega and Cisco, and, because of this failure, he “provides no basis to 
conclude that the Asserted Patents’ value is co-extensive, particularly given the differences in 
functionality covered by the claims . . . .” Id. at 14.                   
    However, AMRH responds that Mr. Hoarty explained that he decided the value of the 
Asserted Patents was co-extensive because he found they had a “common core” of benefits, 

which his apportionment captured. Dkt. No. 147 at 14 (citing Dkt. No. 132-5 at 221:21–222:1). 
AMRH further responds that treating patents as co-extensive is not prohibited. Id. at 14–15. 
AMRH points out that Samsung’s expert treated the asserted patents collectively as well. Id. at 
15 (citing Dkt. No. 147-1 at 718–19).                                     
    The Court finds Samsung’s arguments unpersuasive. Samsung’s first argument, that Mr. 
Hoarty’s apportionment does not account for the incremental value of the Asserted Patents, 
overlaps in part with arguments Samsung previously made concerning Mr. Hoarty’s 
apportionment of the incremental value over the prior art, which this Court considered and 
rejected in Section A. Additionally, because Mr. Hoarty opines that the patents share a common 
core of benefits, the value may be co-extensive. Accordingly, the Court finds Mr. Hoarty’s 

opinions to be sufficiently reliable at this juncture.                    
 D.  Failure to Consider Samsung’s Total ACR Costs                       
    Samsung’s argument here—and the AMRH’s response—rehashes the argument under 
Section B regarding Mr. Hoarty’s failure to begin his analysis from the total costs of Samsung’s 
ACR system rather than the costs of the two servers. Dkt. No. 132 at 14–15; Dkt. No. 147 at 15. 
It is worth noting that Samsung does not continue to raise this as a separate ground in its Reply. 
Dkt. No. 167. Accordingly, the Court has already addressed and rejected this argument.  
                            Il.    CONCLUSION 
     For the preceding reasons, the Court DENIES Samsung’s Motion to Exclude the 
Apportionment-Related Opinions of Mr. W. Leo Hoarty. Dkt. No. 132. 
     SIGNED this 17th day of September, 2025. 

                                         ROY S. PAYNE            \ 
                                         UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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