Anthony Ryan Patterson v. the State of Texas

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11200482","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
In the
                     Court of Appeals
             Second Appellate District of Texas
                      at Fort Worth
                   ___________________________

                        No. 02-24-00483-CR
                        No. 02-24-00484-CR
                        No. 02-24-00485-CR
                        No. 02-24-00486-CR
                        No. 02-24-00487-CR
                   ___________________________

              ANTHONY RYAN PATTERSON, Appellant

                                 V.

                       THE STATE OF TEXAS


                   On Appeal from the 78th District Court
                          Wichita County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. DC78-CR2023-0552-4, DC78-CR2023-0552-5, DC78-CR2023-
            0552-6, DC78-CR2023-0552-7, DC78-CR2023-0552-10

                 Before Kerr, Womack, and Walker, JJ.
                 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Anthony Ryan Patterson appeals his five convictions for trafficking

Macy (Count 4), indecency by exposure with Macy (Counts 5 and 7) and Maribel

(Count 6), and sexual performance by Macy (Count 10) concerning two incidents in

November and December 2017. 1 Patterson raises five issues: (1) his convictions for

human trafficking and its predicate offenses violated his double-jeopardy rights, see

Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 20A.02(a)(7)(B), (I), 21.11, 43.25; (2)–(3) the evidence was

legally insufficient to support his sexual-performance conviction; (4) the trial court’s

introduction of a document the State called the “Halloween candy” cover story

violated his confrontation rights; and (5) the trial court improperly allowed a forensic

interviewer—instead of Mother—to testify as an outcry witness, see Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 38.072. We will affirm.

                                    I. Background

      After a multi-agency investigation, the State charged Patterson with thirteen

counts of human trafficking (Counts 1–4), indecency with a child (Counts 5–7), sexual

performance by a child (Counts 8–10), and employment harmful to children (Counts

11–13). See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 20A.02(a)(7)(B), (I), 21.11, 43.25, 43.251.

      1
        We use pseudonyms to refer to the two complaining witnesses who were
minors when the offenses were committed, and we refer to their family members
other than Jandreani Bell by their relationship to the complainants to protect their
privacy. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (granting crime victims “the right to be
treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout
the criminal justice process”).


                                           2
Patterson’s child victims were sisters Macy and Maribel, who were respectively ten

and eight years old during the two 2017 incidents.

      The jury heard evidence that before the two 2017 incidents, Patterson had

hired prostitutes, including Bell, from a now-defunct webpage named Backpage that

was used for human trafficking and selling prostitution. The jury also heard that police

had twice investigated Patterson when he had told phone-sex workers about his

fantasies of sexually abusing children while being blasphemous.

      In November 2017—the first incident—Bell and two other adults drove her

cousin’s daughters, Macy and Maribel, from Vernon, Texas to meet Patterson in

Wichita Falls. Patterson then drove Bell and the two girls to his house. After they

went inside, Bell instructed the girls to get naked in a bathtub, and they did. Patterson

was also in the bathroom with them. At some point, Bell told the girls to “do

everything he said.”

      Bell and the girls left the bathroom wearing towels and got on Patterson’s bed.

Patterson got naked in front of them. Bell then told the girls to rub baby oil on

Patterson’s legs, and they did. After Maribel went to take a shower, Anthony “hovered

over” Macy and instructed her “to tickle his private part,” which she did while he

touched himself. He ejaculated on her. Macy testified that afterward Patterson held a

Bible and told the girls to say “F Jesus.” Patterson gave the girls a bucket of candy

while they waited in the living room, paid Bell, and drove them all back to the car that

had brought them to Wichita Falls. Bell gave each girl $10.

                                           3
      During the second incident, in late December 2017, Bell and the girls were at a

family party. Bell told Macy that there was someone outside who wanted to meet her.

Macy went outside. When she arrived at a waiting car, Macy saw the two people who

had previously taken her to meet Patterson, and she tried to run back inside. But Bell

grabbed her and pulled her into the car.

      Bell and Macy were again driven to meet Patterson in Wichita Falls, and he

drove them to his house. This time, Macy, Bell, and Patterson got naked on his bed.

Macy described Bell as putting “red candy stuff . . . on [Patterson’s] private part.” She

“was instructed to put [her] mouth down there,” which she did. Macy then went to

the living room. After that, Patterson drove Macy and Bell to meet the other two

people, who drove Macy home.

      That night, Mother questioned the girls, and they reluctantly told her some of

what had happened to them in November. A few days later, Mother called the police.

In March 2018, forensic interviewer Denise Roberts spoke with the girls. The girls

named Bell but could only describe Patterson’s appearance and identify his first name.

      The police eventually arrested Bell. In a recorded jail call to her family, Bell said

that she would get “Anthony” to pay for her bail and lawyer. She also repeatedly tried

calling Patterson from jail. Consequently, the police identified Patterson and learned

that he was paying for Bell’s legal expenses.

      After Bell’s release, she initially agreed to meet with an investigator, but she

went “dark.” Bell was later indicted for human trafficking, and she was again arrested.

                                            4
Police drove Bell directly from the jail to her apartment, where she gave them a

one-page document—what she called a letter and the State called the “Halloween

candy cover story”—containing what appeared to be scripted answers in the first

person about two children who had been taken to a masseuse’s client’s house. The

first five paragraphs read:

       I knew a client of mine had a lot of Hallloween caandy left over so I
       thought it would be a good thing to bring them over and let them enjoy
       some candy because I knew they didn’t get that type of treatment at
       home. They are like my little grrls and I’ve always taken care of them. So
       while we were there I showed them around the house and they had
       never seen a baathtub so big before. It had water jetts all in it. They
       wanted to get into it so I let them. I guess I just thought it would be a
       good experience considering where they are coming from.

             Afterwards they sat in the living room eating caandy and him and
       I had a sexual encoounter massage. Now whether or not they came in
       the room to watch us I don’t know. I was under the impression the door
       was locked . . . But there was absolutely no iintent on my part of
       anything like what I’m accused of.

             Now I told the mom that I had brought them over there. I was
       even transparent with her on what had happened with the encoounter.
       She came up with an idea to see if she could get more money if she
       could involve her D’s. She asked me this I’m assume because she’s
       strung out on drugs. . . . . I told her absolutely not. She kept persisting
       and persisting and I continued to say no.

              The only thing I can think of is this became an idea for the mom
       to get more money and she talked to her D’s about it and it became their
       own reality. What I can tell you is the mom got mad at me about
       ________ and started talking like she was going to black maail me on
       taking her D’s over there if I didn’t get her some money.

              At this point, now I find myself here.




                                           5
      Patterson was later arrested. During a videotaped interview with a Texas

Ranger, Patterson acknowledged that he had a “father-daughter kink” and a

blasphemy fetish. He also admitted to hiring Bell as a prostitute and said that she

knew of these sexual predilections. At first, Patterson told the Texas Ranger that no

children had been to his house, but in line with the Halloween candy cover story,

Patterson admitted that Bell had brought two girls over to get leftover Halloween

candy. He stated, “There was absolutely no sexual situation going on with . . . young

girls.” He also stated that the girls were in a separate room when he “was getting a

massage” from Bell.

      Patterson later admitted to the Texas Ranger, “I lied to you about the girls at

first because it was just embarrassing.” Claiming to have done nothing wrong,

Patterson said that the girls’ mother was a drug dealer who needed money and had

gotten “crossways” with Bell, had “talked the girls into telling” lies, and had

blackmailed Bell, who in turn had blackmailed Patterson.

      The case was tried to a jury, which found Patterson guilty of human trafficking

Macy (Count 4), indecency by exposure with Macy (Counts 5 and 7) and Maribel

(Count 6), and sexual performance by Macy (Count 10) and found him not guilty of

the other eight counts. The jury assessed his punishment at ten years’ confinement for

human trafficking, five years for each of the three indecency convictions, and eighteen

years for sexual performance. The trial court sentenced him accordingly, ordered that



                                          6
some of the sentences run consecutively, and signed judgments of conviction.

Patterson appealed.

                                II. Double Jeopardy

      In his first issue, Patterson argues that his convictions and punishments for

human trafficking, indecency with a child by exposure, and sexual performance

concerning Macy (Counts 4, 7, and 10) violated his federal double-jeopardy rights. He

contends that he was punished “twice”—for the indecency and sexual-performance

offenses and again for the human-trafficking offense, which relied on the same

conduct as the indecency and sexual-performance offenses.2 See U.S. Const. amends.

V, XIV. We disagree.

      The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the

states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects a defendant from multiple

punishments for the same offense. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161, 165
,
97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225
(1977); Bien v. State,
550 S.W.3d 180, 184
(Tex.

Crim. App. 2018); Ex parte Benson,
459 S.W.3d 67, 71
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015). But the


      2
       Patterson does not raise a double-jeopardy challenge under the Texas
Constitution. Consequently, we limit our analysis to the federal Double Jeopardy
Clause. See Ex parte Lewis,
219 S.W.3d 335
, 338–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (analyzing
the Texas and federal double-jeopardy protections); Ex parte Necessary,
333 S.W.3d
782
, 787 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (“Because the state
constitutional [double-jeopardy] right has not been invoked in this case, it is
unnecessary for us to address the protection afforded by the state constitution,
including whether or how that protection differs from the rights provided by the
United States Constitution.”).


                                           7
Double Jeopardy Clause “is not violated if the legislature intended to authorize

multiple punishments.” Ho v. State, No. 02-24-00035-CR,
2025 WL 1197375
, at

*6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 24, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (first quoting Thetford v. State, No. 02-18-00488-CR,
2021 WL 278913
, at

*12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 28, 2021) (mem. op., not designated for

publication), rev’d in part on other grounds, No. PD-0258-21,
2021 WL 2674484
(Tex.

Crim. App. June 30, 2021) (not designated for publication); and then citing Villanueva

v. State,
227 S.W.3d 744, 747
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). And the legislature did so here.

      The human-trafficking statute relies on proving an underlying predicate

offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 20A.02(a). Pertinent to this case, a defendant

commits trafficking when he “traffics a child” and causes her to become the victim of

indecency or sexual performance. See id. §§ 20A.02(a)(7)(B), (I); 21.11, 43.25.

Regarding whether a defendant can be punished for both human trafficking and the

predicate offense, the statute states, “If conduct constituting an offense under this

section also constitutes an offense under another section of this code, the actor may

be prosecuted . . . under both sections.” Id. § 20A.02(c).

      Such language “plainly expresses” the legislature’s intention that an accused—

such as Patterson—should suffer multiple punishments for human trafficking and its

predicate offenses. See Littrell v. State,
271 S.W.3d 273
, 278–79 & n.30 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008); Singleton v. State, No. 05-18-00255-CR,
2019 WL 2353444
, at *2–3 (Tex.

App.—Dallas June 4, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

                                            8
(overruling double-jeopardy complaint where appellant was convicted and punished

for human trafficking and a predicate sexual assault); Moreno v. State,
413 S.W.3d 119
,

130–31 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (same concerning human trafficking

and compelling-prostitution predicate); see also Ritz v. State,
533 S.W.3d 302, 307
(Tex.

Crim. App. 2017) (Newell, J., concurring) (“[T]he legislature sought to provide as

much protection . . . as possible by allowing prosecution for both human trafficking

and the product of that trafficking”). Because the legislature has plainly spoken

through Section 20A.02(c), Patterson’s convictions and punishments for human

trafficking and the underlying predicate offenses—in Counts 4, 7, and 10—do not

violate double jeopardy. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 20A.02(c); Littrell,
271 S.W.3d at

278
. Accordingly, we overrule his first issue.

                 III. Sexual Performance Evidentiary Sufficiency

      In his second and third issues, Patterson challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to support his sexual-performance conviction in Count 10 (either by

individually committing or being a party to the offense). The evidence is sufficient.

A. Sufficiency Standard of Review

      In our review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in a

light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could

have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319
,
99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789
(1979); Queeman v. State,
520 S.W.3d

616, 622
(Tex. Crim. App. 2017). The factfinder alone determines the evidence’s

                                            9
weight and credibility; we may not usurp that role. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

38.04; Martin v. State,
635 S.W.3d 672
, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Queeman,
520 S.W.3d at 622
.

B. Essential Elements of Sexual Performance by a Child

      A person commits the offense of sexual performance by a child if, “knowing

the character and content thereof, he employs, authorizes, or induces a child younger

than [14] years of age to engage in sexual conduct or a sexual performance.”
Tex.

Penal Code Ann. § 43.25
(b), (c).3 “Sexual conduct” includes “lewd exhibition of the

genitals, the anus, or any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola.”
Id.
§ 43.25(a)(2). The statute does not define “lewd exhibition,” but in analyzing

whether a depiction of naked children is “lewd” under Section 43.25(a)(2) for

purposes of child pornography, the court of criminal appeals has approved

consideration of such factors as whether the depiction’s setting is sexually suggestive,

whether it is associated with sexual activity, whether it is intended to elicit a sexual

response, and whether the child is partially or fully nude. Romo v. State,
663 S.W.3d

716
, 719–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).

      “A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is

committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally

responsible, or by both.”
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.01
. “Each party to an offense may

      3
        When the victim is younger than 14 years of age, the offense is a first-degree
felony.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.25
(c).


                                          10
be charged with commission of the offense.”
Id.
“A person is criminally responsible

for an offense committed by the conduct of another if[,] . . . acting with intent to

promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids,

or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.”
Id.
at § 7.02(a)(2); In re

State ex rel. Weeks,
391 S.W.3d 117, 124
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

C. The Evidence

      Patterson argues that the evidence is insufficient because the State failed to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he authorized or induced a sexual performance

or that he was a party to the offense. He cites the “performance” definition of a “play,

motion picture, photograph, dance, or other visual representation that can be

exhibited before an audience of one or more persons.” See
Tex. Penal Code

Ann. § 43.25
(a)(3). And he argues, “No one danced. There is no proof that anyone

took pictures . . . . Nor is there any other ‘visual representation that can be exhibited’

beyond the retina of an eyeball.’”

      But Patterson is merely setting up a strawman argument. As we have quoted

above, the sexual-performance statute requires proof of either “sexual conduct or a

sexual performance,” see
id.
§ 43.25(b), and here, the State offered proof of “sexual

conduct,” see id. § 43.25(a)(2)—not a “performance,” see id. § 43.25(a)(3). Unlike a

“performance,” “sexual conduct” does not require proof of “a play, motion picture,

photograph, dance, or other visual representation that can be exhibited before an

audience.” Id. § 43.25(a)(2), (3); see also Emenhiser v. State,
196 S.W.3d 915
, 930 &

                                           11
n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d) (“Recording the lewd exhibition of a

minor’s genitals on film or other media is not an element of the offense.”).

      Perhaps recognizing as much, Patterson also baldly asserts, “There is no

evidence of sexual conduct by the child”; “[n]o child lewdly exhibited her genitals,

anus, or any portion of her breast below the top of the areola.” But the evidence

shows the contrary. Macy testified that during the December incident (1) she was

driven to meet Patterson; (2) upon entering his house, she “had to get naked”;

(3) while she, Bell, and Patterson were naked, Bell put “red candy stuff . . . all over

[Patterson’s] private part”; (4) Macy was “instructed to put [her] mouth” on

Patterson’s private part, which she did; and (5) Patterson taught her “how to kiss”

while she was still naked.

      After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we

conclude that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

Patterson—either acting individually or as a party to the offense—authorized or

induced Macy, who was under the age of 14, to engage in a lewd exhibition, which

constituted the sexual conduct required for Patterson’s sexual-performance

conviction. See Jackson,
443 U.S. at 319
,
99 S. Ct. at 2789
; see also Nash v. State,

No. 07-19-00298-CR,
2020 WL 2786894
, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 27, 2020,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that a defendant’s




                                          12
inducing a child to exhibit her breasts was “lewd” when nothing suggested a

“pure . . . motive”).4 We overrule Patterson’s second and third issues.

                              IV. Confrontation Clause

       In his fourth issue, Patterson contends that the trial court’s admission of the

document that the State called the Halloween candy cover story violated his

confrontation rights. Because the document was nontestimonial, the trial court did

not err by admitting it.




       4
        In response to the State’s sur-reply—despite Patterson’s arguing in his opening
brief that the State did not prove a “performance”—he asserts that the “sexual[-]
conduct or sexual[-]performance” provision is not at issue. Rather, Patterson claims
that his focus is on the mental-state element—that “whatever the conduct of a
defendant in a performance prosecution,” the defendant’s mental state must be
proven, and the evidence here was legally insufficient to support Patterson’s culpable
mental state. But on this element, Patterson argued in his opening brief that “the
evidence is insufficient to support the very gravamen of the statute, i.e., a sexual
performance reflected in material in which a defendant might know its sexually explicit
content. [Emphasis added.]” Because “material” is not a statutory element of “sexual
conduct”—which the State proved instead of proving a “performance”—Patterson is
improperly attempting to tie the mental-state provision to a non-existent element. See
Emenhiser,
196 S.W.3d at 930
& n.4; see also Sulak v. State, Nos. 02-15-00371-CR,
02-15-00372-CR,
2016 WL 3452914
, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 23, 2016,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (overruling sufficiency challenge
attacking a non-element for sexual performance). Based on the testimony about what
occurred during the November and December incidents, the evidence is legally
sufficient that Patterson knew that during the December incident the conduct induced
was sexual in character and content. See Dornbusch v. State,
156 S.W.3d 859, 869
(Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet. ref’d). The evidence is thus legally
sufficient to support Patterson’s culpable mental state on his sexual-performance
conviction (Count 10). See
id.
13
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

        The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, applicable to the states through

the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Crawford v.

Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 42
,
124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359
(2004); Langham v. State,
305 S.W.3d

568, 575
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI). Once a defendant

raises a Confrontation Clause objection, the State must establish either (1) that the

proposed statement does not contain testimonial hearsay and thus does not implicate

the Confrontation Clause or (2) that the statement does contain testimonial hearsay

but is nevertheless admissible. See De La Paz v. State,
273 S.W.3d 671
, 680–81 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008).

        Although the United States Supreme Court has not defined the outer

boundaries of what constitutes a “testimonial” out-of-court statement, see Martinez v.

State, No. 02-18-00447-CR,
2019 WL 4678426
, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept.

26, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Crawford,
541 U.S. at 68
,
124 S. Ct. at 1374
), the Confrontation Clause “applies to ‘witnesses’

against the accused—in other words, those who ‘bear testimony,’” see
id.
(citing

Crawford,
541 U.S. at 51
,
124 S. Ct. at 1364
). A statement is thus testimonial when it

packages a statement relevant to the issues in a criminal trial for delivery as testimony

at that later trial:



                                           14
      “[T]estimonial statements are those ‘that were made under circumstances
      which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
      statement would be available for use at a later trial.’” Burch v. State,
401 S.W.3d 634, 636
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In determining whether a
      statement is testimonial, we review the objective purpose of the
      statement, not the declarant’s expectations. Coronado v. State,
351 S.W.3d
      315, 324
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Statements are testimonial when the
      circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the
      interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
      later criminal prosecution.
Id.
Florez v. State, No. 02-16-00195-CR,
2017 WL 2471095
, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

June 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

      We generally review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under an abuse-

of-discretion standard. Wall v. State,
184 S.W.3d 730, 743
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). But

when, as here, the admission of evidence involves a constitutional legal ruling—in this

case, whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial for Confrontation Clause

purposes—we give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of

historical facts, but we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to those

facts. See Langham,
305 S.W.3d at 576
; Wall,
184 S.W.3d at 742
(applying hybrid

standard of review to issue of whether statement was testimonial).

B. Analysis

      The Halloween candy document is typewritten with a few handwritten

notations on it, is unsigned and undated, and is not addressed to anyone. It is written

from the first-person perspective of a sex-worker and contains a five-paragraph

narrative and then a series of questions and answers.



                                           15
      Patterson asserts that the State intended to use the document to prove

Patterson’s guilt. In contrast, the State argues that the document does not prove

Patterson’s guilt. Rather, it maintains that the document was intended to provide a

cover-up story or “script” in response to the girls’ sexual-abuse allegations by creating

an innocent story while also diverting attention away from Patterson—for instance, by

describing the client as an out-of-town government employee, who was a “[l]ight

Mexican.”

      “Testimonial” statements are typically formal, solemn declarations made for the

purpose of establishing a fact. See Russeau v. State,
171 S.W.3d 871, 880
(Tex. Crim.

App. 2005). Here, the Halloween candy document does not fall within the categories

of testimonial evidence described in Crawford. The document was not an affidavit, the

product of a custodial examination, or “made under circumstances which would lead

an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for

use at a later trial.” Crawford,
541 U.S. at 52
,
124 S. Ct. at 1364
; Burch,
401 S.W.3d at

636
(“While the exact contours of what is testimonial continue to be defined by the

courts, such statements are formal and similar to trial testimony.”).

      According to trial testimony, Bell handed the statement to the police after

being driven directly from the jail to her apartment. The State points to handwriting

exemplars it offered from Patterson and Patterson’s video-recorded statement to the

Texas Ranger telling much of the same story as is in the document and argues that the



                                           16
trial court could have determined that Patterson either wrote the document or

adopted it as his own statement.

      But whether the trial court determined that Patterson wrote or adopted all or

part of the document, the trial court could have determined that its primary purpose

was to provide both Patterson and Bell with a cover story to further their efforts to

escape criminal responsibility for human trafficking and abusing Macy and Maribel.

Indeed, during the trial court’s hearing concerning the document’s admissibility,

Patterson’s counsel acknowledged that his “co-conspirator, Jandreani Bell, said this

letter was written by [Patterson].” And in his appellate brief, Patterson argues that

“the prosecution [had] introduced a letter written by an alleged co-conspirator who

did not appear or testify.”

      Generally, a co-conspirator’s statements made in the furtherance of the

conspiracy are nontestimonial. See King v. State,
189 S.W.3d 347, 359
(Tex. App––Fort

Worth 2006, no pet.) (citing Crawford,
541 U.S. at 56
,
124 S. Ct. at 1367
). Here, the

Halloween candy document, viewed in context of how it was acquired and what it

stated, does not show that an objective witness could form a reasonable belief that it

would be used at trial to inculpate Patterson; instead, it documents Patterson’s and

Bell’s concerted effort to create a story that they could use to obscure the facts of




                                         17
their human trafficking and abusing Macy and Maribel and to avoid prosecution. 5 See,

e.g., Orona v. State,
341 S.W.3d 452, 463
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d)

(holding co-conspirator’s statements that were made to conceal their crime were

nontestimonial). Because the Halloween candy document is nontestimonial, we

conclude that the trial court did not err by admitting the complained-of statements

over Patterson’s Confrontation Clause objection. See Crawford,
541 U.S. at 56
,
124 S. Ct. at 1367
; Orona,
341 S.W.3d at 463
; King,
189 S.W.3d at 359
. We overrule

Patterson’s fourth issue.

                            V. Outcry-Witness Testimony

      In his fifth issue, Patterson argues that the trial court erred by allowing forensic

interviewer Roberts to testify as an outcry witness because she was not the first adult

to whom Macy and Maribel had disclosed the abuse. According to Patterson, because

Roberts did not qualify as an outcry witness, her testimony regarding Macy’s and

Maribel’s outcry statements should have been excluded as hearsay. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

      “Hearsay statements, while generally inadmissible, may be admitted under

specific conditions when public policy supports their use, and the circumstances

surrounding the making of those statements [guarantee] their reliability.” Martinez v.


      5
       We need not reach Patterson’s additional argument concerning Bell’s
unavailability. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; McCarty v. State,
227 S.W.3d 415, 418
(Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2007), aff’d,
257 S.W.3d 238
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008).


                                           18
State,
178 S.W.3d 806, 810
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Article 38.072, also known as the

outcry statute, creates a hearsay exception in certain child-sexual-offense prosecutions.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.072; Crump v. State, No. 02-24-00063-CR,
2025 WL 18288
, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 2, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication).

       Article 38.072 permits testimony from one outcry witness per event—that is,

“the first person, 18 years of age or older, other than the defendant, to whom the

child . . . made a statement about the offense.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art. 38.072, § 2(a); see Crump,
2025 WL 18288
, at *2; Gibson v. State,
595 S.W.3d 321
,

326 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no pet.). Courts construe “about the offense” to mean

a statement that “in some discernible manner describes the alleged offense.” Garcia v.

State,
792 S.W.2d 88, 91
(Tex. Crim. App. 1990). “[T]he statement must be more

than . . . a general allusion” of sexual abuse.
Id.
In addition, an adult who does not remember the outcry cannot be the outcry

witness. Petty v. State, No. 02-21-00130-CR,
2022 WL 4545532
, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Sept. 29, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Foreman v.

State,
995 S.W.2d 854, 859
(Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref’d) (holding that victim’s

mother and stepfather were not proper outcry witnesses when they both testified that

they had no memory of the outcry). Thus, the proper outcry witness is not necessarily

the first adult to whom the child revealed the abuse but, rather, the first adult to

whom the child revealed specific details concerning the offense. Garcia,
792 S.W.2d at

                                             19
91; see, e.g., Moore v. State, No. 02-23-00152-CR,
2025 WL 353068
, at *6–7 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Jan. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(affirming trial court’s determination that because a child’s prior statements to her

mother lacked sufficient detail, the proper outcry witness was an adult who later

interviewed the child).

      Because of the difficulty that often arises in deciding who is a proper outcry

witness, trial courts maintain “broad discretion” over such decisions, which appellate

courts review under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Garcia,
792 S.W.2d at 92
; Rodgers

v. State,
442 S.W.3d 547, 552
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. ref’d); Foreman,
995 S.W.2d at 859
. Under this standard, “a trial court’s ruling will only be deemed an

abuse of discretion if it is so clearly wrong as to lie outside ‘the zone of reasonable

disagreement’ or is ‘arbitrary or unreasonable.’” Mendez v. State, No. 03-19-00546-CR,
2021 WL 1148960
, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (first quoting Lopez v. State,
86 S.W.3d 228, 230
(Tex.

Crim. App. 2002); and then quoting State v. Mechler,
153 S.W.3d 435, 439
(Tex. Crim.

App. 2005)).

B. Error Preservation

      Before analyzing Patterson’s outcry complaint, the State urges us to consider

whether Patterson forfeited part of his appellate complaint. He did.

      In general, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a defendant must make

a timely and specific objection to the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Wood v. State,

                                            20
693 S.W.3d 308
, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). The trial objection must then match the

complaint raised on appeal. Wood, 693 S.W.3d at 323. And regarding challenges to

outcry testimony, “[m]aking specific objections to each act or event is particularly

important [for] numerous separate and discrete acts of sexual assault, each of which

could have a separate outcry witness.” Eldred v. State,
431 S.W.3d 177, 185
(Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d).

      During the Article 38.072 hearing, Patterson’s counsel objected to the alleged

overlap between Mother’s and Roberts’s outcry-witness testimony for the November

2017 incident, but as for the December 2017 incident, his counsel stated, “we don’t

have an objection at that time.” In his appellate brief, Patterson argues that “[n]either

Mother nor Roberts was an outcry witness to” the November incident, but because

this is not the same objection Patterson made in the trial court, he has forfeited it on

appeal. See Wood, 693 S.W.3d at 323. Additionally, Patterson complains about the

December incident, but he has forfeited any complaints about Roberts being the

proper outcry witness concerning the December incident because he expressly limited

his trial objection to the November incident. See Eldred,
431 S.W.3d at 185
.

C. Analysis

      Regarding the November incident, Patterson contends that “[M]other was the

clear outcry witness, learning about the exposure well before [Macy] arrived to her

interview with Roberts.” But the proper outcry witness is not necessarily the first



                                           21
adult to whom a child revealed the abuse; rather, it is the first adult to whom the child

revealed specific details concerning the offense. See Garcia,
792 S.W.2d at 91
.

      At the Article 38.072 hearing, the State acknowledged that Macy and Maribel

had told Mother about some of the November incident before Roberts had

interviewed each of them. But it asserted that (1) Mother could not definitively say

when Macy and Maribel had described the abuse—that is, whether it was before or

after Roberts had interviewed the girls—and (2) their statements to Mother were

general allusions of abuse that lacked sufficient detail to constitute outcry statements.

      Mother testified that the first time Macy and Maribel told her about the

November incident was the night of the December incident. She said that when the

girls got home, Macy showered, so she began questioning Maribel.

      When asked what Maribel had told her had happened, Mother testified that

Maribel had told her they had been with her cousin and a man and “that she [had]

massaged him and rubbed oil on him.” Mother said,

      I guess he was having sex with my cousin in front of them. And then she
      told me that he told her to put her clothes on and get dressed and for
      her to go into the living room. And him and, I guess, my daughter
      [Macy] stayed in there. And she said she was sitting in the living room,
      which is [Maribel], and I guess he was in the jacuzzi with [Bell] and
      [Macy]. And she was -- I guess they was --

At that point, the State interjected that Mother had said “I guess” several times and

clarified with Mother that this had happened “a while ago,” and Mother agreed with

the State that “there[ were] some things that [she] remember[ed,] . . . [a]nd



                                           22
there[ were] some things that [she] w[as]n’t so sure about.” Mother then agreed that

there were “some things that [she’d] read either online or in the paper.”

      Then, after clarifying what night Mother was talking about and confirming

Bell’s relation to Mother, the State asked Mother what Maribel had told her that Bell

had done. Mother began, “I guess, like -- well -- ,” and the State again told her “[n]o

more guessing.” Mother denied guessing but said, “I don’t know why I keep saying

that” before testifying that Bell took the girls to Wichita Falls “to meet a man,”

although the girls did not know the meeting location.

      The State refocused Mother about what Maribel had told her about the

November incident, and Mother testified as follows:

      Just basically what she was telling me that they was in Wichita. Her and
      her sister [Macy] was in Wichita, and they was in a jacuzzi with a man.
      And he told them to get -- well, he told her, [Maribel], to get dressed and
      go in the living room, and the other one stayed in there, which is [Macy].
      And she said that she -- which was several months later after I had filed
      charges and stuff about the situation, it was several months later, she was
      telling me when I was combing her hair one day that she heard [Macy]
      saying F, F that and stuff. And, I mean, she told me that -- I guess they
      had sex in front of [Macy].

Mother testified that she knew her children and that they would not lie to her.

      The State attempted to clarify Mother’s testimony. Mother testified that the

man drove the girls in a truck and had them duck until they got inside a garage. When

they got to his house, they went inside, “[a]nd [Bell] told them to get butt naked and

whatever he say do, do.”




                                          23
      Mother testified that when Macy got out of the shower and heard Maribel

telling Mother “some of the stuff,” Macy said that Maribel “was lying.” Mother asked

Macy what was going on and tried to get the truth from her. Mother said they argued

and finally Macy told her:

      [T]hey met a guy at the school or the nursing home and he told them --
      no, they got in the car -- when they got in the truck. She basically told
      the same thing [Maribel] said. At first, that she got in the truck. And
      when she got in the truck, they had to keep their head down until they
      got in the garage. The garage door closed and they get out. And they go
      in the house and [Bell] tells them to get naked and do whatever he says.

When asked to give details about what Maribel said, Mother responded as follows:

      She told me that they got naked and they went -- they stood in front of
      him, I guess, and he told the youngest one, which is [Maribel], to go get
      dressed and go in the living room. [Macy] stayed in there. And, I guess, I
      don’t know. I don’t know. I guess maybe [Bell] and him, the guy, had sex
      or whatever in front of [Maribel] -- [Macy].

The State asked whether Macy had told Mother about Bell and the man having sex,

and Mother testified that “[Macy] told me later on down the line.” Mother continued,

“At first, she wasn’t admitting to none of it, none of the stuff, and it took her a long

time to admit to some of the stuff, but she eventually told me piece by piece.”

      The State asked for clarification, and Mother said that Macy described how the

girls gave the man “a massage with the oil or whatever.” When the man told Maribel

to go to the living room, Macy had stayed in the room. Mother again stated that Macy

was not forthcoming about what had happened:

      It took her a while. She -- I had to get it out of her, but she said -- at first
      she was saying that she didn’t do anything with him because I thought --


                                            24
       I guess she thought I was going to get mad at her or something. But later
       on, she told me that -- that he -- she had oral -- [Bell] had oral sex with
       the guy in front of her. She watched them.

When asked whether this was before or after Roberts had interviewed the girls,

Mother testified, “Well, I’m not for sure if everything she told me was before. I

think -- I’m not for sure. I think she told me a bunch -- a bunch of the stuff came out

after” Roberts’s forensic interview.

       Mother then testified that Maribel had told her about the “F God” part after

the forensic interview. And Mother then testified—without naming a specific girl—

that “[s]he had already told me about [Bell] having oral sex with the guy in front of

her. She had already told me that.” Mother testified that the girls believed the man’s

name was either “Anthony” or “Ryan Lane Patterson.” Mother confirmed that when

Macy started talking, her story was similar to Maribel’s, and Mother reiterated that she

believed both girls were telling the truth.

       On cross-examination, Mother acknowledged that the first time either Macy or

Maribel had told her about Patterson was in December. Defense counsel tried to pin

down what things were told that night versus later, and Mother provided little clarity:

       I’m pretty sure everything that [Maribel] said happened that night when
       she was telling me. I’m pretty sure that’s everything that happened. But
       later on down the line -- like if I go to her now, I could ask her a
       question and she would tell me. She’ll tell me some more stuff. They -- I
       don’t know, they come up with more stuff. But the thing is is that the
       things that they’re saying, I know is true because it’s just about what they
       told me.




                                              25
Defense counsel then led Mother through a series of questions about what Mother

had told the police—about her kids being driven to Wichita Falls, riding and ducking

down in a truck, and going into a house where Bell told them to disrobe and “do

whatever he says.”

      Counsel questioned Mother about what Maribel and Macy had told her. Some

of the things Mother confirmed they said, but Mother also testified that

      [s]he told me that both of them got naked. He told [Maribel] to put her
      clothes on and go back in the living room and -- no. At first she -- I
      guess they got in the jacuzzi and they gave him a massage. She gets out
      of the jacuzzi, I’m guessing, and he tells her to put her clothes on and go
      sit in the living room. She goes to the living room, but [Macy] stays.

Then, contradicting her prior testimony about not remembering when Macy had told

her about the oral sex, Mother said she thought Macy had told her before the forensic

interview.

      Roberts testified after Mother. The State proposed that Roberts was the proper

outcry witness because (1) she had testified in greater detail than Mother and

(2) Mother had testified with uncertainty and speculation.

      The situation is similar to that found in Maybin v. State, in which the parties

contested whether the child victims’ mother or forensic interviewers were the proper

outcry witnesses. No. 03-22-00414-CR,
2023 WL 5437164
, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin

Aug. 24, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In Maybin, the

children had first spoken to their mother, but “she could not remember exactly what

the children had told her, alluded that they had shared more details with her after the

                                          26
forensic interview than they had initially, and testified that she had forgotten and

blocked out the details.” Id. at *4. The court determined that the interviewers were the

proper outcry witnesses. Id.; see also Reynolds v. State,
227 S.W.3d 355, 370
(Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (holding that “wavering” and “equivocal” testimony from a

mother that included “I think” and “I don’t remember” authorized a trial court to

conclude that the child “did not report in a discernible manner either of the alleged

offenses to [her] or that [she] could not remember what she was told”).

      Here, Mother gave inconsistent and vacillating testimony about what she had

heard and when she had learned the details from each daughter about the November

incident, and she admitted that she learned some of the details after the forensic

interview. Her testimony was also speculative; twenty times she specifically said she

was guessing.

      On this record, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that (1) Mother

could not recall when she learned the details of the November incident—and had

learned some after the forensic interview, including from media sources; and

(2) Macy’s and Maribel’s prior disclosures to Mother lacked sufficient detail to qualify

as outcry statements and that their true outcry was to Roberts. See Garcia,
792 S.W.2d

at 91
; Maybin,
2023 WL 5437164
, at *4; cf. Reynolds,
227 S.W.3d at 370
. Thus, we

cannot conclude that the trial court abused its broad discretion by allowing Roberts’s

outcry-witness testimony. See Garcia,
792 S.W.2d at 92
; Venancio v. State,



                                           27
Nos. 02-21-00147-CR, 02-21-00148-CR,
2022 WL 17687436
, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Dec. 15, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

       But even if we were to assume that the trial court abused its discretion by

allowing Roberts to testify as an outcry witness, the error would be harmless. See Nino

v. State,
223 S.W.3d 749, 754
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)

(explaining that error in designating an outcry witness is reversible only if it affects the

appellant’s substantial rights). The improper admission of an outcry witness’s

testimony is harmless when the victim testifies about the same instances of abuse.

Petty,
2022 WL 4545532
, at *7; Thomas v. State,
1 S.W.3d 138, 142
(Tex. App.—

Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d).

       In its brief, the State summarized Roberts’s and the girls’ testimony about

Patterson’s conduct during the November incident to show its cumulative nature:

          Roberts’s Testimony                            The Girls’ Testimony
Macy disclosed that in November 2017,          Macy testified that after Bell said she was
Bell told the girls that she was taking        taking them out to eat, she took them
them out to eat, but instead took them         from their house in Vernon to a school in
from their house in Vernon to a school in      Wichita Falls.
Wichita Falls.
Macy disclosed that other adults, a            Macy testified that a male named
woman named Kamisha and the male               “Gentry” drove her to Wichita Falls.
driver known as “Gentry,” also made the        Another adult, Kamisha, also rode with
trip.                                          them.
Macy disclosed that upon arriving in           Macy testified that upon getting to
Wichita Falls, Bell and the girls had          Wichita Falls, she rode with Bell and
ridden in a black truck with “Anthony” to      “Anthony” in a black truck to his house
a house while Bell and “Anthony”               while being instructed to duck.


                                            28
instructed them to duck.
Macy said that upon arriving, Bell told the Macy testified that at Bell’s instruction,
girls to take their clothes off and get in a the girls got naked in a jacuzzi.
jacuzzi, and they did so.
Macy said that while the girls were naked Macy testified that “Anthony” was in the
in the tub, “Anthony” walked in.          bathroom while the girls were naked.
Macy said that the girls were told to get Macy testified that after leaving the
out of the jacuzzi, go into “Anthony’s” jacuzzi, upon being told to, she sat on
room, and sit on his bed while covered Patterson’s bed while wearing a towel.
with towels.
Macy said that as “Anthony” was on the Macy testified that as “Anthony” was on
bed naked, Bell instructed the girls to rub the bed naked, Bell instructed the girls to
oil on him, and they did.                   rub oil on him, and they did.
Macy said the girls got dressed,            Macy testified that “Anthony” told Bell
“Anthony” gave Bell money, he gave the      he was giving her money, he gave the girls
girls a “whole bunch of candy,” and Bell    “a bucket of candy,” and Bell later gave
later gave the girls $10 each.              the girls $10 each.
Maribel said that around the time of        Maribel testified that near the time of
Mother’s birthday (in November), she        Mother’s birthday, she rode in a black
had ridden in a black truck to              truck to “Anthony’s” house while being
“Anthony’s” house, and they had been        instructed to duck.
told to duck on the way.
Maribel said that upon arriving at Maribel testified that at “Anthony’s”
“Anthony’s” house, “the girls got naked house, she got naked in a bathtub, and he
in a jacuzzi,” and Patterson came in the was in the bathroom.
bathroom.
Maribel said that Bell had given them $10. Maribel testified that Bell gave them $10.

      Because Roberts’s testimony about the November incident was cumulative of

Macy’s and Maribel’s, any purported error in admitting it was harmless. See Petty,
2022 WL 4545532
, at *7; see also Allen v. State,
436 S.W.3d 815, 822
(Tex. App.—


                                          29
Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d) (concluding that because the victim had “testified, without

objection, to the same facts that were contained in her outcry,” the admission of the

outcry witness’s testimony “[had] not influence[d] the jury’s verdict or [had] had but a

slight effect”). We thus overrule Patterson’s fifth issue.

                                     VI. Conclusion

       Having overruled Patterson’s five issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments

of conviction on Counts 4–7 and 10.




                                                        /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                                                        Elizabeth Kerr
                                                        Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: November 6, 2025




                                            30