Arterburn v. Home Depot USA Inc

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 8 CLYDE A. ARTERBURN, an individual, Case No. C22‐408‐RSM  9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 10 PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. 11 HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC. dba/aka Home 12 Depot, a Foreign Corporation, 13 Defendant. 14 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (“Home 17 Depot”)’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. #29. Plaintiff Clyde Arterburn opposes. Dkt. 18 #43. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established a genuine 19 20 dispute as to material facts precluding summary judgment dismissal of his claims. However, 21 Home Depot’s Motion will be granted as to the claims for Plaintiff’s unrelated injuries and loss 22 of earning potential/wages. 23 II. BACKGROUND 24 25 On September 21, 2020, at approximately 4:00 P.M., Mr. Arterburn tripped and fell at 26 the Home Depot store located at 1100 NE C St. College Place, Washington (“Store”). Dkts. 27 #30-1 and #30-2. Promptly after Mr. Arterburn’s fall, emergency personnel were called, and he 28 was transported by ambulance for medical treatment. Id. Mr. Arterburn alleges that as he was exiting the store, he tripped over a metal basket 1 2 holder which had been placed over a pipe that protruded slightly from the floor. Dkt. #1. Home 3 Depot claims that the pipe was from a previous Emergency Alert System (“EAS”) that was 4 removed, however, the basket holder was placed in the location with the purpose to hold 5 baskets—not to cover the pipe. Dkt. #29. Nevertheless, there were no baskets in the wire frame 6 holder at the time of the incident. Dkt. #43. Home Depot asserts that Mr. Arterburn’s trip and 7 8 fall was in no way caused by a pipe extruding from the floor of the store. Dkt. #29. 9 There is no dispute that the area where Mr. Arterburn walked and tripped over the 10 basket, between a yellow bollard and a wall, was wide enough that he was able to pass through 11 without twisting or adjusting his body in any way. Dkt. #44-1. Home Depot testified that the 12 13 bollard was placed there to protect the edge of the building from heavy equipment, not to direct 14 customers where to walk. Dkt. #44-8. It is undisputed that there were no signs or warnings to 15 customers in the area where Mr. Arterburn tripped. Id. 16 III. DISCUSSION 17 A. Legal Standard 18 19 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine 20 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 21 R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Material facts are 22 those which might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 23 248. In ruling on summary judgment, a court does not weigh evidence to determine the truth of 24 25 the matter, but “only determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Crane v. Conoco, 26 Inc., 41 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O’Melveny & 27 Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992)). 28 On a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence and draws inferences 1 2 in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Sullivan v. U.S. 3 Dep't of the Navy, 365 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the nonmoving party must 4 make a “sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the 5 burden of proof” to survive summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 6 (1986). 7 8 B. Breach of Duty Claim 9 In Washington, “[a] cause of action for negligence requires the plaintiff to establish (1) 10 the existence of a duty owed, (2) breach of that duty, (3) a resulting injury, and (4) a proximate 11 cause between the breach and the injury.” Johnson v. Liquor & Cannabis Bd., 197 Wn.2d 605, 12 13 611 (2021). “Negligence is generally a question of fact for the jury and should be decided as a 14 matter of law only ‘in the clearest of cases and when reasonable minds could not have differed 15 in their interpretation’ of the facts.” Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 927 P.2d 240 (1996). For 16 negligence claims based on premises liability, Washington has adopted the standards set forth in 17 the Restatement (Second) of Torts, sections 343 and 343A (1965): 18 19 A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he 20 (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and 21 should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 22 (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to 23 protect themselves against it; and 24 (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. 25 26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965); Iwai v. State, 915 P.2d 1089 (1996). 27 28 Generally, a business owner is liable to an invitee for an unsafe condition on the 1 2 premises if the condition was caused by the proprietor or his employees, or the proprietor had 3 actual or constructive notice of the unsafe condition. Fredrickson v. Bertolino's Tacoma, Inc., 4 131 Wn.App. 183, 189, 127 P.3d 5 (2005), review denied, 157 Wn.2d 1026, 142 P.3d 608 5 (2006). An invitee is not required to prove actual or constructive notice of the hazardous 6 condition, if the “nature of the proprietor's business and his methods of operation are such that 7 8 the existence of [the] unsafe condition on the premises is reasonably foreseeable.” Johnson v. 9 Wash. Liquor & Cannabis Bd., 187 Wn.2d 605, 622, 486 P.3d 125 (2021) (quoting Pimentel v. 10 Roundup Co., 100 Wn.2d 39, 666 P.2d 888 (1983)). 11 In this case, the existence of duty, injury, and proximate cause are not in dispute. The 12 13 issue is whether Home Depot breached its duty to Mr. Arterburn by failing to exercise 14 reasonable care against the danger of tripping and falling. 15 Therefore, for Mr. Arterburn’s claim to survive, he must provide sufficient evidence to 16 create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Home Depot “should anticipate the 17 harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 19 343A, comment f (1965). A premises owner breaches its duty of care if an invitee is injured by 20 an unsafe condition either caused by the proprietor or his employees, or the proprietor has actual 21 or constructive notice of the unsafe condition. Wiltse v. Albertson's, 116 Wn.2d 452, 454, 805 22 P.2d 793 (1991). At trial, Mr. Arterburn must establish the existence of an unsafe condition, 23 and must prove that the “nature of the proprietor's business and his methods of operation are 24 25 such that the existence of unsafe conditions on the premises is reasonably foreseeable.” 26 Pimentel, 100 Wn.2d at 49, 666 P.2d 888. 27 28 Home Depot contends that it cannot be liable for Mr. Arterburn’s injuries and damages 1 2 because the condition was not unreasonably dangerous and was otherwise open and obvious. 3 Dkt. # 29. Further, Home Depot alleges that the path Mr. Arterburn took when exiting the store 4 was not reasonably foreseeable because Home Depot had “plainly taken reasonable care to mark 5 the intended exit so that customers, like Plaintiff, could appreciate how to properly exit the 6 store.” Id. 7 8 Home Depot’s arguments ask the Court to take on the role of trier-of-fact. Because the 9 Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it cannot be said, as a 10 matter of law, that the placement of the wire basket was not unreasonably dangerous, or that the 11 path Mr. Arterburn took was not reasonably foreseeable. On this record, the determination of 12 13 whether the placement of the wire basket holder was unreasonably dangerous, and whether a 14 warning sign was required, are facts in material dispute which precludes summary judgement. 15 C. Plaintiff’s Other Medical Treatment and Unrelated Injuries 16 Home Depot moves to dismiss Mr. Arterburn’s claims regarding medical treatment 17 involving unrelated injuries. Mr. Arterburn does not dispute that his fall in February of 2021, 18 19 treatment for renal failure in March of 2021, and treatment for his back and neck are not related 20 to this incident. Dkt. #43 at 1. Accordingly, the Court will grant this portion of the Defendant’s 21 Motion and dismiss any claim for damages regarding these incidents. 22 D. Plaintiff’s Future Damage and/or Wage Loss 23 Mr. Arterburn does not dispute the dismissal of claims for past and future wage loss, 24 25 loss of earning capacity and future economic damages. Dkt. #43 at 2. Accordingly, the Court 26 will grant this portion of Defendant’s Motion and dismiss any claim for past and future wage 27 loss, loss of earning capacity, and future economic damages. 28 IV. CONCLUSION 1 2 Having reviewed the relevant briefing and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby 3 finds and ORDERS that: 4 1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Dkt. #29, is DENIED IN PART as to 5 liability; 6 2. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgement regarding Plaintiff’s treatment 7 8 for unrelated injuries, and future damage and/or wage loss and loss of earning 9 potential, is GRANTED IN PART as stated above. 10 11 DATED this 25th day of September, 2023. 12 13 A 14 15 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ 16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28