Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital, Inc.

14-2619 Bank of New York Mellon Trust v. Morgan Stanley Mortgage In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit ________________  August Term, 2015  (Argued:  August 19, 2015      Decided: April 27, 2016)  Docket No. 14‐2619‐cv  ________________ THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., Trustee for the  Registered Certificate Holders of Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc. Commercial  Mortgage Pass‐Through Certificates Series 2007‐IQ14, Acting by and Through   C‐III Asset Management LLC, As Special Servicer,  Plaintiff‐Appellant,  —v.—   MORGAN STANLEY MORTGAGE CAPITAL, INC.,  Defendant‐Appellee.  ________________ Before:  CABRANES, RAGGI, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges.  ________________ 1  On  appeal  from  an  award  of  summary  judgment  entered  in  favor  of  defendant  Morgan  Stanley  Mortgage  Capital,  Inc.  in  the  Southern  District  of  New York (McMahon, J.), on a claim of breach of contract, plaintiff Bank of New  York  Mellon  Trust  Company,  N.A.  argues  that  the  district  court  erred  in  (1) identifying  a  contractual  duty  to  give  “notice  to  cure”  within  three  business  days  of  becoming  aware  of  a  material  breach  as  a  condition  precedent  to  defendant’s  remedy  obligations;  and  (2) concluding,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  plaintiff’s communication of notice of breach and request for cure was untimely,  thereby absolving defendant of any obligation to repurchase without considering  whether plaintiff’s request demonstrated substantial performance.           VACATED AND REMANDED.      Judge WESLEY dissents in a separate opinion.  ________________                                     DAVID  A.  BARRETT  (Joshua  J.  Libling,  on  the  brief),  Boies,  Schiller  &  Flexner LLP, New York, New York, for Plaintiff‐Appellant.    STEVEN  G.  KOBRE  (Steven  W.  Perlstein,  Josef  M.  Klazen,  Lara  Levinson,  on  the  brief),  Kobre  &  Kim  LLP,  New  York,  New  York, for Defendant‐Appellee.  ________________                                  2        REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge:    In this breach‐of‐contract action, plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon Trust  Company,  N.A.  (“BNY”  or “Trustee”)  appeals an  award  of  summary  judgment  in favor of defendant Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital, Inc. (“Morgan Stanley”)  entered  on  June  17,  2014,  in  the  United  States  District  Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York  (Colleen  McMahon,  Judge).    BNY  argues  that  the  district  court  erred  in  concluding,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  Morgan  Stanley  was  not  contractually obliged to repurchase a mortgage loan allegedly issued in breach of  a contract representation because (1) the Trustee’s duty to give “notice to cure”  within  three  business  days  of  becoming  aware  of  a  material  breach  was  a  condition precedent to the seller’s repurchase obligation, Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr.  Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 0505 (CM) (GWG) (“BNY  I”),  2013  WL  3146824  (S.D.N.Y.  June  19,  2013);  and  (2) that  condition  was  not  performed within the specified three days, but two to four weeks later, see Bank  of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 0505  (CM) (GWG) (“BNY II”), 2014 WL 2745011 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2014).    3        For  reasons  explained  herein,  we  conclude  that  the  contract  at  issue  did  not require notice to cure as a condition precedent to Morgan Stanley remedying  breach.    Indeed,  the  phrase  “notice  to  cure”  does  not  appear  in  the  contract.   Rather,  the  contract  contains  distinct  provisions  for  giving  notice  of  breach  and  making  request  for  cure,  neither  of  which  is  cast  in  the  express  language  of  condition.    To  the  extent  a  condition  precedent  might  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  notice  of  breach  is  a  necessary  trigger  for  the  90‐day  cure  period,  that  rationale would pertain only to the giving of that notice, not to its timeliness, and  much less to request for cure, which performs no triggering role.  Thus, request  for  cure  is  not  a  condition  precedent  to  Morgan  Stanley’s  remedy  obligations,  and  the  timeliness  of  a  request  for  cure,  as  well  as  of  a  notice  of  breach,  is  properly construed as a promise and reviewed for substantial performance.    On review of the record, we further conclude that the notice of breach and  request  for  cure  in  this  case  cannot  be  held  untimely  as  a  matter  of  law,  particularly when reviewed for substantial performance.  Accordingly, we vacate  the award of summary judgment in favor of Morgan Stanley, and we remand the  case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.    4        I.  Background    A.  The Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement    The contract at issue is a May 1, 2007 Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement  (“MLPA”),  pertaining  to  an  $81  million  mortgage  loan  that  Morgan  Stanley  issued to City View Center, LLC (the “City View Loan”) on December 29, 2006,  for  the  purchase  of  a  retail  center  in  Garfield  Heights,  Ohio  (the  “City  View  Property”).  Pursuant to the MLPA, Morgan Stanley sold the City View Loan to  Morgan  Stanley  Capital  I,  Inc.,  which,  pursuant  to  a  Pooling  and  Servicing  Agreement  (“PSA”)  of  the  same  date,  placed  the  City  View  Loan  into  Morgan  Stanley Capital I Trust 2007‐IQ14 (the “Trust”), then valued at nearly five billion  dollars.  The Trust was later securitized and sold to investors.    The  PSA  designated  BNY  as  trustee  of  the  Trust  and,  thus,  the  entity  entitled  to  enforce  various  agreements,  including  the  MLPA  here  at  issue.    The  PSA  also  designated  Wells  Fargo  National  Association  (“Wells  Fargo”)  as  a  Master  Servicer,  responsible  for  administering  the  Trust’s  loans  and  collecting  payments,  and  Centerline  Servicing  Inc.  (“Centerline”)  as  Special  Servicer,  5        responsible  for  servicing  any  defaulted  loans.1    On  May  30,  2007,  Trustee  BNY  granted  the  Master  and  Special  Servicers  authority  to  act  on  its  behalf  when  servicing and administering the Trust’s loans.      B.  City View’s Default on the Loan   On  September  9,  2008,  Master  Servicer  Wells  Fargo  informed  Special  Servicer Centerline that the City View Loan would likely go into default within  60  days  because  (1)  City  View  had  received  numerous  notices  of  lease  default  from Wal‐Mart, the anchor tenant of the City View Property, based on methane  gas intrusion into the store; (2) the Ohio Attorney General had filed a complaint  against  City  View  (and  others)  for  regulatory  violations  on  the  City  View  Property, including the failure to control the migration of combustible gases; and  (3)  the  Ohio  Agency  for  Toxic  Substances  &  Disease  Registry  had  determined  that conditions at the City View Property amounted to an urgent public hazard.   On September 15, 2008, Wal‐Mart in fact closed its City View Property store and,                                                 1   On  May  10,  2010,  pursuant  to  transactions  not  relevant  here,  C‐III  Asset  Management  LLC  replaced  Centerline  as  the  Trust’s  Special  Servicer.    For  purposes  of  this  appeal,  we  need  only  refer  herein  to  the  “Special  Servicer,”  without regard to the specific entity then serving in that capacity.    6        soon  after,  canceled  its  lease.    On  November  8,  2008,  City  View  defaulted  on  a  mortgage‐loan payment.  Four days later, Wells Fargo transferred the City View  Loan to Centerline for special servicing.   C.  Notice of Breach and Request for Cure      Upon transfer, Centerline’s Director of Special Servicing, Jennifer Wilkicki,  began  investigating  Morgan  Stanley’s  possible  breach  of  the  MLPA.2    On  February  16,  2009,  Wilkicki  sent  a  document  captioned  “Representation  and  Warranty  Claim”  to  Centerline’s  Associate  General  Counsel,  Jenna  Unell.    That  four‐page document appears to be a draft notice of breach to the Seller in that its  opening  sentence  states  as  follows:  “The  Special  Servicer  believes  it  has  discovered a Material Breach of the Seller’s Representations and Warranties and  hereby  provides  notice  as  required  by  the  governing  Pooling  and  Servicing                                                 2 As the district court detailed, Wilkicki was not then totally unfamiliar with the  City  View  Loan.    Prior  to  securitization,  Centerline  (and  its  predecessor)  had  acted  as  Interim  Servicer  at  Morgan  Stanley’s  behest.    Centerline’s  parent  company was  then  evaluating  whether to  invest  in  the  Trust,  and Wilkicki  was  among the Centerline employees who conducted due diligence.  See BNY I, 2013  WL 3146824, at  *3,  *25.   The district  court  explained  why  the  Trustee cannot  be  charged  with  knowledge  obtained  by  Centerline  when  not  acting  on  its  behalf,  see id. at *25–29, and the parties do not argue otherwise on this appeal.  Thus, we  do not discuss that further.        7        Agreement.”    J.A.  896.    The  document  proceeds  to  identify  “Representation/Warranty  (12)”  as  the  provision  breached  insofar  as  Morgan  Stanley had represented that it had “no knowledge of any material and adverse  environmental  condition  or  circumstance”  affecting  the  City  View  Property  not  disclosed  in  a  referenced  Environmental  Report  when  it  had,  in  fact,  learned  otherwise.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).3  The document supports this  conclusion  by  citing  Morgan  Stanley’s  January  5,  2007  Closing  Counsel  Transaction Summary, which acknowledged the Environmental Report’s failure                                                 3  Representation 12 is entitled “Environmental Conditions” and states as follows:      (i) With  respect  to  the  Mortgaged  Properties  securing  the  Mortgage Loans . . . an environmental site assessment, or an update  of  a  previous  such  report,  was  performed  with  respect  to  each  Mortgaged  Property  in  connection  with  the  origination  or  the  acquisition  of  the  related  Mortgage  Loan,  a  report  of  each  such  assessment  (or  the  most  recent  assessment  with  respect  to  each  Mortgaged  Property)  (an  “Environmental  Report”)  has  been  delivered to the Purchaser, and the Seller has no knowledge of any  material  and  adverse  environmental  condition  or  circumstance  affecting  any  Mortgaged  Property  that  was  not  disclosed  in  such  report.    J.A. 473 (emphasis in original).    8        to address the fact that the City View Property was subject to state regulation as  a  “closed  land  fill”  and  that  the  property  had  received  “numerous  ‘notices  of  violation’  issued  by  the  Ohio  Environmental  Protection  Agency.”    Id.4    The  document  also  details  “additional  facts  .  .  .  to  demonstrate  the  material  and  adverse  effect”  the  noticed  breach  had  on  “the  interests  of  the  holders  of  the  Certificates  in  the  Mortgage  Loan.”    Id.;  see  id.  at  897–98.    Among  these  were  Wal‐Mart’s  departure  from  the  City  View  Property  and  its  cessation  of  rent  payments,  as  a  result  of  which  other  tenants  exercised  co‐tenancy  clauses  resulting  in  terminated  leases,  reduced  rents,  or  discontinued  rent  payments.   The  document  also  explains  that  this  left  City  View  with  insufficient  operating  income,  causing  it  to  discontinue  loan  payments  to  the  Trust,  which  now  faced  the  legal  expenses  of  petitioning  “the  federal  court  to  place  a  receiver  at  the  property,” proceeding against defaulting tenants, and appealing the rejection of  City  View’s  insurance  claim.    Id.  at  898.    Attributing  the  catalogued  adverse  effects  to  Morgan  Stanley’s  breach  of  Representation  12,  the  document                                                 4  On  this  appeal,  we  express  no  view  as  to  the  merits  of  the  Servicer’s  (and,  therefore,  Trustee  BNY’s)  breach  conclusion.    We  consider  only  whether  BNY  failed to satisfy an MLPA condition precedent for securing a remedy for breach.  9        concluded,  “[t]he  Mortgage  Loan  should  be  repurchased  pursuant  to  the  terms  and conditions set forth in the PSA and the applicable MLPA.”  Id.   Three days later, on February 19, 2009, Unell advised Wilkicki that she had  reviewed pertinent materials and agreed “that there [was] evidence that [Morgan  Stanley]  knew  that  there  were  material  environmental  conditions  or  circumstances  affecting  the  Property  that  were  not  disclosed  in  the  Phase  I  report.”    Id.  at  1266.    Unell  asked  Wilkicki  to  call  her  “to  discuss  further,”  concluding, “I think that the breach notice should be sent.”  Id.       A  breach  notice  was  sent  approximately  one  month  later,  on  March  18,  2009.  In the interim, Wilkicki secured an appraisal, which on February 27, 2009,  valued  the  City  View  Property  at  $22.3  million,  a  steep  decline  from  the  $103.4  million  appraisal  of  two  years  earlier.    Another  appraisal,  confirming  the  $22.3  million valuation, was received on March 13, 2009.      Between  receipt  of  these  two  appraisals,  on  March  3,  2009,  Wilkicki  sent  Unell  a  more  formally  worded  draft  breach  notice  and  request  for  cure,  and  solicited  her  comments.    On  March  13,  Unell  emailed  Wilkicki  her  edits  to  the  draft  notice.    The  next  day,  Wilkicki  sent  the  revised  draft  to  her  supervisor,  10        Chris Crouch, who approved it on March 16 and directed Wilkicki to send it on  to  Centerline’s  President,  Paul  Smyth,  “for  go  ahead  to  release.”    Id.  at  1347.    After receiving Smyth’s authorization for release, Wilkicki sent Morgan Stanley a  formal  notice  of  breach  and  request  for  cure  on  March  18,  2009.    Tracking  language in the MLPA and PSA, the notice stated that if the material breach were  not  corrected  or  cured  within  90  days  of  receipt,  Morgan  Stanley  would  be  contractually obligated to repurchase or to replace the City View Loan.  It is, in  fact, undisputed on this appeal that the breach was one that could not be cured.        Approximately  two  months  later,  by  letter  dated  May  11,  2009,  Morgan  Stanley  replied  that  it  disagreed  with  Centerline’s  “characterization  of  the  facts  and  circumstances”  and  “intend[ed]  to  vigorously  defend  its  underwriting  and  disclosures made in the PSA and the Mortgage Loan.”  Id. at 1093.  Thus, it did  not repurchase or replace the City View Loan.      On September 24, 2010, the Special Servicer sent Morgan Stanley a “Second  and Supplemental Notification of Material Breach.”  In addition to alleging more  facts  to  support  the  earlier  noticed  breach  of  Representation  12,  it  asserted  a  11        breach  of  Representation  27,  the  MLPA’s  No  Material  Default  Representation.5   In its December 22, 2010 reply, Morgan Stanley reiterated its intent to defend its  representations,  and  asserted  that  the  Special  Servicer’s  March  18,  2009  and  September  24,  2010  letters  were,  in  any  event,  deficient  because  they  “constitute[d] late notice.”  Id. at 1096.      D.  District Court Proceedings    On  January  25,  2011,  BNY  filed  this  lawsuit  against  Morgan  Stanley  for  breach of the MLPA.  Following amended pleadings and discovery, both parties  moved  for  summary  judgment.    On  June  19,  2013,  the  district  court  granted  Morgan Stanley partial summary judgment on BNY’s breach claim as to the No                                                 5 In  Representation 27,  Morgan  Stanley warrantied  that,  to its  knowledge,  there  was “no material default, breach, violation or event of acceleration (and no event  which, with the passage of time or the giving of notice, or both, would constitute  any of the foregoing) under the documents evidencing or securing the Mortgage  Loan” that would materially and adversely affect the value of the mortgage loan  or  property.    J.A.  478–79.    The  Special  Servicer  asserted  that  Morgan  Stanley  breached  this  representation  because,  by  December  2006,  at  the  latest,  it  knew  that Wal‐Mart was claiming lease default, and yet Morgan Stanley represented in  May 2007 that there was no material default underlying the City View Loan.  See  id. at 781–82.   12        Material  Default  Representation  provision.6    That  ruling  is  not  at  issue  on  this  appeal.    As  to  the  claimed  breach  of  the  Environmental  Conditions  Representation,  the  district  court  granted  BNY  summary  judgment  on  Morgan  Stanley’s  waiver  defense,  but  concluded  that  “many  issues  of  disputed  fact”  precluded  a  general  award  in  favor  of  BNY.    BNY  I,  2013  WL  3146824,  at  *30.   Although  the  district  court  agreed  with  Morgan  Stanley  that  timely  “notice  to  cure”  was  a  “condition  precedent”  to  any  buyback  obligation  for  breach  of  the  Environmental Conditions Representation, it decided that further discovery was  needed  to  determine  when  the  Special  Servicer  became  aware  of  that  alleged  breach.  Id. at *16–17; see id. at *19–22.      After  discovery  closed,  the  district  court  determined,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  BNY’s  “Special  Servicer  became  aware  of  a  material  breach  of  the  Environmental  Representation  more  than  three  business  days  before  March  18,  2009,”  making  its  breach  notice  on  that  date  untimely,  thereby  failing  to  satisfy                                                 6 The district court concluded that the Special Servicer had possession of all facts  necessary  to  investigate  and  bring  a  claim  for  breach  of  this  representation  by  March  16,  2009,  making  its  September  24,  2010  notice  of  breach  untimely.    See   BNY I, 2013 WL 3146824, at *23.  This conclusion is not challenged on appeal and,  thus, we do not discuss it further.  13        that  condition  precedent  to  Morgan  Stanley’s  repurchase  obligation.    BNY  II,  2014  WL  2745011,  at  *7–9.    Accordingly,  on  June  17,  2014,  the  district  court  entered  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  Morgan  Stanley  on  the  Environmental  Representation breach claim.      This timely appeal followed.  II.  Discussion  This  appeal  presents  two  questions  for  de  novo  review:    (1)  whether  the  MLPA’s request‐for‐cure obligation is a condition precedent that must be timely  performed by the Servicer before Morgan Stanley has any obligation to cure or to  repurchase  a  noticed  defective  loan;  and  (2)  whether  it  can  be  determined  as  a  matter  of  law  on  the  existing  record  that  the  request  for  cure  in  this  case  was  untimely.    See  Lynch  v.  City  of  New  York,  737  F.3d  150,  156  (2d  Cir.  2013)  (reviewing award of summary judgment de novo and upholding only if “there is  no genuine issue of material fact” and “moving party is entitled to judgment as a  matter  of  law”);  Phillips  v.  Audio  Active  Ltd.,  494  F.3d  378,  384  (2d  Cir.  2007)  (interpreting contract de novo).  We answer both questions in the negative and,  therefore,  vacate  the  award  of  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  Morgan  Stanley  14        and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with  this opinion.  A.   MLPA Section 5’s Remedies Provision  The  district  court  derived  the  condition  precedent  it  identified—an    obligation  to  give  “notice  to  cure”  within  three  business  days  of  the  Servicer  becoming  aware  of  a  material  breach—from  MLPA  Section  5,  titled  “Remedies  Upon Breach of Representations and Warranties Made by the Seller.”  Thus, we  begin by examining the relevant text, which states as follows:    [I]f  there  is  a  breach  of  any  of  the  representations  and  warranties    required  to  be  made  by  the  Seller  regarding  the  characteristics  of    the Mortgage Loans and/or the related Mortgaged Properties . . . and    .  .  .  [such]  breach,  either  (i)  materially  and  adversely  affects  the    interests  of  the  holders  of  the  Certificates  in  the  related  Mortgage    Loan, or (ii) both (A) the . . . breach materially and adversely affects    the  value  of  the  Mortgage  Loan  and  (B)  the  Mortgage  Loan  is  a    Specially Serviced Mortgage Loan . . ., [1] the party discovering such    . . . Material Breach shall promptly notify, in writing, the other party    .  .  .  .    [2]  Promptly  (but  in  any  event  within  three  Business  Days)    upon  becoming  aware  of  any  such  .  .  .  Material  Breach,  the  Master    Servicer shall, and the Special Servicer may, request that the Seller,    not later than 90 days from the Seller’s receipt of the notice of such    . . . Material Breach, cure such . . . Material Breach . . . .    [3]  The  Seller  hereby  covenants  and  agrees  that,  if  any  such  .  .  .  Material Breach cannot be corrected or cured in all material aspects  within  the  above  cure  period[],  the  Seller  shall,  on  or  before  the  15        termination  of  such  cure  period[],  either  (i)  repurchase  the  affected  Mortgage  Loan  .  .  .  from  the  Purchaser  or  its  assignee  at  the   Purchase  Price  as  defined  in  the  Pooling  and  Servicing  Agreement,  or  (ii)  if  within  the  two‐year  period  commencing  on  the  Closing  Date, at its option replace, without recourse, any Mortgage Loan . . .  to  which  such  defect  relates with  a Qualifying Substitute Mortgage  Loan.  If such . . . Material Breach would cause the Mortgage Loan to  be other than a “qualified mortgage” (as defined in the Code), then  notwithstanding  the  previous  sentence,  such  repurchase  or  substitution  must  occur  within  90  days  from  the  earlier  of  the  date  the Seller discovered or was notified of the breach or defect.    J.A. 454–55 (emphasis added).7    In fact, the quoted language identifies three obligations (corresponding to  the  inserted  highlighted  numbers).    First,  a  notice‐of‐breach  obligation,  which  requires  any  party—whether  the  Trustee,  Master  Servicer,  Special  Servicer,  or  even  the  Seller—“discovering”  a  material  breach  of  representation  promptly  to  notify the other party of its discovery of such breach.  Second, a request‐for‐cure  obligation, which requires the Master Servicer, and permits the Special Servicer,                                                 7  Section 2.3(a) of the PSA contains similar, but not identical, breach and recourse  language.    See  J.A.  121–22.    The  district  court  focused  on  the  language  in  the  MLPA  as  it  was  the  only  contract  to  which  Morgan  Stanley  was  a  party.    As  neither  party  challenges  that  approach  on  appeal,  we  do  the  same  without  considering any language discrepancies between the MLPA and the PSA.    16        promptly,  but  in  any  event  within  three  business  days  of  “becoming  aware”  of  the material  breach, to  request  that  the  Seller  cure breach  within  90 days  of  the  receipt  of  notice.    Third,  a  cure‐or‐repurchase  obligation,  which  requires  the  Seller either (a) to cure the material breach within 90 days of receiving notice, or  (b)  if  the  breach  cannot  be  cured,  to  repurchase  or  to  replace  the  defective  mortgage loan.    As  this  parsing  demonstrates,  Section  5  nowhere  references  “notice  to  cure.”  We understand the district court to have used that phrase as a shorthand  reference  for  both  the  notice‐of‐breach  and  request‐for‐cure  obligations,  concluding that where, as in this case, the Servicer is the party “discovering” the  material breach, it can be said to have become “aware” of the breach (triggering  its request‐for‐cure obligation) at the same time it “discovered” it (triggering its  notice‐of‐breach obligation).  See BNY I, 2013 WL 3146824, at *20.  As we explain  in  the  next  section  of  this  opinion,  that  reasoning  is  not  without  some  force  in  explaining how a common trigger date applies to these two MLPA obligations in  the  circumstances  of  this  case.    See  infra  pp.  30–32.    But,  it  does  not  support  merging  the  provisions  for  purposes  of  condition‐precedent  review.    Indeed,  17        Morgan  Stanley  defends  the  district  court’s  identification  of  a  condition  precedent only by reference to the request‐for‐cure obligation.  Accordingly, we  here  decide  whether  request  for  cure  is  a  condition  precedent  to  Morgan  Stanley’s obligation to cure or repurchase.     B.   Request  for  Cure  Is  Not  a  Condition  Precedent  to  Cure  or    Repurchase    Under  New  York  law,  which  controls  our  construction  of  the  MLPA,  a  condition precedent is “an act or event, other than a lapse of time, which, unless  the  condition  is  excused,  must  occur  before  a  duty  to  perform  a  promise  in  the  agreement arises.”  Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86  N.Y.2d 685, 690, 636 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).   Conditions precedent are not readily assumed.  While specific, talismanic words  are  not  required,  the  law  nevertheless  demands  that  conditions  precedent  be  “‘expressed in unmistakable language.’”  Id. at 691, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 737 (quoting  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 229, cmt. a, at 185).  Thus, “[i]n determining  whether  a  particular  agreement  makes  an  event  a  condition[,]  courts  will  interpret  doubtful  language  as  embodying  a  promise  or  constructive  condition  rather than an express condition.”  Id.; see Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins.  18        Co.,  79  N.Y.2d  576,  581,  584  N.Y.S.2d  290,  292  (1992);  see  also  Israel  v.  Chabra,  537 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Oppenheimer in acknowledging New York  courts’  caution  when  interpreting  contract  clause  as  condition  precedent).   Applying  these  principles  here,  we  conclude  that,  under  the  MLPA,  the  Servicer’s  obligation  to  request  cure  within  three  business  days  of  becoming  aware of a material breach is not unmistakably cast as a condition precedent to  Morgan  Stanley’s  cure‐or‐repurchase  obligation,  and,  therefore,  must  be   construed as a promise.    Certainly,  the  MLPA  does  not  caption  or  otherwise  label  the  request‐for‐ cure  provision  as  a  “condition  precedent”  to  Section  5  remedies,  as  one  might  expect sophisticated parties to do if that were their intent.  See, e.g., Lindenbaum  v. Royco Prop. Corp., 165 A.D.2d 254, 259, 567 N.Y.S.2d 218, 220 (1st Dep’t 1991)  (concluding  that  contract  clearly  imposed  condition  precedent  where,  under  heading  “Conditions  of  Loan  Approval,”  parties  expressly  noted  that  certain  “conditions  must  be  satisfied  prior  to  the  issuance  of  Closing  Instructions”  (emphasis omitted)).    19        Nor does MLPA Section 5 employ any recognized “linguistic conventions”  of condition—such as “‘if,’ ‘on condition that,’ ‘provided that,’ ‘in the event that,’  and  ‘subject  to,’”—to  make  plain  that  Morgan  Stanley’s  remedy  obligations  do  not arise unless and until the Servicer requests cure.  Israel v. Chabra, 537 F.3d at  93  (quoting  Ginett  v.  Comput.  Task  Grp.,  962  F.2d  1085,  1100  (2d  Cir.  1992))  (identifying  notice  obligation  introduced  by  underscored  phrase  “provided,  however,”  as  condition  precedent  to  immediately  preceding  guaranties);  see  Oppenheimer  &  Co.  v.  Oppenheim,  Appel,  Dixon  &  Co.,  86  N.Y.2d  at  691,  636  N.Y.S.2d  at  737  (recognizing  “if”  and  “unless  and  until”  as  “unmistakable  language of condition”).     The failure to couch the request‐for‐cure provision in the explicit language  of  condition  is  particularly  significant  here  because  the  sophisticated  drafters  elsewhere employed precisely such language to establish undoubted conditions  precedent.    See,  e.g.,    J.A.  448  (providing  in  MLPA  for  certain  actions  “in  the  event that . . . the Mortgage Loans . . . are held to be the property of the Seller”  (emphasis  added));  id.  at  450  (providing  in  MLPA  for  agent  or  designee  to  exercise purchaser’s rights “provided the Purchaser has provided the Seller with  20        prior notice of the identity of such designee or agent” (emphasis added)); see also  id. at 264 (stating in PSA that “successor master servicer must assume all of the  obligations of the terminated Master Servicer . . . as a condition precedent to its  becoming  Master  Servicer  hereunder”  (emphasis  added));  id.  at  341  (stating  in  PSA  that,  “as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  indemnification  provided  for  in  this  Section,” indemnitee must “notify the applicable Indemnifying Party in writing”  of commencement of any action (emphasis added)).8    Indeed,  even  within  MLPA  Section  5,  its  drafters  employed  the  unmistakable  language  of  condition  in  detailing  Morgan  Stanley’s  repurchase  obligation.    See  id.  at  455  (stating  that  Seller  “covenants  and  agrees  that,  if  any                                                 8  There is no indication that BNY played any part in drafting the MLPA.  Rather,   Morgan  Stanley  appears  to  have  drafted  this  document,  as  the  same  Morgan  Stanley  Vice  President  signed  the  agreement  on  behalf  of  both  Morgan  Stanley  and  Morgan  Stanley  Capital  I,  Inc.,  the  sole  contracting  parties.    See  J.A.  465.   While BNY, as the named Trustee, is a party to the PSA, there is no indication in  the  record  as  to  its  role  in  drafting  that  agreement.    In  any  event,  because  the  point is not raised, we have no occasion to consider whether any ambiguities in  MLPA provisions are properly construed against Morgan Stanley as drafter.  See  Village of Ilion v. County of Herkimer, 23 N.Y.3d 812, 820, 993 N.Y.S.2d 648, 652  (2014).  It suffices that the law requires ambiguous provisions to be construed as  promises  rather  than  conditions  precedent.    See  Oppenheimer  &  Co.  v.  Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 691, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 737.     21        such  .  .  .  Material  Breach  cannot  be  corrected  or  cured  in  all  material  aspects  within  the  [90‐day]  cure  period[],  the  Seller  shall  .  .  .  either  (i)  repurchase  the  affected  Mortgage  Loan  .  .  .  or  (ii)  .  .  .  replace,  without  recourse,  any  Mortgage  Loan” (emphasis added)).  In short, Section 5 makes plain that Morgan Stanley is  required to repurchase or replace a defective loan only if it is unable to cure the  defective representation within the 90‐day period afforded by the MLPA.  There  is  no  comparable  contract  language,  however,  that  conditions  this  remedy  obligation on a request for cure, much less on such a request being made within  three business days.  See Realtime Data, LLC v. Melone, 104 A.D.3d 748, 750–51,  961  N.Y.S.2d  275,  277–78  (2d  Dep’t  2013)  (invoking  canon  expressio  unius  est  exclusio  alterius  to  conclude  that  contract  language  conditioning  employee  bonus  “upon”  sale  of  assets  implies  that  bonus  does  not  apply  to  distributions  otherwise based); see also International Fid. Ins. Co. v. County of Rockland, 98 F.  Supp.  2d  400,  412  (S.D.N.Y.  2000)  (recognizing  that  “[s]ophisticated  lawyers  . . .  must  be  presumed  to  know  how  to  use  parallel  construction  and  identical  wording to impart identical meaning when they intend to do so, and how to use  different words and construction to establish distinctions in meaning”).    22        Thus, the very contract language employed by the parties undermines our  dissenting colleague’s conclusion that Morgan Stanley cannot be expected to cure  breaches of which it has been notified but for which it has not received a formal  request  for  cure.    See  Dissenting  Op.,  post  at  4–8.    In  fact,  its  obligation  to  repurchase  is  conditioned  only  on  its  inability  to  cure  within  the  90‐day  cure  period.  And, as the MLPA makes clear, that cure period is triggered exclusively  by  “the  Seller’s  receipt  of  the  notice  of  . . .  Material  Breach,”  not  the  Servicer’s  request for cure.  J.A. 454 (emphasis added).    While  New  York  courts  have  construed  some  triggering  events  as  conditions precedent, they have done so only when the trigger is necessary to a  party’s ability to perform the obligation at issue.  See, e.g., ALJ Capital I, L.P. v.  David  J.  Joseph  Co.,  15  Misc.  3d  1127(A),  2007  WL  1218355,  at  *2,  *5  (Sup.  Ct.  Mar.  13,  2007)  (holding  notice  of  disallowance  a  condition  precedent  to  defendant’s  repayment  obligation  because  notice  was  necessary  to  afford  defendant opportunity to cure disallowance within cure period, upon failure of  which plaintiff could demand repayment), aff’d 48 A.D.3d 208, 208, 851 N.Y.S.2d  154,  155  (1st  Dep’t  2008);  see  also  Assured  Guar.  Mun.  Corp.  v.  DB  Structured  23        Prods., Inc., 33 Misc. 3d 720, 731, 742–44, 927 N.Y.S.2d 880, 887–88, 895–97 (Sup.  Ct.  July  25,  2011)  (assuming  that  notice  of  breach  triggering  60‐day  cure  period  was  condition  precedent  to  repurchase  obligation  in  holding  notice  adequate);  Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. v. Bay View Franchise Mortg. Acceptance Co., No. 00 Civ.  8613 (SAS), 2002 WL 818082, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2002) (applying New York  law in recognizing request to cure as condition precedent where it was exclusive  trigger  for  30‐day  cure  period,  which,  if  not  met,  gave  rise  to  repurchase  obligation).    Even  if  the  MLPA’s  notice‐of‐breach  provision  might  be  construed  as  a  condition  precedent  because  it  is  the  necessary  trigger  for  the  cure  period  afforded  Morgan  Stanley,9  its  request‐for‐cure  provision  serves  no  comparable  essential  function  without  which  Morgan  Stanley  could  not  understand  or  perform  its  cure  obligation.    Because  we  are  not  free  to  “rewrite into  a contract conditions the parties did not insert by adding or excising terms under                                                 9  We  need  not  decide  this  question  because,  as  earlier  noted,  Morgan  Stanley  defends the district court’s judgment only by reference to the contract’s request‐ for‐cure obligation.     24        the guise of construction,” Slamow v. Del Col, 174 A.D.2d 725, 726, 571 N.Y.S.2d  335,  336  (2d  Dep’t  1991),  we  here  conclude  simply  that  whatever  triggering  rationale might apply to notice of breach, it does not extend to request for cure.   The  plain  language  of  the  MLPA  obligates  Morgan  Stanley  to  cure  or  to  repurchase  a  noticed  defective  loan  within  90  days  of  the  receipt  of  a  notice  of  breach.  The obligation makes no mention of receipt of a request for cure.10                                                           10 Judge Wesley deems it implausible that Morgan Stanley would be obligated to  cure in the absence of a request.  He maintains that because the Special Servicer  was  under  no  obligation  to  request  cure,  its  request  for  cure  provided  essential  signaling  and  demand  functions.    See  Dissenting  Op.,  post  at  4–7,  7  n.4.    The  conclusion  is  undermined  not  only  by  the  MLPA’s  express  assignment  of  the  signaling function to notice of breach, but also to its assignment of a mandatory  request‐for‐cure obligation to the Master Servicer.  See J.A. 454 (explaining that,  upon becoming aware of any material breach, Master Servicer must, and Special  Servicer  may,  request  cure).    We  need  not  parse  the  difference  between  the  Master  Servicer’s  and  the  Special  Servicer’s  request‐for‐cure  obligations  further  because,  in  any  event,  the  MLPA  has  not  unequivocally  identified  request  for  cure as a condition precedent.  Thus, in the situation here, where Morgan Stanley  is alleged to have breached its cure‐or‐repurchase obligation and the Servicer is  alleged to have breached its obligation to request cure within three days, the law  considers  two  broken  promises  (three,  when  one  considers  Morgan  Stanley’s  alleged  breach  of  Representation  12)  and  compensates  the  parties  accordingly,  taking  into  account,  among  other  things,  the  issue  of  substantial  performance.   See,  e.g.,  Schwartz  v.  Pierce,  57  A.D.3d  1348,  1350–51,  870  N.Y.S.2d  161,  163–65  (3d Dep’t 2008) (affirming damages award where jury found both parties to be in  breach of contract).  25        Thus,  when  the  district  court  held  that  “sending  a  notice  to  cure  is  unmistakably  required  to  trigger  the  cure  period  and  the  buyback  obligation,”  BNY  I,  2013  WL  3146824,  at  *17  (emphasis  added),  it  could  only  have  been  referring to the MLPA’s notice‐of‐breach obligation, the exclusive trigger for the  90‐day  period.    That  same  conclusion  pertains  to  the  district  court’s  statement  that,  because  the  MLPA’s  repurchase  provision  “expressly  refers  back  to  the  notice to cure,” Morgan Stanley’s obligation to repurchase is “dependent on that  notice.”  Id.  (alteration  and  internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    What  the  repurchase provision expressly refers back to is “the date the Seller discovered or  was  notified  of  the  breach  or  defect,”  J.A.  455;  it  nowhere  mentions  “notice  to  cure.”  The district court went on, however, to conclude that “notice to cure” was  a condition precedent that had to be performed within three business days:  “The  notice  to  cure  is  a  condition  precedent  to  the  repurchase  obligation,  and  the  parties  plainly  bargained  for  the  ‘three  day’  provision  in  the  contract.”    BNY  I,  2013  WL  3146824,  at  *21.    We  disagree.    Even  if  the  first  part  of  the  quoted  sentence  might  find  support  in  the  MLPA’s  notice‐of‐breach  obligation,  the  parties  did  not  plainly  bargain  to  subject  notice  of  breach  to  the  three‐day  26        limitation applicable only to request for cure.  Indeed, when it recited that “[t]he  MLPA  gave  the  Special  Servicer  three  days  to  send  out  notice  of  any  breach,”  BNY II, 2014 WL 2745011, at *3, the district court misstated the contract.     In  sum,  because  (1)  the  obligation  to  request  cure  within  three  business  days  is  neither  framed  in  conditional  language  nor  a  necessary  trigger  for  Morgan Stanley’s remedy obligations; (2) notice of breach is, in fact, the exclusive  trigger for the 90‐day period within which Morgan Stanley was obligated to cure  or  to  repurchase;  and  (3)  the  timeliness  of  notice  of  breach  is  not  contractually  limited to three days, we conclude that the MLPA cannot be construed to make  either notice of breach within three business days or request for cure conditions  precedent  to  Morgan  Stanley’s  remedy  obligations.    See  Oppenheimer  &  Co.  v.  Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 691, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 737.  Rather,  timely  request  for  cure  is  properly  construed  as  a  promise,  which  on  remand  should be reviewed only for substantial performance.  See Israel v. Chabra, 537  F.3d at 93.  27        C.   The  Timing  of  the  Servicer’s  Request  for  Cure  Cannot  Preclude  a    Finding of Substantial Performance as a Matter of Law     The district court determined, as a matter of law, that the Servicer’s March  18,  2009  communication  to  Morgan  Stanley  of  notice  of  breach  and  request  for  cure was untimely.  See BNY II, 2014 WL 2745011, at *9.  We here conclude that  the  timing  of  the  Servicer’s  request  for  cure  cannot  preclude  a  finding  of  substantial  performance  as  a  matter  of  law.    In  explaining  this  conclusion,  we  first  examine  the  reasoning  informing  the  district  court’s  timeliness  analysis,  some  of  which  we  accept,  but  other  parts  of  which  are  at  odds  with  the  plain  language of the MLPA.    As  already  detailed,  the  MLPA  requires  a  party  to  give  notice  of  breach  promptly upon discovering a material breach of representation.  It also requires a  Servicer to act promptly in requesting cure after becoming aware of the breach.   But it is only as to the latter obligation that the MLPA cabins promptness to three  business  days.    The  district  court,  however,  appears  to  have  concluded  that  where,  as  here,  the  Servicer  is  the  discovering  party,  notice  of  breach  is  not  prompt if not made within three days.  See id. at *3 (“The MLPA gave the Special  Servicer  three  days  to  send  out  notice  of  any  breach.”);  id.  at  *9  (holding  that,  28        because  Servicer’s  notice  to  Morgan  Stanley  was  not  sent  within  three  business  days  of  what  court  found  to  be  “absolute,  drop‐dead  date”  for  awareness  of  breach, “breach notice was therefore untimely”).  In view of the Servicer’s having  discovered the breach, the district court concluded that (1) any difference in the  obligations’  triggering  words—“discovering,”  and  “becoming  aware  of”—was  “of no moment,” BNY I, 2013 WL 3146824, at *20; (2) awareness, like discovery,  occurs  only  at  the  conclusion  of  an  investigation  of  the  suspected  breach,  provided the investigation is concluded within a reasonable time, see id. at *19– 21; (3) the Servicer had reasonably concluded its investigation and, thus, become  “aware” of Morgan Stanley’s alleged breach (a) by “February 16, when Wilkicki  prepared  her  memorandum”  to  Unell,  or  certainly  (b)  “by  February  19,  when  Unell  agreed  with  Wilkicki’s  assessment  and  instructed  her  to  send  the  breach  notice,”  but  in  no  event  later  than  (c)  “February  27,  when  the  draft  appraisal  came in,” BNY II, 2014 WL 2745011, at *9.  Thus, the Servicer’s delay of some two  weeks  after  the  last  of  these  dates  to  transmit  a  request  for  cure  was  held  untimely as a matter of law.    29        BNY  faults  this  reasoning  on  several  grounds.    We  focus  here  on  the  argument  it  derives  from  the  well  established  principle  that,  where  contract  provisions  use  different  language,  courts  must  assume  the  parties  intended  different meanings.  See Frank B. Hall & Co. of N.Y. v. Orient Overseas Assocs.,  48 N.Y.2d 958, 959, 425 N.Y.S.2d 66, 67 (1979).  Thus, BNY argues, “discovering”  breach  must  mean  something  different  from  “becoming  aware”  of  breach,  with    “awareness” necessarily coming after “discovery”—indeed, after communication  of  the  notice  of  breach  triggered  by  discovery—to  avoid  the  absurdity  of  requiring  a  Servicer  to  request  cure  (within  three  business  days  of  awareness)  before  requiring  the  party  discovering  the  breach  to  give  notice  (subject  to  an  undefined promptness obligation), thereby triggering the cure period.    BNY’s  argument  makes  sense  when  the  Servicer  is  not  the  party  discovering  the  breach.    In  that  circumstance,  it  will  generally  only  be  upon  receipt  of  the  discoverer’s  notice  of  breach  that  the  Servicer  acquires  the  awareness necessary for it to request cure.  Further, to the extent the discoverer  conducted  an  investigation  of  the  breach  that  the  Servicer  has  no  need  to  30        duplicate,  the  latter  can  reasonably  be  expected  to  make  its  request  for  cure  within three business days of receiving the notice of breach.    But,  when  the  Servicer  is  the  party  discovering  breach,  we  cannot  categorically  conclude,  as  BNY  urges,  that  it  does  not  become  aware  of  the  breach until it transmits its own notice of breach to others.  Dictionary definitions  may admit the possibility of discovery without awareness.  Compare Webster’s  Third New Int’l Dictionary 656 (2002) (defining “discover” as “to obtain for the  first time sight or knowledge of” or “to detect the presence of”), with id. at 152  (defining “aware” as “marked by realization, perception, or knowledge”).11  The  conclusion, however, does not transfer here, where, as the district court correctly  observed, the law charges a party with discovery of breach only after it has had a  reasonable opportunity to investigate and confirm its suspicions—in short, when  it  effectively  becomes  aware,  rather  than  simply  suspicious,  of  breach.    The  reason the law thus delays discovery of a breach is to avoid creating an incentive  for  litigation  before  a  party  knows  that  it  has  suffered  injury.    See  BNY  I,  2013                                                 11  Thus,  Columbus  can  be  said  to  have  discovered  the  Americas  without  being  aware  that  they  were  new  continents,  while  Vespucci  can  be  said  to  have  been  aware that the Americas were new continents without having discovered them.    31        WL 3146824, at *19 (collecting cases); id. at *21 (acknowledging that, in complex  circumstances, confirming investigation can take several months).  We  therefore  decline  to  hold  as  a  matter  of  law  that  a  Servicer  who  discovers  a  breach  cannot  be  charged  with  awareness  until  it  transmits  notice.   The fact that the Servicer in this case simultaneously transmitted its request for  cure with its notice of breach does not necessarily mean that the former was filed  within the requisite three business days.  Rather, the timeliness of both notice of  breach  and  request  for  cure  may  depend,  as  the  district  court  recognized,  on  whether they were sent promptly after the Special Servicer reasonably concluded  its investigation of breach.    Where we depart from the district court is in its conclusion that notice of  breach,  as  well  as  request  for  cure,  had  to  be  communicated  within  three  business days to be deemed prompt.  As already discussed, the MLPA imposes a  three‐day  limitation  on  the  word  “promptly”  only  as  to  requests  for  cure.    The  absence  of  such  a  limitation  from  the  notice‐of‐breach  obligation  indicates  that  the word is to be construed more flexibly in light of the totality of circumstances.   See  United  States  Fid.  &  Guar.  Co.  v.  Annunziata,  67  N.Y.2d  229,  233,  501  32        N.Y.S.2d  790,  792  (1986)  (recognizing  that  where  condition  included  in  one  provision is omitted from another, it “must be assumed to have been intentional  under  accepted  canons  of  contract  construction”);  Sterling  Inv’r  Servs.,  Inc.  v.  1155  Nobo  Assocs.,  LLC,  30  A.D.3d  579,  581,  818  N.Y.S.2d  513,  516  (2d  Dep’t  2006) (same).  We  further  conclude  that  the  district  court  could  not  identify  the  reasonable  conclusion  date  for  the  Special  Servicer’s  breach  investigation—or  even three possible conclusion dates—as a matter of law.  Where the promptness  of  breach  discovery  is  questioned,  resolution  depends  on  an  assessment  of  the  totality  of  circumstances,  necessarily  including  the  credibility  of  witnesses  and  the weight particular evidence will bear.  Such matters are generally determined  by the trier of fact rather than the court, particularly when the ultimate question  is  reasonableness.    See  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  v.  County  of  Nassau,  46  N.Y.2d  1028,  1030, 416 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (1979) (noting that “question whether a notice . . . has  been sent ‘as soon as is reasonably possible’ is a question of fact which depends  on all the facts and circumstances, especially the length of and the reasons for the  delay,” and that “[i]t is only in the exceptional case that it may be decided as a  33        matter of law”); Deso v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of Am., 3 N.Y.2d 127,  129, 164 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (1957) (explaining that “reasonableness of a delay” in  timely written notice is usually question for jury); Vale v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Grp., 112  A.D.3d  1011,  1013,  977  N.Y.S.2d  117,  120  (3d  Dep’t  2013)  (stating  that  where  party  fails  to  comply  with  condition  precedent  requiring  timely  notice,  delay  may  be  excused  if  reasonable,  which  will  generally  be  “question  of  fact  for  a  jury”).    Thus,  while  the  district  court  identified  February  27,  2009,  the  date  Wilkicki received a draft appraisal for the City View Property, as “the absolute,  drop‐dead  date”  for  a  reasonable  investigation  to  have  concluded,  a  factfinder  might determine that where, as here, the investigating party is not an individual  but  a  corporate  entity,  some  degree  of  chain‐of‐command  review  is  part  of  a  reasonable  investigation,  and  the  entity  should  be  permitted  to  undertake  such  review  before  it  is  charged  with  discovering  or  becoming  aware  of  the  breach.   Were the jury to so find in this case, it could extend the investigation’s conclusion  date to March 16, 2009, when Centerline’s president was first asked to authorize  the  notice  of  breach  and  request  for  cure  based  on  the  investigation  of  his  34        subordinates.    In  that  event,  the  March  18,  2009  transmittal  would  have  been  prompt even under a three‐business‐day limitation.12    Of course, even if a factfinder were to include chain‐of‐command review  within  a  reasonable  breach‐investigation  period,  disputes  might  persist  as  to  whether  other  events—e.g.,  commissioning  the  initial  or  review  appraisals—  unreasonably  prolonged  the  investigation.    While  the  district  court  dismissed                                                 12 Judge Wesley disagrees, observing that, under New York law, a corporation is  charged  with  the  knowledge  of  its  agents.    See  Dissenting  Op.,  post  at  12.    But  none of the cited cases reach that conclusion in the context of a corporate entity  conducting  a  breach  investigation,  much  less  one  doing  so  as  the  agent  of  a  trustee.  New  York University v. First Financial Insurance Co., 322 F.3d 750 (2d  Cir.  2003),  does  not  offer  “precisely  this  situation,”  Dissenting  Op.,  post  at  17  n.12, because that case involved neither an agent acting on behalf of a trustee nor  a breach investigation similar in nature or scope to the one at issue here.  Instead,  an insurer was there charged with its investigative agent’s knowledge of breach  as  of  the  date  the  insured  conceded  certain  facts  to  the  agent  that  effectively  admitted the breach precluding recovery under the insurance contract.  See New  York Univ. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 332 F.3d at 753 & n.2.  Here, Morgan Stanley did  not  similarly  confirm  its  breach  of  the  MLPA to  Wilkicki.   As  already  noted,  in  such circumstances, the law affords a reasonable time for investigation of breach  to  avoid  creating  an  incentive  for  premature  litigation.    That  concern  supports  including  some  chain‐of‐command  review  within  a  reasonable  investigation,  rather  than  demanding  action  as  soon  as  any  corporate  agent  reaches  a  conclusion  regardless  of  his  authority  to  act  on  it  for  the  corporation.    See  Kirschner  v.  KPMG  LLP,  15  N.Y.3d  446,  465,  912  N.Y.S.2d  508,  517  (2010)  (acknowledging  that,  generally,  only  acts  within  scope  of  agents’  authority  are  “presumptively imputed to their principals”).    35        Wilkicki’s  explanations  for  these  appraisals  as  implausible,  when  we  view  the  record in the light most favorable to BNY, we cannot conclude that a reasonable  factfinder was precluded as a matter of law from reaching any other conclusion.   Thus, the dispute cannot be resolved on summary judgment.  See, e.g., Dillon v.  Morano,  497  F.3d  247,  253–54  (2d  Cir.  2007)  (vacating  award  of  summary  judgment where permissibility of defendant’s conduct turned on explanation for  it,  which  necessarily  involved  credibility  determination  that  was  question  for  jury).  Further,  because  request  for  cure  is  not  a  condition  precedent,  even  if  a  factfinder  were  to  conclude  that  the  time  for  reasonable  investigation  of  breach  ended more than three business days before March 18, 2009, it would still have to  decide the question of substantial performance.    “Substantial  performance  is  performance,  the  deviations  permitted  being  minor,  unimportant,  inadvertent,  and  unintentional.”    Cramer  v.  Esswein,  220  A.D.  10,  11,  220  N.Y.S.  634,  634  (2d  Dep’t  1927)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted); see Bernard v. Las Ams. Commc’ns, Inc., 84 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1996);  Callanan Indus., Inc. v. Smiroldo, 100 A.D.2d 717, 718, 474 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (3d  36        Dep’t 1984).  Such deviations “will sometimes be atoned for by allowance of the  resulting  damage.”    Jacob  &  Youngs,  Inc.  v.  Kent,  230  N.Y.  239,  241  (1921)  (Cardozo, J.).    The question of substantial performance is usually one “of fact and should  be  decided  as  a  matter  of  law  only  where  the  inferences  are  certain.”    Merrill  Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2007) (collecting  cases,  including  Hadden  v.  Consol.  Edison  Co.  of  N.Y.,  34  N.Y.2d  88,  96,  356  N.Y.S.2d  249,  255  (1974)  (assessing  substantial  performance  on  basis  of  several  factors such as absolute and relative magnitude of default, its effect on contract’s  purpose,  willfulness,  and  degree  to  which  injured  party  was  benefited  under  contract)).  Thus, while BNY points to a number of factors supporting substantial  performance, we do not here decide the question in its favor as a matter of law.   We conclude only that the record does not permit substantial performance to be  rejected  as  a  matter  of  law.    See  Jacob  &  Youngs,  Inc.  v.  Kent,  230  N.Y.  at  243  (explaining that substantial performance is question of degree, which, “if there is  doubt,” must be answered by “triers of the facts”).  37        In  reaching  that  conclusion,  we  reiterate  certain  undisputed  facts.    First,  BNY  did  transmit  a  request  for  cure  to  Morgan  Stanley;  thus,  the  only  performance  issue  is  timeliness.    Second,  the  delay  in  transmittal,  even  on  the  district  court’s  findings,  was  in  the  range  of  two  to  four  weeks.    Third,  the  noticed  breach  of  representation  was  not  curable,  regardless  of  the  date  when  BNY can be charged with awareness of the breach.  These  circumstances  strongly  support  substantial  performance  insofar  as  delay  in  requesting  a  cure  that  was  never  possible  would  likely  be  deemed  trivial.    As  this  court  recently  had  occasion  to  note,  “[w]hen  contracting  parties  agree  to  a  notice‐and‐cure  provision,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  they  do  so  with  the  assumption  that  the  breaches  which  would  be  used  to  terminate  the  contract would  be curable  breaches.”    Giuffre Hyundai,  Ltd.  v.  Hyundai  Motor  Am.,  756  F.3d  204,  210  (2d  Cir.  2014)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)  (emphasis  in  original).    Thus,  “New  York  common  law  will  not  require  strict  compliance  with  a  contractual  notice‐and‐cure  provision  if  providing  an  opportunity to cure would be useless.”  Id. at 209 (collecting cases).    38        Morgan Stanley attempts to distinguish Giuffre and the cases cited therein  on the ground that they considered the propriety of actions taken by parties who,  instead  of  providing  opportunity  to  cure,  terminated  contracts  or  commenced  actions for damages.  It submits that the futility of cure here is no excuse for the  Servicer’s failure timely to request cure because that “is the only mechanism for  Morgan  Stanley’s  obligation  to  be  triggered.”    Appellee  Br.  46.    The  argument  fails  because,  as  we  have  already  concluded,  notice  of  breach,  not  request  for  cure, is the singular trigger for Morgan Stanley’s remedy obligations.  Further, it  is  by  no  means  evident  that  the  timeliness  of  notice  is  essential  to  this  trigger  because the 90‐day cure period would not begin to run until notice was received  and any harm to Morgan Stanley from a delay in notice could offset its remedy  obligations.  See 63 N.Y. Jur. 2d, Guaranty & Suretyship § 134 (2006) (stating that  where giving notice within specified time is not condition precedent to liability,  “consequence of not giving such notice may be to relieve or exonerate” the party  entitled  to  notice  “only  to  the  extent  of  the  damage  sustained  by  reason  of  the  omission”);  see  also  Jacob  &  Youngs,  Inc.  v.  Kent,  230  N.Y.  at  241.    Thus,  the  39        impossibility of cure is properly recognized as a factor that here could weigh in  favor of substantial performance on remand.    Accordingly,  because  the  timeliness  of  the  Special  Servicer’s  request  for  cure  should  not  have  been  determined  as  a  matter  of  law  and  because  a  reasonable jury could find that, even if there was some delay in requesting cure,  the  Special  Servicer  substantially  performed  this  MLPA  obligation,  these  questions  of  timeliness  and  substantial  performance  cannot  be  decided  in  favor  of Morgan Stanley on summary judgment but must be presented to the factfinder  at trial.    III.  Conclusion    To summarize, we conclude as follows:  1. “Notice to cure” is not a phrase that appears in the MLPA and, thus,  cannot be identified as a condition precedent to Morgan Stanley’s MLPA cure‐or‐ repurchase obligation.  2. The  request‐for‐cure  obligation  that  the  MLPA  imposes  on  the  Special  Servicer  is  properly  construed  as  a  promise  rather  than  as  a  condition  40        precedent because it neither employs the linguistic conventions of condition nor  serves as a trigger for the cure period at issue.  3. Even  if  the  MLPA’s  notice‐of‐breach  obligation  could  be  construed  as a condition precedent because it triggers the 90‐day cure period—a matter we  need  not  decide  as  no  party  advances  the  argument—that  rationale  would  not  extend to the timeliness of the notice, which has no triggering effect, much less to  a three‐day time limitation, which does not cabin the notice‐of‐breach obligation  as it does the request‐for‐cure obligation.  4. The  fact  that  the  notice‐of‐breach  obligation  arises  upon  a  party’s  “discovering”  breach  while  the  request‐for‐cure  obligation  arises  upon  a  Servicer’s  “becoming  aware”  of  the  breach  does  not  admit  the  categorical  conclusion,  urged  by  BNY,  that  the  time  for  requesting  cure  cannot  run  before  notice  of  breach  is  given,  particularly  where,  as  here,  the  Servicer  is  the  party  discovering breach.  5. Under New York law, a reasonable time for investigation is afforded  before a party can be said to have discovered or become aware of a breach.  41        6. Questions  of  fact  as  to  the  reasonableness  of  time  taken  to  investigate  the  alleged  breach  of  the  MLPA’s  Environmental  Conditions  Representation  preclude  finding,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  request  for  cure  was  untimely, particularly when reviewed for substantial performance.    The judgment of the district court is, therefore, VACATED, and the case is  REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   42        WESLEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  In  concluding  that  a  request  to  cure  was  not  a  condition  precedent  to  Morgan  Stanley’s  repurchase  obligation  and  that  issues  of  fact  preclude  summary  judgment,  the  majority  opinion  both  misapplies  New  York  law  and  misreads  the  plain  language  of  the  contract.    The  result  is,  in  essence,  judicial  reformation  of  the  agreement,  saving  a  sophisticated  party  from  the  requirements of the bargain it made following arms‐length negotiation.  Because  I cannot agree with these conclusions, I respectfully dissent.  It is indeed the case that New York law requires conditions precedent to be  “express”—that  is,  stated  by  the  parties  in  “unmistakable  language.”   Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d 685, 690–91 (1995)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    But  there  is  no  indication  in  Oppenheimer  that the standard of “unmistakable language”—which the Court drew from the  Second  Restatement  of  Contracts—requires  specific,  talismanic  words.    See  Oppenheimer,  86  N.Y.2d  at  691  (quoting  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  CONTRACTS  § 229  cmt.  a  (1981)).    In  fact,  the  Restatement  clearly  rejects  that  view:    “No  particular form of language is necessary to make an event a condition, although  such words as ‘on condition that,’ ‘provided that’ and ‘if’ are often used for this  1    purpose.  An  intention  to  make  a  duty  conditional  may  be  manifested  by  the  general nature of an agreement, as well as by specific language.”  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 cmt. a.1    A  recent  case  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  confirms  this  analysis:  the  Court  construed a provision requiring negotiation and execution of additional terms as  an  express  condition  precedent  to  a  party’s  obligation  to  supply  fiber‐optic  capacity  but  relied  on  no  conditional  words,  identifying  the  parties’  “clear  intent”  solely  from  the  nature  and  structure  of  the  agreement.    See  IDT  Corp.  v.  Tyco  Grp.,  S.A.R.L.,  13  N.Y.3d  209,  212,  214  (2009).2    Similarly,  lower  New  York  courts have concluded that an express condition precedent exists “despite the lack  of explicitly conditional language” so long as it “was unmistakably required” before  another  obligation  came  into  force.    ALJ  Capital  I,  L.P.  v.  David  J.  Joseph  Co.,  48  A.D.3d  208,  208  (N.Y.  1st  Dep’t  2008)  (emphasis  added);  see  also  Walton  v.  E.  1 See also 13 WILLISTON ON  CONTRACTS § 38:16 (4th ed. 2000) (“Any words which,  when properly interpreted or construed by the court, make clear the notion that  the  performance  of  a  promise  in  a  contract  is  dependent  on  some  other  act  or  event will create an express condition.”).  2  Oppenheimer  itself  also  relied  on  a  case  in  which  absolutely  no  conditional  language  appeared:    the  contract  simply  required  notice  of  shipment  of  goods,  and  the  failure  to  provide  such  notice  was  deemed  a  “failure  to  ‘perform[]  all  conditions precedent’” and “barred [plaintiff] from recovery.”  86 N.Y.2d at 693– 94  (first  alteration  in  original)  (quoting  Jungmann  &  Co.  v.  Atterbury  Bros.,  249  N.Y. 119, 122 (1928)).  2  Analytical Labs, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 532, 533 (N.Y. 2d Dep’t 1998) (finding condition  precedent premised on the structure of the provision, notwithstanding the lack of  conditional  language);  Winfield  Capital  Corp.  v.  Mahopac  Auto  Glass,  Inc.,  208  A.D.2d  715,  715  (N.Y.  2d  Dep’t  1994)  (same).    In  New  York  courts,  therefore,  specific words are strong evidence of, but not necessary to, conditions precedent;  the core inquiry, as in all contracts, is to give effect to the parties’ “clear intent,”  as expressed through the “unmistakable language” they use.  So what then does the language and structure of the contract—negotiated  at  arms’  length  by  sophisticated  commercial  entities—tell  us  about  breaches  of  the  agreement  and  the  remedies  provided  for  those  breaches?    For  ease  of  reference,  here  again  are  the  three  obligations  as  identified  in  the  majority  opinion, ante, at 15–16:  1. If  a  material  breach  exists,  “the  party  discovering  such  .  .  .  Material  Breach  shall  promptly  notify,  in  writing, the other party . . . .”  2. “Promptly  (but  in  any  event  within  three  Business  Days)  upon  becoming  aware  of  any  such  .  .  .  Material  Breach,  the  Master  Servicer  shall,  and  the  Special  Servicer  may,  request  that  the  Seller,  not  later  than  90  days  from  the  Seller’s  receipt  of  the  notice  of  such  .  .  .   Material Breach, cure such . . . Material Breach . . . .”  3. “The Seller hereby covenants and agrees that, if any  such . . . Material Breach cannot be corrected or cured in  3  all  material  aspects  within  the  above  cure  period[],  the  Seller  shall,  on  or  before  the  termination  of  such  cure  period[],  either  (i)  repurchase  the  affected  Mortgage  Loan  .  .  .  or  (ii)  .  .  .  at  its  option  replace,  without  recourse,  any  Mortgage  Loan  .  .  .  to  which  such  defect  relates with a [substitute mortgage].”  J.A.  454–55.    We  can  all  agree  the  third  clause  clearly  conditions  Morgan  Stanley’s  repurchase‐or‐replace  obligation  on  the  existence  of  a  particular  circumstance:  that “any . . . Material Breach cannot be corrected or cured in all  material  aspects  within  the  above  cure  period[].”    J.A.  455  (emphasis  added);  see  Majority  Op.,  ante,  at  21–22  (identifying  this  clause  as  an  example  of  “unmistakable  language  of  condition”).    Similarly,  we  agree  that  this  language  makes the repurchase obligation dependent on the obligation to cure within the  cure  period.    But  where  the  majority  opinion  and  I  depart  is  whether  that  obligation to cure within the cure period arises from the notice of breach or from  the request to cure.   The  majority  opinion  concludes  that  because  the  ninety‐day  period  is  calculated from the date of the notice of breach, the cure period must be triggered  by the notice. See Majority Op., ante, at 23 (“[A]s the MLPA makes clear, that cure  period is triggered exclusively by ‘the Seller’s receipt of the notice of . . . Material  breach,’ not the Servicer’s request for cure.” (quoting J.A. 454)).  I cannot agree:  A  4  ninety‐day  clock  may  count  down  from  the  notice  of  breach,  but  it  is  only  the  request  to  cure  that  gives  that  clock  any  legal  meaning.    The  ninety‐day  cure  period is written as a clause in the middle of the request provision, which states  that “the Special Servicer may[] request that the Seller, not later than 90 days from  the  Seller’s  receipt  of  the  notice  of  such  .  .  .  Material  Breach,  cure  such  .  .  .  Material  Breach.”  J.A. 454 (emphasis added).  In other words, the ninety days and their  legal  significance  are  a  part  of  the  Special  Servicer’s  request.    If  there  were  no  request, ninety days would pass—in time’s typical fashion—but it would not be  a  legally  significant  “cure  period”  for  purposes  of  the  repurchase  obligation  because no one had requested cure by that date.  The majority opinion seems disturbed by the fact the deadline for cure is  not  counted  down  from  the  request  for  cure  and  so  concludes  that  the  request  itself has no conditional force over the repurchase obligation.  But the repurchase  obligation  depends  on  the  Seller  not  curing  the  breach  within  the  cure  period;  that  circumstance  can  only  exist  if  the  Special  Servicer  first  makes  a  request  to  cure,  which  includes  (and  creates)  the  obligation  to  cure  and  the  legal  deadline  for  it.    Nothing  about  the  fact  that  the  deadline  is  established  ninety  days  after  another  event  changes  the  fact  that  it  is  the  request  that  brings  it  into  existence.   5  For  example,  imagine  two  parties  enter  into  a  contract  that  reads:  “Upon  becoming  aware  of  a  material  breach,  the  Special  Servicer  may  request  that  the  Seller,  not  later  than  ten  days  following  the  next  full  moon,  cure  such  material  breach.”    An  obligation  to  cure  within  the  cure  period  does  not  come  into  existence  as  a  result  of  the  lunar  cycle;  it  is  triggered  by  the  request—the  “not  later than” clause simply provides a way to determine the deadline by which the  Seller  must  comply.    Put  simply,  the  request  identifies  an  object  (cure)  and  a  deadline  (ninety  days  following  a  particular  identified  event);  absent  any  request, there is no object and no deadline.3  This interpretation is confirmed by a simple counterfactual:  If the Special  Servicer had exercised its option not to request cure, would Morgan Stanley still  3  Stepping  back,  it  makes  sense  that  the  request  to  cure  calculates  its  deadline  from the notice of breach.  Either party—the Seller or the Special Servicer—may  be  the  one  to  discover  the  breach  in  the  first  instance  and  must  then  notify  the  other party.  See J.A. 454.  If the Seller discovers the breach and provides notice,  the Special Servicer then has three days to decide whether to request cure or lose  its right to do so.  If it chooses to exercise its right to request cure on day three,  there  may  be  only  eighty‐seven  days  until  the  end  of  the  cure  period—but  the  Seller already had three days of notice,  by its own discovery, of the nature and  circumstances  of  the  breach.    By  contrast,  if  the  Special  Servicer  discovers  the  breach,  it  can  both  notify  the  Seller  of  breach  and  request  cure  in  the  same  document, in which case the Seller has the same ninety days of notice.  In either  event,  this  system  ensures  that  the  Seller  has  exactly  ninety  days  of  knowing  about the breach, no more and no less, before the deadline occurs.  6  have been obliged to cure or repurchase the loan?  The answer—on the plain face  of  the  contract—must  be  “no.”    The  contract  is  conspicuously  lacking  any  language making cure of every material breach obligatory on the Seller absent a  request to cure.4  To construe the contract in that way would require reading the  repurchase  obligation  as  creating,  sub  silentio,  an  obligation  to  cure  that  arises  simply  from  notification  of  breach.5    It  is  simply  unfathomable  that  the  parties  4  The  majority  opinion  suggests  this  consideration  is  irrelevant  because  the  MLPA  assigned  the  signaling  function  to  the  notice  of  breach  and  because  the  Master  Servicer  had  a  “mandatory  request‐for‐cure  obligation.”    Majority  Op.,  ante,  at  25  n.10.    However,  the  loan  at  issue  was  transferred  to  the  Special  Servicer in November 2008, see Majority Op., ante, at 7, at which point the Master  Servicer ceased to be “obligated to service and administer” the loan except as to  certain  specified  functions,  none  of  which  include  requesting  cure,  see  J.A.  217.   Only  the  Special  Servicer’s  contractual  rights  and  obligations  are  therefore  relevant, and while the MLPA provided that the Master Servicer “shall” request  cure,  it  provided  only  that  the  Special  Servicer  “may”  request  cure.    J.A.  454.   “May”  in  this  context  can  only  possess  a  permissive,  rather  than  mandatory,  meaning,  see  N.Y.  State  Elec.  &  Gas  Corp.  v.  Aasen,  157  A.D.2d  965,  967  (N.Y.  3d  Dep’t 1990), and the MLPA thus imposed no obligation on the Special Servicer to  request  cure.    As  I  have  explained,  notice  of  a  breach  does  not  trigger  the  obligation to cure the breach—the request to cure is what obliges the Seller to cure  within  the  defined  cure  period.    A  request  to  cure  by  the  Special  Servicer  therefore told the Seller that the former was exercising its option to demand cure,  providing  exactly  the  same  signaling  and  demand  functions  as  the  notice  of  disallowance  in  ALJ  Capital.    See  infra  note  7;  see  also  Majority  Op.,  ante,  at  23  (acknowledging ALJ Capital’s notice as a condition precedent).  5  As  described  above,  if  the  Special  Servicer  decides  not  to  request  a  cure,  then  the date of the notification of breach has no legal significance—ninety days later,  nothing happens, and no one cares.  7  would silently imply, rather than lay out explicitly, such a significant obligation  as  one  requiring  cure  of  every  material  breach  for  which  a  notice  of  breach  was  transmitted.  Instead, the parties explicitly conditioned the repurchase obligation  on the running of the cure period without actual cure, and the cure period only  comes into existence through the Special Servicer’s request.6  Compare this framework with the provisions considered by district courts  in  our  Circuit  that  have  concluded  timely  notice  did  not  constitute  a  condition  precedent to repurchase obligations:  in those cases, the obligation was triggered  by either a party’s discovery of its own breach or its counterparty’s notification— i.e., the obligation could come into existence through a mechanism other than a  request to cure.  See LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., No. 02 Civ.  7868  (HB),  2003  WL  21671812,  at  *3  (S.D.N.Y.  July  16,  2003);  Tr.  for  Certificate  Holders  of  Merrill  Lynch  Mortg.  Passthrough  Certificates  Series  1999‐C1  v.  Love  Funding Corp.,  No.  04  Civ.  9890(SAS),  2005  WL  2582177, at  *7  (S.D.N.Y.  Oct. 11,  2005); see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Dexia Real Estate Capital Mkts., No. 12‐CV‐ 9412, 2014 WL 3368670, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014), rev’d on other grounds, No. 14‐ 6 The majority opinion appears distracted by the District Court’s “notice to cure”  misnomer—but we are engaged in de novo review, and even if we were applying  a more deferential standard, we are certainly not obligated to accept the District  Court’s labels.  8  2859‐cv,  2016  WL  1042090  (2d  Cir.  Mar.  18,  2016)  (summary  order).    Here,  by  contrast,  there  is  no  indication  anywhere  in  the  contract  that  Morgan  Stanley’s  discovery  of  its  own  breach  requires  it  to  do  anything  other  than  “promptly  notify,  in  writing,  the  other  party.”    J.A.  454;  see  Morgan  Guar.  Tr.  Co.  of  N.Y.  v.  Bay View Franchise Mortg. Acceptance Co., No. 00 CIV. 8613(SAS), 2002 WL 818082,  at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2002) (concluding that a request to cure was necessary  to begin cure period, the expiration of which required the seller to repurchase the  loan).  In  sum,  regardless  of  whether  the  parties  used  any  particular  conditional  words, the language of the repurchase obligation is “clear” and “unmistakable”  that  it  arises  only  when  cure  does  not  occur  within  the  cure  period—and  cure  within  the  period  is  an  obligation  that  arises  only  out  of  the  Special  Servicer’s  request.  See ALJ Capital, 48 A.D.3d at 208.7  Because the language and structure  of the provision makes the repurchase obligation unmistakably contingent on the  7  In  fact,  ALJ  concerned  just  such  a  timely  notice  provision  triggering  a  cure  period, after which time the plaintiff was permitted to seek recovery in court.  See  ALJ Capital I, L.P. v. David J. Joseph Co., 15 Misc. 3d 1127(A), 2007 WL 1218355, at  *4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 13, 2007).  The First Department affirmed the trial court’s  conclusion  that  timely  notice  was  a  condition  precedent  “despite  the  lack  of  explicitly  conditional  language”  because  the  written  notice  “was  unmistakably  required  by  the  agreement’s  ‘Cure  Period’  provision  prior  to  the  assertion  of  a  claim for repayment.”  ALJ Capital, 48 A.D.3d at 208.  9  Special  Servicer’s  request  to  cure,  that  request  must  necessarily  constitute  an  express condition precedent.  See IDT Corp., 13 N.Y.3d at 214.  Express  conditions  precedent  are  subject  to  “the  requirement  of  strict  compliance,” in contrast to promises or constructive conditions, with which only  “substantial  compliance”  is  required.    Oppenheimer,  86  N.Y.2d  at  690,  692  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Further,  “no  mitigating  standard  of  materiality  or  substantiality  [is]  applicable  to  the  non‐occurrence  of  [an  express  condition  precedent].”    Id.  at  692  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).   Consequently,  once  we  determine  that  a  request  to  cure  “within  three  Business  Days[]  upon  becoming  aware”  of  the  material  breach,  J.A.  454,  is  an  express  condition precedent to the repurchase obligation, the only remaining question on  summary judgment is whether there exists any genuine issue of material fact as  to  the  Special  Servicer’s  strict  compliance  with  that  condition.    Under  longstanding  New  York  law,  no  reasonable  factfinder  could  determine  that  the  Special Servicer only became aware of the material breach on or after March 15,  2009—i.e., three days before the date of the request to cure.8  8  Because  the  majority  opinion  concludes  the  request  to  cure  was  merely  a  promise,  it  analyzes  the  facts  under  the  rubric  of  substantial  compliance  and  concludes  summary  judgment  is  inappropriate  because  reasonable  factfinders  may  differ  as  to  the  extent  of  any  “reasonable  investigation”  including  “some  10  As  the  majority  opinion  explains,  the  material  breach  identified  here  is  premised  on  Morgan  Stanley’s  representation  that  it  had  no  knowledge  of  any  “material  and  adverse  environmental  condition  or  circumstance  affecting  any  Mortgaged  Property  that  was  not  disclosed  in  such  report.”    J.A.  625;  see  also  Majority Op., ante, at 8 & n.3.  The Special Servicer’s conclusion that a breach of  this  representation  had  occurred  rested  primarily  on  a  document  showing  that  Morgan  Stanley’s  counsel  knew  the  environmental  report  neither  addressed  a  relevant  state  regulation  nor  the  notices  of  violation  issued  thereunder;  in  fact,  this was the only piece of evidence identified in the formal notice of breach and  request  to  cure.    See  J.A.  625–26.    However,  in  a  document  sent  to  the  Special  Servicer’s  Associate  General  Counsel  on  February  16,  2009,  the  Director  of  Special  Servicing—and  the  woman  who  ultimately  signed  the  notice  of  breach  and request to cure—identified “additional facts . . . to demonstrate the material  and  adverse  effect”  of  the  breach,  including  the  anchor  tenant’s  departure  and  subsequent lease terminations by other tenants, “discontinued . . . loan payments  to  the  Trust  in  November  2008  as  a  direct  result  of  insufficient  operating  degree of chain‐of‐command review.”  Majority Op., ante, at 33–38.  Even under a  substantial compliance analysis, however, as explained infra, New York law and  the  undisputed  facts  would  require  us  to  conclude  that  the  Special  Servicer  became aware of the breach as of at least February 16, 2009.  11  income,” and rejection of the borrower’s insurance claim under a pollution legal  liability policy.  J.A. 896–98.  The  majority  opinion’s  approach  places  great  weight  on  the  internal  governance  structure  of  the  Special  Servicer,  essentially  permitting  the  corporation  to  deny  its  “awareness”  of  a  fact  simply  because  it  required  authorization by the president to issue the notice.  See Majority Op., ante, at 34– 36.    But  “a  fundamental  principle  that  has  informed  the  law  of  agency  and  corporations  for  centuries”  is  that  “the  acts  of  agents,  and  the  knowledge  they  acquire  while  acting  within  the  scope  of  their  authority  are  presumptively  imputed to their principals.”  Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 465 (2010);  accord Corrigan v. Bobbs‐Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 68 (1920) (explaining that, if the  employee of a corporation obtains knowledge “while acting within the scope of  his  authority,  on  behalf  of  [the  corporation],  for  its  benefit,  [the  corporation]  is  chargeable with his knowledge”).9  This presumption of corporate knowledge is  conclusive, even if the corporate employee never communicated the information  to her superiors:    9 As a corporate legal entity, the Special Servicer “necessarily functions through  human  actors—its  officers,  agents  and  employees—whose  knowledge  and  conduct  may  be  imputed  to  the  entity  under  the  doctrine  of  respondeat  superior.”  Prudential‐Bache Sec., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 73 N.Y.2d 263, 276 (1989).  12  [N]otice  of  facts  to  an  agent  is  constructive  notice  thereof to the principal himself, where it arises from or  is  at  the  time  connected  with  the  subject‐matter  of  his  agency, for, upon general principles of public policy, it  is  presumed  that  the  agent  has  communicated  such  facts  to  the  principal,  and,  if  he  has  not,  still  the  principal  having  [e]ntrusted  the  agent  with  the  particular business, the other party has a right to deem  his acts and knowledge obligatory upon the principal.  Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N.Y. 563, 569 (1890); accord N.Y. Univ. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 322  F.3d  750,  753  &  n.2  (2d  Cir.  2003)  (applying  these  principles  to  a  timeliness  inquiry and calculating the insurer’s delay in notice from the date its investigator  discovered grounds for liability); Apollo Fuel Oil v. United States, 195 F.3d 74, 76– 77  (2d  Cir.  1999)  (applying  the  same  rule  to  conclude  the  corporation  knew  of  intentional  misconduct  through  its  employees’  knowledge).    This  rule  applies  even  where  such  knowledge  works  the  waiver  of  a  contractual  right  and  the  corporate agent does not have any authorization under the contract to make such  a waiver affirmatively.  See, e.g., Hurley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 247 A.D.  547, 550 (N.Y. 4th Dep’t 1936).  Put  simply,  as  a  matter  of  law,  the  Special  Servicer  knew  the  facts  of  the  breach  and  their  material  and  adverse  effect  on  the  loan  well  before  March  15,  2009.    The  Director  of  Special  Servicing  drafted  a  memorandum  containing  sufficient  facts  to  constitute  awareness  of  both  the  breach  and  its  material  and  13  adverse effects on February 16, 2009.10  Even after that, on February 19, 2009, an  Associate General Counsel at the company confirmed that “there is evidence that  [Morgan  Stanley]  knew”  there  were  undisclosed  environmental  conditions  in  breach of the representation and concluded “I think that the breach notice should  be  sent.”    J.A.  1266.    Yet,  despite  two  employees  responsible  for  investigating  material breaches concluding there was sufficient evidence of such a breach, no  notice  was  sent  until  March  18,  2009,  during  which  time  no  new  material  facts  were obtained by the Special Servicer.  Though the Trustee’s brief makes much of  the  fact  that  neither  the  Director  of  Special  Servicing  nor  the  Associate  General  Counsel had authority to issue a notice of breach, authority to make the ultimate  decision is irrelevant to imputation; what matters is whether the knowledge was  obtained  within  the  scope  of  the  employee  or  agent’s  employment.    See  N.Y.  Univ., 322 F.3d at 753 & n.2; Hyatt, 118 N.Y. at 569; Hurley, 247 A.D. at 550.  There  can be no dispute that the Director of Special Servicing, who ultimately signed the  10  Note also  that  this memorandum  was based  on an  investigation  of  the  loan’s  status  beginning  in  November  2008.    See  J.A.  1109–15.    Thus,  we  are  not  even  considering a situation in which the corporation merely had access to (and thus  only  arguably  constructive  notice  of)  these  facts—the  February  16,  2009  memorandum  memorializes  facts  actually  known  by  the  Director  of  Special  Servicing.    See  J.A.  1111–17.    To  borrow  the  majority  opinion’s  analogy,  see  Majority  Op.,  ante,  at  31  n.11,  she  was  aware  both  that  she  had  found  the  Americas (the fact) and that they were new (its significance).  14  formal notice of breach and request to cure, see J.A. 626, obtained her knowledge  of the breach and its effects in the scope of her authority to investigate potential  breaches.  See J.A. 1110–11; see also N.Y. Univ., 322 F.3d at 753 & n.2 (calculating  delay in insurance coverage denial from the date the investigator learned of the  grounds  for  denial,  notwithstanding  his  lack  of  authority  to  deny  coverage  himself).  Just  as  importantly,  none  of  the  post–February  16  activities  described  by  the  majority  opinion  contributed  in  any  material  way  to  the  Special  Servicer’s  “awareness” of any breach.  None of the internal “chain of command” reviews— not the removal of one paragraph of supporting facts from the notice and request  to  cure  by  the  Associate  General  Counsel,  see  J.A.  1341–45,  nor  the  approvals  without  change  by  both  a  senior  managing  director  and  the  president  of  the  company,  see  J.A.  1347,  1829–30—made  any  additional  facts  available  to  the  corporation,  either  of  the  nature  of  the  breach  or  of  its  material  and  adverse  effects.    The  only  potentially  new  fact  arose  from  the  appraisal  setting  the  collateral’s  market  value  at  $22.3  million,  the  initial  estimate  of  which  was  received  on  February  27,  2009.    See  J.A.  1739.    The  Trustee  argues  that  this  appraisal  was  needed  “to  confirm  that  Morgan  Stanley’s  breach  was  ‘material’  15  under the terms of the MLPA.”  Appellant Br. 17.  But this lone data point could  hardly have tipped the scales of the Special Servicer’s awareness of the breach’s  materiality in light of what it already knew as of February 16, 2009:     (1) The loan was in default;   (2) The  anchor  tenant  had  departed,  which  precipitated  rent  reductions,  lease  terminations,  and  discontinued  rent  payments by other tenants;   (3) An  Ohio  regulatory  body  had  filed  a  lawsuit  against  the  borrower  arising  from  the  same  environmental  regulatory  violations at issue in the breach;  (4) The  borrower’s  insurance  claim  for  the  legal  liability  was  denied;  (5) The Trust was seeking receivership for the property; and   (6) The Trust would have to fund any legal costs associated with  attempts to recoup value.    See  J.A.  619,  897–98.    The  substantive  portion  of  the  February  16,  2009  memorandum concluded with these words: “All of the above results stem from  the state code violations which were present prior to, during and after the sale of  the  Mortgage  Loan  to  the  Trust.  The  Mortgage  Loan  should  be  repurchased  pursuant  to  the  terms  and  conditions  set  forth  in  the  PSA  and  the  applicable  MLPA.”  J.A. 898.  It exceeds all bounds of credulity to think that, in the face of  16  all  these  known  facts,  the  Special  Servicer  was  anything  but  aware  of  the  circumstances of the breach as well as its material and adverse consequences.11    The  majority  opinion’s  approach  thus drastically  departs  from  New York  law  governing  corporate  knowledge  and  timely  request  obligations  under  a  contract.  Under the majority opinion, all any corporation need do now is require  authorization  for  such  requests  at  its  highest  level—and  regardless  of  the  facts  known by employees below the highest executive officer, the corporation cannot  be  charged  with  “awareness”  of  those  facts.12    Not  only  is  this  type  of  passing‐ the‐buck  approach  wholly  contrary  to  “a  fundamental  principle  that  has  11 Even accepting the dubious proposition that confirmation of the loan valuation  somehow moved the Special Servicer from “unaware” to “aware,” that appraisal  was confirmed on March 13, 2009.  See J.A. 1730; Majority Op., ante, at 10.  It took  another five days for the Special Servicer to send the notice of breach and request  to cure.  See J.A. 624–26.  12  The  majority  opinion  criticizes  this  dissent  for  not  citing  cases  related  to  investigations  by  agents  and  employees.    See  Majority  Op.,  ante,  at  35  n.12.   However, our prior decision in New York University offers precisely this situation:  a  line  investigator  at  a  company  contracted  as  an  insurer’s  agent  discovered  grounds for denying coverage, and that knowledge was imputed to the insurer  for purposes of determining timeliness.  See 322 F.3d at 753 & n.2.  The majority  opinion’s error arises from its failure to recognize that investigation was clearly  within the scope of the Director of Special Servicing’s employment, regardless of  her  ability  to  take  some  subsequent  external  action  on  behalf  of  the  company.   The  results  of  her  investigation—i.e.,  knowledge  of  the  facts  and  significance  of  breach—are  therefore  imputed  to  the  Special  Servicer,  who  must  then  take  whatever steps are necessary in its internal governance structure to act within the  time provided by the contract.  17  informed the law of agency and corporations for centuries,” Kirschner, 15 N.Y.3d  at 465, but it would completely defeat the purpose of a temporal limitation on a  contractual  remedy—namely,  the  valuable  certainty  and  diligence  obtained  when  a  sophisticated  counterparty  must  exercise  that  remedy  within  a  defined  period of time.  Particularly when a timely request is a condition precedent to a  contractual remedy, requiring strict compliance, the majority opinion’s approach  dramatically undercuts the force and value of such provisions.  The Oppenheimer Court considered and rejected a rule that would obviate  the harsh consequences of an express condition precedent, concluding that strict  compliance  was  necessary.    See  86  N.Y.2d  at  691–92.    Yet  the  majority  opinion  here  releases  a  sophisticated  party  from  the  burden  of  complying  with  the  agreement  it  made.    At  the  risk  of  stating  the  obvious,  if  the  corporation’s  internal  governance  did  not  permit  a  three‐day  turnaround  between  awareness  of  breach  and  a  request  to  cure,  it  should  have  bargained  for  more  time.13    On  these  facts,  no  reasonable  factfinder  could  determine  that  the  Special  Servicer  13  “Freedom  of  contract  prevails  in  an  arm’s  length  transaction  between  sophisticated  parties  such  as  these,  and  in  the  absence  of  countervailing  public  policy  concerns  there  is  no  reason  to  relieve  them  of  the  consequences  of  their  bargain.    If  they  are  dissatisfied  with  the  consequences  of  their  agreement,  the  time  to  say  so  was  at  the  bargaining  table.”    Oppenheimer,  86  N.Y.2d  at  695  (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).  18  only  became  aware  of  the  breach  on  or  after  March  15,  2009.    As  a  result,  no  reasonable  factfinder  could  find  strict  compliance  with  the  condition  precedent  to  Morgan  Stanley’s  repurchase  obligation,  and  that  obligation  never  came  into  force.  I respectfully dissent.  19  


[by Raggi]

 Judge WESLEY dissents in'a separate opinion. REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge: In this breach-of-contract action, plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A. (“BNY” or “Trustee”) appeals an award of summary judgment in favor of defendant Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital, Inc. (“Morgan Stanley”) entered, on June 17,2014, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Colleen McMahon, Judge). BNY argues that the.district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Morgan Stanley was not contractually, obliged to repurchase a mortgage loan allegedly issued in breach of a contract .representation because (1) the Trustee’s duty to give “notice to cure” within three business days of becoming aware of a material breach was a condition precedent to the seller’s repurchase obligation, Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 0505(CM)(GWG) (“BNY /”), 2013 WL 3146824 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2013); and (2) that condition was not per-forméd within the specified three days, but two to four weeks later, see Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 0505(CM)(GWG) (“BNY II”), 2014 WL 2745011 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2014). For reasons explained herein, we conclude that the contract at issue did not require notice to cure as a condition precedent to Morgan Stanley remedying breach. *300 Indeed, the phrase “notice to cure” does not appear in the contract. Rather, the contract contains distinct provisions for giving notice of breach and making request for cure, neither of which is cast in the express language of condition. . To the extent a condition precedent might be inferred from the fact that notice of breach is a necessary trigger for the 90-day cure period, that rationale would pertain only to the giving of that notice, not to its timeliness, and much less to request for cure, which performs no triggering role. Thus, request for cure is not a condition precedent to Morgan Stanley’s remedy obligations, and the timeliness of a request for cure, as well as of a notice of breach, is properly construed as a promise and reviewed for substantial performance. On review of the record, we further conclude that the notice of breach and request for cure in this case cannot be held untimely as a matter of law, particularly when reviewed for substantial performance. Accordingly, we vacate the award of summary judgment in favor of Morgan Stanley, and we remand the' case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Background A. The Mortgage' Loan Purchase Agreement The contract at issue is a May 1, 2007 Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement (“MLPA”), pertaining to an. $81 million mortgage loan that Morgan Stanley issued to City View Center, LLC (the “City View Loan”) on December 29, 2006, for the purchase of a retail center in Garfield Heights, Ohio (the “City View Property”). Pursuant to the MLPA, Morgan Stanley sold the City View Loan to Morgan Stanley Capital I, Inc., which, pursuant to a Pooling and Servicing Agreement..(“PSA”) of the same date, placed the City View Loan into Morgan Stanley Capital I Trust 20Ó7-IQ14 (the “Trust”), then valued at nearly five billion dollars. The Trust was later securitized and sold to investors. The PSA designated BNY as trustee of the Trust and, thus, the entity entitled to enforce various' agreements, including the MLPA here at issue. The PSA also designated Wells Fargo National Association (‘Wells Fargo”) as a Master Servicer, responsible for administering the Trust’s loans and collecting payments, and Center-line Servicing Inc. (“Centerline”) as Special Servicer, responsible for servicing any defaulted loans. 1 On May 30, 2007, Trustee BNY granted the Master and Special Servicers authority to act on its behalf when servicing and administering the Trust’s loans. B. City Vieio’s Default on the Loan On September 9, 2008, Master Servicer Wells Fargo informed Special Servicer Centerline that the City View Loan would likely go into default within 60 days because (1) City View had ,received numerous notices of lease default from Wal-Mart, the anchor tenant of the City View Property, based on methane gas intrusion into the store; (2) the' Ohio Attorney General had filed a complaint against City View (and others) for- regulatory violations on the City View Property, including the failure to control the migration of combustible gases; and (3) the Ohio Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry had determined that conditions at the City View *301 Property amounted to an urgent public hazard. On September 15, 2008, Wal-Mart in fact closed its City View Property store and, soon after, canceled its lease. On November 8, 2008, City View defaulted on a mortgage-loan payment. Four-days later, Wells Fargo transferred the City View Loan to Centerline for special servicing. C. Notice of Breach and Request for . , Cure Upon transfer, Centerline’s Director of Special Servicing, Jennifer Wilkicki, began investigating Morgan Stanley’s possible breach of the MLPA. 2 On February 16, 2009,- Wilkicki sent a document captioned “Representation and Warranty Claim” to Centerline’s Associate General Counsel, Jenna Unell. That four-page document appears to be a draft notice of breach to the Seller in that its opening' sentence states as follows: '“The Special- Servicer believes it has discovered a. Material Breach of the Seller’s Representations, and Warranties and hereby provides notice as required by the governing Pooling and Servicing Agreement,” J.A. 896. The document proceeds to identify “Representation/Warranty (12)” as the .provision breached -.insofar as Morgan Stanley had represented that, it had “no knowledge of any material and adverse environmental condition or circumstance” affecting' the City View Property not disclosed in a referenced Environmental Report when it had, in fact, learned otherwise. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 3 The document supports this conclusion by citing Morgan Stanley’s January 5, 2007 Closing Counsel- Transaction Summary,, which acknowledged the Environmental Report’s failure to 'address the fact that the City View Property was subject to state regulation as- a “closed land fill” and that the property had received “numerous ‘notices of violation’ issued by the Ohio. Environmental Protection Agency.” Id. 4 The document also details “additional facts ,.. to demonstrate the material and adverse effect” the noticed breach had on “the interests of the holders of the Certificates in the Mortgage Loan.” Id.; see id. at 897-98. Among these were Wal-Mart’s departure from the City View Property and its cessation of rent payments, as a result of which other tenants exercised co-tenancy *302 clauses resulting in terminated leases, reduced rents, or discontinued rent payments. The document also explains that this left City View with insufficient operating income, • causing it to discontinue loan payments'to the Trust,-which now faced the legal expenses of petitioning “the federal court to place a receiver at the property/’ proceeding against defaulting tenants, and appealing the rejection of City View’s insurance claim. Id. at 898. - Attributing the catalogued adverse ‘effects - to Morgan Stanley’s breach of Representation 12, the 1 document concluded, “[-t]he Mortgage Loan should be- repurchased pursuant to the terms and Conditions set forth in the PSA and the applicable MLPA.” Id. : ■ Three days later, on February 19, 2009, Unell advised Wilkicki that she had reviewed pertinent materials and . agreed “that there [was] evidence that [Morgan Stanley] knew that there were material environmental conditions or circumstances affecting the Property that were not disclosed in the Phase I report.” Id. at 1266. Unell asked Wilkicki to call her “to discuss further,” concluding, “I think that the breach notice should be sent.” Id. A breach notice was sent approximately one month later, on March 18, 2009. In the interim, Wilkicki secured an appraisal, which on February 27, 2009, valued the City View Property at $22.3 million, a steep decline from the $103.4 million appraisal of .two years earlier. Another appraisal, confirming the $22.3 million valuation, was received on March 13,2009. Between receipt of these two appraisals, on March 3, 2009, Wilkicki sent Unell a more formally worded draft breach notice and ■ request. for cure, and solicited her comments. On March 13, Unell emailed Wilkicki her edits to the draft notice. The next day, Wilkicki sent the.revised draft to her supervisor, Chris Crouch, who approved it on March 16 and directed Wilk-icki to send it on to Centerline’s President, Paul Smyth, “fór go ahead to release,” Id. at 1347. After receiving Smyth’s ¿uthori-zation for release, Wilkicki sent- Morgan Stanley a formal notice of breach and request for cure» on. March 18, 2009. Tracking language in the MLPA and PSA,, the notice stated that if the material. breach were .not corrected or cured within 90 days of receipt, Morgan Stanley would be contractually obligated to repurchase or to replace the City View Loan. It is, in -fact, undisputed on this appeal that the breach was one that could-not be-cured.. : Approximately two months later, by letter dated May 11, 2009, Morgan- Stanley replied that it disagreed with Centerline’s “characterization-of-the facts and circumstances” and “intended] to vigorously defend its underwriting and disclosures made in the PSA and the Mortgage Loan.” Id. at 1093. Thus, it did not repurchase or replace the.City View Loan. ., On September 24, 2010, the Special Ser-vicer sent Morgan ’Stanley a “Second and Supplemental Notification.- of Material Breach.” In addition to alleging. more facts to support the earlier noticed breach of Representation 12, it asserted a breach of Representation 27, the MLPA’s No Material Default Representation. 5 In its De *303 cember 22, 2010 reply, Morgan Stanley reiterated its intent to defend its representations, and asserted that the Special Ser-vicer’s March 18, 2009 and September 24, 2010 letters were, in any event, deficient because they “cónstitute[d] late notice.” Id. at 1096. : ■ D, District Court Proceedings On January 25, 2011, ■ BNY filed this lawsuit against Morgan Stanley for breach of the MLPA. Following amended pleadings and discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment: Qn June 19, 2013, the district court granted Morgan Stanley partial summary' judgment on BNY’s breach claim as to the No Material Default Representation provision. 6 That ruling is not at issue on this appeal. As to the claimed breach of the Environmental Conditions Representation, the district court granted BNY summary judgment on Morgan Stanley’s waiver defense, but concluded that “many issues,, of disputed fact” precluded a general, award in favor of BNY., SAT J, 2013 WL 3146824 , at *30. Although. the district court agreed with Morgan Stanley that timely “notice to cure” was a “condition precedent” to any buyback obligation for breach of the Environmental Conditions Representation, it decided that further discovery was needed to determine when the Special Servicer became aware of that alleged breach. Id. at *16-17; see id. at *19-22. After discovery closed, the district court determined, as a. matter of law, "that BNY’s “Special Servicer became aware .of a material breach of the Environmental Representation more than three business days before March 18, 2009,” making its breach notice on that date untimely, thereby failing to satisfy that condition precedent to Morgan Stanley’s repurchase obligation. BNY II, 2014 WL 2745011 , at *7-9. Accordingly, on June 17; -2014, the district court entered.summary judgment in favor of Morgan Stanley on- the Environmental Representation breach claim. This timely appeal followed. II.. Discussion This appeal. presents two questions for de novo review: (1) whether the MLPA’s request-for-cure obligation- is a condition precedent that must be timely performed by the Servicer before Morgan Stanley has any obligation , to cure or to repurchase a noticed defective loan; - and (2) whether it can be determined.- as a matter of law on the existing record that the request for cure in this case was untimely. See Lynch v. City of New York, 737 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir.2013) (reviewing award of summary judgment de novo and upholding only if “there is no genuine issue of material fact” qnd “moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”); Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir.2007) (interpreting contract de novo). We answer both questions , in the negative and, therefore, vacate the award of summary judgment in favor of Morgan Stanley and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 'this opinion'. A. MLPA Section 5’s Remedies Provision ■ ■ The district court derived the condition precedent it identified — an obligation to *304 give “notice to cure” within three business days of the Servicer becoming aware of a material breach — from MLPA Section 5, titled “Remedies Upon Breach of-Representations and Warranties Made .by the Seller.” Thus, we begin by examining the relevant text, which states as follows: [I]f there is a breach of any of the representations and warranties required to be made by the Seller regarding the characteristics of the Mortgage Loans and/or the related Mortgaged Properties ... and ... [such] breach, either (i) materially and adversely affects the interests of the- holders of the Certificates in the related Mortgage Loan, or (ii) both (A) the ... breach materially and adversely affects the value of the Mortgage Loan and (B) the Mortgage Loan is a Specially Serviced Mortgage Loan ..., [1] the party discovering such ... Material Breach shall promptly notify, in writing, the other party..[2] Promptly (but in any event within three Business Days) upon becoming aware of any such ... Material Breach, the Master Servicer shall, and the Special Servi-cer may, request that the Seller, not later than 90 days from the Seller’s receipt of the notice of siach ... Material Breach, cure such ... ' Material Breach____ [3], The Seller hereby covenants and agrees that, if any such ... Material Breach cannot be corrected or cured in all material aspects within the above cure period[ ], the Seller shall, on or before the termination of such cure period!], either (i) repurchase the affected Mortgage Loan ... from the Purchaser or its assignee at the Purchase Price as defined in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, or (ii) if within the two-year period commencing on the Closing Date, at its option replace, without recourse, any Mortgage Loan ... to which such defect relates with a Qualifying Substitute Mortgage Loan. If such ... Material Breach would cause the Mortgage Loan to be other than a “qualified mortgage” (as"defined in the Code), then notwithstanding the previous sentence, such repurchase or substitution, must occur, within 90 days from the earlier of the date the.Seller discovered or was notified of the breach or defect. J.A. 454-55 (emphasis added). 7 In fact, the quoted language identifies three obligations (corresponding to the inserted highlighted numbers). First, a notice-of-breach obligation, which requires any party — whether the Trustee, Master Servicer, Special Servicer, or even the Seller — “discovering” a material breach of representation promptly to notify the other party of its discovery of such breach. Second, a request-for-cure obligation, which requires the Master Servicer, and permits the Special Servicer, promptly, but in any event within three business days of “becoming aware” of the material breach, to request that the Seller cure' breach within 90 days of 'the receipt of notice. Third, a cure-or-repurchase obligation, which requires the Seller either (a) to cure the material breach within 90 days of receiving notice, or (b) if the breach cannot be cured, to repurchase or to replace the defective mortgage loan. As this parsing demonstrates, Section 5 nowhere references “notice to cure.” We understand the district court to have used *305 that phrase,as a shorthand.reference for both the ,notice-of-breach and request-for-cure obligations, concluding that where, as in this case, the Servicer is the party, “discovering” the material breach, it can be said to have become “aware” of the breach (triggering its request-for-cure obligation) ■at the samp time it “discovered” it (triggering its notice-of-breach obligation). See BNY I, 2013 WL 3146824 , at *20. As we explain in the next section of this opinion, that reasoning is not without some force in explaining how a common trigger date applies to these two MLPA obligations in the circumstances of this case. See infra pp. 309-10. But, it does not-support merging the provisions for purposes of condition-precedent review. Indeed, Morgan Stanley defends the district court’s identification of a condition precedent only by reference to the requestrfor-cure obligation. Accordingly, we here decide whether request for cure is a condition precedent.to Morgan Stanley’s obligation to cure or repurchase. . , B. Bequest for Cure Is Not a" Condition Precedent to Cure or Repurchase Under New York law, which controls our construction of the MLPA, a condition precedent is “an act or event, other than a lapse of time, which, unless the condition is excused, must occur before a duty to perform a promise in the agreement arises.” Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d 685, 690 , 636 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 , 660 N.E.2d 415 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conditions precedent are not readily assumed. While specific, talis-manic. words are not required, the law nevertheless demands that conditions precedent be “ ‘expressed in unmistakable language.’ ” Id. at 691 , 636 NY.S.2d at 737, 660 N.E.2d 415 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 229, cmt. a, at 185). Thus, “[i]n determining whether a particular agreement makes an event a condition[,] .courts will interpret doubtful language as embodying a promise or constructive condition rather than an express condition.” Id.; see Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 79 N.Y.2d 576 , 581, 584 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 , 594 N.E.2d 571 (1992); see also Israel v. Chabra, 537 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir.2008) (citing Oppenheimer in acknowledging New York courts’ caution when interpreting contract clause as condition precedent). Applying these principles here, we conclude that, under the MLPA, the Servicer’s obligation to request cure within ■ three business days of becoming aware of a material breach is not unmistakably cast.as a condition precedent to Morgan Stanley’s cure-or-repurchase obligation, and, therefore, must be construed as a promise. Certainly, the MLPA does not caption or otherwise label -the request-for-cure provision as a “condition precedent” to Section 5 remedies, as one might expect sophisticated parties to do if that were their intent. See, e.g., Lindenbaum v. Royco Prop. Corp., 165 A.D.2d 254, 259 , 567 N.Y.S.2d 218, 220 (1st Dep’t 1991) (concluding that contract clearly imposed condition precedent where, under heading “Conditions of Loan Approval,” parties expressly noted that certain “conditions must be satisfied prior to "the issuance of Closing Instructions” (emphasis omitted)). Nor does MLPA Section 5 employ any recognized “linguistic conventions” of condition — such as “‘if,’ ‘on condition that,’ ‘provided that,’ -‘in the event that/' and ‘subject to/ ” — to make plain that Morgan Stanley’s remedy obligations do not arise unless and until the ■ Servicer requests cure. Israel v. Chabra, 537 F.3d at 93 (quoting Ginett v. Comput. Task Grp., 962 F.2d 1085, 1100 (2d Cir.1992)) (identifying notice obligation introduced by under *306 scored phrase “provided, hoivever,” as condition precedent to immediately preceding guaranties); see Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel , Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 691 , 636 NY.S.2d at 737, 660 N.E.2d 415 (recognizing “if’ and “unless and until” as “unmistakable language of condition”). The failure to couch the request-for-cure provision in the explicit languáge of condition is particularly significant here because the sophisticated drafters elsewhere employed precisely such language to establish undoubted conditions precedent. See, e.g., J.A. 448 (providing - in MLPA for certain actions “in the event that ... the Mortgage Loans ... are held to be the property of the Seller” (emphasis added)); id. at 450 (providing in MLPA for agent or designee to exercise purchaser’s rights “provided the Purchaser,has provided the Seller with prior notice of .the. identity of such designee or agent” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 264 (stating in PSA that “successor master servicer must assume all of the obligations of the terminated Master Servicer ... as a condition precedent to its becoming Master Servicer hereunder” (emphasis added)); id. at 341 (stating in PSA that, “as a condition precedent to the indemnification provided for in this Section,” indemnitee must “notify the applicable Indemnifying Party in writing” of commencement of any action (emphasis added)). 8 Indeed, even within MLPA Section 5, its drafters employed the unmistakable language of condition in detailing Morgan Stanley’s repurchase obligation. See id. at 455 (stating that Seller “covenants and agrees that, if any such ... Material Breach cannot be corrected or cured in all material aspects within the [90-day] cure period [ ■]; the’ Seller shall ... either (i) repurchase the affected Mortgage Loan ...: or (ii) ■ ... ’replace, without recourse, any Mortgage Loan” (emphasis added)). In short, Section 5 makes plain that Mor-gán Stanley is required to repurchase or replace a defective loan only if it is unable to cure the defective representation within the 90-day period afforded by the MLPA. There is no comparable contract language, however, that conditions this remedy obligation on a request for cure, much less on such a request being made within three business days. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Melone, 104 A.D.3d 748, 750-51 , 961 N.Y.S.2d 275, 277-78 (2d Dep’t 2013) (invoking canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that contract language conditioning employee bonus “upon” sale of assets implies that bonus does not apply to distributions otherwise based); see also International Fid. Ins. Co. v. County of Rockland, 98 F.Supp.2d 400, 412 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (recognizing that “[sophisticated lawyers ... must be presumed to know how to use parallel construction and identical wording to impart identical meaning when they intend to do so, and how tó use *307 different words and construction to establish distinctions in meaning”). Thus, the very contract language employed by the parties undermines our dissenting colleague’s conclusión'that Morgan Stanley cannot be expected to cure breaches of which it has been notified but for which it has not received a formal request for cure. See Dissenting Op., post at 315-17. In fact, its obligation to repurchase is. conditioned only on its inability to cure within the 90-day cure period. And, as the MLPA makes clear, that cure period is triggered exclusively by “the Seller’s receipt of the notice of ... Material Breach,” not the Servicer’s request for cure. J.A. 454 (emphasis added). ■While New York courts have construed some triggering events as conditions precedent, they have done so only when the trigger is necessary to a party’s ability to perform the obligation at issue. See, e.g., ALJ Capital I, L.P. v. David J. Joseph Co., 15 Misc.3d 1127(A) , 2007 WL 1218355 , at *2, *5 (Sup.Ct. Mar. 13, 2007) (holding notice of disallowance a condition precedent to defendant’s repayment obligation because, notice was necessary to afford defendant opportunity ■ to cure disallowance within cure period, upon failure of which plaintiff could demand repayment), aff'd 48 A.D.3d 208 , 208, 851 N.Y.S.2d 154, 155 (1st Dep’t 2008); see also Assured Guar. Mun. Corp. v. DB Structured Prods., Inc., 33 Misc.3d 720, 731, 742-44 , 927 N.Y.S.2d 880 , 887-88, 895-97 (Sup.Ct. July 25, 2011) (assuming that notice of breach triggering 60-day cure period was condition precedent to repurchase obligation in holding notice adequate); Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. v. Bay View Franchise Mortg. Acceptance Co., No. 00 Civ. 8613(SAS), 2002 'WL 818082, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2002) (applying New York law in recognizing request to cure as condition precedent where it was exclusive trigger for 30-day cure period, which, if not met, gave rise to repurchase obligation). - Even if the MLPA’s notice-of-breach provision might be construed as a condition precedent because it is the necessary trigger for the cure period afforded Morgan Stanley, 9 its request-for-cure provision serves no comparable essential function without which Morgan Stanley could not understand or perform its cure obligation. Because we are not free to “rewrite into a contract conditions the parties did not insert by adding or excising terms under the guise of construction,” Slamow v. Del Col, 174 A.D.2d 725, 726 , 571 N.Y.S.2d 335 , 336 (2d Dep’t 1991), we here conclude simply that whatever triggering rationale might , apply to notice of-breach, it does not extend to request for cure. The plain language of the MLPA obligates Morgan Stanley to cure or to repurchase a noticed defective loan within 90 days of the receipt of a notice of breach. The .obligation makes no mention of receipt of a request for cure. 10 *308 Thus, when the district court held that “sending- a notice to cure is unmistakably required to trigger the cure period and the . buyback-obligation,” BNY I, 2013 WL 3146824 , at *17 (emphasis added), it could only have been - referring to the MLPA’s notice-of-breach obligation, the exclusive trigger for the 90-day period. That same conclusion pertains to the district court’s statement that, because the MLPA’s repurchase provision “expressly refers back to the notice to cure,” Morgan Stanley’s obligation to repurchase is “dependent on that notice.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). What the repurchase provision expressly refers back to is “the date the Seller discovered or was notified of the breach or defect,” J.A. 455; it nowhere mentions “notice to cure.” The district court went on, however, to conclude that “notice to cure” was a condition precedent that had to be. performed within three business days: “The notice to cure is a condition precedent- to the repurchase obligation, and the parties plainly bargained for the ‘three day* provision in the contract.” BNY I, 2013 WL 3146824 ,. at *21. We disagree. Even if the first part of the quoted sentence might find support in -the MLPA’s noticé-of-breach obligation, the parties did- not plainly bargain to subject notice of breach To the three-day limitation applicable only to request for cure. Indeed, when it recited that “[t]he MLPA gave the Special Servicer three days to send out notice of any breach,” BNY II, 2014 WL 2745011 , at' *3, the district court misstated the contract. In sum, because (1) the obligation to request cure within three business days is neither framed in conditional language nor a necessary trigger for Morgan Stanley’s remedy obligations; (2) notice of breach is, in fact, the exclusive trigger for the 90-day period within which, Morgan Stanley was obligated to cure or to repurchase; and (3) the timeliness of notice of breach is not contractually limited to three days, we conclude that the MLPA cannot be construed to make either notice of breach within three business days or request for cure conditions precedent to Morgan Stanley’s remedy obligations. See Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 691 , 636 N.Y.S.2d at 737 , 660 N.E.2d 415 . Rather, timely request Tor cure is properly construed as a promise, which on remand should be reviewed only for substantial performance. See Israel v. Chabra, 537 F.3d at 93 . C. The Timing of the Servicer’s Request for Cure Cannot Preclude. a Finding of Substantial Performance as a Matter of Law The district court determined, as a matter of law, that the Servicer’s March •18, 2009 communication to Morgan Stanley of notice of breach and request for cure was untimely. See BNY II, 2014 WL 2745011 , at *9.iWe here conclude that the timing of the Servicer’s request for cure cannot preclude a finding of 'substantial performance as- a matter of law. In explaining this conclusion, we first examine the reasoning informing the district court’s timeliness analysis, some of which we ac *309 cept, but other parts of which are at odds with the plain language of the MLPA. As already detailed; the MLPA requires a party to give notice of breach promptly upon discovering a material breach of representation. It also requires a Servicer to act promptly in requesting cure after becoming aware of the breach. But it is only as to the latter obligation that the MLPA cabins promptness to three business days. The district court, however, appears to have concluded that where, as here,, the Servicer, is the discovering party, notice of breach is not prompt if not made within three days. See id. at *3 (“The MLPA gave the. Special Servicer three days to send out notice of any breach.”); id. at *9 (holding that, because Servicer’s notice to Morgan Stanley was not sent within three business days of what court found to be “absolute, drop-dead date” for awareness of breach, “breach notice was therefore untimely”). In view of the Servicer’s having discovered the breach, the district court concluded that (1) any difference in the obligations’ triggering words — “discovering,” and “becoming aware of’ — was “of no moment,” BNY I , 2013 WL '3146824, at *20; (2) awareness, like discovery, occurs only at the conclusion of an investigation of the suspected breach, provided the inyésti-gation is concluded within a reasonable time, see id. at *19-21; (3) the Servicer had reasonably concluded its investigation and, thus, become “aware” of Morgan Stanley’s alleged breach (a) by “February 16, when Wilkicki prepared‘her memorandum” to Unell, or certainly (b) “by February 19, when Unell agreed with Wilkieki’s assessment and instructed her to send the breach notice,” but in no event later than (c) “February 27, when the draft appraisal came in,” BNY II , 2014 WL 2745Ó11, at *9. Thus, the Servicer’s delay of some two weeks after the .last of these «lates to transmit a request for cure was held untimely as a matter of law. . BNY faults this reasoning on several grounds. We focus- here on the argu-, ment it derives from the well established principle that,, where contract provisions use different language, courts must assume the parties--intended different meanings. See Frank B. Hall & Co. of N.Y. v. Orient Overseas Assocs., 48 N.Y.2d 958, 959 , 425 N.Y.S.2d 66, 67 , 401 N.E.2d 189 (1979). Thus, BNY argues, “discovering” breach must mean something different from “becoming aware” of breach, with “awareness” necessarily coming after “discovery” — indeed, -after communication of the notice of breach triggered by discovery — to avoid the absurdity of requiring a Servicer to' request cure (within three business days of awareness) before requiring the 'party discovering the breach to give notice (subject to an undefined promptness obligation), thereby triggering the cure period. BNY’s argument makes sense when the Servicer is not the .party discovering the breach. In that circumstance, it will generally only be upon receipt of the discoverer’s notice of breach that the Servicer acquires the awareness necessary for it to request cure. Further, to the extent the discoverer conducted an investigation of the breach that the .Servicer has no need to duplicate, the latter can reasonably be expected to make its request for cure within three business days of receiving the notice of breach. But, when- the Servicer is the party discovering breach, we cannot categorically conclude, as BNY urges, that it does not become aware of the breach until it transmits its own notice of breach to others. Dictionary definitions may admit the possibility of discovery without awareness. Compare Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 656 (2002) («iefining “discover” as “to obtain for the first time *310 sight or knowledge of’ or “to detect the presence of’), with id. at 152 (defining “aware” as “marked by realization, perception, or knowledge”). 11 The conclusion, however, does not transfer here, where, as the district court correctly observed, the law charges á party with discovery of breach only after it has had a reasonable opportunity to investigate and confirm its suspicions — in short, when it effectively becomes aware, rather than simply suspicious, of breach. The reason the law thus delays discovery of a breach is to avoid creating an incentive -for litigation before a party knows that it has suffered injury. See BNY I, 2018 WL 3146824 , at *19 (collecting cases); id. at *21 (acknowledging that, in complex circumstances, confirming investigation can take several months). We therefore decline to hold as a matter of law that a Servicer who discovers a breach cannot be charged with awareness until it transmits notice. The fact that the Servicer in this case simultaneously transmitted its request for cure with its notice of breach does not necessarily mean that the former was filed within the requisite three business days. Rather, the timeliness of both notice of breach and request for cure may depend,_ as the district court recognized, on whether they were sent promptly after the Special Servicer reasonably concluded its investigation of breach., Where we depart from the district court is in its conclusion that notice of breach, as well as request for cure, had to be communicated within three business days to be deemed prompt. As already, discussed, the MLPA imposes a three-day limitation; on the word “promptly” only as to requests for cure. The absence of such a limitation from the notice-of-breach obligation indicates that the word is to be construed more flexibly in light of the totality of circumstances. See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Annunziata, 67 N.Y.2d 229, 233 , 501 N.Y.S.2d 790, 792 , 492 N.E.2d 1206 (1986) (recognizing that where condition included in one provision is omitted from another, it “must be assumed to have been intentional under accepted canons of contract construction”); Sterling Inv’r Servs., Inc. v. 1155 Nobo Assocs., LLC, 30 A.D.3d 579, 581 , 818 N.Y.S.2d 513, 516 (2d Dep’t 2006) (same). We further conclude that the district court could not identify the reasonable conclusion date for the Special Servi-cer’s breach investigation — or even three possible conclusion dates — as a matter of law. Where the promptness of breach discovery is questioned, resolution depends on an assessment of the totality of circumstances, necessarily including the credibility of witnesses and the weight particular evidence will bear. ' Such matters are generally determined by the trier of fact rather than the court, particularly when the ultimate question is reasonableness. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. County of Nassau, 46 N.Y.2d 1028, 1030 , 416 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 , 389 N.E.2d 1061 (1979) (noting that “question whether a notice ... has been sent ‘as soon as is reasonably possible’ is a question of fact which depends on all the facts and circumstances, especially the length of and. the, reasons for the delay,” and that “[i]t is only in the exceptional case that it may be decided as a matter of law”); Deso v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of Am., 3 N.Y.2d 127, 129 , 164 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 , 143 N.E.2d 889 (1957) (explaining that “reasonableness of. a delay” in timely written notice is usually question for jury); *311 Vale v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Grp., 112 A.D.3d 1011 , 1013, 977 N.Y.S.2d 117 , 120 (3d Dep’t 2013) (stating that where party.fails to comply with condition precedent requiring timely notice, delay may be excused if reasonable, which will generally be “question of fact for a jury”). Thus, while the district court identified February 27, 2009, the date Wilkicki received a draft appraisal fór the City View Property, as “the absolute, drop-dead date” for a reasonable investigation to have concluded, a factfinder might determine that wheré, as here, the investigating party is not an individual but a corporate entity, some degree of chain-of-eommand review is part of a reasonable investigation, and the entity should be permitted to undertake such review before it is charged' with discovering or becoming aware of the breach. Were the jury to so find in this case, it could extend the investigation’s conclusion date to March 16, 2009, when Centerline’s president was first asked to authorize the notice of breach and request for cure based on the investigation of his subordinates. In that event, the March 18, 2009 transmittal would have been prompt even under a three-business-day limitation. 12 .Of course, even if a factfinder were to include chain:of-command review within a reasonable breach-investigation period, disputes- might persist as to whether other events — e.g., commissioning the initial or review appraisals — unreasonably prolonged the investigation. While the district court dismissed Wilkicki’s explanations for these appraisals as implausible, when we view the record hr the light most favorable to BNY, we' Cannot conclude that a reasonable factfinder was precluded as a matter of law from reaching any other conclusion. .Thus, the dispute cannot be resolved on summary judgment. See, e.g., Dillon v. Morano, 497 F.3d 247, 253-54 (2d Cir.2007) (vacating award of summary judgment where, permissibility of defendant’s conduct turned on explanation for it, which necessarily involved credibility determination that was question for jury). Further, because request for cure is not a condition precedent, even if a factfinder were to conclude that the time for reasonable investigation of breach ended more than three business days before March 18, 2009, it would still have to decide the question of substantial performance. ■ “Substantial performance is performance, the deviations permitted being minor, unimportant, inadvertent, and unin *312 tentional.” Cramer v. Esswein, 220 A.D. 10, 11 , 220 N.Y.S. 634, 634 (2d Dep’t 1927) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Bernard v. Las Ams. Commc’ns, Inc., 84 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir.1996); Callanan Indus., Inc. v. Smiroldo, 100 A.D.2d 717, 718 , 474 N.Y.S.2d. 611, 612 (3d Dep’t 1984). Such deviations “will sometimes be . atoned for by allowance of the resulting damage.” Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 241 , 129 N.E. 889 .(1921) (Cardozo, J.). The question of' substantial performance is usually one “of fact and should be decided as a matter of law only where the inferences are certain.” Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir.2007) (collecting cases, including Hadden v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 34 N.Y.2d 88, 96 , 356 N.Y.S.2d 249, 255 , 312 N.E.2d 445 (1974) (assessing substantial performance on basis of several factors such as absolute and relative magnitude of default, its effect on contract’s purpose, willfulness, and degree to which injured party was benefited under contract)). Thus, while .BNY points to a number of factors supporting substantial performance, we do not here decide the question in its favor as a matter of law. We conclude only that the record does not permit substantial performance to be rejected as a matter of law. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. at 243 , 129 N.E. 889 (explaining that substantial performance is question of degree, which, “if there is doubt,” must be answered by “triers of the facts”). In reaching that conclusion, we reiterate certain undisputed facts. First, BNY did transmit a request for cure to Morgan Stanley; thus, the only performance issue is timeliness. Second, the delay in transmittal, even on the district court’s findings, was in the range of two to four weeks. Third, the noticed breach of representation was not curable, regardless of the date when BNY can be charged with awareness of the breach. These circumstances strongly support substantial performance insofar as delay in requesting a cure that was never possible would likely be deemed trivial. As this court recently had occasion to note, “[w]hen contracting parties agree to a notice-and-cure provision, it is reasonable to assume that they do so with the assumption that the breaches which would be used to terminate the contract would be curable breaches.” Giuffre Hyundai, Ltd. v. Hyundai Motor Am., 756 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, “New York common law will pot require strict compliance with a contractual notice- and-eure provision if providing an opportunity to cure would be useless.” Id. at 209 (collecting eases), Morgan Stanley attempts to distinguish Giuffre and the cases cited therein on the ground that they considered the propriety of actions taken by parties who, instead of providing opportunity to cure, terminated contracts or commenced actions for damages. It submits that the futility of cure here is no excuse for the Servicer’s failure timely to request cure because that “is the only mechanism for Morgan Stanley’s obligation to be triggered.” Appellee Br. 46. The argument fails because, as we have already concluded, notice of breach, not request for cure, is the singular trigger for Morgan Stanley’s remedy obligations. Further, it is by no means evident that the timeliness of notice is essential to this trigger because the 90-day cure period would not begin to run until notice was received and any harm to Morgan Stanley from a delay in notice could offset its remedy obligations. See 63 N.Y. Jur.2d, Guaranty & Suretyship § 134 (2006) (stating that where giving notice within specified time is not condition precedent to *313 liability, ‘‘consequence of not giving such notice may be to relieve or exonerate” the party entitled to notice “only to the extent of the damage sustained by reason of the ■omission”); see also Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. at 241 , 129 N.E. 889 . Thus, the impossibility of cure is properly recognized as a factor that ■ here could weigh in favor of substantial performance on remand. Accordingly, because the timeliness of the Special Servicer’s request for cure should not. have been determined as a matter of law and because a reasonable jury could- find that, even if there was some delay in requesting cure, the Special Servi-cer substantially performed this MLPA obligation, these questions of timeliness and substantial performance cannot be decided in favor of Morgan Stanley on summary judgment but must be presented, to the factfinder at trial. III. Conclusion To summarize, we conclude as follows: 1. “Notice to. cure” is not a phrase that appears in the MLPA and, thus, cannot be identified as a condition precedent to Morgan Stanley’s MLPA cure-or-repurchase obligation. 2. The request-for-cure obligation that the MLPA imposes on the Special Servicer is properly construed as a promise rather than ás a condition precedent because it neither employs the linguistic conventions of condition nor serves as a trigger for the cure period at issue. 3. Even if the MLPA’s notice-of-breach obligation could be construed as a condition precedent because it triggers the 90-day cure period — a matter we need not decide as no party advances the argument — that rationale would not extend to the timeliness of the notice, which has no triggering effect, much less to a three-day time limitation, which doe's not cabin the notice-of-breach obligation as it does the request-for-cure obligation. 4. The fact that the notice-of-breach obligation arises upon a party’s “discovering” breach while the request-for-cure obligation, arises upon a Servicer’s “becoming aware” of the breach does not admit the categorical conclusion, urged by BNY, that the time for requesting cure cannot run before notice of breach is given, particularly where, as here, the Servicer is the party discovering breach. 5. Under New York law, a reasonable time for investigation is afforded before a party can be said to have discovered or become aware of a breach. 6. Questions of fact as to the reasonableness of time taken to investigate the alleged breach of the MLPA’s Environmental Conditions Representation preclude finding, as a matter of law, that request for cure was untimely, particularly when reviewed for substantial performance. The .judgment of the district court is, therefore,: VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for- further proceedings consistent with this opinion. . On May 10, 2010, pursuant to transactions not relevant here, C-III Asset Management LLC replaced Centerline as the Trust’s Special Servicer. For purposes of this appeal, we need only refer herein to the “Special Servi-cer,” without régard to the specific entity then serving in that capacity. . As the district court detailed, Wilkicki was not then totally unfamiliar with the City View Loan. Prior to securitization, Centerline (and its predecessor) had acted--as Interim .Servicer at Morgan Stanley’s behest. Centerline’s parent company was then evaluating whether to invest in the Trust, and Wilkicki was among the Centerline employees who conducted, due diligence. See BNY I, 2013 WL 3146824 , at *3, *25. The district court explained why the Trustee cannot be charged with knowledge obtained by Centerline when not acting on its behalf, see id, at *25-29, and the parties do not argue otherwise on this appeal. Thus, we . do not discuss that further. . Representation 12 is entitled “Environmental Conditions” and states as follows: (i) With respect to the Mortgaged Properties securing the Mortgage Loans ... an environmental site assessment, or an update of a previous such report, was performed with respect to each Mortgaged Property in connection with the. origination or the acquisition of the related Mortgage Loan; a report of each such assessment (or the most recent assessment with respect to each • Mortgaged Property) (an "Environmental Report") has been delivered to the Purchaser, and the Seller has no knowledge of any materiál and adverse environmental condition or circumstance affecting any Mortgaged Property that was-not disclosed in such report. J.A. 473 (emphasis in original). ,On this appeal, we express ho view as to the merits of the Servicer's (and, therefore, Trustee BNY’s) breach conclusion.- We'consider only whether BNY failed to satisfy an MLPA condition-precedent for securing a remedy for breach. . In Representation 27, Morgan Stanley war.rantied that, to its knowledge, there was "no material default, breach, .violation or event of acceleration, (and no event which, with the passage of time or the giving of notice, or both, would constitute any of the foregoing) under the documents evidencing or securing the Mortgage Loan” that would materially .and, adversely affect the value of the mortgage loan or property. J.A, 478-79. The Special Servicer asserted, that Morgan ..Stanley breached this representation because, by December 2006, at the latest, it knew, that Wal-Mart was claiming lease, default, and yet Mor *303 gan Stanley represented in May 2007 that there was no material default underlying the City View.Loan. See id. at 781-82.. . The" district court concluded that the Special Servicer had possession of all facts necessary to investigate and bring a claim for breach of this representation by March 16, 2009, making its September 24, 2010 notice of .breach untimely, . See BNY I, 2013 WL 3146824 , at *23. This conclusion is -not challenged on appeal and, thus, we do not discuss it'further. . Section 2.3(a) of'the PSA contains similar, but not identical, breach and recourse language. See J.A, 121-22, The district court focused on the language in the MLPA as it was the only contract to which Morgan Stanley was a party. As neither party challenges that approach on appeal, we do the same without considering any language discrepancies between the MLPA and the PSA. . There is no indication that BNY played any .part in drafting-the MLPA. Rather, Morgan .Stanley appears to have drafted this document, as the same Morgan Stanley Vice Presi- ' debt signed the agreement on behalf of both Morgan Stanley and Morgan Stanley Capital I, Inc., the sole contracting parties. See J.A. 465. While BNY, as the named Trustee, is a party to the PSA, there is no indication in the record as to its role in drafting that agreement. In any event, because the point is not raised, we .have no occasion to consider whether any ambiguities in MLPA provisions ate properly construed against Morgan Stanley as drafter. See Village of Ilion v. County of Herkimer, 23 N.Y.3d 812, 820, 993 N.Y.S.2d 648 , 652, 18 N.E.3d 359 (2014). It suffices that the law requires ambiguous provisions to be construed as promises rather than conditions precedent. See Oppenheimer & Co., v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 691 , 636 N.Y.S.2d at 737 , 660 N.E.2d 415 . . We need not decide this question because, as earlier noted, Morgan Stanley defends the district court’s judgment only by reference to the contract’s request-for-cure obligation. . Judge Wesley deems it implausible that Morgan Stanley would be obligated to cure in the absence of. a request. He maintains that because the Special Servicer was under no obligation to request cure, its request for cure provided essential signaling and demand functions. See Dissenting Op., post at 315-17, 316 n. 4. The conclusion is undermined not only by the 'MLPA’s express assignment of the signaling function to notice of breach, but also to its assignment of a mandatory request-for-cure obligation to the Master Servicer. See J.A. 454 (explaining that, upon becoming aware of any material breach, Master Servi-cer-must, and Special Servicer may, request cure). We need not parse the difference between the Master Servicer's and the Special Servicer’s request-for-cure obligations further because, in any event, the MLPA has not *308 unequivocally identified request for cure as a condition precedent, Thus, in the situation here, where Morgan Stanley is alleged to have breached its cure-or-repurchase obligation and the Servicer is alleged to have breached its. obligation to request cure within three days, the law considers two broken promises (three, when one considers Morgan Stanley’s alleged breach of Representation 12) and compensates the parties accordingly, taking into account, among other things, the issue of substantial performance. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Pierce, 57 A.D.3d 1348, 1350-51, 870 N.Y.S.2d 161 , 163-65 (3d Dep’t 2008) (affirming damages award where jury found both parties to be in: breach of contract). . Thus, Columbus can be said to have .discovered the Americas without' being ■ aware that they were new continents, while Vespucci can be said to have been aware that the Americas were new continents without having discovered them. . Judge Wesley disagrees, observing that, under New York law, a corporation is charged with the knowledge of its agents. See Dissenting Op., post at 318. ..But none of the cited cases reach that conclusion in the context of a corporate entity conducting a breach investigation, much less one doing so as the agent of a trustee. New York University v. First Financial Insurance Co., 322 F.3d 750 (2d Cir.2003), does not offer "precisely this situation," Dissenting Op., post at 320 n! 12, because that case involved neither an agent acting on behalf of a trustee nor a breach investigation similar in nature or scope to. the . one at issue here., Instead, an insurer was there charged with its investigative agent’s knowledge of breach' as of the date the insured conceded certain facts to the agent that effectively admitted the breach precluding recovery under the insurance contract. See New York Univ. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 322 F.3d at 753 & n. 2. Here, Morgan Stanley did not similarly confirm its breach of the MLPA to Wilkicki. As already noted, in such circumstances, the law affords a reasonable time for investigation of breach to avoid creating an incentive for premature litigation. That concern supports including some chain-of-command review within a reasonable investigation, rather than demanding action as soon as any corporate agent reaches a conclusion regardless of his authority to act on it for the corporatiori. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 465 , 912 N.Y.S.2d 508 , 517, 938 N.E.2d 941 (2010) (acknowledging that, generally, only acts within scope of agents’ authority are "presumptively imputed to their principals”). . See also 13 Williston on Contracts § 38:16 (4th ed.. 2000) ("Any words which, when properly inteipreted or construed by the court, make clear the notion that the performance of a promise in a contract is dependent on some other act or event will create an express condition.”). 


[Dissent by Wesley]

 WESLEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: In concluding that a request to cure was not a condition precedent to Morgan Stanley’s repurchase obligation and that issues of fact preclude summary judgment, the majority opinion both misapplies New York law and misreads the plain language of the contract. The result is, in essence, judicial reformation of the agreement, saving a sophisticated party from the requirements of the bargain it made following arms-length negotiation. Because I cannot agree with these conclusions, I respectfully dissent. *314 It is indeed the case that New York law requires conditions precedent to be “express” — that is, stated by the parties in “unmistakable language.” Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d 685, 690-91 , 636 N.Y.S.2d 734 , 660 N.E.2d 415 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). But there is no indication in Oppenheimer that the standard of “unmistakable language” — which the Court drew from the Second Restatement of Contracts — requires specific, tálismanic words. See Oppenheimer, 86 N.Y.2d at 691 , 636 N.Y.S.2d 734 , 660 N.E.2d 415 (quoting Restatement (Second) .of Contracts § 229 cm't. a (1981)).- In fact, the Restatement clearly rejects that view: “No particular form of language is necessary to make an event ■ a condition, although such words as ‘on condition that,’ ‘provided that’ and ‘if are often used for this purpose. An intention to make a duty conditional may be manifested by the general nature of an agreement, as well as by specific language.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 226 cmt. a. 1 A recent case of the Court of Appeals confirms this analysis: the Court construed a provision requiring negotiation and execution of additional terms as an express condition precedent to a party’s obligation to supply fiber-optic capacity but relied on no conditional words, identifying the parties’ “clear intent” solely from the nature and structure of the agreement. See IDT Corp. v. Tyco Grp., S.A.R.L., 13 N.Y.3d 209, 212, 214 , 890 N.Y.S.2d 401 , 918 N.E.2d 913 (2009). 2 Similarly, lower New York courts have concluded that an express condition precedent exists “despite the lack of explicitly conditional language” so long as it “was unmistakably required” before another obligation came into forcé. ALJ Capital I, L.P. v. David J. Joseph Co., 48 A.D.3d 208, 208 , 851 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1st Dep’t 2008) (emphasis added); see also Walton v. E. Analytical Labs, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 532, 533 , 667 N.Y.S.2d 407 (2d. Dep’t 1998) (finding condition precedent premised on the structure of the provision, notwithstanding the lack of1 conditional language); Winfield Capital Corp. v. Mahopac Auto Glass, Inc., 208 A.D.2d 715, 715 , 617 N.Y.S.2d 499 (2d Dep’t 1994) (same). ‘ In New York courts, therefore, specific words are strong evidence of, but not necessary to, conditions precedent; the core inquiry, as in all contracts,” is to give effect to the parties’ “clear intent,” as expressed through the “unmistakable language” they use. So what then does the language and structure of the contract — negotiated at arms’ léngth by sophisticated commercial entities — tell us' about breaches of the agreement and the remedies provided for those breaches? For ease of reference, here again are the three obligations as identified in the majority opinion, ante, at 304: 1. If a material breach exists, “the party discovering such ... Material Breach ■shall promptly notify, in writing, the other party....” > *315 2. “Promptly (but in any event within three Business Days) upon becoming aware of any such ... Material Breach, the Master Servicer shall, and the Special Servicer may,- request thát the Seller, not later than 90 days from the Seller’s receipt of the notice of such ... Material Breach, cure such ... Material Breach____” • 3. “The Seller hereby • covenants and agrees that, if any such ... Material Breach cannot be corrected or cured in all material aspects within the above cure period[], the Seller shall, on or before the- termination of such cure periodic], either (i) repurchase the affected Mortgage Loan ... or (ii) ... at its option replace, without recourse, any Mortgage Loan ... to which such defect relates with a [substitute mortgage].” J.A. 454-55. We can all agree the third clause clearly conditions Morgan Stanley’s repurchase-or-replace obligation on the existence of a particular circumstance: that “any ... Material Breach cannot be corrected or cured in all material aspects within the above cure period [ ].” J.A. 455 (emphasis added); see Majority Op.,, ante, at 306 (identifying this clause as an example of “unmistakable language of condition”). Similarly, we agree that this language makes the repurchase obligation dependent on the obligation to cure within the cure period. But where the majority opinion and I depart is whether that obligation to cure within the cure period arises from the notice of breach or from the request to cure. The majority opinion concludes that because the ninety-day period is calculated from the date of the notice of breach, the cure period must be triggered by the notice. See Majority Op., ante, at 307 (“[A]s the MLPA makes clear, that cure period is triggered exclusively by ‘the Seller’s receipt of the notice of ... Material breach,’ not the Servicer’s request for cure.” (quoting J.A. 454)). I cannot agree: A ninety-day clock may count down from the notice of breach, but it is only the request to cure that gives, that clock any legal meaning. The ninety-day cure period is written as a clause in the middle of the request provision, which states that “the Special Servi-cer may[ ] request that the Seller, not later than 90 days from the Seller’s receipt of the notice of such ... Material Breach, cure such ... Material Breach.” J.A. 454 (emphasis added). In other words, the ninety day's and their legal significance are a part of the Special Servicer’s request.' If there were no' request, ninety days' would pass — in time’s typical fashion — but it would not be a legally significant “cure period” for purposes of the repurchase obligation because no .one had requested cure by that date. The' majority opinion seems disturbed by the fact the deadline for cure is not counted down from the request for cure and so concludes that the request itself has no conditional force over the repurchase obligation. But the repurchase obligation depends on the Seller not curing the breach within the cure period; that circumstance can only exist if the Special Servicer first makes a request to cure, which includes (and creates) the obligation to cure and the legal deadline for it. Nothing about the fact that the deadline is established ninety days after another event changes the fact that it is the request that brings it into existence. For example, imagine two parties enter into a contract that reads: “Upon, becoming aware of a material breach, the Special Servicer may request'that the Seller,’not later than ten days following the next full, moon, cure such material breach.” An. obligation to cure within the cure period does not come into existence as a result of the lunar cycle; it is triggered by the request — the “not later than” clause simply provides a way to determine the deadline by which *316 the Seller must comply. Put simply, the request identifies an object (cure) and a deadline (ninety days following a particular identified event); absent any request, there is no object and no deadline. 3 This interpretation is confirmed by a simple counterfactual: If the Special Ser-vicer had exercised its option not to request cure, would Morgan Stanley still have been obliged to cure or repurchase the loan? The answer — on the plain face of the contract — must be “no.” The contract is conspicuously lacking any language making cure of every material breach .obligatory on the Seller absent a request to cure. 4 . To construe the contract in that way would require reading the repurchase obligation as creating, sub silentio, an obligation to cure that arises simply from notification of breach. 5 It is simply unfathomable that the parties would silently imply, rather than lay out explicitly, such a significant obligation as one requiring cure of every material breach for which a notice of breach was transmitted. Instead, the parties explicitly conditioned the repurchase obligation on the running of the cure period without actual cure, and the cure period only comes into existence through the Special Servicer’s request. 6 Compare-this framework with the provisions considered by district courts-in our *317 Circuit that have concluded timely notice did not constitute a condition precedent to repurchase obligations: in those cases, the obligation was triggered by either a party’s discovery of its own breach or its counterparty’s notification — i.e., the obligation could come into existence through a mechanism other than a request to cure. See LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., No, 02 Civ. 7868(HB), 2003 WL 21671812 , at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2003); Tr. for Certificate Holders of Merrill Lynch Mortg. Passthrough Certificates Series 1999-C1 v. Love Funding Corp., No.. 04 Civ. 9890(SAS), 2005 WL 2582177 , at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct., 11,2005); see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Dexia Real Estate Capital Mkts., No. 12-CV-9412, 2014 WL 3368670 , at *4 (S.D.N.Y. , July 9, 2014), rev’d on other grounds, No. 14-2859-ev, 643 Fed.Appx. 48 , 2016 WL 1042090 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2016) (summary order). Here, by contrast, there is. .no indication anywhere in the contract that Morgan Stanley’s discovery- of its own breach requires it to do anything other than “promptly notify, in -writing, the other party.” J.A. 454; see Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. Bay View Franchise Mortg. Acceptance Co., No. 00 CIV. 8613(SAS), 2002 WL 818082 , at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30,2002) (concluding that a request to cure was necessary to begin cure period, the expiration of which required the seller to repurchase the loan). In sum, regardless of whether the parties used any particular conditional words, the language of the repurchase obligation is “clear” and “unmistakable” that it arises only when cure does not occur within the cure period — and cure within the. period is an obligation that arises only out of the Special Servicer’s request. See ALJ Capital, 48 A.D.3d at 208 , 851 N.Y.S.2d 154 . 7 Because the language and structure of the provision makes the repurchase obligation unmistakably contingent on the Special Servicer’s request to cure, that request must necessarily constitute -an express condition precedent. See IDT Corp., 13 N.Y.3d at 214 , 890 N.Y.S.2d 401 , 918 N.E.2d 913 . Express conditions precedent are subject to “the requirement of strict compliance,” in contrast to promises or constructive conditions, with which only “substantial compliance” is required. Oppenheimer, 86 N.Y.2d at 690, 692 , 636 N.Y.S.2d 734 , 660 N.E.2d 415 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “no mitigating standard of materiality or sub-stantiality [is] applicable to the non-occurrence of [an express condition precedent].” Id. at 692 , 636 N.Y.S.2d 734 , 660 N.E.2d 415 (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, once we determine that a request to cure “within three Business Days[] upon becoming aware” of the material breach, J.A. 454,- is an express condition precedent to the repurchase obligation, the only remaining question on summary judgment is whether there exists any genuine issue of material fact as -to the Special Servicer’s strict compliance with that condition. Under longstanding New York law, no reasonable factfinder could determine that the Special Servicer only became aware of *318 the material breach on or after March 15, 2009 — ie., three days before the date of the request to cure. 8 As the majority opinion; explains, the material breach identified here is premised on .Morgan Stanley’s representation that it had no knowledge , of any “material- and adverse environmental condition or circumstance affecting any Mortgaged Property that was not disclosed in such report.” J.A. 625; see also Majority Op., ante, at 301 & n. 3. The Special Servicer’s conclusion that a breach of this representation had occurred .rested primarily on a document showing that Morgan Stanley’s counsel knew the environmental report neither addressed a relevant state regulation, nor the notices of violation, issued thereunder; in fact, this was the only piece of evidence identified in the formal, notice of breach and request to cure. See J.A. 625-26. However, in a document sent to the Special Servicer’s Associate General Counsel on February 16, 2009, the Director of Special Servicing — and the woman who ultimately signed the notice of breach and request to cure — identified, “additional facts ,.. to demonstrate the material and adverse effect” of the breach, including the anchor tenant’s departure -and subsequent lease terminations by other tenants, “discontinued ... loan payments to the Trust in November 2008 as a- direct result of insufficient operating income,” and rejection of the borrower’s insurance claim under a pollution legal liability policy. J.A. 896-98. The majority opinion’s approach places great weight on the internal governance structure of,the Special Servicer, essentially permitting the corporation to deny its “awaréness” of a fact simply because it required authorization by the president to issue the notice. See Majority Op., ante, at 310-12. But “a fundamental principle that has informed the law of agency and corporations for centuries” is that “the acts of agents, and the knowledge they acquire while acting within the scope of their authority are presumptively imputed to their principals.” Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 465 , 912 N.Y.S.2d 508 , 938 N.E.2d 941 (2010); accord Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 68 , 126 N.E. 260 (1920) (explaining that, if the employee of a corporation obtains knowledge “while acting within the scope of his authority, on behalf of [the corporation], for its benefit, [the corporation] is chargeable with his knowledge”). 9 - This presumption of corporate knowledge is conclusive, even if the corporate employee never communicated the information to her superiors: [Njotice of facts to an agent is constructive notice thereof to the principal himself, where it arises from or is at the time connected with the subject-matter of his agency, for, upon general principles of public policy, it is presumed that the agent has -communicated such facts *319 to the principal, and, if he has not, still the principal having- .[ejntrusted the agent .-with the particular business, the other party has a right to deem his acts and knowledge obligatory upon the principal. Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N.Y. 563, 569 , 23 N.E. 891 (1890); accord N.Y. Univ. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 750 , 753 & n. 2 (2d Cir.2003) (applying these principles to a timeliness inquiry and calculating the insurer’s delay in notice from the date its investigator discovered grounds for liability); Apollo Fuel Oil v. United States, 195 F.3d 74, 76-77 (2d Cir.1999) (applying the same rule to conclude the corporation knew of intentional misconduct through its' employees’ knowledge). This rule applies even where such. knowledge works the waiver of a contractual right and the corporate agent does not have any authorization under the contract to make such a waiver affirmatively. See, e.g., Hurley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 247 A.D. 547, 550 , 288 N.Y.S. 199 (4th Dep’t 1936). Put simply, as a matter of law, the Special Servicer knew the facts of the breach and their material and adverse effect on the loan well before March 15, 2009,. The Director of Special Servicing drafted a memorandum containing sufficient facts to constitute awareness of both the breach and its material and adverse. effects on February 16, 2009. 10 Even after that, on February 19, 2009, an Associate General Counsel at the company confirmed that “there is evidence that [Morgan Stanley] knew” there were undisclosed environmental conditions in breach of the representation and concluded “I think that the breach notice should be' sent.”. J.A. 1266. Yet, despite two employees responsible for investigating material breaches concluding there was sufficient evidence of such a breach, no notice was sent until March 18, 2009, during which time no new material facts were obtained by the Special Servi-cer. Though the Trustee’s brief makes much of the fact that neither the “Director of Special Servicing nor the Associate General Counsel had authority to issue a.notice of breach, authority to make the ultimate decision is irrelevant to imputation; what matters - is whether the knowledge was obtained within the scope of the employee or agent’s employment. See N.Y. Univ., 322 F.3d at 753 & n. 2; Hyatt, 118 N.Y. at 569 , 23 N.E. 891 ; Hurley, 247 A.D. at 550 , 288 N.Y.S. 199 . There can be.-no dispute that the Director of Special Servicing,, who ultimately signed the formal notice of breach and request to cure, see J.A. 626, obtained her knowledge of the breach and its effects in the scope of her ‘authority to investigate potential breaches. See J.A. 1110-11; see also N.Y. Univ., 322 F.3d at 753 & n. 2 (calculating delay in insurance coverage denial from the date the investigator learned of the. grounds for denial, notwithstanding his lack of authority to deny coverage himself). Just as importantly, none of the post-February 16 activities described by the majority opinion.contributed in any material way to the Special Servicer’s “awareness” of any breach. None of the internal “chain of command” reviéws — not the removal of one paragraph of supporting facts from the notice and request to cure by the Associate General Counsel, see J.A. *320 1341-45, nor the approvals without change by both a senior managing director and the president of the company, see J.A. 1347, 1829-30 — made any additional facts available to the corporation, either of the nature of the breach or of its material and adverse effects. The only potentially new fact arose from the appraisal setting the collateral’s market value at $22.3 million, the initial estimate of which was received on February 27,2009. See J.A. 1739. The Trustee argues that this appraisal was needed “to confirm that Morgan Stanley’s breach was ‘material’ under the terms of the MLPA.” Appellant Br. 17. But this lone data point could hardly have tipped the scales of the Special Servicer’s awareness of the breach’s materiality in light of what it already knew as of February 16, 2009: (1) The loan was in default; (2) The anchor tenant had departed, which precipitated rent reductions, lease terminations, and discontinued rent payments by other tenants; (3) An Ohio regulatory body had filed a lawsuit against the borrower arising from the same environmental regulatory violations at issue in the breach; (4) The borrower’s insurance claim for the legal liability was denied; (5) The Trust was seeking receivership for the property; and (6) The Trust would have to fund any legal costs associated with attempts to recoup value. See J.A. 619, 897-98. The substantive portion of the February 16, 2009 memorandum concluded with these words: “All of the above results, stem from the state code violations which were present prior to, during and after the sale of the Mortgage Loan to the Trust. The Mortgage Loan should be repurchased pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in the PSA and the applicable MLPA.” J.A. 898. It exceeds all bounds of credulity to think that, in the face of all these known facts, the Special Servicer was anything but aware of the circumstances of the breach as well as its material and adverse consequences. 11 The majority opinion’s approach thus drastically departs from New York law governing corporate knowledge and timely request obligations under a contract. Under the majority opinion, all any corporation need do now is require authorization for such requests at its highest level — and regardless of the facts known by employees below the highest executive officer, the corporation cannot be charged with “awareness” of those facts. 12 Not only is *321 this type of passing-the-buck approach wholly contrary to “a fundamental principle that has informed the law of agency and corporations for centuries,” Kirschner, 15 N.Y.3d at 465 , 912 N.Y.S.2d 508 , 938 N.E.2d 941 , but it would completely defeat the purpose of a temporal limitation on a contractual remedy — namely, the valuable certainty and diligence obtained when a sophisticated counterparty must exercise that remedy within a defined' period of time. Particularly when a timely request is a condition precedent to a contractual remedy, requiring strict compliance, the majority opinion’s approach dramatically undercuts the force and value of such provisions. The Oppenheimer Court considered and rejected a rule that would obviate the harsh consequences of an express condition precedent, concluding that strict compliance was necessary. See 86 N.Y.2d at 691-92 , 636 N.Y.S.2d 734 , 660 N.E.2d 415 . Yet the majority opinion here releases a sophisticated party from thé burden of complying with the agreement it made. At the risk of stating the- obvious, if the corporation’s internal governance did not permit a three-day turnaround between awareness of breach and a request ‘to cure, it should have bargained for more time. 13 On these facts, no reasonable factfinder could determine that the Special Servicer only became aware of the breach on or after March 15, 2009. As a result, no reasonable factfinder could find strict compliance with the condition precedent to Morgan Stanley’s repurchase obligation, and that obligation never came into force. 1 respectfully dissent. . Oppenheimer itself also relied on a case in which absolutely no conditional language appeared; the contract simply required notice of' shipment of goods, and the failure to provide such notice was deemed a “failure to ‘perform[ ] all conditions precedent’ ” and "barred [plaintiff] from recovery.” 86 N.Y.2d at 693-94 , 636 N.Y.S.2d 734 , 660 N.E.2d 415 (first alteration in original) (quoting Jungmann & Co. v. Atterbury Bros., 249 N.Y. 119, 122 , 163 N.E. 123 (1928)). . Stepping back, it makes sense that the request to cure calculates its deadline from the notice of breach. Either party — -the Seller or the Special Servicer — may be the one to discover the breach in the first instance and must then notify the other party. See J.A. 454. If the Seller discovers the breach and provides notice, the Special Servicer then has three days to decide whether to request cure or lose its right to do so. If it chooses to exercise its right to request cure on day three, there may be only eighty-seven days until the end of the cure period — but the Seller already had three days of notice, by its own discovery, of the nature and circumstances of the breach. By contrast, if the Special Servicer discovers the breach, it can both notify the Seller of breach and request cure in the same document, in which case the Seller has the same ninety days of notice. In either event, , this system ensures that the .Seller has exactly ninety days of knowing about the breach, no more and no less, before the deadline occurs. . The majority opinion suggests this consideration is irrelevant because the MLPA-assigned the signaling function to -the notice of breach and because the Master Servicer had a "mandatory request-for-cure obligation.” Majority Op., ante, at 307 n. 10. However, the loan at ' issue was transferred to the Special Servicer ,in-November 2008, see Majority Op., ante, at 301, at which point the Master Servicer ceased to be "obligated to service and administer” the loan except as to certain specified functions, none of which include requesting cure, see J.A, 217. Only the Special Servi-cer’s contractual rights and obligations are therefore relevant, and while the MLPA provided that the Master Servicer "shall” request cure, it provided only that the Special Servi-cer "may” request cure. J.A. 454. "May” in this context can only possess a permissive, rather than mandatory, meaning, see N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Aasen, 157 A.D.2d 965, 967 , 550 N.Y.S.2d 223 (3d Dep’t 1990), and the MLPA thus imposed no obligation on the Special Servicer to request cure. As I have explained, notice of a breach does not trigger the obligation to cure the breach — the request to cure, is what obliges the Seller to cure within the defined cure period. A request to cure by the Special Servicer,, therefore told the Seller that the former was exercising its option to demand cúre, providing exactly the same signaling and demand functions as the notice of disallowance in ALJ .Capital. See infra note 7; see also Majority Op., ante, at 307 (acknowledging AU Capital’s notice as a condition precedent). . ■ As described above, if the Special Servicer decides not to request a cure, then the date of the notification of breach has no legal .significance — ninety days later, nothing happens, and no one cafes. , The majority opinion appears distracted by the District Court’s "notice.to cure” misnomer — but we are engaged in de novo review, and even if we were applying a more deferential standard, we are certainly not obligated to accept the District Court’s labels. . In fact, AU concerned just such a timely notice provision triggering a cure period, after which time the plaintiff was permitted to -seek recovery-in court. See ALJ Capital I, L.P. v. David J. Joseph Co., 15 Misc.3d 1127(A) , 2007 WL 1218355 , at *4-5 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Mar. 13, 2007). The First Department affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that timely notice was "a condition precedent "despite the lack of explicitly conditional language” because the written notice "whs unmistakably required by the agreement’s 'Cure Period’ provision prior to the assertion of a claim for repayment.” ALJ Capital, 48 A.D.3d at 208 , 851 N.Y.S.2d 154 . . Because the majority opinion concludes the request to cure was merely a promise, it analyzes the facts under the rubric of substantial compliance and concludes summary judgment, is inappropriate because reasonable factfinders may differ as to the extent of any "reasonable investigation” including "some , degree of chain-of-command review.” Majority Op., ante, at 310-12. Even under a substantial compliance analysis, however, as explained infra, New York law and the undisputed facts would require us to conclude that the Special Servicer became aware of the breach as of at least February 16, 2009. . As' a corporate legal entity, the Special Ser-vicer "necessarily functions through human actors — its officers, agents and ■ employees— whose knowledge and conduct may be imputed to the entity under the doctrine of respon-deat superior.” Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Citibank , N.A., 73 N.Y.2d 263, 276 , 539 N.Y.S.2d 699 , 536 N.E.2d 1118 (1989). . Note also that this memorandum was based on an investigation of the loan’s status beginning in November 2008. See J.A. 1109-15. Thus," we are not even considering a situation in which the corporation merely had access to (and thus only arguably constructive notice of) these facts — the February 16/2009 memorandum memorializes facts actually known by the Director of Special Servicing. See J.A. 1111-17. To borrow the majority opinion’s analogy, see Majority Op., ante, at 311 n. 11, she was aware both that she had found the Americas (the fact) and that they were new (its significance). . Even accepting the dubious proposition that confirmation of the loan valuation somehow moved the Special Servicer from "unaware” to "aware,” that appraisal was confirmed on March 13, 2009. See J.A. 1730; Majority Op,, ante, at 302. It took another five days for the Special Servicer to send the notice of breach and request to cure. See J.A, 624-26. . The majority opinion criticizes this dissent for not citing cases related to investigations by agents and employees. See Majority Op., ante, at 311 n. 12. However, our prior decision in New York University offers precisely this situation; a line investigator at a company contracted as an insurer’s agent discovered grounds for denying coverage, and that knowledge was imputed to the insurer for purposes of determining timeliness. See 322 F.3d at 753 & n, 2. The majority opinion’s error arises from its failure to recognize that investigation was clearly within the scope of the Director of Special Servicing’s employment, regardless of her ability to take some subsequent external action on behalf of the company. The results of her investigation— i.e., knowledge of the facts and significance of breach — are therefore imputed to the Special Servicer, who must then take whatever steps are necessary in its internal governance structure to act within the time provided by the contract. . “Freedom of contract prevails in an arm's length transaction between sophisticated par- . ties such as these, and in the absence of countervailing public policy concerns there is no reason to relieve them of the consequences of their bargain. If they are dissatisfied with the consequences of their agreement, the time to say so was at the bargaining table.” Oppenheimer, 86 N.Y.2d at 695 , 636 N.Y.S.2d 734 , 660 N.E.2d 415 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).