Beauchamp v. Muise

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Melanie Elaine Beauchamp, No. CV-24-00861-PHX-GMS 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Maria Cristina Muise and Jason Muise, 13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Defendants Maria Cristina Muise and Jason Muise’s 16 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. (Doc. 5). For the following reasons, 17 the Motion is granted with leave to amend. 18 BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff Melanie Elaine Beauchamp sells cosmetic products and resides in 20 Arizona.1 (Doc. 1-2 at 1). Defendants Maria Christina and Jason Muise are married.2 (Id.). 21 Beauchamp alleges that the Muises, through their statements on social media, committed 22 the torts of false light, defamation, business disparagement, and intentional and negligent 23 infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 2-4). 24 In September 2023, Christina Muise reached out to Beauchamp to inquire about 25 receiving free cosmetic products in exchange for promoting those products on social media. 26 1 According to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Beauchamp owns 27 and operates Cheveaux LLC, a compounding pharmacy in Arizona that specializes in skincare and hair regrowth products. (Doc. 9 at 3). 28 2 According to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Muises reside in New Hampshire. (Doc. 5 at 1). 1 (Id. at 1). Beauchamp and Christina Muise eventually agreed that Beauchamp would send 2 products to Christina Muise as payment for creating social media content about those 3 products. (Id. at 2). Beauchamp began to send products from her business in Arizona to 4 the Muises in New Hampshire, and the Muises promoted those products on their social 5 media platforms to over 340,000 followers. (Id.). 6 On February 6, 2023, Christina Muise allegedly criticized Beauchamp and her 7 products on a TikTok livestream. (Id.). The Muises then allegedly opened fake accounts 8 on TikTok to disparage the products and, on multiple occasions, made false statements 9 about Beauchamp and her products on social media livestreams. (Id.). Christina Muise 10 allegedly encouraged her followers on social media to stop using Beauchamp’s products. 11 (Id.). On March 16, 2024, Christina Muise allegedly urged her followers to “go after 12 [Beauchamp’s] board certifications,” accusing Beauchamp of “unethical conduct or breach 13 of professional duties” and “illegal” activity. (Doc. 1-2 at 3). The Muises also allegedly 14 posted public records about Beauchamp on social media. (Id.). 15 DISCUSSION 16 I. Legal Standard 17 In a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the “party seeking to invoke the 18 court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists.” Scott v. 19 Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986). Because the Court is resolving this Motion 20 without holding an evidentiary hearing, Beauchamp “need make only a prima facie 21 showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand this motion.” Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 22 1498 (9th Cir.1995); see also Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 23 1258 (9th Cir.1989). That is, Beauchamp “need only demonstrate facts that, if true, would 24 support jurisdiction over the defendant.” Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1498. 25 To establish the prima facie case for personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the 26 burden of showing that: (1) the forum state's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over the 27 nonresident defendant; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with principles of due 28 process. Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1995). 1 Arizona's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the Due 2 Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); Doe v. American 3 Nat'l Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 1997). Due process requires a nonresident 4 defendant to have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the 5 maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 6 justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal citation omitted). 7 There are two types of personal jurisdiction, general and specific. Burger King Corp. v. 8 Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.5 (1985). General jurisdiction allows a court to entertain 9 all actions against defendants because they have significant, continuous contacts with a 10 forum state, while specific jurisdiction allows only actions against defendants that relate 11 directly to their contacts with the forum state because those contacts are minimal. See id. 12 In her Response to the Muises’ Motion, Beauchamp makes no argument that this Court 13 may exercise general jurisdiction over the Muises. Rather, Beauchamp asserts that specific 14 jurisdiction exists. 15 A. Specific Jurisdiction 16 “Defendants’ contacts with the forum state are sufficient to subject them to the 17 state’s specific jurisdiction if (1) they purposefully directed tortious activities at the forum 18 or a resident thereof or performed some act by which they purposefully availed themselves 19 of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum, (2) the claims arise out of or result 20 from the defendant’s forum-related activities, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is 21 reasonable.” Tanga.com LLC v. Gordon, No. CV-14-01871, 2015 WL 533264, at *2 (D. 22 Ariz. Feb. 9, 2015) (citing Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 23 1086 (9th Cir. 2000)). 24 The Ninth Circuit has held that the specific jurisdiction test “may be satisfied by 25 purposeful availment of the privilege of doing business in the forum; by purposeful 26 direction of activities at the forum; or by some combination thereof.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La 27 Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir.2006). Under 28 either the purposeful availment or purposeful direction analysis, plaintiffs must also show 1 that their suit arises out of the defendant's contacts in the forum state. See Terracom v. 2 Valley Nat. Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1995); Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1088. 3 This “arising out of” requirement is met if, but for the contacts between the defendant and 4 the forum state, the cause of action would not have arisen. See Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 271. 5 The Court’s decision whether to apply the purposeful availment or purposeful 6 direction prong of the specific jurisdiction test turns on the nature of the underlying claims. 7 Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., 11 F.4th 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Morrill v. Scott 8 Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2017)). “When the underlying claims sound in 9 contract,” the Court employs the purposeful availment analysis. Id. “When [the underlying 10 claims] arise from alleged tortious conduct committed outside the forum,” the Court 11 employs purposeful direction analysis. Id.; see also Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor 12 Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802-03 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying purposeful direction test where 13 “[d]efendant’s actions outside the forum state . . . are directed at the forum, such as the 14 distribution in the forum state of goods originating elsewhere”). 15 Since the underlying claims in this case—false light, defamation, business 16 disparagement, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress—sound in 17 tort, the purposeful direction analysis for specific jurisdiction applies. See Cummings v. 18 Western Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 133 F.Supp.2d 1144, 1153 (D. Ariz. 2001) (applying the 19 purposeful direction analysis to cases involving defamation, intentional interference with 20 business relationship, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false light); see also 21 Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 128 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying the 22 purposeful direction analysis to a case involving defamation, intentional interference with 23 business relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress). 24 1. Purposeful Direction 25 Courts evaluate purposeful direction using the Calder “effects test.” See Brayton 26 Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010). Under the 27 “effects test,” the defendant must allegedly have: “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) 28 expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to 1 be suffered in the forum state.” Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th 2 Cir. 2002). All three elements of the test must be satisfied. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 3 805. The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that “a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the 4 forum state [does not always give] rise to specific jurisdiction.” Dole, 303 F.3d at 1112 5 (quoting Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087). Rather, “something more is needed in addition to a 6 mere foreseeable effect.” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2006). 7 The Ninth Circuit has held that the requisite “something more” for purposeful direction 8 involves “express aiming at the forum state,” or in other words, “targeting” the forum state. 9 See Pebble Beach Co., 453 F.3d at 1156-57 (finding no specific personal jurisdiction where 10 defendant’s actions lack “individualized targeting” at the forum state). 11 The Muises’ committed intentional acts for the purposes of the effects test. See 12 Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088 (finding that the sending of a letter constituted an intentional 13 act); see also Cummings, 133 F. Supp. at 1157-59 (finding that the creation of an agreement 14 and actions related to the agreement constituted intentional acts); see also Schwarzenegger, 15 374 F.3d at 806 (holding that posting in a newspaper constituted an intentional act). The 16 Muises’ alleged acts cannot occur spontaneously or because of reflex, so the Court finds 17 the Muises must have intended to perform them. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 663 F.Supp at 18 850 (D. Ariz. 2009) (finding that Defendant’s “phone calls, emails, and mailings” 19 constituted intentional acts because the alleged acts “cannot occur spontaneously or 20 because of reflex”). 21 The next question is whether the Muises’ intentional acts targeted Arizona. This 22 inquiry is “fact-specific, but the Court is guided by the principle that it ‘must focus on the 23 defendant’s contacts with the forum state, not the defendant’s contacts with a resident of 24 the forum.’” Gonzalez v. U.S. Human Rights Network, 512 F. Supp. 3d 944, 958 (D. Ariz. 25 2021) (citing Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2015)). “The plaintiff cannot 26 be the only link between the defendant and the forum,” Id. (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 27 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)), because “a tort must involve the forum state itself, and not just have 28 some effect on a party who resides there.” Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1145. 1 To begin, the Muises’ remote communications with Beauchamp were not expressly 2 aimed at Arizona. A defendant’s remote communications with a plaintiff residing in the 3 forum state do not constitute “express aiming,” particularly where the defendant “never 4 visited the forum state” or “performed any relevant duties in the forum state.” Gonzalez, 5 512 F. Supp. at 958-59. Throughout the remote communications, the Muises remained in 6 New Hampshire. Any connection to Arizona through these communications existed only 7 because Beauchamp lived in Arizona, which is insufficient for purposeful direction. See 8 Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1144 (finding no purposeful direction because “[a]ny links to Arizona, 9 which included [d]efendants’ communications with [p]laintiffs by telephone and email . . 10 . occurred only because it happened to be where [p]laintiffs resided”). Even accepting 11 Beauchamp’s assertion that the Muises initiated contact with Beauchamp, a defendant’s 12 initiation of a conversation with a plaintiff who resides in the forum state does not 13 necessarily yield a finding of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Gray & Co. v. 14 Firstenberg Machinery Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 758, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding no personal 15 jurisdiction despite defendant initiating the first conversation with plaintiff who resided in 16 forum state). 17 Additionally, to the extent there may have been an agreement between Christina 18 Muise and Beauchamp to receive free products in exchange for social media promotion, 19 the fact that the parties entered into an agreement itself does not establish personal 20 jurisdiction. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 478 (“If the question is whether an 21 individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish sufficient 22 minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum, we believe the answer clearly is that it 23 cannot.”). Further, the agreement lacks any written contract, as well as evidence of alleged 24 negotiations in Arizona, meetings in Arizona, or a long-term relationship. See LLC 25 Wholesale Supply, LLC v. Allion HealthCare, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-01174, 2013 WL 26 12284460, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 22, 2013) (finding no personal jurisdiction given absence 27 of a written contract, negotiations, meetings in the forum state, and long-term relationship). 28 The only connection to Arizona in this agreement, as alleged by Beauchamp, involves the 1 Muises’ awareness that Beauchamp resided in Arizona and shipped the products from 2 Arizona. (Doc. 9 at 4). But “mere knowledge of the [plaintiff’s] residence is not sufficient 3 to create personal jurisdiction.” Xcentric Ventures v. Bird, 683 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1073 (D. 4 Ariz. 2010). Beauchamp, therefore, does not allege the requisite “express aiming” or 5 “targeting” of Arizona. See Pebble Beach Co., 453 F.3d at 1156-57. Beauchamp provides 6 no reason to believe, for example, that the Muise’s comments were expressly or especially 7 made to Arizona customers. Rather, this agreement appears to target an audience beyond 8 Arizona, aiming to promote Beauchamp’s products to a market outside of Arizona through 9 social media exposure. 10 With no discussion of Arizona or an Arizona audience, the Muises’ posts on social 11 media regarding Beauchamp and Beauchamp’s products also did not target Arizona. See 12 Xcentric, 683 F.Supp.2d at 1073 (finding no personal jurisdiction where “[p]laintiffs have 13 not alleged that [d]efendant’s internet article mentioned Arizona or Arizona residents, or 14 that [d]efendants took any affirmative steps to direct the article or website to an Arizona 15 audience”). Posting on the internet about a resident of the forum state does not constitute 16 targeting the forum state itself. Id. (holding “[p]laintiffs have not met their burden . . . of 17 showing defendants expressly aimed [an online article]. . . at Arizona” because “[p]laintiffs 18 have alleged no connection between the [article] and the forum state other than that the 19 article was about [plaintiffs]”). 20 Moreover, the fact that the Muises’ social media posts were viewable in Arizona 21 does not indicate that the Muises expressly aimed the posts at Arizona. Id. (citing Young 22 v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 264 (4th Cir. 2002)). Federal courts have 23 recognized that an internet post, which reaches the forum state and is accessible to residents 24 of the forum state, does not subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in the forum state. 25 C.f. Boddy v. Pourciau, No. C18-1046, 2018 WL 4637380, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Sep. 27, 26 2018) (“To hold that [d]efendants are subject to this court’s jurisdiction simply because the 27 tweets were viewable in Washington would open [d]efendants to being hauled into every 28 court in the country.”); Stewart v. Stuckey-Smith, No. 22-04553, 2022 WL 17069966 at *5 1 (D.N.J. 2022) (citing Young, 315 F.3d at 263) (“Mere placement of content on the internet, 2 by itself does not subject the poster to personal jurisdiction in any state in which someone 3 accesses that content.”). 4 Even if the Muises’ posts caused a foreseeable effect on Beauchamp in Arizona, 5 such as deterring consumers in Arizona from purchasing Beauchamp’s products, that 6 foreseeable effect alone would not establish purposeful direction. See Morrill, 873 F.3d at 7 1145 (“A tort must involve the forum state itself, and not just have some effect on a party 8 who resides there.”). Although “a defendant’s intended audience and the place of 9 plaintiff’s reputation may play a role in the jurisdiction analysis,” Boddy, 2022 WL 10 17069966 at *6 (citing Walden, 571 U.S. at 287-88), a plaintiff would need to show that 11 the forum state was the “focal point of the . . . harm suffered.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 287 12 (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 789). But the Muises’ posts were viewable throughout the 13 country, and Beauchamp has failed to show that Arizona was a focal point of any harm 14 caused by the Muises’ posts or that the Muises intentionally focused their conduct on the 15 state of Arizona in particular. Thus, the Muises’ posts did not target Arizona or its 16 residents. 17 Since Beauchamp has not met her burden of establishing that any of the Muises’ 18 actions were expressly aimed at Arizona or its residents, the Court need not consider 19 whether Beauchamp satisfied the final element of the “effects test” or the other 20 requirements for personal jurisdiction. 21 At oral argument, the parties addressed Count 15 of the Complaint, which alleges 22 that Christina Muise stated on social media, “We should go after her board certifications.” 23 (Doc. 1-2 at 3). Beauchamp argued that this statement referred to the Arizona board 24 certifications of Beauchamp herself. The Muises argued that this statement referred to the 25 board certifications of a person by the name of “Dr. Monica Richardson.” Exhibit Q 26 features the alleged statement, which is located within the comments of a social media post. 27 (Doc. 9 at 44). Upon review of Exhibit Q, it is unclear to the Court whether the alleged 28 statement refers to Beauchamp or Dr. Monica Richardson. The word “her” may refer to 1|| “Dr. Monica Richardson,” whose name is listed in the comment above Christina Muise’s || comment, or may refer to Beauchamp, who is potentially the subject of the main post. (Doc. 9 at 44). It is conceivable that whether or not this statement refers to the Arizona 4|| board certifications of Beauchamp may affect this Court’s jurisdiction analysis. “A district || court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely 6|| clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Akhtar v. 7\| Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 8 || 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988)). Since ambiguity exists surrounding this allegation, and it is 9|| unclear whether the Complaint’s deficiency could be cured by amendment, the Court grants 10 || the Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend. 11 CONCLUSION 12 Beauchamp has failed to meet her burden of making a prima facie case of personal 13 || jurisdiction over the Muises. As a result, dismissal is appropriate. Since it is conceivable that the defects described above could be cured by amendment, such dismissal is with leave 15 || to amend. 16 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Maria Christina Muise and Jason Muise’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is GRANTED with 18 || leave to amend within thirty days of the date of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to file an || amended complaint within thirty days of this order, the Clerk is directed to terminate this 20 || action. 21 Dated this Ist day of October, 2024. 22 - “\ 4 Chief United States District Judge 25 26 27 28 -9-