Brittany Walker v. Rogers Group, Inc.

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11197294","type":"100trialcourt","part":"other","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                              
          NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA                               
              NORTHEASTERN DIVISION                                  
BRITTANY WALKER,              )                                           
                         )                                           
Plaintiff,               )                                           
                         )                                           
vs.                           )       Civil Action No. 5:25-cv-283-CLS    
                         )                                           
ROGERS GROUP, INC.,           )                                           
                         )                                           
Defendant.               )                                           
               MEMORANDUM OPINION                                    
This action is before the court on the motion of plaintiff, Brittany Walker, for
a protective order.  She asks the court to prohibit defendant, Rogers Group, Inc., from
issuing two subpoenas:  the first to plaintiff’s prior employer, Clearview Cancer
Institute, for certain documents relating to her employment; and, second, to Valley
Behavioral  Services,  P.C.,  for  documents  relating  to  plaintiff’s  mental  health
treatment.  Doc. no. 16.1                                                 
The subpoena proposed to be issued to Clearview Cancer Institute demands the
production of:                                                            
Any and all documents pertaining to disciplinary actions, performance
evaluations, termination, complaints made by or against employee and 
investigations  thereof,  and  any  requests  for  leave  or  job-related
accommodations pertaining to [plaintiff].                            
1 Plaintiff’s motion refers to a subpoena proposed to be issued to Keith Watts for documents
relating to plaintiff’s mental health treatment, but that subpoena is not contained in the record.
Doc. no. 16-1, at ECF 4 (alteration supplied).  The subpoena directed to Valley
Behavioral Services seeks “[a]ny and all medical and billing records related to the

healthcare and/or treatment of [plaintiff] from 1/1/2020 to present.”  Id. at ECF 11
(alterations supplied).                                                   
Plaintiff asks the court to issue a protective order preventing issuance of both

subpoenas because each allegedly seeks “information in which she has a recognized
interest in confidentiality,” and is “subject to the psychotherapist/patient privilege and
should  not  be  subject  to  discovery.”2    In  its  opposition,  defendant  asserts  that
employment records from plaintiff’s former employer, Clearview Cancer Institute, are

sought  “in  order  to  determine  if  Plaintiff’s  mental  distress  was  pre-existing  or
attributable to other factors,” and also because the documents are relevant to plaintiff’s
“credibility.”3 With respect to plaintiff’s mental health treatment records from Valley

Behavioral Services, defendant argues that plaintiff has waived any privilege by virtue
of her claim for damages for mental anguish.4                             
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or

defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”  For purposes of discovery,

2 Doc. no. 16 (Motion for Protective Order), at 3.                   
3 Doc. no. 19 (Defendant’s Response), at 4-8.                        
4 Id. at 8-10.                                                       
                           2                                         
relevance is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that
reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be

in the case,” even if the material itself would be inadmissible.  Oppenheimer Fund,
Inc. v. Sanders,
437 U.S. 340, 351
(1978).  The scope of discovery is broad, “in order
to provide parties with information essential to the proper litigation of all relevant

facts, to eliminate surprise and to promote settlement.”  Coker v. Duke & Co., Inc.,
177 F.R.D. 682, 685
(M.D. Ala. 1998) (citations omitted).                 
The Federal Rules “strongly favor full discovery whenever possible.”  Moore
v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co.,
927 F.2d 1194
, 1197 (11th Cir. 1991).  “The party

resisting production of information bears the burden of establishing lack of relevancy
or undue burden in supplying the requested information.”  Gober v. City of Leesburg,
197 F.R.D. 519, 521
(M.D. Fla. 2000).  “Where there is a doubt over relevancy, the

court should still permit discovery.”  Coker,
177 F.R.D. at 685
.          
This court will first address the second challenged subpoena (i.e., for plaintiff’s
mental health treatment records).  The United States Supreme Court adopted the
psychotherapist-patient  privilege  in  Jaffee  v.  Redmond,
518  U.S.  1,  10
(1996). 

Specifically, the Court held that “confidential communications between a licensed
psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected
from compelled disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”
Id.
at

                           3                                         
15.  The patient may, however, waive the privilege.
Id.
at 15 n.14.  The issue of
whether the privilege may be implicitly waived has not been clarified by the Eleventh

Circuit.                                                                  
Even so, other courts have found the doctrine of implied waiver applicable to
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  See Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc.,
201

F.R.D. 551, 557
(N.D. Ga. 2001).  In Stevenson, the court found implicit waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege appropriate “only when something other than garden
variety  emotional  distress  has  been  alleged.”
Id.
“Garden  variety”  claims  for
emotional distress have been described as “claims of generalized insult, hurt feeling,

and  lingering  resentment”  that  “do  not  involve  a  significant  disruption  of  the
plaintiff’s work life and rarely involve more than a temporary disruption of the
claimant’s personal life.”  Javeed v Covenant Medical Center, Inc.,
218 F.R.D. 178,

179
(N.D. Iowa 2001).                                                     
Count I of plaintiff’s complaint alleges that she                    
has suffered, is now suffering, and will continue to suffer emotional
distress, pain, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
and other nonpecuniary losses as a direct result of the Defendant’s  
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 
including, but not limited to, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.     
Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 33 (alteration supplied).  Defendant argues that is enough
to put plaintiff’s mental health at issue, such that discovery of her treatment records
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should be allowed.                                                        
Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have identified the following actions by a

plaintiff that place her mental condition at issue and constitute a waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege:  (1) stating a tort claim for intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress; (2) alleging a specific mental or psychiatric injury or

disorder; (3) alleging unusually severe emotional distress; (4) intending to offer expert
testimony to support a claim for emotional distress damages; or (5) conceding that his
or her mental condition is in controversy.  See Blake v. City of Montgomery, No. 2:19-
CV-243-RAH-SMD,
2020 WL 6804456
, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2020) (citing  

Chase v. Nova Southeastern University, Inc., No. 11-61290-CIV,
2012 WL 1936082
,
at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2012)).  Plaintiff argues, and this court agrees, that she has
taken none of those actions in this case.  She does not assert a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, has not alleged a specific mental or psychiatric injury,
does not allege unusually severe emotional distress, does not intend to offer expert
testimony to support her claim for mental anguish damages, and she does not concede
that her mental condition is in controversy.  Additionally, she has not alleged that any

pre-existing mental health condition was exacerbated by defendant’s termination of
her employment.  See, e.g., Chase,
2012 WL 1936082
, at *5.  Accordingly, the court
concludes  that  plaintiff  has  not  waived,  either  explicitly  or  implicitly,  the

                           5                                         
psychotherapist-patient privilege.  Accordingly, her motion for a protective order is
due to be granted with respect to defendant’s proposed subpoena to Valley Behavioral

Services, P.C.5                                                           
Defendant also contends that discovery of certain records from plaintiff’s
previous employer, Clearview Cancer Institute, should be allowed.  Defendant argues

that  the  employment  records  are  relevant  to  plaintiff’s  claim  for  compensatory
damages for mental anguish.  Specifically, defendant seeks to discover whether
plaintiff’s alleged mental distress was pre-existing, or is attributable to other factors. 
As support for its position, defendant appended records of plaintiff’s visits to the

Huntsville Hospital Emergency Department which occurred during the period she was
employed by Clearview Cancer Institute.6  Plaintiff contends that the employment
records are not discoverable because she has not put her mental health at issue.  

As stated above, the court agrees that plaintiff has asserted only a “garden
variety”  claim  for  mental  anguish  damages,  such  that  she  has  not  waived  the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.  Even so, while plaintiff has not put her mental
health at issue for purposes of determining whether the privilege was waived, she

nonetheless seeks compensatory damages for mental anguish.  Although plaintiff has

5 The same rationale applies to any other individual mental health provider from whom
records may be sought.  See supra note 1.                                 
6 See doc. no. 19-1.                                                 
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a privacy  interest  in  her  employment  records,  they  are  not privileged.   Whether 
plaintiff had a preexisting mental health condition, or whether her emotional distress 
is attributable to other factors, is relevant to her claim for damages. 
 Defendant  has  shown  that  its  position  is  not  merely  speculative,  as 
demonstrated by records from hospital visits during the time period that plaintiff was 
employed by Clearview Cancer Institute.  Accordingly, the court concludes that the 
requested records from Clearview Cancer Institute, limited to documents pertaining 
to disciplinary actions, performance evaluations, termination, complaints made by or 
against plaintiff and investigations thereof, and any requests for leave or job-related 
accommodations pertaining to plaintiff, may be relevant,  and discovery should be 
allowed.  Accordingly, that aspect of plaintiff's motion for a protective order is due 
to be denied. 
 An order consistent with the  findings  of this memorandum opinion will be 
entered contemporaneously herewith. 
 DONE this 4th day of November, 2025.
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