Bryant v. Pettis

1 2 3 4 5 6 THE DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM 7 8 LAKISHA M. BRYANT, CIVIL CASE NO. 24-00020 9 Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING 10 vs. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 35) AND DENYING 11 WILLIAM J. PETTIS, PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS (ECF NOS. 5, 6, 7, 22, 40) 12 Defendant. 13 14 Before the court are Plaintiff Lakisha M. Bryant’s motions to appoint counsel (ECF Nos. 15 5, 22), Motion for Relief (ECF No. 6), Application to Proceed without Prepayment of Fees (ECF 16 No. 7), and motion for issuance of subpoena duces tecum (ECF No. 40), as well as Defendant 17 William J. Pettis’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (ECF No. 35). Plaintiff is proceeding 18 pro se. The court has reviewed the record, the relevant case law, and deems this matter suitable 19 for submission without oral argument. 20 For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s motion for relief, application to proceed 21 without prepayment of fees, motions to appoint counsel are DENIED, and Defendant’s motion 22 to dismiss is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with 23 prejudice, and the motion for issuance of subpoena is DENIED as moot. 1 I. Relevant Facts and Procedural Posture1 2 Plaintiff, a resident of Virigina, filed a complaint against Defendant Pettis, a resident of 3 Florida, and his corporation, WJP Dental Corporation, on September 16, 2024. ECF No. 1. As 4 required, Plaintiff paid the $405 filing fee.2 On December 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to 5 appoint counsel, a motion for relief, and an application to proceed without prepaying fees. ECF 6 Nos. 5-7. 7 On January 21, 2025, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, but after Plaintiff 8 moved to amend her complaint, the Magistrate Judge held a status hearing where he indicated 9 that Plaintiff’s amended complaint would be considered filed on March 28, 2025. ECF Nos. 16, 10 32, 33. The amended complaint, brought only against Defendant Pettis,3 seeks to invoke this 11 court’s diversity jurisdiction by alleging the parties’ residences in different states and an amount 12 in controversy of $10 million. Am. Compl. at 1-5, ECF No. 33. The claims are based on serious 13 allegations that Defendant Pettis raped Plaintiff in 1994. See id. at 5. Plaintiff cites to Guam’s 14 criminal sexual conduct statutes, specifically first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct 15 under 9 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 25.15, 25.20, and related sections on the applicable punishment 16 and statute of limitations for those offenses. Id. at 6-7. The operative facts are as follows. 17 Around October or November 1994, Defendant Pettis allegedly raped Plaintiff “with the 18 intent of harm” while she was “helpless/incapacitated from being inebriated, and unable to 19 consent/participate in sexual intercourse.” Id. at 6. Defendant Pettis “had intent to harm the 20 21 1 Page citations throughout this Decision and Order refer to CM/ECF-generated page numbers. 22 2 Plaintiff initially overpaid the filing fee by $35.00 via Pay.gov after she mailed her complaint to the court, but the 23 Magistrate Judge granted her motion for refund on January 13, 2025. ECF No. 14. 3 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed WJP Dental Corporation on February 6, 2025. ECF No. 23. 1 plaintiff when he subjected her to unauthorized ejaculation inside her body” and “unprotected 2 physical contact.” Id. at 7-8. It appears that the conduct occurred while the parties were serving 3 in the U.S. Navy. See id. at 7. Defendant Pettis’s conduct caused “pregnancy/childbirth” that 4 resulted in “lifelong medical anguish wondering why I even had my baby.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff 5 further alleges that Defendant Pettis’s conduct was “offensive to a reasonable sense of personal 6 dignity,” that she “did not consent,” and that Defendant Pettis’s actions were “intentional, 7 willful, malicious, and/or done with reckless regard to Plaintiff’s rights/his 1st wife/and our 8 unborn children.” Id. “As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff has 9 sustained and will continue to sustain economic injury in the form of lost wages, loss of benefits, 10 irreparable damage to her reputation, severe emotional distress, physical and mental health 11 problems and legal expenses to date.” Id. “Defendant Pettis acted with malice, and willful and 12 conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others when aggressively sexually battering 13 Plaintiff and causing intentional infliction of emotional harm/distress and negligent infliction of 14 emotional harm/distress.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff requests various forms of relief, including “monetary 15 payment of $10,000,000.00 in damages,”4 “defendant being registered on the sex offender’s 16 registry,” and defendant “acknowledg[ing] his wrongdoing” and changing the narrative “that 17 [she] was a will participant, and got any type of gratification from his egregious behavior,” 18 among others. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff also requests relief under 9 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 25.15, 19 25.20, such as “criminal charges . . . to be picked up.” Id. at 10. 20 21 22 4 Plaintiff’s $10 million damages request consists of $1.5 million in lost wages from her U.S. Navy service, $1.6 23 million in lost wages from her USPS service, $3 million as a “Pro Se fee/continued mental anguish,” $2 million in punitive damages, and $3 million in “Injury-Pregnancy and childbirth and child permanently disabled. Am. Compl. at 10, ECF No. 33. 1 On April 18, 2025, Defendant Pettis5 moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure 2 to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mot., ECF No. 35. Defendant 3 Pettis argues that “all claims are time-barred” and that the amended complaint should be 4 dismissed in its entirety. Id. at 1-2. Defendant Pettis also argues that equitable tolling is 5 unavailable for Plaintiff’s claims because, in Guam, equitable tolling applies only to insurance 6 claims. Id. at 3-4. And even if the court equitably tolled Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff’s claims are 7 barred by the doctrine of laches because “Plaintiff has shown a lack of diligence in prosecuting 8 her claim against Defendant” and “to defend against an assault that allegedly occurred in 9 1994 . . . would be highly prejudicial against Defendant.” Id. at 4-5. Finally, Defendant Pettis 10 argues that the amended complaint should be dismissed with prejudice because “Plaintiff can 11 prove no set of facts that can bring her claims for assault and battery within Guam’s statute of 12 limitations,” i.e., Plaintiff cannot possibly cure the deficiencies argued above. Id. at 5. 13 Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss but acknowledges that she “has not addressed her 14 claims appropriately and according to standard.” Opp’n at 3, ECF No. 37. Nonetheless, she 15 argues that “defendant’s conduct still stands as criminal without any statute of limitations on the 16 criminal acts and the plaintiff has filed a criminal report on March 10, 2025.” Id. at 3-4. In 17 support, Plaintiff clarifies her claims against Defendant Pettis: (1) first-degree criminal sexual 18 conduct under 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 25.15; (2) second-degree criminal sexual conduct under 9 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 25.20; (3) gender violence under CAL. CIVIL CODE § 54.2; (4) intentional 20 infliction of emotional distress; (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (6) civil rights 21 violation under CAL. CIVIL CODE § 52.1; (7) civil rights violation under CAL. CIVIL CODE § 51.7; 22 23 5 The motion to dismiss was also filed on behalf of WJP Dental Corporation, however, the corporation had already been dismissed from this action. See ECF No. 23. Therefore, the court refers to Defendant Pettis as the moving party throughout this Decision and Order. 1 (8)“[i]njuries resulting in childbirth of a permanently disabled child resulting in PTSD”; and 2 (9)“[g]eneral [r]elief.” Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff then addresses Defendant Pettis’s arguments by 3 requesting that the statute of limitations be tolled because Defendant Pettis’s egregious conduct 4 continues to take a toll on her life. Id. at 5. Plaintiff also explains that arguments about her delay 5 in filing this case “add insult to injury” because of the lasting impact that his conduct had on her, 6 including “taking care of his adult child.” Id. at 5-6. 7 On August 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the court subpoena wireless 8 telephone companies for text messages between the parties. Mot., ECF No. 40. 9 II. Jurisdiction 10 Plaintiff invokes this court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, alleging that she and 11 Defendant Pettis are citizens of different states (Virginia and Florida, respectively) and an 12 amount in controversy of $10 million. See Am. Compl. at 5, 10, ECF No. 33. Plaintiff’s amended 13 complaint appears to state civil claims for assault, battery, and negligent and intentional 14 infliction of emotional distress, along with civil rights claims under the California Civil Code. 15 See id. at 7-8; Opp’n at 4, ECF No. 37. However, Plaintiff also asserts claims under 9 GUAM 16 CODE ANN. §§ 25.15, 25.20, which are criminal statutes in Guam that define and prohibit first- 17 and second-degree criminal sexual conduct as felonies. Am. Compl. at 6-7, ECF No. 33. 18 Defendant Pettis does not address these claims in his motion to dismiss. See Mot., ECF No. 35. 19 For the reasons explained below, the court sua sponte dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under 9 GUAM 20 CODE ANN. §§ 25.15, 25.20 for lack of jurisdiction but proceeds to evaluate Plaintiff’s remaining 21 claims in light of the motion to dismiss. 22 Federal courts are without jurisdiction to try alleged criminal violations of state statutes. 23 E.g., Beal v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Corp., 312 U.S. 45, 49-50 (1941). And private citizens do not have 1 “authority to initiate a federal criminal prosecution of a defendant for their alleged unlawful 2 acts.” E.g., Cottonwood Env’t L. Ctr. v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 2023 WL 7018748 3 (D. Mont. Oct. 25, 2023) (cleaned up) (quoting Kafele v. Frank & Woolridge Co., 108 Fed. 4 App’x 307, 308-09 (6th Cir. 2004)). Sections 25.15 and 25.20 are criminal statutes that do not 5 contain a private right of action and must be prosecuted by indictment or information. See 8 6 GUAM CODE ANN. § 1.15; 9 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 25.15(b), 25.20(b); cf. Scott v. Emanuel, No. 7 22-CV-1955-GPC-AGS, 2023 WL 376010, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2023) (citing Allen v. Gold 8 Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 9 (9th Cir. 1980)) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim where criminal statute “does 10 not support a private cause of action”). Therefore, this court is without jurisdiction over 11 Plaintiff’s criminal claims, and such claims had to be brought by the local prosecutor’s office 12 within three years after the criminal sexual conduct was committed. See 8 GUAM CODE ANN. 13 § 10.20(c); see also 8 GUAM CODE ANN. § 10.17 (providing that only first- and second-degree 14 criminal sexual conduct that occurred after the enactment of 8 GUAM CODE ANN. § 10.17 may be 15 brought at any time). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under the Guam criminal code are 16 DISMISSED. 17 Nonetheless, the court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the former class of claims 18 (assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional 19 distress), which are civil claims that can arise under Guam law. In doing so, the court applies 20 federal procedural law and state substantive law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 21 (1938); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465-66 (1965). Relevant here, Guam’s statutes of 22 limitations on assault, battery, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress are 23 considered substantive law. E.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 745 (1908). 1 III. Discussion 2 A. Motion for Relief and Application to Proceed without Prepaying Fees 3 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), a court may authorize the commencement of a civil 4 lawsuit without the prepayment of fees or security therefor. See also Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of 5 Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 766 n.3 (2023) (citing Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.1 6 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that § 1915(a)(1) applies to all persons, not just prisoners). District 7 courts have broad discretion in determining whether the filing fees is “fair and appropriate in a 8 particular case.” Id. at 767-68. Procedurally, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed without prepaying 9 the filing fee, the court is required to screen the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Until the 10 application is granted, and the complaint is screened, the case cannot proceed unless the plaintiff 11 has paid the filing fee. See id. at § 1915(a)(1). 12 Here, Plaintiff filed the motion for relief and application to proceed without prepaying 13 fees on December 23, 2024, approximately three months after she filed her original complaint 14 and paid the filing fee.6 See ECF Nos. 6-7. Although Plaintiff attested to her inability to pay, she 15 paid the filing fee in full. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for relief and application to proceed 16 without prepaying fees are DENIED as moot. 17 B. Citations to the California Civil Code Before evaluating Defendant Pettis’s motion to dismiss, the court briefly addresses 18 Plaintiff’s citations to the California Civil Code in her opposition. Therein, Plaintiff cited to three 19 civil rights statutes in the California Civil Code despite not raising such claims in her amended 20 21 complaint. See Opp’n at 4, ECF No. 37 (citing to CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51.7, 52.1, 52.4). 22 23 6 The court’s records indicated that Plaintiff paid the filing fee on September 9, 2024, even though her complaint was filed on September 16, 2024. Plaintiff’s receipt has the Pay.gov tracking identification number: 27HJ5H2Q. 1 Although the court must liberally construe a pro se litigant’s submissions and hold the 2 litigant to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” pro se litigants are 3 not excused from the rules of procedure. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 4 2010). And under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, pleadings must contain “a short and plain 5 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to the relief sought.” FED. R. CIV. P. 6 8(a)(2); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1). “Even a pro se litigant must comply with Rule 8(a)(2), 7 and noncompliance may be met with sua sponte dismissal.” Cleveland v. Flores, 2024 WL 8 5056009, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 2024) (citing Hearns v. San Bernadino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 9 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008). Considering Rule 8’s pleading standard, a complaint must “contain 10 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted); see also Knapp v. 12 Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). 13 Here, Plaintiff did not state claims under the California Civil Code in her amended 14 complaint but cited to them for the first time in her opposition to the motion to dismiss. See Am. 15 Compl. at 5-10, ECF No. 33; Opp’n at 4, ECF No. 37. Even when the court liberally construes 16 Plaintiff’s amended complaint, the court has no reasonable basis to infer that such claims were 17 adequately stated in the amended complaint. See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42. Plaintiff’s 18 allegations appear to arise out of conduct that occurred entirely in Guam. See Am. Compl. at 5- 19 10, ECF No. 33. This leaves the court without a basis to apply California’s civil rights statutes to 20 Defendant Pettis’s conduct.7 See, e.g., Regueiro v. FCA US, LLC, 671 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (C.D. 21 22 7 After reviewing each of the California statutes that Plaintiff cites in her opposition, the court did not find any 23 provision that explicitly indicates that the statutes “have force or operation beyond the boundaries of the state.” Terpin v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Norwest Mortg., Inc. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 4th 214, 222 (1999) 1 Cal. 2023) (citations omitted) (discussing the principle of extraterritoriality whereby California 2 statutes are presumed to not apply outside of California absent an explicit provision to the 3 contrary, in the context of California’s Unfair Competition Law); Terpin v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 4 339 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (same). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s failure to state 5 such claims in her amended complaint does not give Defendant Pettis “fair notice of what [her] 6 claim[s are] and the grounds upon which [they] rest[].” See Echlin v. PeaceHealth, 887 F.3d 967, 7 977 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) and quoting Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), 8 Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2006)). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s citations to the California 9 Civil Code are improperly pleaded and will not be considered here. 10 C. Defendant Pettis’s Motion to Dismiss 11 1. Legal Standard 12 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss when 13 a plaintiff “fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A 14 Rule 12(b)(6) motion “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 15 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is proper “if the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails 16 to allege facts sufficient to support a cognizable legal theory.” Seymour v. Contreraz, No. CV 17 22-125-BLG-SPW-KLD, 2023 WL 5846715, at *2 (D. Mont. Feb. 15, 2023) (citing Zixiang Li v. 18 Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013). When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the 19 court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light 20 most favorable to the non-moving party. Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 15 F.4th 21 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2021); Vasquez v. L.A. County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). This is 22 particularly true of a pro se litigant where the court must liberally construe their pleadings. See 23 Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42. However, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat an otherwise proper motion to dismiss.” Id. “Dismissal for failure to state a claim 1 is appropriate only if it appears beyond doubt that the non-moving party can prove no set of facts 2 in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1249 (internal 3 citations omitted). “Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect, . . . a pro 4 se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior 5 to dismissal of the action.” Garity v. APWU Nat’l Lab. Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) 6 (quoting Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995)). 7 2. Analysis 8 As the court mentioned previously, it reads Plaintiff’s amended complaint as broadly 9 stating claims for assault, battery, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 10 See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42. This is not to say that Plaintiff’s has adequately alleged each of 11 the necessary elements for such claims. Rather, the court assumes, without deciding, that 12 Plaintiff’s states such claims to address the grounds for the motion to dismiss. In his motion to 13 dismiss, Defendant Pettis argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 14 granted because her claims are time-barred under Guam law. Mot. at 2-3, ECF No. 35. Although 15 he argues that all claims should be dismissed on this ground, he focused his arguments on the 16 alleged claims for assault and battery and did not address intentional or negligent infliction of 17 emotional distress. Id. at 3. Nonetheless, the court applies Defendant Pettis’s argument to each of 18 Plaintiff’s claims because the motion to dismiss requests that the entire case be dismissed and 19 argues that “all claims in the Amended Complaint are time-barred on its face.” Id. 20 Under 7 GUAM CODE ANN. § 11301 et seq., the applicable period of limitations for “the 21 commencement of actions other than for the recovery of real property” are provided. Section 22 11306 provides that actions for assault or battery must be brought within two years. 7 GUAM 23 CODE ANN. § 11306. And because Chapter 11 does not provide a specific statute of limitations 1 for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, the catch-all contained in 7 GUAM 2 CODE ANN. § 11312 controls. Section 11312 provides that “an action for relief not otherwise 3 provided for must be commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action shall have 4 accrued.” 7 GUAM CODE ANN. § 11312. 5 Under both provisions, Plaintiff’s claims come before the court well-beyond the 6 applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff’s claims for assault, battery, and intentional and 7 negligent infliction of emotional distress arise out of an alleged rape by Defendant Pettis that 8 occurred in October or November 1994. Am. Compl. at 5, ECF No. 33. The statute of limitations 9 requires that Plaintiff file her assault and battery claims no later than October or November 1996 10 and her intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims no later than October or 11 November 1998. See 7 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 11306, 11312. Plaintiff’s complaint came before 12 this court almost twenty-six years after the statute of limitations had run for Plaintiff’s intentional 13 and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, and almost twenty-eight years for her 14 assault and battery claims. See id.; Am. Compl. at 5, ECF No. 33. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims 15 are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. 16 The court also agrees with Defendant Pettis that the court cannot equitably toll these 17 statutes of limitations because equitable tolling is not available for such claims under Guam law. 18 See Mot. at 3-4, ECF No. 35. “Equitable tolling suspends the running of a limitations period.” 19 DFS Guam L.P. v. A.B. Won Pat Int’l Airport Auth., Guam, 2020 Guam 20 ¶ 80 (citing Guam 20 Hous. & Urban Renewal Auth. v. Dongbu Ins. Co., 2001 Guam 24 ¶ 10). In Guam, the doctrine 21 applies “only ‘in the narrow context of insurance claims,’” and has not been adopted in any other 22 case. Id. (quoting Taitano v. Calco Fin. Corp., 2008 Guam 12 ¶ 44 n.4 and citing Ignacio v. 23 People, 2012 Guam 14 ¶ 42 n.4). “Given the Supreme Court of Guam’s hesitancy to broaden the 1 applicability of equitable tolling beyond insurance claims, the court finds that equitable tolling 2 may not be applied” to 7 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 11306, 11312. See Guam Waterworks Auth. v. 3 Badger Meter, Inc., Civil Case No. 20-00032, 2023 WL 4053899, at *9-10 (D. Guam June 16, 4 2023) (citations omitted). Because the court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred and not 5 subject to equitable tolling, the court does not address Defendant Pettis’s arguments regarding 6 the doctrine of laches. See Mot. at 4-5, ECF No. 35. 7 In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s amended complaint and claims for assault, battery, 8 intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress are 9 DISMISSED with prejudice because no additional allegations could cure the deficiencies 10 caused by Guam’s statutes of limitations. See Garity, 828 F.3d at 854. 11 D. Motions to Appoint Counsel 12 Finally, Plaintiff filed two motions to appoint counsel, the first on December 23, 2024, 13 and the second on February 6, 2025. ECF Nos. 5, 22. In her first motion, Plaintiff requests 14 appointment of counsel on the basis that she is “unable to obtain counsel for these proceedings” 15 and is “entitled to the relief requested.” Mot. at 1, ECF No. 5. In support, Plaintiff submitted a 16 Criminal Justice Act form for appointment of counsel, indicating that she is a veteran and pro se 17 litigant. Id. at 2. In her second motion, Plaintiff states that “the appointment of counsel is 18 necessary to ensure a fair trial and to protect [her] rights under the [Constitution].” Mot. at 1, 19 ECF No. 22. Without an attorney, Plaintiff states that she is “at a significant disadvantage in 20 effectively presenting my case and defending my rights.” Id. 21 Only in extraordinary circumstances may the court request an attorney to represent a 22 litigant unable to afford counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 23 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 1 In considering requests for counsel, the court must consider a plaintiff’s “likelihood of success 2 on the merits” and evaluate “the plaintiff’s ability to articulate [her] claims in light of the 3 complexity of the legal issues involved.” Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 4 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that 5 exceptional circumstances must be “viewed together”). A “likelihood” means that there is 6 “possible merit” to the claims, not that success is certain or even probable. See Byrd v. Maricopa 7 Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 925 (2017). The plaintiff bears the burden of 8 demonstrating these exceptional circumstances. Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970. 9 As explained above, the court denied Plaintiff’s motion for relief and application to 10 proceed without prepaying fees and dismissed her complaint with prejudice. See supra at 6-7, 9- 11 12. In a similar vein, the court finds that “exceptional circumstances” do not exist that would 12 warrant appointing counsel to Plaintiff because her claims lack a likelihood of success on the 13 merits given the applicable statutes of limitations in Guam. See Byrd, 845 F.3d at 925. Although 14 the court recognizes that issues of jurisdiction and statutes of limitations can be complex, 15 particularly for non-lawyers, the court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s amended complaint with 16 prejudice warrants the denial of Plaintiff’s motions to appoint counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 17 motions to appoint counsel are DENIED. 18 IV. CONCLUSION 19 The court does not take Plaintiff’s allegations lightly. If true, Plaintiff’s amended 20 complaint demonstrates that she endured severe and irreversible conduct that appears to have 21 caused her significant anguish. Unfortunately, Plaintiff is without recourse in this court because 22 the court lacks jurisdiction to hear her criminal claims and her civil claims are time-barred. Thus, 23 Plaintiff’s motion for relief, application to proceed without prepaying fees, and motions to Page 14 of 14 1 || appoint counsel are DENIED. Defendant Pettis’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and 2 || Plaintiffs motion to issue subpoena is DENIED as moot. Plaintiff's amended complaint is 3 || DISMISSED with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. 4 SO ORDERED. 6 vs /s/ Frances M. Tydingco-Gatewood y ae a Chief Judge 7 i Gt, Dated: Aug 18, 2025 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24