Capital Standard, LLC, Tchentsov <strong>v</strong>. US Bank National Association, Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC9

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11422006","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT

CAPITAL STANDARD, LLC; VLADIMIR O. TCHENTSOV,
as trustee of the TF15529 Land Trust; and
ANNA TCHENTSOV, as guardian for Oleg V. Tchentsov,
as beneficiary under the TF15529 Land Trust,

Appellants,

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as trustee for
BEAR STEARNS ASSET BACKED SECURITIES I
TRUST 2005-AC9, ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2005-AC9,

Appellee.

No. 2D2024-1392

August 21, 2026

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Michael F. Andrews,
Judge.

Kenneth H. Keefe of The Keefe Law Firm, P.A., South Pasadena, for
Appellants.

Kathleen D. Dackiewicz, Sara F. Holladay, and Emily Y. Rottmann of
McGuireWoods LLP, Jacksonville, for Appellee.

ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.
Capital Standard, LLC, Vladimir Tchentsov, as trustee of the
TF15529 Land Trust, and Anna Tchentsov, as guardian of Oleg V.
Tchentsov, beneficiary under the TF15529 Land Trust (collectively,
Capital Standard), appeal a final declaratory judgment entered in favor of
U.S. Bank National Association. We conclude that Capital Standard's
arguments lack merit, and we affirm the judgment in all respects without
further comment. We write, however, to sanction Capital Standard's
counsel, Kenneth Keefe, for his rampant use of hallucinated citations to
legal authority in his amended initial brief and subsequent reply brief
and to explain the rationale for the sanctions that we impose. 1
It's been three years since the release of the widely publicized
decision in Mata v. Avianca, Inc.,
678 F. Supp. 3d 443
(S.D.N.Y. 2023), in
which a federal district court sanctioned several attorneys and a law firm
under rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for, among other
things, citing fake cases created by generative artificial intelligence (AI) in
legal memoranda and then responding evasively when confronted with
the issue. Since then, and as we have previously noted, see Clerk of Ct.
& Comptroller for 13th Jud. Cir., Hillsborough Cnty. v. Rangel,
427 So. 3d
1069
, 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025), the danger of using generative AI tools in

1 "Two types of mistakes, or 'hallucinations,' are most relevant:

fabrications and inaccuracies." Malkeet Lnu v. Blanche,
177 F.4th 1014
,
1024 (9th Cir. 2026) (citing Magesh et al., Hallucination-Free? Assessing
the Reliability of Leading AI Legal Research Tools, 22 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 216, 221 (2025)). "Fabrications are instances in which the
generative AI tool provides cases or quotations that do not exist at all."
Id.
(citing 22 Empirical Legal Stud. at 221, 230). "Inaccuracies are more
subtle. . . . The generative AI tool might cite to real authorities but
provide an answer that is legally or factually inaccurate or not supported
by the citation."
Id.
at 1024–25 (citing 22 Empirical Legal Stud. at 221–
22). "Fabrications are the most notorious hallucinations, but
inaccuracies may prove more dangerous to our profession in the long
run. Inaccuracies are more likely to go unnoticed by attorneys and
judges because they are not always susceptible to facial checks." Id. at
1025.

2
legal writing without reality-checking the results has been well
documented in numerous opinions in state and federal courts across the
United States, in legal publications, and in the national media. 2 It's been
the ubiquitous subject of CLE courses and roundtable discussions of
attorneys and the judiciary. What's more, it's been the focus of a
mushrooming number of decisions from multiple Florida district courts
of appeal.3 In short, at this point in time, it defies belief for a practicing

2 Damien Charlotin, a French attorney and lecturer in "legal data

analysis," has developed a database referenced by multiple courts that
tracks court orders related to AI-hallucinations. AI Hallucination Cases,
Damien Charlotin, https://www.damiencharlotin.com/hallucinations
(last visited Aug. 7, 2026). As of this opinion, Charlotin has identified
497 cases in the United States involving attorneys' reliance on AI
hallucinations. Id.
3 See, e.g., Avery v. Beauzil,
51 Fla. L. Weekly D1068
(Fla. 4th DCA

May 27, 2026) (barring a pro se litigant from future filings due in part to
AI hallucinations in filings); Gleason v. Marcus,
432 So. 3d 1265
, 1265–
66 (Fla. 2d DCA 2026) (cautioning on the dangers of using generative AI
without confirming the results); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez,
51 Fla. L. Weekly
D771
(Fla. 6th DCA Apr. 10, 2026) (ordering attorney to show cause why
she should not be sanctioned for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari
containing AI hallucinations); Gouveia v. Meridian Fin. Invs., LLC,
432 So.
3d 49
, 50–51 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026) (warning a pro se party against using
generative AI without verifying the results in any future filings); Hessert
v. Hessert,
431 So. 3d 610
, 615 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026) (ordering a party to
show cause why she should not be sanctioned for AI hallucinations in
her petition for a writ of certiorari); Russell v. Mells,
426 So. 3d 913
, 920
(Fla. 2d DCA 2025) (referring attorney to The Florida Bar for AI
hallucinations); Takefman v. Pickleball Club, LLC,
418 So. 3d 826
, 826–
27 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (warning about the use of generative AI without
verifying the results); Goya v. Hayashida,
418 So. 3d 652
, 656 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2025) (warning a pro se party who had filed a "counterfeit brief"
based on AI hallucinations); Rangel, 427 So. 3d at 1071–72 (referring
attorney to The Florida Bar for AI hallucinations); Gutierrez v. Gutierrez,
399 So. 3d 1185
, 1188 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (imposing sanctions on a pro
se litigant for submitting a brief that included "fictitious case law").

3
attorney to plead ignorance of the risks of relying on generative AI
without double-checking the results. See Fletcher v. Experian Info. Sols.,
Inc.,
168 F.4th 231
, 235 (5th Cir. 2026) ("If it were ever an excuse to
plead ignorance of the risks of using generative AI to draft a brief without
verifying its output, it is certainly no longer so."); see also United States
v. McGee,
806 F. Supp. 3d 1264
, 1275 (S.D. Ala. 2025) ("Given the broad
attention . . . to the problem with AI generated cases and authorities, no
attorney can claim ignorance or simply bury their head in the sand when
it comes to their own use of AI (regardless of what program they use).").
And yet here we are. Attorney Keefe used a generative AI tool from
the beginning of this appeal without any apparent guardrails. Capital
Standard's original initial brief was replete with nonexistent quotations
and purported statements of law with wholly inaccurate cites. Soon after
filing that initial brief, Capital Standard moved to file an amended initial
brief because, Attorney Keefe claimed, he had identified "critical issues
that require clarification and elaboration." Apparently, however,
ensuring the accuracy of his purported authorities was not among those
"critical issues" because Capital Standard's subsequent amended initial
brief included at least thirty-one instances of Attorney Keefe's citing or
quoting existing cases for propositions they do not contain. That
amended initial brief contained numerous whoppers, including, to give
just a few:
• Repeatedly citing Maciejewski v. Holland,
441 So. 2d 703
(Fla. 2d DCA 1983), a two-page opinion explaining why the
complaint there stated a cause of action for declaratory
relief, for unrelated propositions such as that "[u]nder
Florida law, a party's actions that affirm the validity of a
transaction preclude subsequent challenges to that

Only the 2026 cases referenced above postdate our January 8,
2026, order to show cause to Attorney Keefe.

4
transaction" and that "[r]atification occurs when a party,
through its actions or inactions, affirms a transaction or
fails to repudiate it within a reasonable time."
• Serving up nonexistent quotes—complete with purported
pincites—such as, "[fundamental error] goes to the
foundation of the case or the merits of the cause of action
and is equivalent to a denial of due process," citing Hart
Properties, Inc. v. Slack,
159 So. 2d 236, 239
(Fla. 1963).
• Passing off Miami Country Day School v. Bakst,
641 So. 2d
467
(Fla. 3d DCA 1994), a case discussing the statutory
mechanics of whether a houseboat qualified for a
homestead exemption, as authority for a panoply of
propositions, including that "Florida law provides strong
protections to individuals who acquire property in good
faith, for valuable consideration, and without notice of
competing claims" and that "a party's delay or misleading
conduct bars recovery where another party suffers
detriment as a result."
• Relying on Gonzalez v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.,
95 So. 3d 251
(Fla. 2d DCA 2012), a case pertaining to the
adequacy of an undated assignment to confer standing, as
an all-purpose authority on a multitude of other subjects,
including that "substantive evidence, not speculation, is
needed to rebut possession-based presumptions" and that
"good faith reliance on recorded documents is sufficient to
establish bona fide purchaser status."
In its answer brief, U.S. Bank pointed out that Gonzalez says
nothing whatsoever about a noteholder's rights and that Maciejewski
does not even mention the word "ratification" (let alone the concept). The
clear message behind its remarkably tempered response, however, went
unheeded, if not completely unheard: Capital Standard's reply brief
added another fifteen AI hallucinations, including the fake case Board of
Regents v. Wilson,
365 So. 2d 213
(Fla. 1st DCA 1979); citations to
several of the offending cases from the amended initial brief for
additional propositions that are nowhere to be found in them; and, for
good measure, citations to several new cases with that same problem.

5
Upon the ostensible completion of briefing, we began our review of
the record and the operative briefs and very quickly determined that
there was almost nothing trustworthy about Capital Standard's legal
representations on appeal. On January 8, 2026, we issued a detailed
show-cause order to Attorney Keefe, meticulously documenting the forty-
six hallucinations we sample above (thirty-one in the amended initial
brief and fifteen in the reply). We gave Attorney Keefe until 5:00 p.m. on
January 12 to file with the court copies of every case that he had cited
and required that "for every case, [A]ttorney Keefe, with highlighting and
annotation, shall clearly identify the exact place in that case that
corresponds to the indicated proposition(s) for which he has cited it in
either the amended initial brief or the reply brief." We also instructed, "If
the cited case does not exist, or if [A]ttorney Keefe cited an existing case
for a proposition for which it does not stand, [A]ttorney Keefe shall
explain how he permitted that to happen in a separate and complete
written submission." And we warned him that failure to comply could
result in "dismissal of this appeal, an award of attorney fees, referral to
The Florida Bar, and any other sanctions permitted by Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.410(a) or law."
Despite our warning, Attorney Keefe ignored us. Indeed, more than
a month passed with no response. By that point, we were concerned not
only that Attorney Keefe had disregarded an unequivocal court order but
that his clients might be wholly unaware of what was transpiring. We
therefore entered another order on February 20, 2026, striking Capital
Standard's amended initial brief and reply and permitting the filing of a
new initial brief. We explained that if Capital Standard would no longer
be using Attorney Keefe's services, it would need to appear through new
counsel because it was a corporation. We directed Attorney Keefe to

6
provide his clients with a copy of the order; in addition, our Clerk sent a
copy to his clients' last known addresses. We closed that order by noting
that "[s]anctions against Attorney Keefe will be imposed by separate
order."
Attorney Keefe finally surfaced on February 23. In a short,
unsworn filing, he contended that he had not seen our January 8 order
when it issued, suggesting that he had been busy preparing for a trip to
Japan but also stating, "I do not have a specific explanation as to how
this [January 8] Order was missed." He made no effort at that point to
comply with the January 8 order other than to claim generally that he
had not known that generative AI could produce bogus results:
In preparing portions of those filings, I utilized artificial
intelligence as a supplemental research tool. I did not fully
appreciate that such tools can generate inaccurate or
nonexistent citations unless each authority is independently
verified through reliable legal research sources.
He stated that he would set up unspecified processes to ensure that this
problem would not happen again. And although he said that he
"accept[ed] full responsibility for [the] citation errors," he never
apologized for wasting both the court's and U.S. Bank's time and
resources.4
Because the bulk of Attorney Keefe's legal argument in the
offending filings is based on hallucinated authority, it is obvious to us
that generative AI was not merely Attorney Keefe's "supplemental
research tool," as he claims, but his primary or only one.

4 After our court's February 20 order, Capital Standard, through

Attorney Keefe, did eventually file a second amended initial brief and
reply brief with verified citations. Our disposition on the merits is based
on those corrected briefs and not on the amended initial brief and reply
brief discussed herein.

7
Discussion
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410(a) provides:
After 10 days' notice, on its own motion, the court may
impose sanctions for any violation of these rules, or for the
filing of any proceeding, motion, brief, or other document that
is frivolous or in bad faith. Such sanctions may include
reprimand, contempt, striking of briefs or pleadings,
dismissal of proceedings, costs, attorneys' fees, or other
sanctions.
There is no doubt here that Attorney Keefe violated our rules.
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.045(d), specifies, "All documents
filed with the court must be signed as required by Florida Rule of
General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.515." After Attorney
Keefe's offending filings, the Florida Supreme Court amended Florida
Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.515(d) to specify
that the signer of a court filing represents that "the legal authorities
identified exist and are accurately cited." That amendment also provides:
The Court may, on its own motion or the motion of a party,
impose sanctions for any filing inconsistent with this
representation after providing the signer notice and an
opportunity to be heard. . . . includ[ing] reprimand, contempt,
striking of the document, dismissal of proceedings, costs,
attorneys' fees, or other sanctions.
Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.515(d) (eff. June 15, 2026).
These recent changes, however, have simply made more explicit
what was already required by rule 2.515(d)(2) at the time Attorney Keefe
signed the amended initial brief and reply brief. Pursuant to that rule,
Attorney Keefe certified that he had "read the document[s]" and that to
the best of his "knowledge, information, and belief, there are good
grounds to support the document[s]." See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud.
Admin. 2.515(d)(2). But that certification is patently false when an
argument in the brief is based on AI hallucinations. See Hessert v.

8
Hessert,
431 So. 3d 610
, 613 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026) (citing rule 2.515(d)(2)
and noting that "Florida's appellate courts, like other courts, require pro
se litigants and attorneys to sign their filings and thereby represent the
accuracy thereof"); see also Russell v. Mells,
426 So. 3d 913
, 920 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2025) (holding that signing a brief with AI hallucinations violates
rule 2.515(d) and other ethical requirements); cf., e.g., Park v. Kim,
91
F.4th 610, 615
(2d Cir. 2024) ("At the very least, the duties imposed by
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11] require that attorneys read, and
thereby confirm the existence and validity of, the legal authorities on
which they rely."); Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P.,
336 Cal. Rptr. 3d 897
,
912 (Cal. Ct. App. 2025) ("To state the obvious, it is a fundamental duty
of attorneys to read the legal authorities they cite in appellate briefs or
any other court filings to determine that the authorities stand for the
propositions for which they are cited.").
Attorney Keefe's amended initial brief also violated Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.210(b)(5), which requires "argument with regard to
each issue, with citation to appropriate authorities." It should go without
saying that there is nothing "appropriate" about phony legal authority.
See Goya v. Hayashida,
418 So. 3d 652
, 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (noting
that an appellate court has authority under Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.410(a) to sanction a party for violating rule 9.210's legal-
argument requirement for briefs); Gutierrez v. Gutierrez,
399 So. 3d 1185
,
1188 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (sanctioning a party under rule 9.210(b) for AI
hallucinations).
Moreover, it does not matter that "some of the cases" that Attorney
Keefe cited exist or that "some of the propositions of law were legitimate."
See Whiting v. City of Athens,
170 F.4th 455
, 461 (6th Cir. 2026).
Indeed, we "reject[ ] any . . . notion that because some authority exists to

9
support a legal proposition it should negate the harm caused by false
and hallucinated cases. Put bluntly—absolutely not; period; end of
story; all stop." McGee, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1273; see also Russell, 426
So. 3d at 919 ("But what counsel seems to imply—that since the
substance of the analysis in her brief wasn't necessarily wrong, her
misstatements are not an issue we should be overly concerned about—is
simply unacceptable.").
Here, we gave Attorney Keefe detailed notice of the AI
hallucinations in his amended initial brief and reply brief, and we gave
him the opportunity to explain himself or be sanctioned. Rather than
immediately fall on his sword, he ignored us for more than a month and
responded only after we issued a new order directing that his clients be
informed of the situation. We find neither his explanations satisfactory
nor him apologetic, but even if we did, on this record, we would sanction
him nonetheless. See Rangel, 427 So. 3d at 1071 (ordering sanctions for
AI hallucinations even when counsel noted that he was "deeply
remorseful for his lapses of professional judgment").
Accordingly, we fine Attorney Keefe $500 for his belated response to
the order to show cause and $1,000 for his AI misuse. Further, we order
that he personally pay U.S. Bank the attorney's fees it incurred in
preparing its answer brief in response to Capital Standard's amended
initial brief. In addition, we refer Attorney Keefe to The Florida Bar.
These sanctions are commensurate with Attorney Keefe's misconduct
and appear to us to be the minimum necessary under the circumstances
to deter future misconduct. As we explain now, our sanctions are also
consistent with an increasingly multifaceted strategy by the courts for
handling AI misuse by attorneys in legal filings.

10
$1,500 fine on Attorney Keefe. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.410(a) provides us with ample authority to fine attorneys for violating
our rules and orders requiring a response. See, e.g., P.P. v. Dep't of
Health & Rehab. Servs.,
683 So. 2d 1098, 1098
(Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
(imposing a $1,000 fine on counsel payable into the court registry based
on counsel's failure to respond to court's orders or to rectify her failure to
file an initial brief); D.A. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs.,
614 So. 2d
662, 664
(Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (imposing a $250 fine on counsel payable to
the clerk of court based on counsel's willful failure to comply with court's
orders or to rectify his failure to file an initial brief); Hagood v. Wells
Fargo N.A.,
125 So. 3d 1012, 1014
(Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (imposing a
$1,000 fine on counsel payable to the clerk of court and noting that
"[e]ven negligent violations of rules of procedure may justify sanctions");
Dumas v. Marrero,
864 So. 2d 531, 532
(Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (imposing a
$250 fine on counsel payable to the clerk of court based on counsel's
failure to respond to an order to show cause); Banderas v. Advance
Petroleum, Inc.,
718 So. 2d 376, 377
(Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (imposing a
$2,500 fine on counsel payable to the clerk of court based on counsel's
filing of a frivolous and offensive motion for rehearing).
Further, filings that include AI hallucinations force the judiciary
and its staff to waste time sloshing through bilge rather than analyzing
cases on their merits. At bottom, they gut an appellate court's ability to
rely on counsel to set out in the first instance the applicable law
governing a dispute. See Azar v. Garza,
584 U.S. 726, 730
(2018) (noting
the importance of "lawyers and courts alike be[ing] able to rely on one
another's representations"); Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum,
912 So. 2d 561,
571
(Fla. 2005) ("[Appellate courts] depend on counsel to accurately state
both the facts and the applicable law."). As the Sixth Circuit recently

11
stated in Whiting, AI hallucinations " 'unnecessarily burden[] the court
and the taxpayers,' so courts can and should fine the offending lawyers
to reimburse the court for its time." 170 F.4th at 467–68 (quoting
Noland, 336 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 914).
Indeed, fines have become a common sanction in both federal and
state courts across the country when attorneys sign filings that include
AI hallucinations, and $1,500 is on the gentler end of the spectrum. See,
e.g., Whiting, 170 F.4th at 468 (imposing a $15,000 fine); Fletcher, 168
F.4th at 240 (imposing a $2,500 fine); Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v.
LeTennier,
250 N.Y.S.3d 260
, 268 (N.Y. App. Div. 2026) (imposing a
$5,000 fine); Benjamin v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
779 F. Supp. 3d 341
,
351 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (imposing a $1,000 fine and observing that it was
"lower than in many other similar cases in part because of [counsel's]
candor and sincere regret," one-time use of generative AI, and voluntary
CLE participation); Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc.,
348 F.R.D. 489
, 499 (D.
Wyo. 2025) (imposing a $3,000 fine on counsel who drafted the brief that
included fake cases and $1,000 fines on counsel who signed on to the
brief); United States v. Hayes,
763 F. Supp. 3d 1054
, 1073 (E.D. Cal.
2025) (imposing a $1,500 fine); Noland, 336 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 915
(imposing a "conservative" sanction of $10,000 because counsel "has
represented that his conduct was unintentional, and because he has
expressed remorse for his actions"); People v. Lerin H.,
271 N.E.3d 524
,
530 (Ill. App. Ct. 2025) (imposing a $1,000 fine); Ringo v. Colquhoun
Design Studio, LLC,
582 P.3d 695
, 697 (Or. Ct. App. 2025) (imposing a
$500 fine for each false citation and $1,000 for each false quotation or
statement of law, for a total of $2,000); McGee, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1266
(imposing a $5,000 fine); Jackson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., No. 7-24-cv-
136,
2025 WL 1932274
, at *5 (M.D. Ga. July 14, 2025) (imposing a

12
$1,000 fine); Gauthier v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 23-CV-281,
2024 WL 4882651
, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2024) (imposing a $2,000
fine); Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 466 (imposing a $5,000 fine).
We are confident that with this opinion, this court leaves no doubt
that it considers the imposition of fines on counsel an appropriate
sanction for the reliance on unverified AI-generated content in court
filings. Consequently, we may not be so gentle on attorney offenders in
the future.
Fee award to U.S. Bank for researching and answering the
amended initial brief. As noted above, Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.410(a) authorizes the court, on its own motion, to award fees
to the opposing party. Fee awards against counsel personally have
likewise become a common sanction across the country for including AI
hallucinations in court filings. See, e.g., Whiting, 170 F.4th at 466
(ordering appellant's counsel to reimburse appellees "in full" for all
attorneys' fees incurred by appellees); Heimkes v. Fairhope Motorcoach
Resort Condo. Owners Ass'n,
828 F. Supp. 3d 1317
, 1344 (S.D. Ala.
2026) (ordering counsel to pay $55,597 in attorneys' fees for time spent
responding to counsel's misstatements of law); Amarsingh v. Frontier
Airlines, Inc., No. 24-1391,
2026 WL 352016
, at *7 (10th Cir. Feb. 9,
2026) (ordering pro se attorney appellant to pay appellee $1,000 to offset
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in responding to the problematic
aspects of appellant's brief); In re Kenney,
422 So. 3d 905
, 925 (La. Ct.
App. 2025) (affirming trial court's order directing plaintiff's counsel to
pay $1,368 of defendant's attorneys' fees); Grymes Dev. Co. v. Fodera,
245 N.Y.S.3d 863
, 869 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2025) (ordering plaintiff's counsel
to reimburse third-party defendants $11,718 and $5,275 in attorneys'
fees for having to respond to motion for summary judgment containing AI

13
hallucinations); Garner v. Kadince, Inc.,
571 P.3d 812
, 816 (Utah Ct. App.
2025) (ordering counsel to pay opposing party's attorneys' fees); Versant
Funding LLC v. Teras Breakbulk Ocean Navigation Enters., No. 17-CV-
81140,
2025 WL 1440351
, at *7 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2025) (ordering that
counsel be jointly and individually liable for opposing party's attorneys'
fees and costs incurred for time spent researching and replying to a filing
containing AI hallucinations). Here, we award U.S. Bank fees for the
time it spent researching and answering the amended initial brief.
Referral of Attorney Keefe to The Florida Bar. "[T]he unique role of
attorneys as officers of the court mandates that attorneys be held to the
highest of ethical standards." Fla. Bar v. Brown,
905 So. 2d 76, 82
(Fla.
2005) (quoting DeBock v. State,
512 So. 2d 164, 168
(Fla. 1987)). Long
before the misuse of AI became an issue, the supreme court observed
that appellate counsel has an "independent ethical obligation to present
both the facts and the applicable law accurately and forthrightly." Boca
Burger, Inc.,
912 So. 2d at 571
.
As this court explained in Russell:
When a lawyer cites imaginary legal authorities to our
court as if they were law, we are compelled to refer that
lawyer to the Bar because of the professional rules of
conduct. It doesn't take much moral imagination to
understand why. As judges, we rely on attorneys to ethically
represent their clients. We expect that representation to be
zealous, honest, and competent. Indeed, lawyers owe the
courts and their clients a duty to practice with competence
and candor. See R. Regulating
Fla. Bar 4-1
.1 ("A lawyer must
provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation."); R. Regulating
Fla. Bar 4-3
.3(a)(1) ("A lawyer
shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law
to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material
fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer

14
. . . .").
426 So. 3d at 920.
Attorney Keefe violated these basic ethical principles through his
use of hallucinated legal authority in the amended initial brief and reply
brief. We therefore refer him to The Florida Bar to proceed as
appropriate.
We reiterate that the problem here is not Attorney Keefe's use of
generative AI. See Fletcher, 168 F.4th at 235 (noting that generative AI in
law practice may very well be "helpful if done properly and carefully").
Indeed, "there is nothing inherently wrong with an attorney properly and
competently utilizing AI or any of its subsets to practice law or litigate
cases." Versant Funding LLC,
2025 WL 1440351
, at *4. Rather, it is his
use of generative AI without also "ensur[ing] that the legal propositions
and authority generated are trustworthy." See ByoPlanet Int'l, LLC v.
Johansson,
792 F. Supp. 3d 1341
, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2025). As one court
has memorably put it, "[T]he use of artificial intelligence must be
accompanied by the application of actual intelligence in its execution."
Mid Cent. Operating Eng'rs Health & Welfare Fund v. HoosierVac LLC, No.
2:24-CV-326,
2025 WL 574234
, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 21, 2025), report
and recommendation adopted as modified,
2025 WL 1511211
(S.D. Ind.
May 28, 2025).
In conclusion, we impose on Attorney Keefe a $1,500 fine payable
to the clerk of this court within fourteen days; we remand this matter to
the trial court to determine the reasonable amount of appellate attorney's
fees incurred by U.S. Bank for researching and answering Capital
Standard's amended initial brief; and we refer Attorney Keefe to The
Florida Bar for further proceedings. Attorney Keefe is solely responsible
for paying the fee award and fine and may not charge his clients for

15
those amounts. And as noted above, the declaratory judgment is
affirmed in all respects.
Affirmed; remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

NORTHCUTT and SMITH, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

Capital Standard, LLC, Tchentsov <strong>v</strong>. US Bank National Association, Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I Trust 2005-AC9

AI Case Brief

Ask AI About This Case

Full Opinion

Case Information