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Full Opinion
The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
November 13, 2025
2025COA88
No. 24CA1046 Castillo v. STEM — Government — Colorado
Governmental Immunity Act — Claire Davis School Safety Act;
Justiciability — Mootness
As a matter of first impression, a division of the court of
appeals considers whether the Claire Davis School Safety Act, § 24-
10-106.3, C.R.S. 2025, requires a case to proceed to a jury trial
after the parties have completed full discovery, the defendant
deposits with the court the maximum amount of damages that the
plaintiffs could recover at trial, and the defendant agrees that the
sum may be released to the plaintiffs but does not admit liability.
The division concludes that in these circumstances, a district court
does not err by dismissing the case as moot.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA88
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1046
Douglas County District Court No. 21CV30323
Honorable Gary M. Kramer, Judge
John Castillo and Maria Castillo,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
STEM School Highlands Ranch, Science Technology Engineering and Math
(STEM) School, and Science Technology Engineering and Math (STEM) High
School,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Grove and Bernard*, JJ., concur
Announced November 13, 2025
The Dan Caplis Law Firm, LLC, Daniel J. Caplis, Babar Waheed, Denver,
Colorado; 5280 Appellate Group, Nelson Boyle, Denver, Colorado for Plaintiffs-
Appellants
Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Ryan L. Winter, Andrew P. Reitman, Matthew J. Hegarty,
Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Plaintiffs, John and Maria Castillo (the Castillos), appeal the
district court’s judgment dismissing as moot their claims against
defendant, STEM School Highlands Ranch aka the Science
Technology Engineering and Math High School (STEM).1 We affirm.
I. Background and Procedural History
A. School Violence
¶2 School shootings in the United States occur with alarming
repetition, terrorizing students, teachers, families, and
communities. Colorado has not escaped these tragedies. See Ch.
266, sec. 1(2), 2015 Colo. Sess. Laws 1035 (Between 1999 and
2015, there were “three separate incidents of school violence [in
Colorado] in which students [were] killed at their schools.”); Haylee
May, Colorado Already Has Measures in Place to Prevent School
Shootings, Where Are the Gaps?, Colo. Pub. Radio (Sept. 12, 2025),
https://perma.cc/Z4HX-NN66 (“Colorado has seen [twenty-five]
incidents of gunfire on school campuses since 2013 . . . .”).
1 The Castillos also named the Douglas County School District as a
defendant. However, the District and the Castillos settled their
dispute, and the District is not a party to this appeal.
1
¶3 In an effort to prevent school violence and to compensate
victims, while simultaneously protecting public and charter schools
from unlimited liability, the Colorado General Assembly passed the
Claire Davis School Safety Act (Act), § 24-10-106.3, C.R.S. 2025.
The General Assembly explained the Act’s multiple objectives as
follows:
(3) . . . [T]he General Assembly . . . declares the
purposes of this [A]ct are:
(a) To recognize and state that there is a
limited duty of reasonable care upon public
schools, charter schools, and their employees
to provide for student safety and to protect
students and employees in their schools;
(b) To waive on a limited basis governmental
immunity, thereby allowing for recovery of
capped damages where that duty of reasonable
care has been breached by a school district,
charter school, or their employees; and
(c) To waive on a limited basis governmental
immunity to ensure that there is a robust and
effective discovery through the legal system of
the causes of acts of school violence.
(4) It is the intent of the [G]eneral [A]ssembly
in enacting this [A]ct to affirmatively recognize
a statutory duty upon school districts, charter
schools, and their employees to protect
students, faculty, and staff from foreseeable
harm caused by other persons. The [G]eneral
[A]ssembly hereby declares that the purpose of
recognizing that this duty exists under this
2
[A]ct is to create a tort remedy against school
districts and charter schools in cases where a
school district, charter school, or its employees
knew or should have known of the danger that
was presented and breached that duty of care.
(5) The [G]eneral [A]ssembly also further states
that its intent in enacting the provisions in
this [A]ct regarding discovery and settlement is
to provide a remedy for plaintiffs affected by
acts of school violence and to achieve robust
and vigorous discovery of events leading to
those incidents of school violence.
2015 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1036; see Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172 P.3d
437, 443 n.7 (Colo. 2007) (treating an uncodified legislative
declaration of purpose “as equal in authority” to a codified
declaration).
¶4 To achieve these objectives, the General Assembly created a
limited waiver of schools’ sovereign immunity to permit victims of
school violence to bring a claim for monetary damages, subject to
the limits of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), see
§§ 24-10-101 to -120, C.R.S. 2025, and to engage in “vigorous
discovery” concerning the events leading to the school violence.
2015 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1036.
¶5 This case requires us to resolve whether, after the completion
of vigorous and full discovery, a defendant’s deposit of a plaintiff’s
3
maximum potential recovery in the court’s registry — with an
agreement that such funds should be delivered to the plaintiffs in
satisfaction of their claim, but without an admission of liability —
permits the court to dismiss a plaintiff’s claims as moot. We
conclude that it does and therefore affirm the district court’s
dismissal of the Castillos’ claims against STEM.
B. The 2019 Shooting
¶6 STEM is a publicly funded charter school. On May 7, 2019,
two STEM students obtained handguns, entered a classroom that
contained twenty-nine students — including eighteen-year-old
Kendrick Castillo2 — blocked the door, and started shooting. One
of the perpetrators fatally shot Kendrick when Kendrick rushed
forward to protect others in the classroom. Students then
restrained both perpetrators until police officers arrived.3
Kendrick’s selfless and heroic actions are credited with saving many
lives. He was murdered two weeks before his high school
graduation.
2 To avoid confusion with his parents, we refer to Kendrick by his
first name. We mean no disrespect in doing so.
3 Both perpetrators were subsequently convicted of first degree
murder.
4
C. District Court Proceedings
¶7 In May 2021, the Castillos brought a wrongful death action
under the Act against STEM, seeking monetary damages attributed
to their son’s death. The Castillos alleged that STEM should have
reasonably foreseen the shooting because the perpetrators
insinuated on social media and in an internet post that they
planned to carry out a violent act at the school. The Castillos
argued that Kendrick’s death resulted from STEM’s alleged failure
to take protective steps in view of these threats. They requested a
jury trial to determine the amount of their damages. The Castillos
did not request any form of injunctive or declaratory relief.4
¶8 Early in the case, STEM moved under C.R.C.P. 67(a) to deposit
$387,000 — the maximum recoverable amount under the CGIA5 —
in the court’s registry and to have the court dismiss the action as
moot. STEM did not concede liability, arguing that the Castillos’
4 With respect to incidents of violence that occurred before July 1,
2017, the Act originally prohibited a court from entering a
declaratory judgment that a public school or charter school had
acted negligently. Ch. 266, sec. 2, § 24-10-106.3(9)(b)(I)-(II), 2015
Colo. Sess. Laws 1036-1038. But this provision was repealed
effective July 1, 2018. Id.
5 The parties agree that this sum represented the maximum amount
the Castillos could recover from STEM under the CGIA.
5
claims were subject to the CGIA and that, by tendering the
maximum recoverable amount under the CGIA, their claims were
rendered moot.
¶9 The district court denied STEM’s motions after finding that,
although the CGIA permitted STEM to deposit the maximum
recoverable damages into the court’s registry, dismissal at that
point was inappropriate because section 24-10-106.3(10) prohibits
a party from using procedural mechanisms, such as an offer of
settlement, default, or confession of judgment, to unilaterally
resolve a case before the completion of full discovery.
¶ 10 The parties made their initial disclosures in November 2021.
STEM moved for a broad protective order, which the district court
granted over the Castillos’ objection. Between November 2021 and
December 2022, the parties engaged in robust discovery: 21
depositions — including those of designees of the Douglas County
School District and STEM — the disclosure of over 25,000 pages of
records, a site inspection, and the review of extensive law
enforcement investigation records and testimony provided through
the perpetrators’ criminal proceedings. After the completion of
discovery, the district court set a February 2023 jury trial.
6
¶ 11 In December 2022, STEM renewed its C.R.C.P. 67 motion and
its motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was now moot because
the parties had completed discovery and STEM had deposited the
full amount of the Castillos’ potential monetary damages with the
court. STEM thereafter moved to convert the jury trial into a bench
trial to address the jurisdictional issue of whether STEM was
immune from the Castillos’ claims. See Trinity Broad. of Denv., Inc.
v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 925-27 (Colo. 1993).
¶ 12 In February 2023, the district court granted STEM’s renewed
C.R.C.P. 67 motion and its motion to dismiss after making the
following findings:
(1) STEM’s broad immunity under the CGIA had been
partially waived under the Act.
(2) Pursuant to Rudnick v. Ferguson, 179 P.3d 26 (Colo. App.
2007), a claim under the CGIA may become moot if the
defendant deposits with the court the maximum amount
recoverable by the plaintiffs at trial. Id. at 29.
(3) Neither the CGIA nor C.R.C.P. 67 required STEM to
admit liability or confess judgment if it tendered the
7
maximum recoverable amount and no other relief was
requested.
(4) Because the parties agreed that the Castillos’ maximum
recovery was $387,000, STEM had deposited that sum
into the court registry, and full discovery had been
completed pursuant to the Act, dismissal was
appropriate.
¶ 13 The court entered the order granting STEM’s motions to
dismiss subject to the following conditions:
1) STEM is to deposit certified funds in the
amount of $387,000 into the registry of the
Douglas County District Court;
2) The Clerk of Court is to pay over those
funds to . . . [the Castillos’ counsel];
3) By the deposit of the funds, STEM is not
deemed to have admitted liability or confessed
judgment.
4) Upon deposit of the funds, the Plaintiffs[’]
claims will become moot and the trial will be
vacated.
5) The case will be dismissed once the
protective order issue regarding the claims of
confidential information has been resolved.
¶ 14 The district court appointed a special master to resolve the
issues related to the “designation of confidential information
8
pursuant to the protective order.” In October 2023, the special
master issued his final order, “Special Master Order No. 3” (SMO3),
concluding that portions of deposition testimony would remain
confidential because they were protected by the deliberative process
privilege. See City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042,
1050 (Colo. 1998) (concluding that the deliberative process privilege
is part of the common law of Colorado).
¶ 15 The Castillos asked the district court to modify portions of
SMO3 to permit the public release of certain documents that the
special master had concluded were protected from disclosure. In
April 2024, the court held a closed hearing to address the contested
materials. After the hearing, the court largely adopted SMO3 but
made portions of two additional deposition transcripts publicly
available. The April order resolved all outstanding discovery issues,
and neither party challenges any of the special master’s or the
district court’s discovery orders on appeal.
¶ 16 The Castillos filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its
February 2023 dismissal order in light of Scardina v. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Inc., 2023 COA 8, ¶ 42, vacated on other grounds, 2024
CO 67. STEM opposed the Castillos’ motion and moved for the
9
entry of final judgment. The court set the matter for a hearing and
ordered the parties to file motions addressing how the case should
proceed. After full briefing, the court dismissed the case and
reaffirmed its February 2023 order.
¶ 17 The district court distinguished the division’s decision in
Scardina,6 which was brought under the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act (CADA), because the statutory relief under CADA
serves to vindicate a plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from
discrimination and permits only a nominal fine rather than
economic damages.7 In contrast, the court reasoned that the Act’s
purposes include ensuring the completion of full discovery and
providing meaningful economic compensation for victims of school
violence. Given these disparate purposes, the district court
concluded that Scardina did not control.
6 The district court’s order was issued before the supreme court
decided Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Scardina, 2024 CO 67, which
vacated the district court’s and the division’s orders and dismissed
the case. Id. at ¶ 61. In doing so, the court expressed “no opinion
about the merits of Scardina’s claims, and nothing about today’s
holding alters the protections afforded by CADA.” Id.
7 In 2025, the General Assembly amended CADA to allow a person
aggrieved by a CADA violation to recover limited economic damages.
See Ch. 232, sec. 3 § 24-34-602(1)(a), 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1099.
10
¶ 18 The district court concluded that dismissal was appropriate
because (1) the parties had completed full and vigorous discovery;
(2) the Castillos sought only economic damages, and STEM
tendered the maximum amount of recoverable damages; (3) there
was no further relief that the court could grant beyond the
$387,000 that STEM had deposited into the court’s registry; (4) the
Act contemplates settlement and does not mandate that a trial
occur; and (5) the Act does not require a determination or
assessment of liability.
¶ 19 The district court also noted that, because the parties had
completed discovery, the Act’s prevention and accountability
purposes had been served because “the public information
disclosed in discovery will be scrutinized and debated by school
officials, safety officials, parents, teachers,” and concerned
members of the public, and that the court of public opinion will
determine whether STEM breached its duty of reasonable care.
This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
¶ 20 The Castillos contend that the district court erred by granting
STEM’s motion to dismiss and depriving them of the opportunity to
11
have a jury determine STEM’s liability. They argue that the Act’s
legislative intent suggests that a plaintiff may compel a trial to
facilitate public disclosure of the events leading to the act of school
violence, determine the standard of care, and hold a negligent
school publicly accountable. The Castillos also argue that STEM
used improper procedural mechanisms to render their claims moot,
and in any event, the claims are not moot under multiple
exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
¶ 21 We begin our analysis by setting forth the controlling legal
standards and then address the Castillos’ specific legal arguments.
A. Standard of Review and Statutory Construction
¶ 22 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we
review de novo. Colo. State Bd. of Educ. v. Brannberg, 2023 CO 11,
¶ 15. When interpreting statutes, we seek to discern and give effect
to the General Assembly’s intent. Id. “In doing so, we apply words
and phrases in accordance with their plain and ordinary meanings,
and we consider the entire statutory scheme to give consistent,
harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts.” Id. If the
statute’s language is clear, “we must apply it as written, and we
need not resort to other rules of statutory construction.” Id. at
12
¶ 16. Additionally, when construing a statute, we must respect the
legislature’s choice of language. UMB Bank, N.A. v. Landmark
Towers Ass’n, 2017 CO 107, ¶ 22. Therefore, we do not add words
to or subtract words from the statute. Id.
¶ 23 If a statute’s meaning is clear based on its plain language, we
generally do not consult the statute’s legislative history. Smith v.
Exec. Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186, 1190 (Colo. 2010).
Moreover, a court may not interpret a statute to accomplish
something that the statute’s plain language does not suggest,
warrant, or mandate. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.,
246 P.3d 651, 661 (Colo. 2011).
¶ 24 We review a district court’s grant of leave to deposit funds
under C.R.C.P. 67(a) for an abuse of discretion. Coors Brewing Co.
v. City of Golden, 2013 COA 92, ¶ 75. A district court abuses its
discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,
or unfair, or when it misconstrues or misapplies the law. Moore v.
4th Jud. Dist. Att’y, 2024 COA 48, ¶ 6.
¶ 25 Whether a case is moot also presents a question of law that we
review de novo. Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Urbina, 2013 COA 155, ¶ 23.
Courts exercise their jurisdiction to address actual controversies
13
between parties. Rudnick, 179 P.3d at 29. A case becomes moot
when the relief sought, if granted, would have no practical legal
effect on the controversy. Urbina, ¶ 22. Subject to limited
exceptions, a court will not exercise its jurisdiction if the case has
become moot. Id.
B. Applicable Laws
1. The CGIA and the Act
¶ 26 Generally, the CGIA provides public entities — including
public schools and charter schools — broad immunity, but it waives
immunity for injuries arising out of certain designated actions.
§ 24-10-106(1), C.R.S. 2025 (“A public entity is immune from
liability in all claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort”
unless such immunity has been expressly waived.); § 24-10-
106(1)(a)-(k) (waiving sovereign immunity for injuries arising from
specifically delineated governmental actions).
¶ 27 The CGIA includes monetary caps limiting how much a
plaintiff can recover from a public entity. See § 24-10-114(1)(a)-(b),
C.R.S. 2025. Claims brought under the Act are subject to the
statutory caps. § 24-10-106.3(9)(a). As previously noted, the
parties agree that the maximum amount that the Castillos could
14
recover under the Act was $387,000.8 See § 24-10-114(1)(a)-(b); see
also Colorado Secretary of State, Certificate (Jan. 5, 2022),
https://perma.cc/4FAP-YS2X.
¶ 28 Under the Act, a plaintiff may recover monetary damages if the
school breached its “duty to exercise reasonable care to protect all
students, faculty, and staff from harm from acts committed by
another person when the harm is reasonably foreseeable, while
such students, faculty, and staff are within the school facilities or
are participating in school-sponsored activities.” § 24-10-106.3(3).
A publicly funded charter school’s sovereign immunity is waived
under the CGIA “with respect to . . . a claim of a breach of the duty
of care established in [the Act] . . . arising from an incident of school
violence.” § 24-10-106.3(4).
8 The CGIA imposes a statutory maximum that individuals can
recover “[f]or any injury to one person in any single occurrence.”
§ 24-10-114(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025. The maximum recovery is
periodically adjusted “by an amount reflecting the percentage
change over a four-year period in the United States department of
labor, bureau of labor statistics, consumer price index for Denver-
Aurora-Lakewood for all items and all urban consumers, or its
applicable predecessor or successor index.” § 24-10-114(1)(b).
15
¶ 29 In service to its discovery, disclosure, and prevention
purposes, the Act provides as follows:
In order to promote vigorous discovery of
events leading to an incident of school violence
in any action brought under this section, an
offer of judgment by a defendant under section
13-17-202, C.R.S. [2025], prior to the
completion of discovery, is not deemed rejected
if not accepted until fourteen days after the
completion of discovery, and the plaintiff is not
liable for costs due to not accepting such an
offer of judgment until fourteen days after the
completion of discovery. If a defendant refuses
to answer a complaint, or a default judgment
is entered against a defendant for failure to
answer a complaint, or a defendant confesses
liability in an action brought under this
section, the court shall allow full discovery
upon request of the plaintiff.
§ 24-10-106.3(10).
2. Rudnick, C.R.C.P. 67, and Scardina
¶ 30 Both the CGIA and the Act attempt to facilitate multiple
purposes. On the issue of economic damages, the General
Assembly has attempted to provide a measure of compensation to
plaintiffs, or their next of kin, for injuries caused by specific
governmental conduct, while at the same time avoiding excessive
economic exposure to governmental entities.
16
¶ 31 Consistent with these dual purposes, our case law recognizes
that a governmental defendant may invoke C.R.C.P. 67(a) to render
a case moot, even when an injured plaintiff would prefer to proceed
to trial. See Rudnick, 179 P.3d at 30-32; C.R.C.P. 67(a) (A
defending party may “deposit with the court all or any part of such
sum or thing, to be held by the clerk of the court subject to
withdrawal in whole or in part at any time thereafter upon order of
the court.”). Even if the deposit does not include an admission of
liability or confession of judgment, the district court may deem the
claim moot if the defending party deposits the maximum
recoverable amount under the CGIA and agrees that the sum may
be delivered to the plaintiff in satisfaction of their claims. Rudnick,
179 P.3d at 30.
17
¶ 32 In Scardina,9 a division of this court addressed Rudnick’s
application to CADA. Scardina, ¶¶ 38-50; see also §§ 24-34-600.3
to -605, C.R.S. 2025. The division concluded that CADA was
enacted by the General Assembly to “fulfill the ‘basic responsibility
of government to redress discriminatory . . . practices.’” Scardina,
¶ 44 (quoting Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 24). Therefore, in
the context of an aggrieved party seeking injunctive relief under
CADA, the division concluded that the trial court correctly found
that the case was not moot under Rudnick because the core policy
of CADA would be frustrated if a defendant could “avoid the finding
of discrimination simply by paying a fine.” Scardina, ¶ 46.
9 Because the Colorado Supreme Court vacated the division’s
opinion, it no longer has the precedential value it did when the
district court dismissed this case. See City of Arvada ex rel. Arvada
Police Dep’t v. Denv. Health & Hosp. Auth., 2017 CO 97, ¶ 24 n.3.
Nonetheless, we understand that the Castillos contend that we
should apply the same legal rationale articulated in Scardina to
reverse the district court’s dismissal order. Thus, we address
whether Scardina’s legal reasoning applies to claims brought
pursuant to the Act. Id. (“[B]ecause our vacated opinion no longer
holds precedential value, we have revisited this issue and reach the
same conclusion.”).
18
C. Legislative Intent Argument
¶ 33 The Castillos argue that we should interpret the Act in light of
its legislative intent. Specifically, they acknowledge that the Act’s
“purposes are unambiguous,” but they argue that “the Act is
ambiguous as to how it will accomplish these purposes — especially
so, if it allows partially suppressed discovery without any means to
fulfill the [General Assembly’s] intention to make schools safer.”
From their perspective, the purposes of providing reasonable
compensation and limiting governmental financial exposure should
not be elevated to the height that they shade the full public
disclosure and accountability provided by a jury trial and verdict on
the parties’ substantive contentions.
¶ 34 The Castillos’ argument has some initial appeal, but it fails on
closer examination. True, a jury trial involving matters of public
interest often serves to educate the public and incentivize policy
changes. And one aspect of a trial is cross-examination, which is
often cited as the legal system’s greatest truth-finding mechanism.
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (describing cross-
examination as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth” (quoting 5 John Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 (3d
19
ed. 1940))). On the other hand, there is an equally compelling
interest in allowing governmental defendants to avoid unnecessary
litigation in order to conserve public resources. Finnie v. Jefferson
Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 79 P.3d 1253, 1260-61 (Colo. 2003).
Ultimately, these types of policy choices are best left to the General
Assembly.
¶ 35 This deference to the General Assembly is particularly apt —
indeed, required absent a constitutional violation — when the
General Assembly has chosen between options available to it.
Anderson v. Longmont Toyota, Inc., 102 P.3d 323, 326-27 (Colo.
2004) (“Our duty is to effectuate the intent and purpose of the
General Assembly. We apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the
statute, if clear.” (citation omitted)). Nowhere in the Act did the
General Assembly direct that a trial must be held if a plaintiff
demands it. In contrast, the Act specifically contemplates the
completion of “vigorous” and “full discovery.” § 24-10-106.3(10).
20
¶ 36 The word “discovery” has specific legal meaning,
1. The act or process of finding or learning
something that was previously unknown . . . .
2. Compulsory disclosure, at a party’s request,
of information that relates to the litigation . . . .
The primary discovery devices are
interrogatories, depositions, requests for
admissions, and requests for production . . . .
3. The facts or documents disclosed . . . .
4. The pretrial phase of a lawsuit during which
depositions, interrogatories, and other forms of
discovery are conducted.
Black’s Law Dictionary 584-85 (12th ed. 2024).
¶ 37 When the General Assembly used the term “discovery” in
section 24-10-106.3, it did so while referring to remedies that are
generally available to a defendant to settle a case prior to trial. See
§ 13-17-202, C.R.S. 2025. Thus, the General Assembly used
“discovery” in a legal sense. That legal context refers to “[t]he
pretrial phase of a lawsuit” rather than the trial itself. Black’s Law
Dictionary at 584. This provision reflects the General Assembly’s
intent to permit vigorous and full discovery but does not
demonstrate an intent to force a school to trial when the plaintiff
only sought monetary relief and the school has deposited with the
court the full measure of money damages requested in the
complaint.
21
¶ 38 Section 24-10-106.3’s language permitting full and vigorous
discovery before settlement, without reference to any right to
compel a public trial, reflects the General Assembly’s conscious
choice to require discovery but also to permit a post-discovery
resolution in the manner contemplated by Rudnick. Contrary to the
Castillos’ argument, this legislative action does not create an
ambiguity in how the purposes of the Act will be fulfilled but rather
reflects the General Assembly’s deliberate choice.10 We are bound
to respect that legislative choice rather than ignore the Act’s plain
language to achieve a different result. UMB, ¶ 22.
¶ 39 In addition to being inconsistent with the legislative mandate,
the Castillos’ argument is premised on an erroneous legal
assumption. Particularly, they argue that a trial is necessary
because “juries decide the standards of care.” We disagree.
¶ 40 First, the Act expressly sets forth STEM’s standard of care in
these situations. § 24-10-106.3(3). Second, to the extent that the
10 We also note that a trial is not the only venue in which the
discovery mandated by the statute could be useful in fulfilling the
Act’s purposes of education, prevention, and accountability. A
party may present the information obtained in discovery to a school
board, the legislature, a city council, the media, and the governor’s
office, among others.
22
language of the Act permits any uncertainty concerning the
applicable standard of care, the resolution of that issue is entrusted
to courts, not to juries. See White v. Pines Enters., Inc., 728 P.2d
759, 760 (Colo. App. 1986) (“Whether there is a duty of care to
plaintiff is not a matter to be submitted to or decided by a jury. It is
a question of law for decision by the trial court.” (citation omitted)).
¶ 41 Finally, though we may not consider legislative history to
create an ambiguity, we may rely upon the General Assembly’s
statement of purpose — whether codified or not — in confirming
that our interpretation of a statute is consistent with that purpose.
Stamp, 172 P.3d at 443 n.7; Welby Gardens v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of
Equalization, 71 P.3d 992, 995-98 (Colo. 2003) (considering
legislative history to support the court’s plain language
interpretation of an unambiguous statute). And here, the district
court interpreted and applied the Act consistently with its stated
purpose.
¶ 42 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s
interpretation and application of the Act were not contrary to the
General Assembly’s intent when adopting it.
23
D. The Reasoning of Scardina Is Not Inconsistent with Rudnick
¶ 43 The Castillos argue that the district court erred by not
reconsidering its decision that the case was moot under Rudnick in
view of the reasoning applied in Scardina. We disagree.
¶ 44 Rudnick arose under the CGIA, while Scardina arose under
CADA. See Scardina, ¶ 43. This distinction is vital to understand
the scope of the respective decisions. The CGIA primarily focuses
on providing economic compensation for victims who are injured
through governmental action for which immunity has been waived.
Id. On the other hand, at the time of the division’s decision in
Scardina, CADA imposed “a fine to deter discriminatory practices by
the defendant rather than to award damages to fully compensate
the aggrieved party.” Id. Thus, CADA’s primary focus was not on
providing economic compensation to a plaintiff but, rather, “to fulfill
the ‘basic responsibility of government to redress discriminatory . . .
practices.’” Id. at ¶ 44 (citation omitted).
¶ 45 One trait that CADA and the CGIA do share is that neither
contains an express provision addressing whether a case may be
settled under C.R.C.P. 67(a) before trial. In Rudnick, given the
economic remedy provided by the CGIA, the division concluded that
24
a defendant could invoke C.R.C.P. 67 to render a claim moot by
depositing with the court the full amount the plaintiff could recover
under the CGIA. Rudnick, 179 P.3d at 30-31. The division
reasoned that defendants could use this process even though they
did not agree to confess judgment or otherwise admit liability.
¶ 46 In contrast, given CADA’s broader public policy and limited
compensatory purposes, the division in Scardina concluded that the
district court did not err by declining to permit the defendant to use
the C.R.C.P. 67 process to moot the case. Scardina, ¶¶ 38-50.
Indeed, the division concluded that to do so would undermine
CADA’s purpose, diminish the precedential value of a liability
finding, and undermine the “broad societal interests in affirming the
equality of all persons and disavowing discriminatory practices in
the public sector.” Id. at ¶ 46.
¶ 47 The Castillos urge us to adopt the division’s reasoning in
Scardina to disavow the use of C.R.C.P. 67 under the Act. We
decline to do so for two reasons. First, we perceive material
differences between the absence of an economic remedy provided by
CADA at the time of the Scardina opinion and the significant
economic remedy provided by the Act.
25
¶ 48 Second, and most critically, in the Act — unlike in CADA —
the General Assembly expressly addressed limitations on a
defendant’s use of procedural mechanisms to obtain dismissal of a
case. The Act limits such practices prior to the completion of
vigorous and full discovery. By drawing this line, the General
Assembly implicitly determined that such practices are permitted
after the completion of discovery, without requiring a trial. See
Kinslow v. Mohammadi, 2024 CO 19, ¶ 21 (“This interpretation of
legislative silence is consistent with ‘the General Assembly’s policy
choice’ . . . .” (quoting Elgin v. Bartlett, 994 P.2d 411, 415 (Colo.
1999))). As previously explained, we must interpret the Act in a
manner that effectuates the General Assembly’s intent. Thus, we
conclude that the reasoning in Scardina does not apply here.
¶ 49 The Castillos next argue that Rudnick’s reasoning has been
rendered untenable by the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (2016). Campbell-
Ewald held that an “unaccepted settlement offer has no force,” and
“[w]ith the offer off the table, and the defendant’s continuing denial
of liability, adversity between the parties persists.” Id. at 156. But
Campbell-Ewald is distinguishable on multiple grounds.
26
¶ 50 First, that case is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68,
not C.R.C.P. 67. Id. Second, even if it were interpreting a parallel
rule, we are not bound by the Court’s interpretation of federal rules
when interpreting a Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure. See Garcia v.
Schneider Energy Servs., Inc., 2012 CO 62, ¶ 10 (“While this [c]ourt
is not bound to interpret our rules of civil procedure the same way
the United States Supreme Court has interpreted its rules, we do
look to the federal rules and federal decisions interpreting those
rules for guidance.”).
¶ 51 Most importantly, in Campbell-Ewald, the Supreme Court
expressly stated that it was not deciding “whether the result would
be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff’s
individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the
court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.”
Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. at 166. For these reasons, we disagree
with the Castillos’ contention that Campbell-Ewald renders the
holding in Rudnick obsolete.
E. Mootness Exceptions
¶ 52 The Castillos argue that their claims should proceed to trial
even if they are moot because, as they see it, various exceptions to
27
the mootness doctrine apply to this case. Specifically, they argue
that the case should not be deemed moot because (1) the case
presents issues of great public importance; (2) collateral
consequences are still at issue; and (3) the case is capable of
repetition but evades review.
¶ 53 Ordinarily, a case is moot when the relief requested would not
have a practical effect upon an existing controversy. Urbina, ¶ 22.
Nonetheless, as the Castillos argue, various exceptions allow a case
to proceed that would otherwise be moot. But contrary to their
arguments, we conclude that none of the cited exceptions applies
here.
1. Great Public Importance
¶ 54 A dispute that would otherwise be moot may proceed on the
merits if the case presents an issue “of great public importance.”
People in Interest of C.G., 2015 COA 106, ¶ 37. We agree with the
Castillos that there is significant public interest in preventing and
remediating incidents of school violence. As previously explained,
we also agree that the litigation process, including discovery and
jury trials, can offer a means to educate parties and the public
about the risks that schools face and the type of remedial measures
28
that schools have available to mitigate or prevent such tragedies.
But it is clear that the General Assembly was also aware and
mindful of these considerations when it passed the Act. And with
that knowledge, the General Assembly adopted section 24-10-
106.3(10), which limits a defendant’s use of procedural mechanisms
to obtain a dismissal of the case against a plaintiff’s wishes.
¶ 55 The line drawn by the General Assembly reflects a decision to
facilitate the completion of discovery but not to compel a trial once
that discovery is completed and a defendant has complied with the
Rudnick procedures. We are not at liberty to disregard this line
simply because the issues to be addressed at a potential trial
present a matter of public interest. See Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Progressive Mountain Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 250, 256 (Colo. App. 1999)
(“[I]t is for the General Assembly to balance competing social
goals. . . . [W]e cannot supply a right or remedy the General
Assembly has chosen not to provide.”), aff’d, 27 P.3d 343 (Colo.
2001).
2. The Collateral Consequences Exception
¶ 56 Next, the Castillos invoke the “collateral consequences”
exception to mootness. This exception is often invoked in the
29
criminal context to allow a defendant to appeal a criminal
conviction that has ongoing collateral consequences even though
the defendant has already completed the underlying sentence.
See DePriest v. People, 2021 CO 40, ¶ 10 (“Even if a sentence has
been fully served, an appeal of the underlying conviction is not
moot if there is a possibility that the conviction will give rise to
collateral consequences.”). Often the defendant’s completion of
their sentence prevents a court from granting any effective relief.
But application of general mootness principles in this context may
be unjust if the defendant may still be adversely affected by the
conviction. See id. at ¶ 9 (“Collateral consequences can include
prohibitions on a felon’s ability to vote and own firearms, potential
sentencing as a habitual criminal, possible impeachment based on
prior convictions, and proscription from working in certain
regulated professions.”).
¶ 57 Recognizing this practical reality, courts have created the
collateral consequences doctrine as an exception to general
mootness principles to ensure that a claiming party is not deprived
of the opportunity to avoid these adverse collateral impacts. Id.
(“Under the collateral consequences exception to the mootness
30
doctrine, a case is moot ‘only if it is shown that there is no
possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on
the basis of the challenged conviction.’” (quoting Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968))).
¶ 58 Drawing from these principles, the Castillos argue that their
claims are not moot because a trial could visit additional adverse
consequences on STEM. They cite C.G. in support of the argument.
C.G. arose when a child was adjudicated dependent or neglected
based on father’s alleged abandonment of the child and default on
the petition. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. C.G. was placed with his half-sibling in
the custody of the sibling’s father, who was later convicted of
murdering C.G. Id. at ¶ 5. Father brought a federal civil rights
action against the department of human services, alleging a denial
of his due process rights. Id. at ¶ 6. Father then moved to set aside
the adjudication entered against him. Id.
¶ 59 The department argued that father’s motion was moot in view
of the child’s death, but father argued that the adjudication created
adverse consequences for him because it impacted his ability to
proceed on his federal civil rights claim. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. The district
court sided with the department and dismissed father’s motion. Id.
31
at ¶ 9. Father appealed to this court, and the division reversed the
mootness ruling under the collateral consequences doctrine, noting
that the dependency and neglect orders had continuing adverse
consequences by limiting father’s ability to pursue the federal
litigation. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35.
¶ 60 The common denominator in DePriest and C.G. is that the
underlying judgment or order being appealed had continuing
adverse consequences on the appealing party. The Castillos do not
argue that the dismissal of their claims may have continuing
adverse consequences for them; rather, they argue that “a jury
finding of liability could have had the collateral consequence of
harming STEM’s reputation by exposing its mistakes (from which
the public could learn how to better protect schools).” But the
Castillos do not cite any controlling authority, and we are aware of
none, that would allow us to invoke the collateral consequences
exception to mootness because a trial and resulting judgment could
have adverse consequences for an opponent with no tangible
consequences to the appealing party. Thus, we see no basis for
invoking the collateral consequences exception to mootness.
32
3. Capable of Repetition and Evading Review
¶ 61 Finally, the Castillos argue that the district court erred by not
permitting the case to proceed because it presents a controversy
that is capable of repetition but evades review. See Trinidad Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1102 (Colo. 1998) (“[W]e may
resolve what is an otherwise moot case when the issue involved is
one that is capable of repetition yet evading review.”). But as STEM
notes, school shootings — though repeated with disturbing and
tragic regularity — are inherently fact specific. And the Castillos do
not develop an argument explaining how the “evading review”
exception can be appropriately invoked in this case. Accordingly,
we decline to address the issue further. See People v. West, 2019
COA 131, ¶ 23 (we do not address arguments that are not
adequately developed on appeal).
III. Summary
¶ 62 In adopting the Act, the General Assembly limited a school’s
ability to use procedural mechanisms, prior to the completion of
vigorous and full discovery, to moot a claim brought to redress
injuries resulting from reasonably foreseeable harm caused by an
incident of school violence. The Act does not, however, impose such
33
limitations on a school’s ability to utilize the Rudnick procedure to
moot a case after the completion of such discovery. Thus, the
district court did not err by dismissing this dispute as moot after
the parties completed discovery, STEM deposited funds in the
maximum amount available to the Castillos, and their complaint
requested no other relief.
IV. Disposition
¶ 63 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE BERNARD concur.
34
Case Information
- Court
- Colo. Ct. App.
- Decision Date
- November 13, 2025
- Status
- Precedential