Charles Joshua Raines v. the State of Texas

                                  IN THE
                          TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 10-22-00359-CR

CHARLES JOSHUA RAINES,
                                                             Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                             Appellee



                           From the 85th District Court
                               Brazos County, Texas
                         Trial Court No. 19-03987-CRF-85


                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Charles Joshua Raines was convicted of the offense of Continuous Family

Violence, see TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.11(a), and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Because

the trial court did not err in denying Raines’s motion to quash, Raines was not harmed

by the introduction of hearsay evidence, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

granting the State’s motion for a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the trial court’s

judgment is affirmed.
BACKGROUND

        Amy had known Raines since she was 14 years old. They had a relationship for

about four years and had two children together. Raines was abusive. The police were

called many times. Amy’s mom, Suzanne, also suffered from Raines’s abuse. Amy, her

children, and Suzanne, started living together, without Raines, sometime in 2015. This

case centers on two assaults, one on Amy and one on Suzanne.

MOTION TO QUASH

        In his first issue, Raines complains that the trial court erred in denying his motion

to quash because the indictment for continuous family violence was barred by the statute

of limitations. Specifically, he complains, as he did in the trial court, that two 2016

charging instruments did not toll the running of the limitations period for the indictment

charging continuous family violence.

        Raines was charged by information on January 12, 2016, for an assault against

Suzanne occurring on or about December 7, 2015. On April 21, 2016, he was charged by

indictment for violation of a condition of his bond by committing family violence against

Amy by striking Amy with his hands or applying pressure to her neck or throat and for

an assault against Amy, as a member of his family or household, by impeding her breath

or circulation, both offenses occurring on or about February 8, 2016. Subsequently, on

September 26, 2019, Raines was charged by indictment for continuous family violence,

alleged to have occurred against Suzanne and Amy for offenses occurring on the same

dates alleged in the prior 2016 information and indictment. The State further alleged that

the prior 2016 information and indictment were pending when the offense for continuous

Raines v. State                                                                        Page 2
family violence was indicted.

        Standard of Review

        When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to quash an indictment, we

apply a de novo standard of review. See State v. Jarreau, 512 S.W.3d 352, 354 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2017); Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Moff,

154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). This is because the trial court’s decision on

a motion to quash is based only on the indictment or charging instruments in question,

the motion itself, and the argument of counsel; thus, the trial court is in no better position

than we are to decide this issue. See Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 601.

        Tolling Statute of Limitations

        The Code of Criminal Procedure requires an indictment to demonstrate, on its

face, that the prosecution is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. State v.

West, 632 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.02(6).

However, the Code also provides that "[t]he time during the pendency of an indictment,

information, or complaint shall not be computed in the period of limitation." TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 12.05(b); West, 632 S.W.3d at 910-11.

        In Hernandez v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that not just any

indictment would toll the statute of limitations. Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 768, 772

(Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Rather, the Court held that “to fulfill the legislature's purpose in

enacting Article 12.05(b), a prior indictment tolls the statute of limitations under Article

12.05(b) for a subsequent indictment when both indictments allege the same conduct,

same act, or same transaction.” Id. at 774. (Emphasis added). "’A subsequent indictment

Raines v. State                                                                         Page 3
is barred by the statute of limitations if it broadens or substantially amends the charges

in the original indictment.’" State v. West, 632 S.W.3d 908, 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)

(quoting Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 773).

        A factor that led the Court of Criminal Appeals to this determination is the

fundamental requirement that an indictment must give a defendant adequate notice to

prepare a defense. Id. In order for a prior indictment to provide sufficient notice, such

that the defendant could preserve facts necessary to defending against the subsequent

indictment, the two indictments must involve the same event. Id. at 912; Hernandez, 127

S.W.3d at 774. The word, “same,” is given its common and ordinary meaning. West, 632

S.W.3d at 912. Thus, in determining whether the same conduct, same act, or same

transaction is alleged in both indictments, those alleged conducts, acts, or transactions

must be “one and the same event.” Id. at 913. Further, to answer this “sameness”

question, we focus on whether the defensive strategy to the prior indictment's allegations

would have necessarily translated into defenses to the subsequent indictment's

allegations. Id. at 915.

        Suzanne’s Charge

        Initially, Raines questions whether the prior charge for assault bodily injury by

striking Suzanne is the “same” for purposes of limitations as the subsequent charge for

assault bodily injury by striking Suzanne who is a member of Raines’s family or

household or a person with whom Raines has or has had a dating relationship. Raines

contends that the original information simply charged Raines with bodily injury assault

while the subsequent indictment added language that Suzanne was a member of Raines’s

Raines v. State                                                                     Page 4
family or household or had a dating relationship with Raines. Raines asserts he had no

notice that he was to prepare a defense that he and Suzanne had a substantial personal

relationship.

        According to the Court of Criminal Appeals, it is the conduct, the act, the

transaction—in essence, the event—that is required to be the same between the original

and subsequent indictments. See State v. West, 632 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021);

Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 768, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We have held, in the

context of the constitutionality of Texas Family Code section 71.0021, the Dating Violence

statute, that the conduct of which the actor needs notice is the assault, not the status of

the actor's relationship to the victim. Childress v. State, 285 S.W.3d 544, 552 (Tex. App.—

Waco 2009, pet. ref'd). See also Watkins v. State, No. 10-23-00040-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS

8950, at *8 (Tex. App.—Waco Nov. 30, 2023, no pet.) (not designated for publication). We

see no difference in holding the same in this context. Thus, being in a substantial personal

relationship is a circumstance of status, not a form of conduct, an act, a transaction, or an

event for which Raines requires notice.

        Because the act of assault is the key for “sameness,” the original information gave

adequate notice to Raines to prepare a defense. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in

denying Raines’s motion to quash on this ground.

        Amy’s Charge

        Raines also questions whether the prior charge of assault bodily injury by striking

Amy with Raines’s hand is the “same” as the subsequent charge of occlusion assault for

the purposes of the statute of limitations. Raines claims that the original indictment

Raines v. State                                                                        Page 5
charged Raines with causing bodily injury to Amy, with whom Raines has or has had a

dating relationship, by impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of Amy

by applying pressure to the throat or neck or blocking the nose or mouth of Amy—in

other words, occlusion assault. In the subsequent indictment, Raines was charged with

causing bodily injury to Amy, a member of Raines’s family or member of his household

or person with whom he has or has had a dating relationship, by striking her with his

hand. The difference between the two indictments, Raines argues, is the additional

description of Raines’s and Amy’s relationship, 1 and more significantly, the type of

bodily injury alleged.

        The State, however, argues it is the first count of the original indictment, not the

second count alleging occlusion assault, that would have put Raines on notice to defend

against a bodily injury assault on Amy as alleged in the subsequent indictment. In that

first count, Raines was charged with violating a condition of his bond on or about

February 8, 2016 by striking Amy, a person with whom Raines has or has had a dating

relationship, with his hands or applying pressure to her neck or throat. A person commits

this type of offense if, in violation of a condition of bond set in a family violence case and

related to the safety of a victim, the person knowingly or intentionally commits family

violence. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.07(a)(1). Family violence means an act by a member

of a family or household against another member of the family or household that is


1We have already determined that the status of a defendant’s relationship with a victim is not conduct of
which the defendant needs notice. See Childress v. State, 285 S.W.3d 544, 552 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, pet.
ref'd). See also Watkins v. State, No. 10-23-00040-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 8950, at *7-9 (Tex. App.—Waco
Nov. 30, 2023, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Thus, we will not further discuss this part of
Raines’s argument.

Raines v. State                                                                                   Page 6
intended to result in, as applicable to this case, bodily injury. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 71.004.

        As noted previously, Raines was charged in the subsequent indictment with

causing bodily injury to Amy, a member of Raines’s family or member of his household

or person with whom he has or has had a dating relationship, by striking her with his

hand. A person commits an offense of continuous violence against the family if, during

a period that is 12 months or less in duration, the person two or more times engages in

conduct that constitutes an offense under Section 22.01(a)(1) against another person who

may be a member of a family or household as defined by the Texas Family Code. See TEX.

PENAL CODE § 25.11(a). An offense under section 22.01(a)(1) is a bodily injury assault. See

id. § 22.01(a)(1).

        When comparing the two charging instruments for “sameness” of the event, the

language describing the act against Amy which was used in the subsequent indictment

was very similar to the language used in the original indictment, except to delete the

plural of “hand” and the language, “or applying pressure to her neck or throat.” Thus,

count one of the original indictment alleges the same act of causing bodily injury by

striking Amy and requires the same proof as the subsequent indictment. Further, we

cannot say that the offense in the subsequent indictment broadened or substantially

amended the offense alleged originally such that the offense in the subsequent indictment

is barred by limitations. See Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 768, 772 (Tex. Crim. App.

2004). We conclude that count one of the original indictment gave adequate notice to

Raines to prepare a defense to the subsequent indictment. See State v. West, 632 S.W.3d

908, 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

Raines v. State                                                                         Page 7
        Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Raines’s motion to quash on this

ground.

        Raines’s first issue is overruled.

HEARSAY

        In his second issue, Raines contends the trial court erred in allowing the testimony

by one investigator about hearsay statements by another investigator during the initial

hearing on the State’s Motion for Finding of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing.

        Under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, a defendant is barred from asserting

his right of confrontation when he has wrongfully procured the unavailability of the

witness. Shepherd v. State, 489 S.W.3d 559, 573 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. ref'd)

(citing Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359-362, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 171 L. Ed. 2d. 488 (2008)).

Article 38.49 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is a codification of the forfeiture

by wrongdoing doctrine. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.49; see also Brown v. State, 618

S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The statute requires the trial court to “determine,

out of the presence of the jury, whether forfeiture by wrongdoing occurred by a

preponderance of the evidence." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.49(c).

        The State’s Motion for Finding of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing was filed on August

12, 2020, six days before Raines’s initial trial. The hearing on the motion was held on

August 14, 2020. 2 Raines objected to Investigator Johse, with the Brazos County District


2
  As we discovered, and was noted by the State in its response to Raines’s third issue, the volume of the
Reporter’s Record containing this hearing, Volume 8, is incorrectly dated August 14, 2022. It is clear from
the appellate record that the year the hearing took place was 2020. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial
court stated, “We are set for a motion for finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing and the State just this morning
filed another motion to permit witness testimony by realtime videoconference….” The motion filed “just

Raines v. State                                                                                        Page 8
Attorney’s Office, testifying as what actions Investigator Stephenson, with the

Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office, stated he took in attempting to serve a

subpoena on Amy and Suzanne. The trial court overruled the objection.

        Assuming without deciding the trial court erred, Raines was not harmed.

Although the trial court eventually granted the State’s motion and the trial began, the

trial court declared a mistrial because Raines and officers of the court were potentially

exposed to the Covid virus. Prior to the mistrial, Stephenson testified in trial about the

steps he took to serve a subpoena on Amy and Suzanne. He was cross-examined about

those efforts. These were the same, but more detailed, facts testified to by Investigator

Johse at the first hearing on the State’s motion. Shortly before Raines’s second trial

convened in 2022, the State filed a Supplemental Motion for Finding of Forfeiture by

Wrongdoing and a second hearing was held. At this second hearing, the trial court took

judicial notice of the testimony from the first hearing which included Johse’s testimony

regarding what Stephenson had told him.                     However, the State also introduced

Investigator Stephenson’s testimony from Raines’s first trial into evidence. Raines did

not object.

        It is well-established that "erroneously admitted evidence will not result in

reversal when other such evidence was received without objection, either before or after

the complained-of ruling." Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see



this morning” was contained in the Clerk’s Record and was file stamped on August 14, 2020 at 9:15 a.m.
We believe the 2022 date on Volume 8 is merely a typographical error in light of the trial court’s statement
and especially in light of the fact that a second forfeiture hearing and a second trial occurred in, and the
reporter’s record was prepared in, 2022.

Raines v. State                                                                                      Page 9
also Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 302 n.29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Because the same

information by Stephenson, himself, was admitted at the second hearing without

objection, if there was any error in the admission of Stephenson’s testimony through

Johse at the first hearing, it was harmless. See Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 282; Estrada, 313 S.W.3d

at 302 n.29.

        Raines’s second issue is overruled.

    WAIVING SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

        In his third and final issue, Raines contends the trial court erred in granting the

State’s motion and supplemental motion for a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing.

Specifically, Raines contends the State failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the

evidence that it made a good faith effort to locate the witnesses and that the witnesses’

absences were wrongfully procured by Raines. 3

        Article 39.49 Basics

        As noted in Raines’s second issue, Article 38.49 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure, the codification of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, provides that a

defendant who "wrongfully procures the unavailability of a witness or prospective

witness . . . may not benefit from the wrongdoing by depriving the trier of fact of relevant

evidence . . . [and] forfeits the party's right to object to the admissibility of evidence or

statements based on the unavailability of the witness." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.



3
 Raines briefs this issue as to both Amy and Suzanne. Whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s
motions as to Amy is moot. Amy appeared at Raines’s second trial, and the motions were granted only as
to Suzanne after the second hearing. Thus, we will not discuss whether the trial court erred in granting
any motion as to Amy.

Raines v. State                                                                                    Page 10
38.49(a). The evidence to be considered by the trial court in determining forfeiture by

wrongdoing is "[e]vidence and statements related to a party that has engaged or

acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of a

witness." Id. (b). The party offering evidence of wrongdoing is not required to show that

"the actor's sole intent was to wrongfully cause the witness's or prospective witness's

unavailability," the actions constituted a criminal offense, or that any statements offered

are "reliable." Id. (d). Further, the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing may apply even

though the act with which the accused is charged is the same as the one by which he

allegedly rendered the witness unavailable. See Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 125

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

        Standard of Review

        The parties agree, and this Court has held, that we review the trial court’s decision

on a motion for a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing for an abuse of discretion. See

Shepherd v. State, 489 S.W.3d 559, 572 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. ref'd). See also

Thompson v. State, No. 10-16-00238-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6971, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Waco July 26, 2017, no pet.) (not designated for publication). See also Byrd v. State, No.

07-20-00234-CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 4773, at *13-14 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 13, 2022,

pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication). If the trial court's decision is within the zone

of reasonable disagreement, it has not abused its discretion, and we defer to that decision.

Shepherd, 489 S.W.3d at 572. When assessing evidence regarding acts alleged to have

procured a witness's unavailability, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial

court's finding. See Brown v. State, 618 S.W.3d 352, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Byrd, 2022

Raines v. State                                                                        Page 11
Tex. App. LEXIS 4773, at *14. Further, direct or circumstantial evidence may be used to

show that the defendant's wrongful conduct caused a witness's unavailability. See Baxter

v. State, No. 02-22-00258-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 8944, at *40-41 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Nov. 30, 2023, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (citing Brown, 618 S.W.3d at 357

("[C]ourts have recognized that procurement or causation need not be proven directly,

but may be established by inference.") and 23 Corpus Juris Secundum, Criminal

Procedure and Rights of Accused § 1182 (2023) ("Circumstantial evidence may be used to

establish, in whole or in part, that the witness's unavailability was procured by the

defendant.")). If there are no findings of fact, as in this case, we review the evidence in

the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and assume the court made findings

that are supported by the record. Shepherd v. State, 489 S.W.3d 559, 572 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2016, pet. ref’d). We may not substitute our decision for that of the trial court.

Id. at 573.

        Good Faith Effort

        We begin with Raines’s complaint that the trial court abused its discretion when

the State did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it made a good

faith effort to locate Suzanne. For purposes of the Confrontation Clause, a witness is

"unavailable" if the witness does not appear for trial despite the State's good faith efforts

to obtain the witness’s presence at trial. Reed v. State, 312 S.W.3d 682, 685 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref'd); Ledbetter v. State, 49 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2001, pet. ref'd).

        Because the trial court took judicial notice of the testimony presented in both

Raines v. State                                                                       Page 12
hearings, we consider what steps the State took in securing Suzanne’s presence for both

the first trial and the second trial. Prior to the first trial, which began on August 18, 2020,

Melissa Carter, the victim’s assistance coordinator for Brazos County, travelled on

August 4, 2020, with prosecutors and Investigator Johse (the State’s team) to Willis, Texas

where Suzanne and Amy lived together in a gated community. The State’s team arrived

at the front gate at 10:00 a.m., and the security guard gave them access to the

neighborhood. They knocked several times on the door, but neither Suzanne nor Amy

came to the door. Johse heard noises in the house consistent with people walking around

and dogs barking. A car registered to Suzanne was parked in the driveway. Carter called

both Amy and Suzanne on their cell phones and left messages requesting a call back.

Neither called. The State’s team was on site for about 30 minutes. On the Wednesday

before the trial, Carter called Amy and Suzanne again and left messages. The calls were

not returned.

        Investigator Stephenson, with the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office,

also tried to serve Amy and Suzanne one or two weeks before the first trial. He went to

the residence five or six times for a week at different times of the day to try to make

contact with them.     He rang the doorbell and knocked on the door “until it was

annoying.” On occasion, he would walk around the house to see if anyone was there.

He never saw anyone at home but saw Suzanne’s car there. Generally, Stephenson

waited at the residence between 5 to 20 minutes before leaving. Once, however, he

waited for approximately an hour, watching the house. He was not able to serve the

subpoena on Amy or Suzanne. Stephenson was going to try to serve the subpoena the

Raines v. State                                                                         Page 13
morning of trial. He was to contact Johse if he was successful. Johse was not contacted.

        Testimony for Raines’s second trial began on October 11, 2022. Melissa Carter said

she spoke to Suzanne once in January of 2021. Johse and the prosecutor were present for

that conversation. Suzanne was very clear that she would not come to court and would

not make herself available to receive a subpoena or to be at court to testify. When meeting

with Amy a month before trial, Amy told the State’s team that Suzanne was avoiding

process of service, but she also told them where Suzanne was and gave them Suzanne’s

phone number. Immediately after the meeting, the State’s team went to Suzanne and

Amy’s home in Willis. Amy did not go with them because she did not want Suzanne to

know that Amy was meeting with them. Johse knocked on the door numerous times.

Carter then called and texted Suzanne. They were unsuccessful in contacting her.

        Raines asserts the State's efforts to contact Suzanne did not represent a good-faith

attempt because Suzanne was not suddenly non-cooperative, as was the case in Byrd v.

State, No. 07-20-00234-CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 4773, at *16 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July

13, 2022, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication). Raines argues Suzanne had always

been uncooperative and unwilling to prosecute Raines, and the State could have done

more to ensure Suzanne's presence, especially during the break between trials. Whether

Suzanne had always been unwilling to prosecute Raines is not dispositive. See Stapp v.

State, No. 06-23-00016-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 6443, *12 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug.

23, 2023, no pet.) (not designated for publication). That circumstance in Byrd, was just

that—a circumstance.      It was not regarded in the appellate court’s opinion as a

requirement to prove good faith.

Raines v. State                                                                      Page 14
        Further, Raines does not suggest what else the State could have done to secure

Suzanne’s presence at trial. The State attempted to serve an out-of-town subpoena on

multiple occasions, either through Johse or Stephenson before the first trial. In 2021,

Suzanne made it clear to the State that she was afraid and was going to avoid service of

a subpoena at all costs. When the State discovered Suzanne was at home through a

discussion with Amy a month before the second trial, it made another attempt to serve

Suzanne. All attempts, in 2020 and in 2022, were unsuccessful.

        “Our role, … , is not to play armchair quarterback.” Byrd v. State, No. 07-20-00234-

CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 4773, at *16 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 13, 2022, pet. ref'd) (not

designated for publication). As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “it is

always possible to think of additional steps that the prosecution might have taken to

secure the witness' presence, [cite omitted] but the Sixth Amendment does not require

the prosecution to exhaust every avenue of inquiry, no matter how unpromising.” Hardy

v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 71-72, 132 S. Ct. 490, 181 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2011) (per curiam). The State

is not required to engage in clearly futile activities before a trial court can, in its discretion,

determine that the State made good-faith efforts to produce a witness at trial. Ledbetter v.

State, 49 S.W.3d 588, 594 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. ref'd). Further, given the

standard of review, we will not speculate and consider what else the State could have

done. See Hardy, 565 U.S. at 72 (“the deferential standard of review set out in 28 U. S. C.

§2254(d) does not permit a federal court to overturn a state court's decision on the

question of unavailability merely because the federal court identifies additional steps that

might have been taken.”).

Raines v. State                                                                            Page 15
        Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling

and also drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court's ruling, the evidence

supports a showing of good faith. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in granting the State’s motion to forfeit for this reason.

        Conduct Designed to Prevent

        We next address Raines’s complaint that the trial court abused its discretion

because there was no evidence that Raines directly threatened Suzanne to keep her from

testifying. Whether Raines directly threatened Suzanne is also not dispositive. The

question is, did Raines engage in conduct intended to prevent Suzanne from testifying?

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.49(b). See also Stapp v. State, No. 06-23-00016-CR, 2023

Tex. App. LEXIS 6443, *12 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 23, 2023, no pet.) (not designated

for publication).

        The trial court admitted evidence that Raines was violent toward Amy. Through

13 offense reports, the trial court considered evidence that Raines had strangled,

threatened, and “assaulted” Amy, grabbed Amy, grabbed Amy’s hair, and killed Amy’s

dog. Sometimes, the responding officers reported that marks could be seen on Amy. One

time, when Amy sought refuge in a Michael’s store, Raines kicked on the doors which

employees had locked to keep Amy safe. Some of these incidents occurred out of

retaliation for actions by Amy which Raines disliked. A 14th offense report, which was

also admitted into evidence, concerned Suzanne. Raines had been angry with Amy who

left the house to defuse the situation. Raines then became threatening toward Suzanne.

A third party in the house tried to resolve this situation but Raines ultimately struck

Raines v. State                                                                       Page 16
Suzanne with a closed fist on the left side of Suzanne’s face. The punch left Suzanne with

a cut above her eye and a swollen, bloody face.

        Recordings of phone calls from Raines to Amy and Suzanne while Raines was in

jail, all occurring within 10 days from the date of the first hearing in 2020, were also

admitted into evidence.        Sgt. Belangeri, with the Brazos County Sheriff’s Office,

sponsored the admission of the recordings. She and Melissa Carter agreed the main

theme of these calls was to convince Amy and Suzanne not to appear at trial because,

according to Raines’s explanation during the calls, if there were no witnesses, the case

against him would be dismissed. In two of the recordings, Raines left a voicemail on

Amy’s phone and two minutes later, left a voicemail on Suzanne’s phone. Raines’s

message to Suzanne’s phone was that it would be better if no victims appeared at trial.

He told her that if no victims appeared, there would be no “offense.” Although there

were no recordings of actual conversations between Raines and Suzanne, Belangeri and

Carter also agreed that the phone calls between Amy and Raines demonstrated Suzanne

was with Amy and in constant contact with Amy. 4

        Suzanne told authorities she was extremely afraid of Raines because he was

violent. She feared Raines would retaliate against both her and Amy if they cooperated

with police. Suzanne made it clear to the State that she would not come to court to testify

because she feared retaliation. The evidence showed Raines had retaliated before.




4
  It was established that Suzanne and Amy lived together and the voicemail left on Suzanne’s phone
showed that Raines believed Suzanne was in contact with Amy because he also let Suzanne know that he
could not reach Amy and wondered if everything was okay.

Raines v. State                                                                             Page 17
        In determining whether Raines’s conduct was intended to keep Suzanne from

testifying, it is pertinent to know that Amy was afraid of Raines as well. She told Carter

that physical violence and death threats were a part of her relationship with Raines. Amy

had known Raines since she was 14 years old and knew that certain words, phrases, and

looks were Raines’s ways of communicating threats to kill her. She was scared to see him

in court—she knew he did not want her testifying or cooperating with the District

Attorney’s Office. She said Raines threatened to kill her and Suzanne if he went to prison

in this case.

        Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim from resorting

to outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent testimony to police officers or

cooperation in criminal prosecutions. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 377, 128 S. Ct. 2678,

171 L. Ed. 2d. 488 (2008). Moreover, as Melissa Carter testified,

        Family violence is different because victims know the abusers, they know
        their offenders, they usually know them intimately and very well. So they
        know how they speak, they know how they control, they know how they
        manipulate….It's more controlling, it's more veiled because their victims
        know them, they know what they mean. They don't have to speak it directly
        in those words.

        The record here shows that Raines was violent to both Amy and Suzanne. Raines

retaliated against Suzanne for something Amy did that displeased Raines. Suzanne was

afraid of more retaliation. Raines communicated to Amy and Suzanne that if no victims

appeared, his case would be dismissed. Amy knew that Raines could threaten her

without directly communicating a threat. Because Suzanne and Amy lived together with

Amy’s children and were in contact with each other, it would be reasonable for the trial


Raines v. State                                                                        Page 18
court to infer that Suzanne understood indirect threats as well.                    It would also be

reasonable for the trial court to infer that Suzanne understood from Raines’s calls there

would be consequences if she appeared in court or cooperated with the State.

         Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to and also drawing all

reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court's ruling, the record supports the trial

court’s determination that Raines engaged in conduct intended to prevent Suzanne from

testifying. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s

motion to forfeit for this reason.

         Raines’s third issue is overruled.

CONCLUSION

         Having overruled each issue presented on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                                TOM GRAY
                                                Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Johnson, and
       Justice Rose 5
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed August 1, 2024
[Do not publish]
[CR25]




5
    The Honorable Jeff Rose, Senior Chief Justice (Retired) of the Third Court of Appeals, sitting by
assignment of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.


Raines v. State                                                                                   Page 19