Charley v. Gleason

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"10795377","type":"100trialcourt","part":"other","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                       
                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA                            


KEVIN SCOTT CHARLEY,                                                     

                    Plaintiff,       Case No. 3:25-cv-00005-TMB          

            v.                                                           
                                 ORDER ON PRISONER’S COMPLAINT           
SHARON GLEASON, THE U.S.           UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT            
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND THE
42 U.S.C. § 1983
(DKT. 1)         
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LAW                                                   

                    Defendants.                                          


                        I.  INTRODUCTION                                 
    This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Kevin Scott Charley’s Complaint under 
the Civil Rights Act
42 U.S.C. § 1983
(the “Complaint”).1 For the following reasons, the 
Complaint at Docket 1 is DISMISSED.                                       
                       II.  BACKGROUND                                   
    On January 10, 2025, self-represented prisoner Kevin Scott Charley filed a civil complaint 
against Federal District Court Chief Judge Sharon Gleason, the U.S. Department of Justice, and 
the “U.S. Department of Law” (“Defendants”).2 Charley also filed a civil cover sheet and an 
application to proceed without prepaying the filing fee.3 In Claim One, Charley alleges Chief Judge 
Gleason violated Charley’s right to access the courts by dismissing his writ of mandamus and 

1 Dkt. 1 (Complaint).                                                     
2
Id.
To the Court’s knowledge, the United States government does not have a Department of Law. 
It is the Department of Justice that oversees domestic enforcement of federal law. To the extent 
Charley intended to name the State of Alaska Department of Law overseeing his  criminal 
prosecution in State of Alaska vs. Charley, Case No. 3PA-24-01414CR, the prosecutors employed 
by that agency are also protected by prosecutorial immunity and are not responsible for filing 
criminal charges against anyone else on his behalf. See infra pp. 5–7.    
3Id.; Dkt. 2 (Civil Cover Sheet); Dkt. 3 (Application to Waive Prepayment of Filing Fee). 
failing to file a criminal case on his behalf.4 In Claims Two and Three, Charley alleges the “U.S. 
Department of Law” and U.S. Department of Justice also violated his right to access the courts by 
failing to file a criminal complaint on his behalf.5 For relief, Charley requests $241 trillion in 
damages and $333 trillion in punitive damages.6                           

    Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court takes judicial notice of 
the cases Charley has previously filed in federal court.7 Previously, Charley filed a Motion for 
Writ of Mandamus against the Alaska Ombudsman Office and the Victims Crime Compensation 
Board.8 On November 19, 2024, Charley filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal in that case after 
the Court issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss his filing as frivolous.9 He also filed a case against 
Jason  Summerville,  an  Alaska  State  Trooper;  Sheri  Olson,  a  Department  of  Corrections 
Superintendent; and the State of Alaska, Office of Children Services.10 This case is still pending.11  
    The Court has screened the Complaint in accordance with
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915
(e) and 
1915A. The Court finds Charley has failed to adequately state a claim for which relief may be 
granted. The Court further finds the Complaint to be frivolous and that allowing leave to file an 


4 Dkt. 1 at 3.                                                            
5 Dkt. 1 at 4–5.                                                          
6 Dkt. 1 at 8.                                                            
7 Judicial notice is the “court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a 
party’s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact; the court’s power to accept such a fact.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); See also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria 
Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc.,
971 F.2d 244, 248
(9th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e may take notice of 
proceedings  in  other  courts,  both  within  and  without  the  federal  judicial  system,  if  those 
proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” (internal quotation marks omitted.)). The 
Court’s online docket records may be accessed by the public online at pacer.uscourts.gov or 
without a Pacer login and password in the Clerk’s Office during regular business hours. 
8 Charley v. Alaska Ombudsman Office, 3:24-cv-00210-SLG, at Dkt. 1 (Motion).  
9 Charley v. Alaska Ombudsman Office, 3:24-cv-00210-SLG, at Dkt. 6 (Notice of Voluntary 
Dismissal).                                                               
10 Charley v. Sommerville, et al., 3:24-cv-00172-SLG, at Dkt. 1 (Complaint), Dkt. 14 (First 
Amended Complaint).                                                       
11
Id.
amended complaint would be futile. Therefore, the Court will not grant Charley leave to file an 
amended complaint and dismisses this case with prejudice. This dismissal counts as a strike under
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(g).                                                      
                     III.  LEGAL STANDARD                                
    Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a federal district court is required to screen 

complaints  brought  by  prisoners  seeking  relief  against  a  governmental  entity  or  officer  or 
employee of a governmental entity.12 In this screening, a district court shall dismiss the case at any 
time if the court determines that the action:                             
         (i)  is frivolous or malicious;                                 
         (ii)  fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 
         (iii)  seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.13 

    In conducting its screening review, a district court must accept as true the allegations of 
the complaint, construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 
doubts  in  the  plaintiff's  favor.14   However,  a  court  is  not  required  to  accept  unwarranted 
inferences.15 Further, a court cannot act as an attorney for a self-represented litigant, such as by 
supplying the essential elements of a claim.16                            
    Although the scope of review generally is limited to the contents of the complaint, a court 
may also consider documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in 


12
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915
, 1915A.                                              
13
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2)(B).                                             
14Bernhardt  v.  L.A.  County,
339  F.3d  920,  925
(9th  Cir.  2003) (holding  a  court  must 
construe pleadings filed by self-represented litigants liberally and afford the complainant the 
benefit of any doubt).                                                    
15 Doe I v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc.,
572 F.3d 677, 681
(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).                                                        
16 Pliler v. Ford,
542 U.S. 225, 231
(2004); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska,
673 F.2d 
266, 268
(9th Cir. 1982).                                                 
the complaint, or matters of judicial notice.17 Such documents that contradict the allegations of a 
complaint may fatally undermine the complaint's allegations.18            
    Before a court may dismiss any portion of a complaint, a court must provide a plaintiff 
with a statement of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend or otherwise 
address the problems, unless amendment would be futile.19  Futility exists when “the allegation of 

other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.”20 
                         IV.  ANALYSIS                                   
    This action is dismissed with prejudice and all pending motions are denied as moot. 
Charley’s claims are not appropriately brought as a new case. Further, his claims are frivolous 
because they are unsupported by law and because the Defendants against which he brings them 
are protected by judicial and prosecutorial immunity. Therefore, the Court finds that amendment 
of the claims is futile.21                                                

 A.  Charley’s Claims are Not Appropriately Brought as a New Case        
    Charley brought the claims which underly the Complaint previously in another case that is 
pending before the District Court.22 The Court has not yet screened Charley’s First Amended 
Complaint in that case.23 After the Court has screened his Complaint in that case, Charley may file 


17 United States v. Ritchie,
342 F.3d 903, 908
(9th Cir. 2003).           
18 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,
266 F.3d 979, 988
(9th Cir. 2001), amended by
275 F.3d 
1187
(2001) (noting that a plaintiff can “plead himself out of a claim by including ... details 
contrary to his claims”).                                                 
19 Gordon v. City of Oakland,
627 F.3d 1092, 1094
(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Albrecht v. Lund,
845 
F.2d 193, 195
(9th Cir. 1988)).                                           
20 Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co.,
806 F.2d 1393, 1401
(9th Cir. 1986). 
21 See id.; Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
656 F.3d 1034, 1041
(9th Cir. 2011) 
(setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper 
where amendment would be futile).                                         
22 Sommerville, 3:24-cv-00172-SLG.                                        
23
Id.
at Dkt. 14.                                                        
an appeal or seek relief from the final judgment if he disagrees with the Court’s analysis.24 
Charley’s challenges are not appropriately brought as a new case.25       

 B.  The Claims are Frivolous and Amendment is Futile                    
    A claim is legally frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”26 The 
Court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory 
or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless.27 Charley’s claims are unsupported by law 
and, regardless, the Defendants are protected by judicial and prosecutorial immunity. 
    1.  Charley Cannot Force the Government to Bring Criminal Charges    

    Charley believes the Defendants violated his rights by failing to press criminal charges “as 
requested.”28 However, private citizens do not have a right to have criminal charges brought on 
their behalf.29 The United States Constitution delegates the powers of the Federal Government into 
three defined categories: the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch, and the Judicial Branch.30  
The Executive Branch of the United States has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to 
decide whether to prosecute a criminal case.31  As the Judicial Branch, this Court does not have 


24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b); Local Civil Rule 7.3(h)(5) (“[M]otion seeking relief from or 
amendment of an appealable order or judgment must be filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59 or 60”).                                                     
25 Weeks v. Bayer,
246 F.3d 1231, 1236
(9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a party must overcome a 
“high hurdle” to obtain relief under Rule 59(e) since only “highly unusual circumstances” will 
justify its application); 333 W. Thomas Med. Bldg. Enters. v. Soetantyo,
976 F. Supp. 1298, 1302
(D. Ariz. 1995) (“A motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask a court to rethink what 
the court had already thought through.” (cleaned up)).                    
26 Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated 
in Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1130
(9th Cir. 2000).                   
27 Id. at 327.                                                            
28 Dkt. 1 at 4–5.                                                         
29 Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 619
(1973) (“[I]n American jurisprudence . . . , a private 
citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”).  
30 Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 721
(1986).                            
31 United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 693
(1974).                      
the power to criminally prosecute any individual or to issue an order for the arrest of an individual 
based on Plaintiff’s request.32 Therefore, by alleging that Chief Judge Gleason “failed to file” a 
criminal complaint on his behalf and that the United States Department of Justice “failed to file” 
criminal complaints “as requested,”33 Charley has not alleged a violation of his rights. 

    2.  The  Named  Defendants  are  Protected  by  Judicial  Immunity  and  Prosecutorial 
      Immunity                                                           

    State and federal “[j]udges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely 
immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.”34  This judicial 
immunity is immunity from lawsuit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages, and it cannot 
be overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice.35  Similarly, “[c]ourt clerks have absolute quasi-
judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an 
integral part of the judicial process.”36 A mistake does not abrogate this immunity even if it results 
in  “grave procedural errors.”37  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that “when a 
person who is alleged to have caused a deprivation of constitutional rights while acting under color 
of federal law can successfully assert judicial or quasi-judicial immunity from damages, that 



32 See Egolf v. United States, No. 4:23-CV-00007-SLG,
2023 WL 5350680
, at *2 (D. Alaska Aug. 
21, 2023); Latronica v. Merrill Lynch,
2016 WL 6967586
, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2016), report and 
recommendation adopted sub nom. Latronica v. Lynch,
2016 WL 10654059
(E.D. Cal. 2016). 
33 Dkt. 1 at 3–5.                                                         
34 Ashelman v. Pope,
793 F.2d 1072
, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) (in determining 
if an action is judicial, courts focus on whether “(1) the precise act is a normal judicial function; 
(2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then 
pending before the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a 
confrontation with the judge in his or her official capacity.”).          
35 Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 11
(1991) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985). 
36 Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Dist. of Nevada,
828 F.2d 1385, 1390
(9th Cir. 1987). 
37 Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 359
(1978).                           
immunity also will bar declaratory and injunctive relief.”38 Therefore, even if Charley’s claim was 
not frivolous, Chief Judge Gleason is protected from the claim by her judicial immunity.  
    Likewise,  Charley’s damage claim against the  Department of Justice is also barred. 
Prosecutorial immunity insulates prosecutors for all actions taken within the scope of their duties 
in pursuing a criminal prosecution.39  A prosecutor’s absolute immunity extends to “initiating a 

prosecution and presenting the [Government’s] case.”40 Absolute prosecutorial immunity is meant 
to “protect[ ] the prosecutor from harassing litigation that would divert his time and attention from 
his official duties” and to “enabl[e] him to exercise independent judgment when ‘deciding which 
suits to bring and in conducting them in court.’”41 As Charley’s claim alleges the Department of 
Law and the Department of Justice failed to prosecute a claim on his behalf, the agency is protected 
by prosecutorial immunity.                                                
 C.  This Dismissal Counts as a Strike.                                  

    The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that a self-represented prisoner receive a strike 
if his case is dismissed “as frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted.”42 The “three strikes” provision was “designed to filter out the bad claims and facilitate 
consideration of the good.”43 Once a prisoner-plaintiff has accumulated three strikes, he is 
prohibited from bringing any other cases in federal court without prepaying the full filing fee 
unless he make a “plausible allegation” that he “is under imminent danger of serious physical 



38 Mullis,
828 F.2d at 1394
.                                              
39 Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 430
(1976).                          
40
Id.
41 Torres v. Goddard,
793 F.3d 1046, 1051
(9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher,
522 U.S. 
118, 125
(1997)) (alteration in original).                                
42
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(g).                                                   
43 Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 204, 224
(2007).                          
injury” at the time of filing his complaint.44 The imminent danger standard requires a prisoner to 
allege an “ongoing danger.”45 In addition to being “imminent,” the alleged danger must also be 
“both fairly traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in [the] complaint and redressable by the 
court.”46                                                                 

                        V.  CONCLUSION                                   
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds the Complaint is frivolous and that leave to 
amend would be futile.                                                    
    IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:                                             
    1. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice.                            
    2. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.                           
    3. This dismissal counts as a STRIKE under 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(g).       
    4. The Court certifies that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith
      pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(a)(3) because the Complaint is frivolous.47
    5. Charley must not file any future claims for which he lacks a sufficient legal or factual
      basis.                                                             
    6. The Clerk shall issue a final judgment and close this case.       
    IT IS SO ORDERED.                                                    
                        Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 5th day of February, 2025. 
                                  /s/  Timothy M. Burgess                    _
                                   TIMOTHY M. BURGESS                    
                                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE           
44
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(g); Andrews v. Cervantes,
493 F.3d 1047, 1055
(9th Cir. 2007). 
45 Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1056–57.                                          
46 Ray v. Lara,
31 F.4th 692, 701
(9th Cir. 2022) (adopting nexus requirement between the alleged 
imminent danger and the violations of law alleged in the complaint for imminent danger exception 
to the PLRA three-strikes provision).                                     
47 Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3)(A);
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(a)(3) (“An appeal may not be taken in forma 
pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.”); see also Hooker v. 
American Airlines,
302 F.3d 1091, 1092
(9th Cir. 2002) (noting that an appeal is taken in “good 
faith” if it seeks review of at least one “non-frivolous” issue).