City of Burien v. King County

1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 10 AT SEATTLE 11 CITY OF BURIEN, a municipal CASE NO. 3:24-cv-00433-RAJ coporation, 12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION Plaintiff, TO REMAND 13 v. 14 PATRICIA COLE-TINDALL, in her 15 official capacity as the King County Sheriff and KING COUNTY, a home 16 rule charter county, 17 Defendants. 18 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. Dkt. # 14. 21 Defendants assert counterclaims against Plaintiff, Dkt. # 16, and oppose remand of this 22 matter, Dkt. # 17. The parties do not request oral argument, and the Court does not find 23 it necessary. The Court has reviewed the motions, the materials filed in support of the 24 motions, the balance of the record, and the governing law. For the reasons stated below, 25 the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion. 26 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 This matter arises out of a dispute regarding the non-enforcement of a local 3 ordinance. Pursuant to the Interlocal Agreement (“ILA”), King County through King 4 County Sheriff’s Office (“KCSO”) provides law enforcement services to Plaintiff, the 5 City of Burien. See Dkt. # 14 at 5. 6 The City Council of Burien adopted Ordinance 832 (the “Ordinance”), titled 7 “Unlawful Public Camping,” on March 4, 2024. Dkt. # 16 at 16-20. The Ordinance 8 prohibits the use of nonresidential public property as a living space. Id. The Ordinance 9 defines this as, “to camp, dwell, lodge, reside, sleep, or exercise nontransitory exclusive 10 control over any portion of nonresidential public property.” Id. The nonresidential public 11 property includes “any Burien park, street, sidewalk, or any other open area where Burien 12 or another governmental agency has a property interest, including easements.” Id. There 13 is an exception to the general prohibition when there is no available overnight shelter and 14 the use of nonresidential public property as a living space occurs between 7 p.m. and 6 15 a.m. the following morning. See id. Noncompliance with the Ordinance is classified as 16 a misdemeanor offense. See id. 17 In providing services to Burien, Sheriff Patricia Cole-Tindall instructed her 18 department not to enforce the Ordinance. Id. King County and Sheriff Cole-Tindall 19 (“King County Defendants”) contend that the Ordinance violates federal caselaw. See 20 Dkt. # 17 at 3. Defendants acknowledge that KCSO has refused to enforce the Ordinance 21 to date. Dkt. # 17 at 2. 22 On March 11, 2024, Defendants in the instant action, King County and Sheriff 23 Patricia Cole-Tindall, initiated a related lawsuit in federal court seeking declaratory and 24 injunctive relief (“federal action”). See Cole-Tindall v. City of Burien, 24-cv-00325-RAJ 25 (March 11, 2024). There, Plaintiffs ask this Court to evaluate the constitutionality of the 26 Ordinance. See id. 1 When King County and Sheriff Cole-Tindall brought the federal action instead of 2 following the procedure outlined in the ILA, the City of Burien filed the instant lawsuit 3 in Snohomish County Superior Court (“state court action”). Plaintiff, the City of Burien 4 (“Plaintiff” or “Burien”), argues that pursuant to the ILA, this dispute should have been 5 referred to an oversight committee. Dkt. # 14 at 5-7. In the state court action, Burien 6 assert a breach of contract claim requesting specific performance and injunctive relief. 7 Dkt. # 1-1 ¶¶ 5.1-5.7. King County Defendants then filed a notice of removal to federal 8 court, Dkt. # 1, and filed counterclaims seeking declaratory judgment regarding the 9 constitutionality of the Ordinance, Dkt. # 16 ¶¶ 58-61. Burien now asks this Court to 10 remand this matter to Snohomish County Superior Court. Dkt. # 14 11 III. LEGAL STANDARD 12 A civil action brought in a state court may be removed to a federal district court if 13 the federal district court could have exercised original jurisdiction over the action. See 14 28 U.S.C. § 1441. In general, federal jurisdiction exists when a claim either (1) arises 15 under the Constitution and laws of the United States, or (2) arises between citizens of 16 different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 17 1331, 1332. Federal courts strictly construe the removal statute and must reject 18 jurisdiction if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance. See 19 Hawaii ex rel. Louie v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 761 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014); 20 Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, the defendant has the burden 21 of establishing that removal is proper. See Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 22 (9th Cir. 2005). 23 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “in order for a claim to arise ‘under 24 the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,’ ‘a right or immunity created by 25 the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of 26 1 the plaintiff’s cause of action.’” Philips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127 2 (1974) (quoting Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936)). This essential federal 3 element must appear in the plaintiff’s own statement of its cause of action. Louisville & 4 N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); see also Franchise Tax Bd. of State of 5 Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (“For better or 6 worse . . . a defendant may not remove a case to federal court unless the plaintiff’s 7 complaint establishes that the case ‘arises under’ federal law.”). 8 Whether a complaint raises a federal question is determined by the “well-pleaded 9 complaint rule,” which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal 10 question is present on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar 11 Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “The rule makes the plaintiff the master of 12 the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” 13 Id. The well-pleaded complaint rule does not permit a finding of jurisdiction “predicated 14 on an actual or anticipated defense” or “upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim.” 15 Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009). It is “settled law that a case may not 16 be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the defense is 17 anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal 18 defense is the only question truly at issue.” Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 393 (citing 19 Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12). 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 1 IV. ANALYSIS 2 As all parties in this action are citizens of Washington, see Dkt. #1-1, removal is 3 only proper if the court could have exercised federal question jurisdiction over this action 4 when it was filed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. Burien argues this matter must be 5 remanded to state court because the Complaint concerns a contract dispute and does not 6 present a federal question. See generally Dkts. # 14, 18. King County Defendants assert 7 removal is appropriate because Burien’s breach of contract claim raises federal questions 8 and “Burien has ‘artfully pleaded’ its complaint as framed a by state claims.” Dkt. # 17 9 at 2. 10 Under the artful pleading doctrine, “a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting 11 to plead necessary federal questions.” Hansen v. Grp. Health Coop., 902 F.3d 1051, 12 1057 (9th Cir. 2018). Federal question jurisdiction will exist despite no federal claim 13 appearing on the face of the complaint in a “small category of cases” in which a state law 14 claim “necessarily raises a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which 15 a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance 16 of federal and state power.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning, 17 578 U.S. 374, 383 (2016); see also ARCO Env’t Remediation, LLC v. Dep’t of Health & 18 Env’t Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that a state-created cause of 19 action can be deemed to arise under federal law “where the claim is necessarily federal 20 in character”). 21 King County Defendants state that the “constitutionality of Ordinance No. 832 is 22 an essential element of Burien’s breach of contract and injunctive relief claims.” Dkt. # 23 17 at 7. Defendants are wrong. The Complaint alleges breach of contract and seeks 24 injunctive relief and damages. Under Washington law, a breach of contract claim 25 requires proof of three elements—the existence of a contract, its breach, and resulting 26 damages. See Nw. Indep. Forest Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 78 Wash. App. 707, 1 713 (1995). The basis of this cause of action is King County Defendants’ failure to 2 perform and comply with the ILA’s dispute resolution process. See Dkt. # 1-1 ¶ 5.2. 3 Burien does not have the burden to plead or prove the constitutionality of the Ordinance 4 in asserting a breach of contract claim. There is nothing to suggest that Burien pleaded 5 the breach of contract claim in a manner to avoid asserting a federal question. Therefore, 6 the nature of this dispute is not necessarily federal in character and the artful pleading 7 doctrine does not support removal to federal court. 8 At most, the disputed constitutionality of the Ordinance relates to a potential 9 defense against the breach of contract claim. King County Defendants do not dispute 10 their nonperformance. See Dkt. # 17 at 2. Defendants seem to ask the Court to excuse 11 their conduct based on the belief that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and ask this Court 12 to rule on the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Dkts. # 16, 17. This is insufficient to 13 support removal of the state law claims to federal court. 14 Defendants have failed to establish removal jurisdiction under the well-pleaded 15 complaint rule or the artful pleading doctrine. The face of Burien’s Complaint does not 16 implicate a substantial federal question. Burien’s state law contract claim is not 17 necessarily federal in character. Nor is a federal question an element of their state law 18 contract claim. Instead, Defendants’ argument about the constitutionality of the 19 Ordinance only raises a federal question defense. Likewise, Defendants’ counterclaims 20 seeking declaratory judgment of the constitutionality of the Ordinance are insufficient to 21 support removal to federal court. 22 23 24 25 26 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion. Dkt. # 14. 3 The clerk shall remand this case to Snohomish County Superior Court. 4 5 Dated this 24th day of September, 2024. 6 7 A 8 9 The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26