Cole v. Kramlinger

            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Emma Cole,                            File No. 24-CV-03521 (JMB/DJF)      

     Plaintiff,                                                      

v.                                                                        
                                          ORDER                      
Jason Andrew Kramlinger; St. Croix County,                                
Wisconsin;  State  of  Wisconsin;  Scott                                  
Needham,  Judge;  Karl   Anderson,                                        
Prosecutor;  Jessica  Buberl,  and  Sally                                 
Standart,                                                                 

     Defendants.                                                     


This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Emma Cole’s application to proceed in 
forma pauperis (Doc. No. 6) while pursuing her claims against the Defendants, who include 
the father of her minor child, the State of Wisconsin, certain attorneys, and a member of 
the Wisconsin judiciary (together, Defendants).  For the reasons discussed below, the Court 
will dismiss Cole’s Complaint because it fails to state a plausible claim for relief, and it 
will therefore deny the IFP Application as moot.                          
                     BACKGROUND                                      
This matter arises from a child custody dispute, which has been ongoing since 2015.  
Cole is the mother of a minor child, O.C.L.K., and Kramlinger is the child’s adjudicated 
father.  See In re the Paternity of O.C.L.K., No. 2015PA33PJ (Wis. Cit. Ct.).1  Presently, 

1 The Court may take judicial notice of court records.  Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 
760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005).                                                  
Cole and Kramlinger are involved in open family court proceedings in Wisconsin and 
Minnesota.  See id.; Kramlinger v. Cole, No. 62-FA-24-453 (Minn. Dist. Ct.)  In the past 

several months, the parties appeared in the Wisconsin matter before Defendant Judge Scott 
Needham to discuss a summer parenting schedule for O.C.L.K., and the docket shows 
ongoing activity and correspondence from the parties.  See In re Paternity of O.C.L.K., No. 
2015PA33PJ.  On October 28, 2024, Ramsey County District Court Referee Elizabeth 
Clysdale issued an order in the Minnesota matter clarifying that “Wisconsin has continuing 
and exclusive jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding pertaining to this matter and 

will continue to have such exclusive jurisdiction until the State of Wisconsin explicitly 
relinquishes jurisdiction over the file 2015PA33PJ.”  See Kramlinger v. Cole, 62-FA-24-
453, Index #53 ¶ 11.                                                      
In addition, Cole was recently charged with, and pleaded no contest to, intentionally 
concealing a child from another parent in violation of Wisconsin state law.  See State v. 

Mary Ellen Langworthy, No. 2022CF289 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Sept. 9, 2024).2  In that matter, 
Judge  Needham  presided  over  the  proceedings,  Defendant  Karl  Anderson  was  the 
prosecutor, and Defendant Jessica Buberl represented Kramlinger.  See id. 
On September 3, 2024, Cole filed a Complaint in this Court.  (Doc. No. 1.)  In it, 
she alleges that Kramlinger continues to file motions in Wisconsin family court case even 

though the proceedings “w[ere] transferred to Minnesota in 2018.”  (Id. at 4.)  She asserts 
that Kramlinger’s conduct, and the other Defendants’ complicity in it, “amount[s] to a 


2 Cole has also been known as Mary Ellen Langworthy.                      
conspiracy to deprive her of her . . . rights.”  (Id.)  Specifically, she asserts claims of false 
imprisonment, harassment (including interstate stalking and threats to witnesses), denial of 

accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and a violation of the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).  (Id.)  She asks the Court to enjoin Defendants’ 
conduct, referral of parties for criminal prosecution, and to issue a lifetime restraining order 
against the Defendants.  (Id.)  She asserts that her claims arise under federal statutes, 
including 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and the VAWA.  (Id. at 3.)  After 
filing the Complaint, Cole also filed an IFP Application, a motion to dismiss matters 

pending in state court, and motions for injunctive relief.  (Doc. Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7.) 
                      DISCUSSION                                     
Cole’s IFP Application shows that she is financially eligible for IFP status.  (See 
Doc.  No.  6.)    However,  courts  must  deny  an  IFP  application  when  the  applicant’s 
underlying pleading fails to state a cause of action on which relief may be granted.  See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir. 1996) (per 
curiam).  The complaint must at least “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  When determining whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief, courts accept as true all factual allegations and 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.  Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 511 

F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2008).  A self-represented litigant’s complaint is to be liberally 
construed; however, the complaint still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims in 
it.  Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).                   
As discussed below, the Court has determined that the Complaint fails to state a 
plausible claim for relief because three Defendants are immune from suit and because Cole 

has not alleged sufficient facts in support of her claims against the remaining Defendants. 
I.   IMMUNITY FROM SUIT                                                   
A.   State of Wisconsin                                              
As noted above, the Complaint names the State of Wisconsin as a Defendant.  The 
Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars individuals from suing a state in federal 
court unless either Congress authorized the suit, or the state waived its sovereign immunity 

by consenting to being sued.  College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999).  The Court first observes that the Complaint does 
not make clear what allegedly wrongful conduct Cole attributes to the State of Wisconsin.  
To the extent her claim or claims against the State of Wisconsin arise under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, any such claims fail.  Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity 

for claims under section 1983.  Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1988).  
Further, the allegations in the Complaint do not permit the Court to reasonably infer that 
the State of Wisconsin has consented to suit under section 1983.  See, e.g., Lister v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 240 N.W.2d 610, 618–19 (Wis. 1976) (explaining that state 
agency cannot be sued absent explicitly consent by state legislature).3   




3 Even if the Eleventh Amendment did not bar Cole’s claims against the State of Wisconsin, 
the claim would still fail because the State of Wisconsin is not a “person” subject to suit 
under section 1983.  See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Will, 491 U.S. at 66. 
B.   Judge Scott Needham                                             
Cole also names Judge Scott Needham of St. Croix County, Wisconsin Circuit 

Court, as a Defendant.  The doctrine of judicial immunity provides that a judicial officer, 
when “exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, 
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.”  See Hamilton v. City of Hayti, 
Mo., 948 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991)).  
Judicial immunity does not apply when a plaintiff alleges that (1) the alleged wrongful 
conduct was not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, and (2) when the alleged wrongful 

conduct was undertaken in the judge’s judicial capacity but were “taken in the complete 
absence of all jurisdiction.”  Id. (quoting Mireles, 948 F.3d at 11–12).  Allegations of 
malice or corruption do not defeat judicial immunity.  Id.  To the extent the Complaint asks 
for declaratory or injunctive relief, judicial immunity bars such claims, as well.  See 
Scheffler v. Trachy, 821 F. App’x 648, 652 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).  

Cole  does  not  specify  what  allegedly  wrongful  conduct  in  the  Complaint  is 
attributable to Judge Needham.  However, she does allege that the Wisconsin state court 
(over which Judge Needham presides) has issued “orders that violate her rights;” that “state 
actors in Wisconsin,” including Judge Needham, have “manipulat[ed] court orders”; and 
that “Wisconsin no longer has jurisdiction over her case.”  (Doc. No. 1 at 4.)  Thus, Cole 

appears to allege that Judge Needham is not entitled to judicial immunity because he acted 
without jurisdiction.4  The Court disagrees.                              

4 The factual statements in the complaint do not allege that Judge Needham acted outside 
of his judicial capacity, and only the second Mireles prong is at issue here. 
Federal  courts  are  to  “construe  broadly  the  scope  of  the  judge’s  jurisdiction 
. . . where the issue is the immunity of a judge.”  Justice Network, Inc. v. Craighead Cnty., 

931 F.3d 753, 762 (8th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).  Wisconsin’s Constitution provides that 
“the circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this 
state . . . .”  Wis. Const. art. VII § 8; see also Wis. Stat. § 753.03 (providing that the “circuit 
courts have the power to hear and determine, within their respective circuits, all civil and 
criminal actions and proceedings unless exclusive jurisdiction is given to some other 
court”).    Further,  the  Wisconsin  Legislature  decided  that  “[t]he  circuit  courts  have 

jurisdiction of all actions affecting the family and have authority to do all acts and things 
necessary  and  proper  in  those  actions  to  carry  their  orders  and  judgments  into 
execution . . . .”  Wis. Stat. § 767.01(1).                               
Plainly,  therefore,  Judge  Needham  was  properly  exercising  jurisdiction  when 
addressing issues relating to paternity, child custody, and Cole’s state criminal charges.  

While Cole believes that state courts in Minnesota, not Wisconsin, have jurisdiction over 
child  custody  issues,  Referee  Clysdale  has  reached  the  contrary  conclusion.    See 
Kramlinger  v.  Cole,  62-FA-24-453,  Index  #53  ¶ 11  (“Wisconsin  has  continuing  and 
exclusive jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding pertaining to this matter and will 
continue  to  have  such  exclusive  jurisdiction  until  the  State  of  Wisconsin  explicitly 

relinquishes jurisdiction over the file 2015PA33PJ.”)  For this reason, the Court concludes 
that Judge Needham has not acted “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”  Stump v. 
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978); see also Scheffler, 821 F. App’x at 652 (“A court’s 
exercise of its jurisdiction in an erroneous manner does not make the act any less a judicial 
act; nor does it render the judicial defendant liable to answer in damages for it at the suit 
of  the  plaintiff,  as  though  the  court  had  proceeded  without  having  any  jurisdiction 

whatever.” (cleaned up)).  Cole’s claims against Judge Needham are barred. 
C.   Karl Anderson                                                   
Cole  also  names  Anderson,  a  prosecutor,  as a  Defendant.    (See  Doc. No.  1.)  
However,  a  state  prosecutor  is  entitled  to  absolute  immunity  for  acts  performed “in 
initiating a prosecution and in presenting the States’s case” against a criminal defendant.  
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).  Such immunity “covers prosecutorial 

functions such as the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution, the presentation of 
the state’s case at trial, and other conduct that is intimately associated with the judicial 
process.”  Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261, 1266 (8th Cir. 1996).  Absolute 
prosecutorial immunity, moreover, “defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official’s 
actions were within the scope of the immunity.”  Imbler, 424 U.S. at 419 n.13. 

As with the defendants discussed above, Cole does not specify in the Complaint 
what allegedly wrongful conduct she attributes to Anderson.  (See Doc. No. 1.)  At most, 
she refers to Anderson as a “prosecutor,” and court records show that Anderson, on behalf 
of Wisconsin, brought criminal charges against Cole for interfering with the custodial 
rights  of  another  parent.    See  State  v.  Langworthy,  No.  2022CF289.    Because  the 

Complaints includes no facts alleging that Anderson’s conduct fell outside of his official 
prosecutorial duties, Anderson is immune from suit for damages.5          

5 To the extent the Complaint asks for declaratory or injunctive relief related to Anderson’s 
allegedly wrongful conduct, the Court observes that, “federal courts should not interfere in 
II.  COLE’S REMAINING CLAIMS                                              
Having concluded that the State of Wisconsin, Judge Needham, and Anderson are 

immune from suit, the Court asks whether Cole’s Complaint has stated a plausible claim 
for relief against the remaining Defendants (Kramlinger, Standart, Buberl, and St. Croix 
County).  As already noted, Kramlinger is the adjudicated father of O.C.L.K.  Buberl is a 
private  attorney  who  has,  on  occasion,  represented  Kramlinger  in  his  family  law 
proceedings in the Minnesota and Wisconsin state courts.  It is not clear who Standart is. 

A.   Section 1983                                                    
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege a violation of a 
constitutional right committed by a person acting under color of state law.”  Andrews v. 
City of W. Branch, Iowa, 454 F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).   “[A] private 
actor may be liable under § 1983 when the private actor ‘is a willful participant in joint 
activity with the State or its agents in denying a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”  Dossett 

v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d 940, 947 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted).  Setting 
aside the question of whether Cole has established a plausible constitutional violation, Cole 
asserts no facts suggesting that Kramlinger or Buberl acted together with state actors in 
violating those rights.  Cole’s section 1983 claims against Kramlinger and Buberl therefore 
fail as a matter of law.                                                  


state criminal court proceedings when state a federal law provide adequate remedies and 
when intervention needlessly threatens the principle of comity.”  Rogers v. Bruntrager, 
841 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 1988).  Plaintiff has not alleged that she has filed a state appeal 
of her criminal conviction or that such an appeal (or any other legal recourse) is not 
available to her.  Accordingly, to the extent that prosecutorial immunity does not bar 
equitable relief, Plaintiff’s request for such relief is simply premature.  Id. 
The Complaint also fails to state a claim against Standart.  “Liability under § 1983 
requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”  Mayorga 

v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006).  The Court has reviewed the Wisconsin 
and Minnesota family court records and is unable to discern who Standart is or how she 
may be involved in the conduct described in Cole’s Complaint.  In short, the Complaint 
contains no allegations of any causal connection between the alleged deprivation of rights 
and Standart’s conduct.  Cole’s section 1983 claim against Standart therefore fails. 
This leaves St. Croix County.  A political subdivision, such as St. Croix County, 

“may not generally be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for the unconstitutional 
acts of its employees.”  Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 
1999) (citing Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).  Rather, “[a] 
political subdivision may be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its officials or 
employees when those acts implement or execute an unconstitutional policy or custom of 

the subdivision.”  Id.  Here, the Complaint fails to allege facts concerning the essential 
elements of municipal liability under section 1983.  See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91 (1978) 
(listing essential elements of municipal liability—including the violation of a constitutional 
right and the existence of a custom or official policy that brought about the alleged 
constitutional violation).  Cole’s section 1983 claims will be dismissed. 

B.   18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242                                           
Cole asserts causes of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.  However, those 
statutes are federal criminal statutes, and there is no private right of action for violations of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or  242.  See United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 846 (8th Cir. 1998); 
see also Green v. Carlson, No. 19-CV-1666 (ECT/SER), 2019 WL 5400509, at *4 (D. 
Minn. Oct. 22, 2019) (“Section 242 provides no private right of action.”); Roberson v. 

Pearson, Case No. 12-CV-2056 (ADM/FLN), 2012 WL 4128303, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 
27, 2012) (listing cases), report and recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4128293 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 18, 2012).  These claims are therefore dismissed.             
C.   VAWA and ADA Claims                                             
Cole also alleges that Defendants violated VAWA and the ADA.  Congress enacted 
VAWA to address housing instability for those affected by domestic violence, see 34 

U.S.C. § 12472, and the ADA prohibits discrimination and retaliation against people with 
disabilities in employment, transportation, public accommodation, and access to state and 
local government programs and services, among others, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.  
The Complaint, however, contains no factual allegations describing how the Defendants 
violated VAWA, or which provision was purportedly violated.6  Likewise, the Complaint 

contains no factual allegations identifying the nature of Cole’s asserted disability, or 
describing her requested accommodation.  Accordingly, these claims are dismissed. 
D.   State Law Claims                                                
In the Complaint, Cole also alleges that Defendants “stalked” her, “harassed” her, 
and threatened witnesses.  (Doc. No. 1).  Such claims arise under state law.   




6 Further, it is not clear that VAWA establishes a private cause of action.  United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (declaring unconstitutional the private civil remedy 
established by VAWA).                                                     
To the extent that Cole contends that Defendants engaged in criminal stalking or 
harassment,  this  Court  has  no  authority  to  investigate  or  prosecute  alleged  criminal 

offenses.  See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch 
has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.”). 
To the extent Cole contends that Defendants’ behavior was tortious, the Court will 
decline to hear her state law claims.  Court has already determined that Cole’s federal 
claims fail as a matter of law, and “it is normal practice . . . to dismiss pendent claims 
without prejudice, thus leaving plaintiffs free to pursue their state law claims in the state 

courts, if they wish.”  Marianist Province of U.S. v. City of Kirkwood, 944 F.3d 996, 1003 
(8th Cir. 2019).  The Court declines to exercise its pendent jurisdiction here and dismisses 
the state law claims for that reason.                                     
                        ORDER                                        
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT 

IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:                                                   
1.   Plaintiff  Emma  Cole’s  Complaint  (Doc.  No.  1)  is  DISMISSED  WITH 
     PREJUDICE;                                                      

2.   Plaintiff’s  Motion  to  Dismiss,  Motion  for  Abatement  of  Lower  Court 
     Proceedings, and for Federal Protection (Doc. No. 3) is DENIED as moot;  

3.   Plaintiff’s  Motion  for  a  Temporary  Restraining  Order  (Doc.  No.  4)  is 
     DENIED as moot;                                                 
4.   Plaintiff’s IFP Application (Doc. No. 6) is DENIED as moot.     

5.   Plaintiff’s Emergency Request for Federal Court Intervention (Doc. No. 7) 
     is DENIED as moot; and                                          

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                 

Dated:  October 29, 2024                /s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan              
                                   Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan            
                                   United States District Court