Com. v. Baum, Z.

J-A17002-25


NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 ZACHARY WILLIAM BAUM                  :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 886 WDA 2024

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 25, 2024
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-03-CR-0000760-2022

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 ZACHARY WILLIAM BAUM                  :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 888 WDA 2024

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 25, 2024
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-03-CR-0000751-2022

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 ZACHARY WILLIAM BAUM                  :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 889 WDA 2024

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 25, 2024
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-03-CR-0000762-2022


BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
J-A17002-25



MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                    FILED: October 15, 2025

       Zachary William Baum appeals from the judgments of sentence entered

at three dockets for his convictions for multiple crimes against three victims:

strangulation, stalking, and simple assault, related to victim C.F.; indecent

assault, related to victim K.S.; and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse

(IDSI), sexual abuse of children, and corruption of minors, related to victim

R.T.1 He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of expert

testimony, and the use of Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury

Instruction (Pa. SSJI (Crim)) § 4.13B. We affirm.

       Baum’s appellate claims address his convictions related to victim R.T.

only. Therefore, we limit our discussion to the procedural and factual history

relevant to those convictions. The Commonwealth charged Baum with

numerous sex offenses related to R.T., including IDSI. As to IDSI, the

information alleged that Baum “forced his penis into the known juvenile

victim’s mouth against her will[.]” Criminal Information at CP-03-CR-

0000762-2022.

       Before trial, Baum filed a motion for a Frye hearing, seeking to

disqualify the Commonwealth’s expert psychologist, Veronique Valliere, Ph.D.

He claimed that “[t]here are articulable grounds to believe that [Dr. Valliere]

has not applied accepted scientific methodology in a conventional fashion” in

reaching her conclusions. Motion for Frye Hearing, filed 8/28/23, at ¶ 7
____________________________________________


1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2718(a)(1), 2709.1(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), 3126(a)(2),
3123(a)(1), 6312(b)(1), and 6301(a)(1)(iii), respectively.

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(citation and quotation marks omitted). Baum then filed a second motion to

disqualify Dr. Valliere, this time “based on the face of her expert report[.]”

Motion to Disqualify Commonwealth Expert, filed 8/29/23, at ¶ 10. He argued

that her report “demonstrates that to reach her expert opinion she applied no

methodology, let alone a ‘methodology generally accepted by scientists in the

relevant field[.]’” Id. at ¶ 4 (citing Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038

(Pa. 2002)). Baum stated at the top of the first page of both motions, “No

Hearing Requested.” The court denied both motions. Order, filed 9/7/23.

      Baum also filed a motion in limine to preclude the use of the standard

criminal jury instruction 4.13B, which reads:

         4.13B   Conviction   Based     on    Reported   Victim’s
         Uncorroborated Testimony in Sexual Offenses--General

         The testimony of [name of reported victim] standing alone,
         if believed by you, is sufficient proof upon which to find the
         defendant guilty in this case, if the Commonwealth has
         established all of the elements of the crime beyond a
         reasonable doubt. The testimony of the reported victim
         need not be supported by other evidence to sustain a
         conviction. Thus, after consideration of the evidence, you
         may find the defendant guilty if the testimony of [name of
         reported victim] convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt
         that the defendant is guilty.

Pa. SSJI (Crim), § 4.13B. Baum argued that the instruction violated his Fifth

and Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his

rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Motion In Limine Regarding

Pa. SSJI (Crim), § 4.13B, filed 8/28/23. The court also denied this motion.

See Order, filed 9/7/23.




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      During the voir dire of Dr. Valliere, she described her educational

background,    training,   and   experience   regarding   sexual   assault   and

victimization. N.T., Trial, 9/25/23, at 5-6. She also explained that her work

with the Sexual Offender Assessment Board (SOAB) resulted in her “work[ing]

with literally thousands of offenders and hundreds and hundreds – probably

in the thousands of victims of now, either performing the care, doing

evaluations or supervising the care of victims and offenders.” Id. at 7. In

addition to her experience on the SOAB, Dr. Valliere testified that she had two

outpatient clinics where she treated both victims and offenders of sexual

offenses. Id. Dr. Valliere testified that she had published three books about

“victims, perpetrators and the criminal justice system” and had previously

testified “dozens of times” on victim behavior and response related to sexual

offenses. Id. at 8, 9.

      Defense counsel pointed out that Dr. Valliere’s expert report stated that

she gained her knowledge in victim behavior and response “through [her] own

studies as well as [through] clinical work treating hundreds of victims of

assault.” Id. at 11 (citing Defense Exhibit A (“Expert Report”)). Dr. Valliere

explained that these studies included “[a]ll the studying I have done to learn

about victims, all of the research I did to write my books, all of the books that

I have read.” Id. She further testified that her knowledge about victim

response and behavior is “based partly on what people tell me, what my

experience shows and what the research shows.” Id. at 33. Counsel also




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inquired about the books written by Dr. Valliere and the methodology of

doctors cited in the books. Id. at 16, 19, 20.

      Following voir dire, counsel objected to Dr. Valliere being offered as an

expert because “there is no methodology.” Id. at 34. The court overruled the

objection, finding that Dr. Valliere met the standard for testifying as an expert

based on her “special training or experience beyond that that a lay person

would have.” Id. at 36. The court then explained to the jury that it was

permitting Dr. Valliere to testify as an expert in clinical and forensic

psychology. Id. at 37.

      In her testimony, Dr. Valliere explained that she was testifying as a

“blind expert,” meaning that she had no knowledge of the facts of the case,

the victim, or the perpetrator. Id. She further explained that her testimony

was limited to “information based upon [her] training, experience and

knowledge primarily about victim behaviors before, during and after a sexual

assault[.]” Id. at 38. During cross-examination, counsel questioned Dr.

Valliere about the books she authored and inquired as to her potential bias.

Dr. Valliere did not testify about the specifics of the case, the victims, or Baum.

      R.T. testified that she had come to know Baum when she was 16 years

old. N.T., Trial, 9/26/23, at 118. The two met on Snapchat. Id. at 119. During

their first meeting in December 2019, R.T. performed oral sex on Baum, who

was 21 years old at the time. Id. at 121. R.T. testified that their sexual

relationship eventually progressed to what she described as consensual

vaginal intercourse and occurred multiple times throughout their relationship.

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Id. at 124, 176, 177. She also described separate incidents in which Baum

became violent with her. During one incident, Baum choked R.T. while she

was lying on the bed after he learned that another male had seen a video of

Baum and R.T. having sex. Id. at 143, 144. Another time, Baum pressed

R.T.’s head against a window while grabbing her neck after discovering a

“hickey” on her neck. Id. at 126.

     R.T. also testified that she took medication for anxiety and depression

and at times she would take too much. Id. at 129, 130. During those times

she would feel “kind of foggy” and had difficulty remembering things in the

moment. Id. at 130. She described one sexual encounter in Baum’s car on a

day that she had taken a larger amount of her medication. She testified that

during the “middle” of sex with Baum “my head was feeling foggy and I was

like ‘How did I get here? I don’t remember [Baum] taking me up here. I want

to stop.’” Id. at 131. She told Baum to stop and “[Baum] just kept going even

though I was saying no” and told her, “Don’t tell your friends I raped you.”

Id. This occurred while R.T. was still 16 years of age. Id. at 133. During

another sexual encounter, Baum ejaculated inside of R.T. without telling her.

Id. at 150. A few weeks later, R.T. learned that she was pregnant. R.T.

informed Baum of the pregnancy and “he said he would kill himself on his way

to work if [R.T.] didn’t have an abortion.” Id. at 151. Baum and R.T. did not

have sex after R.T. became pregnant. Id. at 152, 153.

     R.T. gave birth to the child in April 2021. Id. at 152. A final sexual

encounter occurred between Baum and R.T. in July 2021. Id. at 163. R.T.

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J-A17002-25



drove with her child to pick Baum up to see the child. The three went to a park

and afterwards R.T. drove Baum to his sister’s house. Id. at 165. Baum told

her to drive to the end of the street near a stop sign. Id. at 166. Once she

arrived, Baum said he would not get out of the car unless R.T. performed oral

sex on him. Id. The child was still in the car at the time. Id. Baum exposed

his erect penis and R.T. put her face over it. Id. at 166, 201. Baum then

pushed R.T.’s head down causing his penis to enter her mouth. Id. at 166,

167. She testified that she “was hoping on all I had to do was touch it and he

would leave, but he pushed my mouth down more than I had wanted it.” Id.

at 201. R.T. got up and told Baum to get out of the car. Id. at 167. R.T.’s

communication with Baum “mostly stopped” after this incident. Id. at 168.

      The jury found Baum guilty of the above referenced offenses, and the

court sentenced him to an aggregate term of nine to 25 years’ incarceration.

This timely appeal followed.

      Baum raises the following issues:

         1. Was the evidence insufficient to support a conviction of
         18 Pa.C.S. § 312[3](a)(1) involuntary deviate sexual
         intercourse?

         2. Does expert testimony that is not based on a
         methodology accepted in the field violate a defendant’s
         rights under U.S. Const. amend. VI and Pa. Const. art. I §9?

         3. Should Pa. SSJI (Crim) 4.13B, regarding the
         uncorroborated testimony of a victim in sexual offense
         cases, be disallowed as a violation of a defendant’s right to
         due process under U.S. Const. amend. V and Pa. Const. art.
         I?




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J-A17002-25



Baum’s Br. at 4 (answers of trial court omitted).

        Baum’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his IDSI

conviction. He claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove the element of

forcible compulsion or threat of forcible compulsion. He points to R.T.’s

testimony where she agreed that Baum did not threaten to harm her but said

he would not get out of the car until she performed the sexual act. He claims

the victim initially consented, noting her testimony that she “was hoping on

all I had to do was touch it and he would leave, but he pushed my mouth

down more than I had wanted to.” Id. at 16. Baum claims that the

Commonwealth failed to prove that Baum knew the limitation on consent or

the subsequent withdrawal of consent by the victim. He also alleges the

Commonwealth failed to prove that his act of pushing the victim’s head down

amounted to forcible compulsion or the threat of forcible compulsion.

Additionally, he asserts that the Commonwealth failed to prove that his act of

refusing to get out of the car amounted to forcible compulsion or the threat of

such.

        Our standard of review for a sufficiency claim is de novo and our scope

of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Banniger, 303 A.3d 1085, 1091

(Pa.Super. 2023). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth and determine whether “there is sufficient evidence to enable

the factfinder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. (citation omitted).




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     The crime of IDSI occurs when a person “engages in deviate sexual

intercourse[,]” including oral intercourse, “with a complainant by forcible

compulsion.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(1); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 801

A.2d 551, 556 (Pa. 2002) (listing oral intercourse as a form of deviate sexual

intercourse). To establish forcible compulsion, the Commonwealth must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the force was “absen[t] of consent, inducing

submission without further resistance.” Commonwealth v. Buffington, 828

A.2d 1024, 1031 (Pa. 2003). Such force may be physical, psychological, or

the threat of physical force. See Commonwealth v. Quinones, 200 A.3d

1004, 1012 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 727 A.2d

541, 544 (Pa. 1999)). Forcible compulsion is determined based on the totality

of circumstances and may include consideration of the following factors:

        the respective ages of the victim and the accused, the
        respective mental and physical conditions of the victim and
        the accused, the atmosphere and physical setting in which
        the incident was alleged to have taken place, the extent to
        which the accused may have been in a position of authority,
        domination or custodial control over the victim, and whether
        the victim was under duress.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 721 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986)).

     Here, the court rejected Baum’s sufficiency challenge. Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the court found

that the Commonwealth established every element of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. It explained:



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             In this case, R.T. testified that when she gave Mr. Baum
         a ride, Baum told her he would not get out of her car unless
         she performed oral sex on him. She did not wish to perform
         oral sex, but hoped that if she touched his penis he would
         leave the car. As she lowered her head toward his penis, he
         used his hand or hands to push her head down and her
         mouth onto his penis. She angrily pulled her head up and
         demanded that he get out of her car, which he did.

            Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
         Commonwealth, there is sufficient evidence to prove each
         and every element of the offense. In particular, the evidence
         that Mr. Baum surprised R.T. by pushing her head down so
         that his penis entered her mouth, together with the
         evidence that she angrily pulled her head back up and
         demanded that he exit the car, shows that she did not agree
         to perform oral sex and that his penis only entered her
         mouth because he pushed her head.

Rule 1925(a) Opinion, Docket 762, filed 8/30/24, at 12-13. We agree with the

court’s holding.

      Based on the totality of the evidence, including the prior encounters

between Baum and R.T., we conclude that the Commonwealth established the

element of forcible compulsion or threat of forcible compulsion. First, the

Commonwealth presented evidence of Baum’s past physical violence against

R.T. Then, against that background, the victim testified that on the occasion

in question, Baum told her that he would not leave her car until she performed

oral sex. R.T. testified that she “was hoping on all I had to do was touch it and

he would leave,” but Baum pushed her head down onto his penis farther than

she wanted. N.T., Trial, 9/26/23, at 201. The fact that Baum had to push her

head supports the inference that he was aware that he was acting without the

victim’s consent. Baum’s claim is meritless.



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      Next, Baum challenges the admissibility of Dr. Valliere’s expert

testimony. He argues that Dr. Valliere failed to employ a methodology

generally accepted in the field, and such testimony violated his rights under

the Sixth Amendment and Pennsylvania Constitution. He claims her testimony

revealed that she “employed no methodology and that Dr. Valliere had, in

fact, in her book, rejected another purported expert’s conclusions because he

had employed no methodology[.]” Baum’s Br. at 19. He also asserts that this

case is distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594

(Pa.Super. 2018), where this Court rejected a challenge to the admission of

Dr. Valliere’s expert testimony. See id. at 19-21 (citing N.T., Trial, 9/25/23,

at 20-22).

      The admission of expert testimony is within the trial court’s discretion.

Cramer, 195 A.3d at 605. Rule 702 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence

provides the factors for determining if a witness may give expert testimony.

         A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
         experience, training, or education may testify in the form of
         an opinion or otherwise if:

         (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
         knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average
         layperson;

         (b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
         knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
         evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and

         (c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the
         relevant field.

Pa.R.E. 702.



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       Here, Baum does not argue that Dr. Valliere employed a methodology

that is not generally accepted in the field, in violation of Rule 702. Rather, he

argues that her testimony was inadmissible because she employed “no

methodology” at all. Baum’s Br. at 19. The record belies this claim. She

explained how her training, education, experience, and research formed her

substantive testimony on victims’ behavior and responses related to sexual

assault. Moreover, Baum’s reliance on the Frye2 standard is misplaced. It only

applies if the party challenging the admissibility of expert scientific testimony

first shows that the testimony involves novel scientific evidence. See Cramer,

195 A.3d at 606; Trach v. Fellin, 817 A.2d 1102, 1109 (Pa.Super. 2003) (en

banc). Baum has made no effort to carry that initial burden. To the extent

Baum has claimed a violation of the Sixth Amendment or the Pennsylvania

Constitution, he waived the issue because his brief includes absolutely no

argument on either question. Baum has not shown that the trial court abused

its discretion in admitting Dr. Valliere’s testimony.

       In his final issue, Baum challenges suggested standard criminal jury

instruction 4.13B regarding the jury’s ability to rely on uncorroborated witness

testimony in sexual offense cases. Baum directs us to out-of-state cases

disapproving of a “uncorroborated testimony” or “single witness” jury

instruction. He maintains that “[t]his Court should mandate a . . . ‘non




____________________________________________


2 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).


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J-A17002-25



particularized instruction applicable to all witness testimony,’ if not disallow

[jury instruction] 4.13B altogether.” Baum’s Br. at 31.

      This claim is meritless. Suggested standard criminal jury instruction

4.13B remains a proper statement of Pennsylvania law. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

3106 (“The testimony of a complainant need not be corroborated in

prosecutions under this chapter.”). See also Commonwealth v. Holiday,

No. 870 WDA 2022, 2023 WL 8923110 at *5 (Pa.Super. filed Dec. 27, 2023)

(unpublished mem.) (rejecting constitutional challenge to suggested standard

criminal jury instruction 4.13B). Baum has not cited any Pennsylvania

authority stating otherwise.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.




DATE: 10/15/2025




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