AI Case Brief
Generate an AI-powered case brief with:
đź“‹Key Facts
⚖️Legal Issues
đź“šCourt Holding
đź’ˇReasoning
🎯Significance
Estimated cost: $0.10–$0.50 per brief, depending on opinion length and retries
Full Opinion
J-S10009-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHRISTIAN RAYMOND BORGES- :
QUINONES :
: No. 1179 MDA 2020
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 11, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-06-CR-0003940-2019
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: JUNE 3, 2021
Christian Raymond Borges-Quinones (Appellant) appeals from the
judgment of sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of criminal
conspiracy to commit simple assault. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 2701(a)(1).
We affirm.
On July 14, 2019, Terrell Nelson (the victim) and his paramour, Kiara
Borges (Borges),1 drove to the residence of Borges’ mother, Elba Alequin
(Alequin), to do laundry. N.T., 6/23/20, at 74, 95. Borges and the victim
parked their car and waited for Alequin to return to the house. Id. at 75, 113.
Appellant’s brother and co-conspirator, Felix Alvarez-Quinones (Felix), resided
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Borges is Appellant’s sister. N.T., 6/23/20, at 74, 95.
J-S10009-21
at the house and was home when the victim and Borges arrived. Id. at 75,
77, 112.
The victim and Borges, while waiting for Alequin, saw Appellant walking
in and out of the house, which was unusual because Alequin had prohibited
Appellant from entering the house. Id. at 75, 96, 112, 151. The victim saw
Felix speaking with Appellant outside. Id. at 76. Alequin eventually returned,
and Borges and the victim helped Alequin carry groceries into the house. Id.
at 76, 113.
The victim encountered Felix in the house. Id. at 77, 98, 113. There
was tension between Felix and the victim, as they had argued the previous
day. Id. at 75, 77, 82-83, 98. Alequin told Felix and the victim not to continue
the argument in the house, and they initially complied. Id. at 77, 98.
Appellant walked to the front door of the house and stood on the steps.
Id. at 77, 98, 114-15, 118. Alequin and Borges went to the door to meet
Appellant, who began yelling insults at Alequin and arguing with Borges. Id.
at 77, 98, 114-15, 118. The victim was in the kitchen at the time, making a
telephone call. Id. at 77-78, 88.
Felix heard the commotion from upstairs and came down to see what
was going on. Id. at 77, 100, 116-18. Alequin asked Felix to help prevent
Appellant from entering the house. Id. at 116, 118. Felix told Alequin “No.”
Id. Alequin and Borges tried to bar the door, but Felix and Appellant, acting
together, pushed the front door open for Appellant to gain entry. Id. at 77,
-2-
J-S10009-21
100, 116-18. Once inside, Felix and Appellant ran to the kitchen to confront
the victim. Id. at 77-78, 100, 118. The victim testified that Felix initially
punched him in the face and ribs, after which Appellant struck the victim. Id.
at 78. Both Felix and Appellant punched the victim multiple times. Id. at 78,
100-01, 118.
During the fracas, Alequin announced she was going to call the police.
Id. at 79, 102-03, 121. Appellant and Felix then ran out of the house and left
in Appellant’s car. Id. at 79, 103. The next day, the victim went to the
hospital where he was treated for a fractured bone in his face and a swollen
eye. Id. at 81-82.
In October 2019, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts
of simple assault, one count of conspiracy to commit simple assault, and three
counts of harassment. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), 903, 2709(a). On
June 22, 2020, Appellant filed a pretrial motion in limine. In relevant part,
Appellant sought permission to cross-examine the victim about his status as
a probationer at the time of the assault, and whether his probation status
caused him to lie about not being the aggressor.
Before the start of trial on June 23, 2020, the court heard argument on
the motion in limine. Thereafter, court permitted Appellant to question the
victim about being on probation at the time of the assault. The court also
allowed the defense to state that the victim could potentially face “adverse
consequences” for a probation violation or new arrest. However, the court
-3-
J-S10009-21
precluded the defense, over its objection, from stating the victim could face
jail time if he violated his probation. The trial court stated to defense counsel:
You’re going to get your ability to argue that there was some
adverse consequence if [the victim] was under supervision; that
if that would have occurred, . . . a new arrest would be an adverse
consequence to being under supervision. Okay. But none of us
know whether or not he would have definitively gone to jail.
N.T., 6/23/20, at 12.
The matter proceeded to trial. A jury tried Appellant on the simple
assault and conspiracy to commit simple assault charges, and the trial court
simultaneously tried Appellant on three counts of summary harassment.
The Commonwealth presented testimony from the victim, Borges,
Alequin, and the investigating police officer. Appellant testified and claimed
the victim was the aggressor. See id. at 154-55 (Appellant stating, “When I
ran inside and got to the kitchen, . . . I see [the victim] punch Felix in the
face. . . . [S]o I got in, tried [] to separate the fight the best way I could.”).
Appellant denied ever striking the victim. Id. at 155.
The jury found Appellant guilty of criminal conspiracy and acquitted him
of one count of simple assault. The trial court granted judgment of acquittal
on the remaining simple assault count and found Appellant not guilty of all
harassment charges.
Appellant did not file post-sentence motions. Appellant timely filed a
notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
-4-
J-S10009-21
Appellant raises two issues for our consideration:
A. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion in
Limine seeking to introduce at trial that jail time was a
potential adverse consequence to a violation of probation and,
therefore, a possible motivator for the alleged victim’s version
of the alleged events?
B. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the
conviction on the charge of Criminal Conspiracy to Commit
Simple Assault where the Commonwealth failed to present any
evidence that there was an agreement with any other person
or persons to commit Simple Assault?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
Appellant first challenges the trial court’s order denying his motion in
limine. We review such orders for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth
v. Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2018).
It is settled that the admission of evidence,
is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial
court’s ruling regarding the admission of evidence will not be
disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest
unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such
lack of support to be clearly erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Cosby, 224 A.3d 372, 397 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation
omitted).
Appellant argues the trial court erred in precluding the defense from
suggesting the victim could face jail time if he violated his probation. See
Appellant’s Brief at 11-14. Appellant maintains:
The inability of defense counsel to inquire into the potential
penalty [the victim] faced if found to be in violation of his
probation was a critical factor that likely would have swayed the
jury to disbelieve the rest of [the victim’s] weak and
-5-
J-S10009-21
uncorroborated testimony. [The victim’s] testimony against
[Appellant] could have been impeached with the fact that he faced
jail time if [he] was found to be in violation of his probation and
this potential outcome motivated his lies.
Id. at 14.
It is well-settled that,
a criminal defendant has a right to cross-examine any adverse
witness . . . for the purpose of impeaching his credibility. The
credibility of a witness may be impeached by evidence which tends
to show that the witness had an interest in the outcome of the
trial, or that the witness’ testimony may be untruthful, or that the
witness may possess a bias which colors his testimony[.]
Commonwealth v. Butler, 601 A.2d 268, 271 (Pa. 1991) (internal citations
omitted).
Further, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:
[W]henever a prosecution witness may be biased in favor of the
prosecution because of outstanding criminal charges or because
of any non-final criminal disposition against him within the same
jurisdiction, that possible bias, in fairness, must be made known
to the jury. Even if the prosecutor has made no promises, either
on the present case or on other pending criminal matters, the
witness may hope for favorable treatment from the prosecutor if
the witness presently testifies in a way that is helpful to the
prosecution. And if that possibility exists, the jury should know
about it.
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 69 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted);
see also Commonwealth v. Lane, 621 A.2d 566, 568 (Pa. 1993) (“It is
particularly important that, where the determination of a defendant’s guilt or
innocence is dependent upon the credibility of a prosecution witness, an
adequate opportunity be afforded to demonstrate through cross-examination
that the witness is biased.” (citation omitted)).
-6-
J-S10009-21
Finally, the scope of cross-examination is within the discretion of the
trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 527 (Pa. 2005).
Here, the trial court, consistent with Patterson, supra and Butler,
supra, permitted the defense to question the victim about being a probationer
who could face adverse consequences if he violated probation. See N.T.,
6/23/20, at 89-90. Indeed, the court gave the defense latitude to question
the victim about whether being on probation influenced him to falsely deny
being the aggressor. See, e.g., id. at 89 (defense counsel inquiring: “And if
a different party is the first to talk to police and tells a story where you’re the
aggressor, it’s possible that your probation would be violated, correct?”); id.
(defense counsel asking the victim: “do you know if you change your story
after having given a report to police you can be charged with a new crime,
false reports, right?”). Further, our review confirms the trial court’s finding
that there was no evidence suggesting the victim would have faced jail time
for a hypothetical probation violation. See N.T., 6/23/20, at 10; see also
Trial Court Opinion, 12/3/20, at 3.
In sum, we discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion and agree
with its conclusion:
The defense did not need to specifically mention that [the
victim] could have been sent to jail for violating his probation to
show the jury that [the victim] may have had a motive to lie. The
fact that [the victim] was on probation and could have faced
adverse consequences if he were to violate his probation was
enough for the defense to show motive or bias.
-7-
J-S10009-21
Trial Court Opinion, 12/3/20, at 4 (emphasis added); accord Lane, 621 A.2d
at 568 (rejecting defendant’s challenge to trial court’s limitation of defense
cross-examination of prosecution witness and stating: “It is quite clear that
the court in this case permitted sufficient latitude on cross-examination to
inform the jury that the witness, faced with multiple outstanding felony
charges in the same jurisdiction, might be biased against appellant in order to
obtain favorable treatment in his own prosecution.”). Appellant’s first issue
lacks merit.2
Appellant next argues the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove all elements of the crime of conspiracy to commit simple
assault beyond a reasonable doubt. See Appellant’s Brief at 15-19.
The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether,
viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to
enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
____________________________________________
2 Even if the trial court erred in limiting cross-examination of the victim, no
relief is due because the defense suffered no discernable harm by the trial
court’s ruling. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schley, 136 A.3d 511, 515 (Pa.
Super. 2016) (to constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not
only be erroneous but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party);
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 2021 PA Super 53, *12 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(discussing harmless error doctrine and explaining a defendant is entitled to
a fair trial but not a perfect one). Indeed, the trial court only precluded the
defense from explicitly mentioning jail as a possible adverse consequence
the victim could face for a probation violation.
-8-
J-S10009-21
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated, and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the finder of fact, while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 206 A.3d 551, 557 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations
and brackets omitted). “On appeal, this court evaluates the full record to
determine whether sufficien[t] evidence was presented to support each
element of the crime charged; however, we do not second-guess the jury’s
factual determinations.” Commonwealth v. Risoldi, 238 A.3d 434, 454 (Pa.
Super. 2020).
Appellant argues his conspiracy conviction cannot stand because the
Commonwealth presented no evidence Appellant entered into an agreement
with Felix to commit simple assault. See Appellant’s Brief at 16-17; see also
id. at 16 (arguing any agreement was “mere conjecture”).
We are guided by the following principles:
To convict a defendant of conspiracy, the trier of fact
must find that: (1) the defendant intended to commit or aid in the
commission of the criminal act; (2) the defendant entered into
an agreement with another (a “co-conspirator”) to engage in
the crime; and (3) the defendant or one or more of the other co-
conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the agreed
upon crime. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903. The essence of a criminal
-9-
J-S10009-21
conspiracy, which is what distinguishes this crime from accomplice
liability, is the agreement made between the co-conspirators.
Mere association with the perpetrators, mere presence at
the scene, or mere knowledge of the crime is insufficient to
establish that a defendant was part of a conspiratorial agreement
to commit the crime. There needs to be some additional proof
that the defendant intended to commit the crime along with his
co-conspirator. Direct evidence of the defendant’s criminal intent
or the conspiratorial agreement, however, is rarely
available. Consequently, the defendant’s intent as well as the
agreement is almost always proven through circumstantial
evidence, such as by the relations, conduct or circumstances of
the parties or overt acts on the part of the co-conspirators. Once
the trier of fact finds that there was an agreement and the
defendant intentionally entered into the agreement, that
defendant may be liable for the overt acts committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy regardless of which co-conspirator
committed the act.
Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 229 A.3d 622, 633 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(emphasis added, some citations omitted).
Further, our Supreme Court has cautioned:
A conspiracy cannot be established based only upon mere
suspicion and conjecture. Preexisting relationships or mere
association of participants, without more, will not suffice to
establish a prosecutable criminal conspiracy. . . . In other words,
even a husband and a wife, a parent and a child, friends,
paramours, or siblings are not, by virtue of these close
relationships alone, conspirators when acting in concert. The
Commonwealth still must demonstrate the formation of an illicit
agreement, the attendant specific shared intent to promote or
facilitate the object offense, and an overt act. No level of intimacy
or history between actors can replace the elements of the offense.
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 188 A.3d 400, 410 (Pa. 2018) (emphasis in
original, citations and quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court in
Chambers further explained:
- 10 -
J-S10009-21
[D]irect evidence of the formation of a conspiratorial agreement
is rare, and often must be derived from the facts and
circumstances of each case. The agreement need not be
formal, nor must it even be expressly communicated. It
can be established instantaneously, or it can be the product
of drawn-out deliberations. By way of example, in the context of
multi-person fights, two participants can form a conspiracy to
assault another person by discussing at length a plan to assault
that person, or, alternatively, those same individuals can form
the illicit agreement by mere nodding of heads, so long as they
possess the requisite intent.
Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
Appellant argues “neither the familial relationship between [Appellant]
and his co-defendant/brother Felix nor [Appellant’s] presence at the scene of
the assault is sufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy.” Appellant’s
Brief at 15 (citing Chambers, supra). Appellant contends, “There exists no
testimony, contrary to the court’s assertion, that Felix and [Appellant] acted
in harmony in pushing the door open with the express purpose of entering the
house to assault [the victim].” Id. at 16-17. Appellant relies on
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 453 A.2d 927, 930 (Pa. 1982), in which our
Supreme Court stated that merely jumping into an “affray spontaneously,
rather than pursuant to a common plan, agreement, or understanding” does
not constitute criminal conspiracy. See Appellant’s Brief at 18.
Our review of the record reflects that Appellant entered the house
despite Alequin barring him from do so. N.T., 6/23/20, at 96, 112. On the
previous day, Appellant’s brother, Felix, got into an argument with the victim.
Id. at 75, 82-83, 98. Borges stated that when she and the victim arrived at
- 11 -
J-S10009-21
the house and saw Appellant, she was concerned because she knew Appellant
was not permitted there. Id. at 96. Appellant argued with Borges at the front
door to the house and yelled insults at Alequin. Id. at 77, 98, 114-15, 118.
In addition, the victim saw Appellant and Felix talking just prior to the assault.
Id. at 76.
Felix, upon hearing the commotion, had come downstairs. Id. at 77,
100, 116-18. Alequin asked Felix to help prevent Appellant from entering the
house; Felix refused. Id. at 116, 118. Borges explained what happened next:
Q. [The prosecutor:] Did [Appellant] try to come in the house?
A. He did.
Q. And did anyone try to stop him from coming in the house?
A. I was standing in the [] door telling him to go and that’s when
he started yelling loud and me and [Alequin] were standing there
and that’s when Felix came down and went into the middle
hallway as well.
Q. What happened there?
A. Felix came down. He was confused. And then [Appellant]
and [Felix] ended up pushing through and they ran to the
kitchen and that’s when they started to hit [the victim] in the
kitchen.
Q. Did you go into the kitchen?
A. Yes, I did.
***
Q. What did you see?
A. I saw [Appellant] hitting [the victim] with Felix, Felix slapping
[the victim] on his lap [and] his face, and [Appellant] just kept
hitting him and hitting him. We went into the kitchen to try to
- 12 -
J-S10009-21
break them apart; and when we tried, [Appellant] ended up
pushing [Alequin] into the cabinets in the kitchen[.]
Id. at 100-01 (emphasis added); see also id. at 102 (Borges stating
Appellant was the aggressor and hit the victim four times).
The prosecutor also questioned Alequin about the melee:
Q. After [Appellant’s verbal] argument with [Borges,] what
happened?
A. Felix came down. He was confused because he didn’t know
what was happening at that very moment. . . . And I told [Felix]
to help me with [Appellant], to not let [Appellant] come inside.
[Felix] looked at me and he said, No, and [Appellant] went up
the steps. And between both [Appellant and Felix], they
pushed the door and that’s when [Appellant] came in with Felix.
. . . So between both of them, they hit [the victim].
Id. at 116 (paragraph breaks omitted); see also id. at 118 (stating “Felix []
was the first one to run towards the kitchen; and he . . . gave the first punch.
So when [Appellant] came, he also was punching [the victim] all over the
place.”). When Borges called the police, Appellant and Felix fled together in
Appellant’s car. Id. at 103.
The above evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner, was sufficient to establish the
agreement element of criminal conspiracy. It was not necessary for Appellant
and Felix to expressly communicate their agreement or formulate a detailed
plan. See Chambers, supra. The concert of action of Appellant and Felix
circumstantially established their agreement. See Dunkins, supra (“the
agreement is almost always proven through circumstantial evidence, such as
- 13 -
J-S10009-21
by the relations, conduct or circumstances of the parties or overt acts on the
part of the co-conspirators.”). Felix refused Alequin’s request to keep
Appellant out of the house, and both Felix and Appellant jointly forced the
front door open and ran into the kitchen to attack the victim. See N.T.,
6/23/20, at 96, 116, 118.
To the extent there were conflicts in the testimony, it was within the
sole purview of the jury to evaluate credibility and determine the weight to be
given the conflicting testimony, which we may not re-weigh on appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“It is
the function of the jury to evaluate evidence adduced at trial to reach a
determination as to the facts, and where the verdict is based on substantial,
if conflicting evidence, it is conclusive on appeal.” (citation omitted)). The
jury ostensibly credited the testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses and
discredited Appellant’s self-serving account; we may not disturb this finding.
See id.
Finally, the authority upon which Appellant relies is distinguishable and
unavailing. See Kennedy, 453 A.2d at 930 (holding no conspiracy existed
where defendant and his alleged co-conspirator “acted independently and
spontaneously” in beating the victim, and emphasizing “[t]he fact that the
affray erupted from an argument, the manner in which the beating was
inflicted, and the overt acts of the participants prior to and concurrent with
- 14 -
J-S10009-21
commission of the assault fail to bespeak concert of action indicative of a
common design.”). Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency challenge fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 06/03/2021
- 15 -
Case Information
- Court
- Pa. Super. Ct.
- Decision Date
- June 3, 2021
- Status
- Precedential