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J-A21031-25
2025 PA Super 230
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHARLES DAVID DOUGLAS, III :
:
Appellant : No. 859 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 30, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-21-CR-0000252-2023
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 7, 2025
Appellant, Charles David Douglas, III, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County on
April 30, 2024. After a careful review, we affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history, thoroughly summarized by
the trial court, are as follows:
On August 3, 2022, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Yoon Jang
was on routine patrol performing speed enforcement on Interstate
81 southbound in the area of Exit 44 in Dickinson Township,
Cumberland County. The posted speed limit in that area is 55
miles per hour, but it changes to 65 miles per hour at mile marker
43.7. Trooper Jang was using a Falcon handheld radar through his
driver’s side window to monitor the speed of vehicles traveling in
that area.
At approximately 7:44 p.m., Trooper Jang observed a
vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed, which triggered the
radar’s doppler tone to “shriek.” The device measured the vehicle’s
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A21031-25
speed at 76 miles per hour, 21 miles per hour above the posted
speed limit. Trooper Jang testified that his view of the vehicle was
not obstructed in any way, and that the vehicle was traveling in
the left lane when he initially observed it, moving over to the right
lane while he was operating the radar.
Trooper Jang turned on his overhead lights and pulled out
onto Interstate 81 southbound at mile marker 44. He got behind
the vehicle in the right lane of traffic. The vehicle moved into the
left lane of traffic to pass a tractor-trailer, and then proceeded to
move back into the right lane. The vehicle stopped for Trooper
Jang’s signal at mile marker 42.5 on the right shoulder.
Trooper Jang approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and
identified Defendant by his Georgia driver’s license. Trooper Jang
explained to Defendant the reason for the stop. While speaking
with Defendant, Trooper Jang noticed the “very strong” odor of an
air freshener and detected the faint odor of marijuana coming
from the vehicle. When Trooper Jang questioned Defendant about
the odor, Defendant stated that he had smoked marijuana earlier.
Defendant denied having a medical marijuana card, but stated
that there was marijuana in the vehicle. Trooper Jang then asked
Defendant to perform Standard Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs).
While performing the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN)
test, Trooper Jang noticed that Defendant had bloodshot eyes,
which, he testified, through his training, knowledge, and
experience he knows to be a sign of impairment from the use of
marijuana. During the walk-and-turn test, Defendant was unable
to maintain balance, stopped after the ninth step, made an
improper turn, and missed heel-to-toe. On the one-leg-stand test
Defendant used his arms for balance.
Trooper Jang then conducted Advanced Roadside
Impairment Driving Enforcement (ARIDE) testing. During the lack
of convergence test, Trooper Jang observed that Defendant’s left
eye did not converge, which, according to his training, knowledge,
and experience, indicates that Defendant may be under the
influence of drugs. He again observed Defendant’s eyes to be
bloodshot, and Defendant’s tongue was white. On the Modified
Romburg test, Trooper Jang observed that what Defendant
estimated to be 30 seconds was actually 16 seconds, which in his
training, knowledge, and experience, may be an indicator of
someone who had imbibed drugs.
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J-A21031-25
Trooper Jang then asked to search Defendant’s vehicle, to
which he consented. The search yielded two multi-colored packs
of suspected marijuana, a metal grinder, and a tray. Trooper Jang
seized the items, eventually logging them into the Evidence
Property Record System.
Defendant was placed under arrest for driving under the
influence of a controlled substance. He was transported to UPMC
Carlisle when he was read the DL-26 chemical test warning. At
that time Defendant consented to a draw of his blood. Blood was
taken at 8:35 p.m., approximately 50 minutes after the stop of
Defendant’s vehicle. The blood was analyzed and revealed the
presence of Delta-g-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and its active and
inactive metabolites.
Defendant was charged with Driving Under the Influence of
a Controlled Substance (any amount of a Schedule I controlled
substance); Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Substance
(any amount of a metabolite of a controlled substance); Driving
Under the Influence of a Controlled Substance (incapable of safe
driving); Unlawful Possession of a Small Amount of Marijuana;
Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; and Exceeding
Maximum Speed Limits. The Commonwealth later withdrew Count
4 - Unlawful Possession of Small Amount of Marijuana under 35
Pa.C.S. § 780-113(a)(31)(ii) and amended the Information to
include Count 7 - Unlawful Possession of Small Amount of
Marijuana under 35 Pa.C.S. § 780-113(a)(31)(i).
A non-jury trial commenced before [the trial court] on April
4, 2024. The Commonwealth first offered the testimony of Michael
Lamb, who was permitted to testify as an expert in Forensic
Toxicology. Mr. Lamb testified that he is a forensic toxicologist with
NMS Labs, a laboratory located in Horsham, Pennsylvania. In this
case, Mr. Lamb testified, NMS was asked to test a sample of blood
received via Federal Express. He stated that they were asked to
test the blood for the presence of Delta-9 THC, the active
component of marijuana, as well as two of its primary metabolites.
In this case, Delta-9 THC was detected at a concentration of 9.1
nanograms per milliliter. Additionally, the blood contained 11-
Hydroxy Deita-9 THC, a substance created when Delta-9 THC is
metabolized by the liver, also known as an active metabolite, at
the level of 3.5 nanograms per milliliter. The blood also contained
Delta-9 Carboxy THC, a substance created as the body further
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J-A21031-25
metabolizes THC, also known as an inactive metabolite, at a level
of 100 nanograms per milliliter. Mr. Lamb testified that the
presence of 11-Hydroxy Delta-9 THC indicates recent use of
marijuana, likely within 24 hours of the blood draw.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Mr. Lamb if
his job was to “make sure if anything looks strange or if any of it
looks off that you get it retested.” Mr. Lamb replied that case
review is part of his job, and that there are “many processes that
we employ, kind of like checks and balances, to ensure that results
are recorded appropriately.” Defense counsel then inquired if there
was anything that was “off originally.” Mr. Lamb stated that it is
not uncommon to “rerun” samples, and that in this particular case,
they did retest a sample, and the results were confirmed “within
precision of the original results” and reported. Mr. Lamb further
testified that the repeat testing was only done for the THC level,
and that the analyst who performed the testing reran the test
because of an issue with the chromatography that was resolved
when the test was rerun. The initial test measured the THC in the
amount of 11 nanograms per milliliter, and the second test
measured THC in the amount of 9.1 nanograms per milliliter, so
the lower amount was reported. Mr. Lamb stated that all of the
testing results would be reported in raw data, and that the raw
data is not typically provided with a report but can be requested.
The Commonwealth then offered called Trooper Jang.
Trooper Jang’s testimony was supported by a Motor Vehicle
Recording (MVR) which was submitted into evidence and played
for the [c]ourt. The MVR reflects the information testified to by
Trooper Jang, as recited supra.
The Commonwealth last offered the testimony of Taylor
Yurasits, who was permitted to testify as an expert in the
quantification of controlled substances in whole blood. Ms. Yurasits
is a Forensic Laboratory Analyst with the Cumberland County
Forensic Laboratory. In this case, Ms. Yurasits testified that she
received the sample of Defendant’s blood on August 5, 2022,
performed testing on the blood on August 8, 2022, and prepared
a report of her findings, which was reviewed by a certifying
scientist.
Ms. Yurasits then testified to her findings. The first test that
she performed was a 13-panel drug screen analysis, which was
presumptively positive for cannabinoids. She then sent the blood
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J-A21031-25
sample to NMS Labs for a confirmatory test and quantification. Ms.
Yurasits stated that the Cumberland County Forensic Lab will
typically do their own confirmatory and quantification testing, but
at the time Defendant’s sample was collected, the instrument that
they use for confirmatory and quantification testing was being
upgraded, so it was the practice at that time to send blood
samples to NMS Labs for further testing.
After the close of evidence, defense counsel argued that
there was no indication of impairment from Defendant’s driving,
noting that he was merely speeding, and the results of the field
sobriety tests were “somewhat irrelevant.” Defense counsel then
argued that the blood results were inconclusive because Mr. Lamb
could not point to the cause of the first invalid test, and that the
results could have been “up to plus or minus up to 20 percent
incorrect.”
[The trial court] then found Defendant guilty of Count 1 -
driving under the influence of a controlled substance (THC); Count
2 - driving under the influence of a controlled substance
(metabolite); and Count 6 - exceeding maximum speed limit. [The
trial court] acquitted Defendant of possession of a small amount
of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia because the
Commonwealth did not present any evidence to show that the
substance seized was in fact marijuana. Likewise, [the court]
acquitted Defendant on Count 3 - driving under the influence -
controlled substance - impaired ability to safely drive. On April 30,
2024, Defendant was sentenced to a mandatory 72 hours to 6
months incarceration on the DUI offenses.
Tr. Ct. Op. at 1-8 (footnotes omitted).
Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on May 9, 2024. Following
argument on the motion, the trial court denied the motion on June 7, 2024.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal and filed a concise statement pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on July 11, 2024. The trial court filed its 1925(a) opinion on
November 8, 2024. This appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following three issues for our review in his brief:
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J-A21031-25
I. WHETHER THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE AS TO SHOCK ONE’S SENSE OF JUSTICE WHERE THE
TESTIMONY AND OTHER EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED MR. DOUGLAS
WAS NOT GUILTY OF DUI CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IMPAIRS
ABILITY TO SAFELY DRIVE AND THE LAB TESTING CONTAINED
INCONSISTENCES?
II. WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH TO PROVIDE
MR. DOUGLAS WITH THE COMPLETE LAB REPORT INCLUDING THE
TESTING DATA WHICH WAS FLAGGED AS INCONSISTENT
VIOLATED MR. DOUGLAS’ DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AS THE
EVIDENCE IS POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY UNDER, BRADY V.
MARYLAND,
373 U.S. 83
(1963)?
III. WHETHER THE TESTIMONY OF COMMONWEALTH’S WITNESS
MICHAEL E. LAMB VIOLATED MR. DOUGLAS’ RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, SMITH V. ARIZONA, WESTLAW NO. 22-
899 (S. CT. DECIDED JUNE 21, 2024), AS MR. LAMB’S TESTIMONY
AND LAB REPORT WERE BASED ON ANOTHER LAB ANALYST’S
TESTING AND TESTIMONIAL NOTES RELATED TO THAT TESTING?
Appellant’s Br. at 6.
Appellant’s first issue is a challenge to the weight of the evidence. “[A]
trial court’s denial of a post-sentence motion based on a weight of the
evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings.” Commonwealth v.
Sanders,
42 A.3d 325, 331
(Pa. Super. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In connection with a weight-of-the-evidence issue, we engage in
exceedingly narrow review. To begin, we recognize that,
our standard of review for a weight-of-the-evidence claim is an
abuse of discretion. As we have often reminded appellants, “An
appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a weight
of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a
review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Windslowe,
158 A.3d 698, 712
(Pa. Super.
2017). . . .
-6-
J-A21031-25
“An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is
rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise
of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,
prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.”
Commonwealth v. Santos,
176 A.3d 877, 882
(Pa. Super.
2017). To mount an abuse-of-discretion attack against the trial
court’s determination that its guilty verdicts were not so against
the weight of the evidence as to shock that court’s own
conscience, [an appellant must] . . . demonstrate how the trial
court’s ruling overrode the law, was manifestly unreasonable, or
the product of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality.
Commonwealth v. Rogers,
259 A.3d 539, 541
(Pa. Super. 2021), appeal
denied,
280 A.3d 866
(Pa. 2022) (emphasis omitted). A weight-of-the-
evidence claim “concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict
but questions which evidence is to be believed.” Commonwealth v.
Charlton,
902 A.2d 554, 561
(Pa. Super. 2006). “The finder of fact . . .
exclusively weighs the evidence, assesses the credibility of witnesses, and
may choose to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v.
Sanchez,
36 A.3d 24, 39
(Pa. 2011).
Appellant argues that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
and that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him guilty of 75
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii). Appellant’s Br. at 16. The relevant DUI
statute provides:
(d) Controlled substances. — An individual may not drive, operate
or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle under
any of the following circumstances:
(1) There is in the individual’s blood any amount of a:
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J-A21031-25
(i) Schedule I controlled substance, as defined in the
act of April 14, 1972 (P.L.233, No.64), known as The
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act;
...
(iii) metabolite of a substance under subparagraph (i)
or (ii).
(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the
individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual
physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d).
Appellant takes issue with the three reasons relied on by the trial court
for its verdict: First, the trial court reasoned that Appellant’s blood tests
showed THC and its active and inactive metabolites, yet Appellant argues that
there was an issue with the testing. Appellant’s Br. at 17-18. Second, the trial
court relied on Appellant’s poor performance on the SFSTs and ARIDE testing,
yet it acquitted Appellant of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2), finding insufficient
evidence that Appellant’s ability to safely drive was impaired. Appellant’s Br.
at 19. Third, the trial court relied on Appellant’s admission to Trooper Jang
that he admitted to smoking marijuana and was in possession of it, yet the
statute required proof that the substance was in his blood; an element that
cannot be satisfied by mere admission to use or possession. Appellant’s Br. at
21.
Appellant correctly indicates that section 3802(d)(1) does not require
that a driver be impaired; it requires proof only that Appellant’s blood
contained an enumerated controlled substance or a metabolite of the
-8-
J-A21031-25
controlled substance. Appellant’s Br. At 21; see Commonwealth v.
Etchison,
916 A.2d 1169, 1174
(Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasis omitted). While
the trial court’s 1925(a) opinion mentions the indicators of impairment in the
SFSTs and the ARIDE testing, the odor of marijuana in Appellant’s car, and his
admission to marijuana use, Tr. Ct. Op. at 17, these are all factors that
provided reasonable grounds to the Trooper that Appellant had marijuana in
his system. These factors justified the Trooper’s request for a blood draw,
regardless of what weight the trial court afforded to this evidence for purposes
of section 3802(d)(2). Significantly, the fact that Appellant’s blood contained
marijuana and its active and inactive metabolites is determinate.
The record supports the fact that Appellant’s blood contained “any
amount of specifically enumerated controlled substances in his blood,
regardless of impairment.” Etchison,
916 A.2d at 1174
(emphasis in original).
Appellant argues that the results were unreliable because on cross-
examination, he elicited testimony from Mr. Lamb that “the analyst who was
calculating the data reran the testing due to an issue with the
chromatography.” Appellant’s Br. at 17; N.T., 4/22/24, at 21. The first test
resulted in 11 nanograms of THC per milliliter of Appellant’s blood. The second
test resulted in 9.1 nanograms per milliliter. N.T., 4/22/24, at 16, 24.
Despite Mr. Lamb’s testimony that there was an issue with the
chromatography, the issue, which could have had several causes, was resolved
when the test was rerun. N.T., 4/22/24, at 21-22. Mr. Lamb reported the lower
-9-
J-A21031-25
of the two numbers in his conclusion. Cmwlth. Ex. 10. The trial court credited
the expert’s opinion that this is not an uncommon issue and that samples are
routinely rerun yet still reliable. Tr. Ct. Op. at 11. We are bound by the trial
court’s credibility findings. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the
trial court.
Appellant’s second issue is that the Commonwealth violated his due
process rights by running afoul of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83
(1963),
when it failed to provide lab reports and results that revealed issues with the
testing of his blood sample. To establish a Brady violation, an appellant “must
demonstrate: (1) the prosecution concealed evidence; (2) the evidence was
either exculpatory or impeachment evidence favorable to him; and (3) he was
prejudiced.” Commonwealth v. Treiber,
121 A.3d 435, 460-61
(Pa. 2015).
No Brady violation occurs where the parties had equal access to the
information or if the defendant knew or could have uncovered such evidence
with reasonable diligence. Commonwealth v. Morris,
822 A.2d 684, 696
(Pa. 2003).
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth provided him with the three-
page lab report documenting the testing performed at NMS Labs. However,
the expert witness testified that he reviewed data not listed within the three-
page report in order to render his testimony. Appellant’s Br. at 25. Appellant
argues that the undisclosed reports could have proved his innocence given
that errors occurred during testing.
Id.
- 10 -
J-A21031-25
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573 requires the
Commonwealth to turn over the results of expert opinions in its possession or
control. Specifically, Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(e) reads:
(1) Mandatory. In all court cases, on request by the defendant,
and subject to any protective order which the Commonwealth
might obtain under this rule, the Commonwealth shall disclose to
the defendant's attorney all of the following requested items or
information, provided they are material to the instant case. The
Commonwealth shall, when applicable, permit the defendant’s
attorney to inspect and copy or photograph such items.
....
(e) any results or reports of scientific tests, expert opinions,
and written or recorded reports of polygraph examinations or
other physical or mental examinations of the defendant that are
within the possession or control of the attorney for the
Commonwealth[.]
Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(e). If the police possess evidence that is favorable to
the defense, then the Commonwealth is deemed to be responsible for its
disclosure even if it is solely in the possession of the police. See
Commonwealth v. Lambert,
884 A.2d 848, 853
(Pa. 2005) (quoting Brady,
373 U.S. at 87
). Additionally, Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(D) provides that both parties
have a continuing duty to disclose evidence that is requested prior to trial that
is subject to disclosure.
In the instant case, Appellant requested discovery, including any expert
information and reports. The Commonwealth provided discovery materials
that included the complete report it received from NMS Labs. However,
Appellant did not receive the raw data upon which the lab report was based.
The Commonwealth asserts that it was never in possession of the raw data;
- 11 -
J-A21031-25
indeed, Mr. Lamb testified that it is not lab policy to include the raw testing
data in the report, although it may be requested from the lab.
The Commonwealth did not request the raw data from the lab, and
Appellant did not request the raw data from the Commonwealth or from the
lab. NMS Labs, Inc. is an independent laboratory and not a government
agency, Tr. Ct. Op., at 12, so it cannot be arguably considered “the state” or
“the police” for purposes of Brady. NMS Labs accepts samples from various
agencies, medical examiners, police departments, doctors, and defense
attorneys. N.T., 4/22/24, at 11. Appellant was entitled to file a motion
compelling the Commonwealth to obtain and release the raw testing data
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(e), but he did not. He states in his brief
that if he was given this data, he could have employed his own expert to
examine and interpret the data. Appellant’s Br. at 26. However, he had the
right to subpoena NMS labs directly, but he did not do so. Accordingly, because
Appellant failed to act with due diligence to uncover this data to which he had
equal access, no Brady violation occurred.
To be sure, we also note that Appellant did not establish that the raw
data contained exculpatory material, nor does he submit that it contained
information contrary to the result that Appellant’s blood contained THC. He
does not assert that the raw data could have led to the conclusion that there
was no concentration of THC in his blood, rather, he asserts that he could have
had an expert examine any inconsistencies which he describes as “potentially
- 12 -
J-A21031-25
exculpatory.” This falls short of the requirements to prove a Brady violation.
This claim fails.
Appellant’s final issue is that Mr. Lamb’s testimony violated the
confrontation clause because he was not the analyst who performed the test
on Appellant’s blood sample. Appellant contends that admitting the lab report
without permitting him to cross-examine the analyst who performed the
testing violated his right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, and Smith v. Arizona,
602 U.S. 779
(2024).
Initially, we note that Appellant did not object at trial to the introduction of Mr.
Lamb’s lab report or his testimony, and thus any hearsay argument is waived
on appeal. However, we elect to analyze the report to illustrate the conclusion
that the Confrontation Clause is not implicated in light of the Smith decision
from the United States Supreme Court.
“The issue of whether a defendant was denied his right to confront a
witness under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is a question
of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary.” Commonwealth v. Milburn,
72 A.3d 617, 618
(Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the United States
Supreme Court has explained that
[t]he Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a
criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him.
The Clause bars the admission at trial of “testimonial statements”
of an absent witness unless she is “unavailable to testify, and the
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J-A21031-25
defendant ha[s] had a prior opportunity” to cross-examine her.
Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 53-54
,
124 S. Ct. 1354
,
158 L. Ed. 2d 177
(2004). And that prohibition applies in full to
forensic evidence. So a prosecutor cannot introduce an absent
laboratory analyst’s testimonial out-of-court statements to prove
the results of forensic testing. See Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 305, 307, 329
,
129 S. Ct. 2527
,
174
L. Ed. 2d 314
(2009).
Smith v. Arizona,
602 U.S. 779, 783
(2024).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has opined that a toxicology report
obtained by police in determining whether a suspect was DUI is testimonial
and subject to the Confrontation Clause when “the report was made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial and was plainly
created for an evidentiary purpose.” Commonwealth v. Yohe,
79 A.3d 520,
537
(Pa. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Yohe
Court determined which analyst must testify in order to satisfy a defendant’s
right to confront the witnesses against him.
In Yohe, after police stopped Yohe for inoperable license
plate and brake lights, the officer observed signs of intoxication.
See
id. at 523
. The officer requested and obtained a blood sample
and sent that sample to NMS Labs for analysis. See
id.
At NMS
Labs, an employee confirmed the seal was not broken, labeled the
sample, and placed it in a secured bin. See
id.
Another employee
then retrieved the sample, removed a portion of blood (called an
aliquot), returned the sample to storage, and tested the aliquot
for alcohol content. See
id.
This first test was completed using
enzymatic assay. See
id.
A third employee conducted two more
tests with the sample by removing two new aliquots from the
sample and testing those aliquots using gas chromatography. See
id.
Finally, a fourth employee, Dr. Lee Blum, received all data from
the three prior employees, examined the results of the three tests,
confirmed the chain of custody, and authored a report indicating
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J-A21031-25
what Yohe’s BAC was at the time the blood sample was drawn.
See
id. at 523-24
. Despite Yohe’s objections, Dr. Blum’s report
was the report utilized at trial to convict Yohe. See
id. at 524
.25.
After reviewing in detail the U.S. Supreme Court decisions
in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 305
(2009),
Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
564 U.S. 647
(2011), and Williams
v. Illinois,
567 U.S. 50
(2012), our Supreme Court parsed out
who of the four employees were required to testify to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause. The Yohe Court found that Dr. Blum was
the analyst that must testify to satisfy the Confrontation Clause[.]
Commonwealth v. Jackson, No. 1788 MDA 2024,
2025 Pa. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 2399
, at *8-9 (Sep. 12, 2025).1 The Court reasoned that Dr. Blum was
the analyst who legitimately determined the appellant’s BAC because:
According to Dr. Blum’s trial testimony, he reviewed the case
folder, verified the chain of custody information and examined the
personal identification information. Additionally, he checked the
testing that was performed and the data that resulted, evaluated
the analytical data from the duplicate gas chromatography and
the enzymatic assay, compared the results of the two gas
chromatography tests, compared the result of the enzymatic
assay test to the two gas chromatography tests, ensured that
these numbers supported each other, and reported the lowest of
the two gas chromatography test results as Appellant’s BAC.
Yohe,
79 A.3d at 539-40
.
Nearly the same facts are present in the instant case: Mr. Lamb testified
that after another analyst tested Appellant’s blood sample, Mr. Lamb ensured
compliance with chain of custody procedures, reviewed the underlying raw
____________________________________________
1 We note that, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), unpublished non-precedential
decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their
persuasive value. We find guidance in the unpublished memorandum cited
supra and find it to be instructive in this matter.
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J-A21031-25
data, checked for any errors, compared the results of the original testing with
the results of the re-test, determined that the numbers were “within precision”
under certain criteria which he specified, and made an independent conclusion
to report the lower of the two numbers based on the data. N.T., 4/22/24, at
12, 18-24.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court decided a case involving an
expert analyst who provided testimony based on reports and notes prepared
by another lab analyst who was absent from trial. See
Smith, supra.
Our
research has revealed only two Pennsylvania cases addressing this decision.
In Smith, the Court addressed the application of Confrontation Clause
“principles to a case in which an expert witness restate[d] an absent lab
analyst’s factual assertions to support his own opinion testimony.” Smith v.
Arizona,
602 U.S. 779, 783
(2024). Appellant relies heavily on Smith to
support his argument that Mr. Lamb’s testimony regarding the toxicology
report violated his Confrontation Clause rights. There the Court stated:
To implicate the Confrontation Clause, a statement must be
hearsay (“for the truth”) and it must be testimonial—and those
two issues are separate from each other. The latter, this Court has
stated, focuses on the “primary purpose” of the statement, and in
particular on how it relates to a future criminal proceeding. A court
must therefore identify the out-of-court statement introduced,
and must determine, given all the “relevant circumstances,” the
principal reason it was made.
Id. at 800-01
(internal citation omitted).
Hearsay is an “out-of-court statement[] offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.”
Id. at 785
. Here, the declarant, Mr. Lamb, authored and
- 16 -
J-A21031-25
signed the lab report on which he based his opinions. Under Yohe, Mr. Lamb
was the proper analyst to testify to the results of the toxicology report, and
his report was not an out-of-court statement. Contrarily, in Smith, one analyst
conducted the lab tests on the appellant’s blood, documented her notes, typed
the lab report, arrived at a conclusion, and signed the document. That analyst
was no longer employed at the lab at the time of the appellant’s trial, so the
prosecution removed her name from the witness list and added a substitute
analyst from the same lab who had no prior connection to the case. The
substitute expert testified to the first analyst’s conclusion using her report.
Id.
at 790
. These cases are factually distinguishable as the report used there was
hearsay and the report used here was not hearsay. Accordingly, Appellant’s
reliance on Smith is misplaced. We affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/07/2025
- 17 -Case Information
- Court
- Pa. Super. Ct.
- Decision Date
- October 7, 2025
- Status
- Precedential