Com. v. Eaddy, A.

Pa. Super. Ct.2/26/2025
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J-S31005-24


 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 AUSTIN EADDY                            :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :     No. 738 EDA 2024

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 7, 2024
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-15-CR-0001537-2016


BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                        FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2025

      Austin Eaddy appeals from the order that dismissed his petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm in part, vacate

in part, and remand for further proceedings.

      Appellant is serving a sentence of four to ten years of imprisonment for

convictions of attempted rape and indecent assault. We summarized the facts

and procedure of the case as follows on his direct appeal, and reproduce it

here at length due to their relevance to the issues we address infra:

      The Commonwealth alleged Appellant took the complainant’s
      phone and sexually assaulted her in a parking garage at West
      Chester University. Appellant and the complainant were both
      students at the university, but did not know each other before the
      incident in question. Appellant and the complainant admitted
      drinking alcohol at separate parties before meeting.

      Surveillance video showed Appellant and the complainant meeting
      on the street at approximately 2:00 a.m. on April 1, 2016. They
      walked across campus together and eventually entered a parking
J-S31005-24


     garage through a window in the concrete wall. Once inside the
     parking garage, the complainant handed Appellant a phone, and
     [he] put the phone in his pocket. Shortly thereafter, Appellant
     and the complainant embraced near a set of garage doors, which
     were closed at the time. The video showed the two apparently
     embracing, kissing, and engaging in other intimacies by the
     garage doors. Appellant and the complainant then walked from
     the garage doors to a space between two parked cars. As
     discussed below, Appellant and the complainant provided different
     accounts of what happened between the two cars.

     An independent witness, Catherine Doherty, entered the parking
     garage. She could not recall where she parked and was pressing
     the button on her key fob. She then heard a distressed female
     voice asking for her phone. According to Ms. Doherty, she saw
     Appellant standing in front of the complainant. The complainant
     was on her back on top of the hood of a car, and the complainant’s
     pants were down. When Ms. Doherty asked what was going on,
     Appellant stated, “Oh shit,” and ran. The complainant left in a
     different direction than Appellant and was crying and pulling up
     her pants. Ms. Doherty initially pursued Appellant, but [he] exited
     the parking garage through the window in the concrete wall.

     Ms. Doherty then caught up with the complainant. Ms. Doherty
     did not know the complainant before the incident, but learned that
     they both lived in the same residence hall. Ms. Doherty walked
     with the complainant to the residence hall and opened the door
     for her. A security guard noticed that the complainant’s knee was
     bleeding and called West Chester University police. Although the
     complainant initially stated that she wanted to go to her room,
     [she] then told the guard she was sexually assaulted.

     Officer Matthew Rychlak responded to the dispatch based on the
     security guard’s initial call. As the officer was parking his car by
     the residence hall, he received an update that the complainant
     also reported a sexual assault. The officer entered the residence
     hall and initially attempted to interview the complainant in a
     common room of the residence hall. However, he then had Ms.
     Doherty enter the room and interviewed the complainant with Ms.
     Doherty present. The officer indicated that the complainant
     appeared more comfortable with Ms. Doherty present.

     During this interview, the complainant told the officer she was
     sexually assaulted. [She] initially reported she was in the parking

                                    -2-
J-S31005-24


     garage when a black male approached her and forced her to
     engage in oral and vaginal intercourse.

     An ambulance took the complainant to a hospital where she
     underwent a sexual assault examination.            Ms. Doherty
     accompanied [her] to the hospital. A blood test revealed that the
     complainant’s blood-alcohol concentration was over .20%. The
     sexual assault examination did not detect the presence of
     Appellant’s DNA on the complainant. Officer Rychlak separately
     interviewed Ms. Doherty at the hospital, and she told the officer
     that she witnessed a rape.

           ....

     Appellant, who had left the campus sometime after the incident,
     was taken into custody on April 6, 2016. The Commonwealth
     subsequently filed an information charging Appellant with rape,
     attempted rape, indecent assault, and theft, among other
     offenses.

     Appellant retained counsel and submitted numerous pretrial
     motions seeking discovery and the admission of evidence
     regarding the complainant . . . and Ms. Doherty. On June 12,
     2017, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to preclude
     Appellant from referring to . . . the complainant’s prior sexual
     conduct, including her text messages to third parties . . . and
     [also] Ms. Doherty’s previous sexual assault.

     On June 19, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the
     Commonwealth’s motion in limine. The trial court heard [the]
     parties’ general arguments discussing the bases of the motion in
     general terms. . . . The trial court scheduled an in camera
     conference, with a court reporter present, for June 23, 2017, to
     hear arguments based on more specific facts.

     On July 10, 2017, the trial court entered an order granting the
     Commonwealth’s motion in limine. The trial court, in a footnote
     to its order, reasoned that (1) the Rape Shield Law, 18 Pa.C.S.
     § 3104, precluded Appellant from presenting the complainant’s
     text messages regarding her “sexual proclivities,” . . . and (3) the
     evidence of a previous sexual assault against Ms. Doherty w[as]
     irrelevant and any relevant purpose would be outweighed by the
     potential for prejudice. The docket and record contained no
     indication that the trial court held a formal in camera hearing.

                                    -3-
J-S31005-24


     However, the trial court later referred to “off the record” proffers
     made by Appellant.

           ....

     At trial, the complainant testified that she had been drinking at
     several parties before she met Appellant. [She] stated she could
     not recall the events after the last party that she attended.
     Specifically, the complainant testified that she did not remember
     meeting Appellant on the street, walking with him to the parking
     garage, or entering the parking garage. She could not explain
     why she appeared to hand Appellant a phone after they entered
     the garage. She also could not remember her interactions with
     Appellant while they were by the garage doors.

     According to the complainant, she first recalled being with
     Appellant when they were between the two cars in the parking lot
     and Appellant told her “to suck his dick.” Appellant pushed her
     head down, and when she tried to stop, Appellant pushed her
     aside and choked her. [She] testified that Appellant had his penis
     in her mouth. Appellant eventually made her get up and get face
     down on the hood of the car. [She] could not remember how
     Appellant had her phone, but recalled asking him to give back her
     phone. Appellant did not return her phone. Instead, she felt
     Appellant’s penis at her “butt.” [She] then heard a female, Ms.
     Doherty, call out. The complainant pulled up her pants and left.

     The complainant verified that her phone was later found outside
     the garage. However, when the phone was returned to her, the
     screen was shattered. She testified that the screen of the phone
     was not damaged when she last remembered using the phone.

     On cross-examination, the complainant acknowledged that she
     was convicted for having a false identification several months after
     the incident in the parking garage. [She] testified that she was
     interested in education and became an education major after the
     incident. She conceded that certain convictions or reports of
     misbehavior, such as indecently exposing herself, could disqualify
     her from becoming a teacher.

     [Ms. Doherty testified as to the facts outlined above. During
     cross-examination, she conceded that she was not certain that
     she saw a rape but assumed so because Appellant ran away, that
     the only thing she heard the complainant say to Appellant was to

                                    -4-
J-S31005-24


     ask for her phone back, and that when she elected to chase
     Appellant when he fled, she did not trigger any of the available
     emergency call boxes.]

     Appellant also testified at trial. [He] admitted that he was with
     the complainant before the incident in question. According to
     Appellant, he and the complainant met on the street, and they
     engaged in small talk while walking together across campus. Once
     they were outside the parking garage, he and the complainant
     began kissing and groping each other. Appellant testified that
     [she] suggested they “hang out” without worrying about a
     relationship. They then climbed into the parking garage though
     the window in the concrete wall.

     Appellant testified that while they were inside the parking garage,
     the complainant asked him to hold her phone because it would not
     fit in the pockets of her shorts. [She] then handed him her phone,
     which he placed in his pocket. Appellant stated that he and the
     complainant began kissing while they were by the garage door.
     [She] pulled her top down to show him her pierced nipple.
     According to Appellant, he and the complainant agreed to “hook
     up,” which Appellant believed meant having sexual intercourse.
     Throughout his testimony, Appellant suggested that the
     complainant took the initiative throughout the incident. Appellant
     further indicated that [she] pointed in the direction of the two cars
     and suggested they move to that area.

     Appellant testified that while he and the complainant were
     between the two cars, Ms. Doherty interrupted them just as the
     complainant started to pull down her shorts. Appellant asserted
     that he and the complainant were both standing, and he was fully
     clothed, standing behind the complainant. Appellant denied
     choking or striking the complainant or otherwise forcing her to
     perform any sexual act. Appellant also denied that any sexual
     intercourse occurred during the incident.

     Appellant testified that he and the complainant agreed to part
     ways when they saw yellow lights flashing from a car. He fled
     when he sensed someone approaching him. As he was exiting the
     parking garage, he heard the complainant yell out for her phone
     and state that he stole her phone. Once outside, Appellant
     dropped the complainant’s phone in the grass by the parking
     garage.


                                     -5-
J-S31005-24


     In his arguments to the jury, Appellant asserted that the
     complainant was a willing participant in their interactions and
     voluntarily handed him her phone for him to hold as they reached
     the garage door.         Appellant challenged the complainant’s
     credibility and her claims that he assaulted her.        Appellant
     specifically referred to the surveillance video and the absence of
     any evidence that he left DNA on [her].

     Appellant also emphasized that Ms. Doherty was the first person
     to use the term “rape.” He argued that Ms. Doherty misconstrued
     the incident and only assumed that she saw “a rape.” Appellant
     suggested that Ms. Doherty’s misunderstanding tainted the
     complainant’s recollection of events, as well as the police
     investigation.    Further, Appellant asserted that the police
     investigation into the reported sexual assault was deficient and
     that the police failed to corroborate all of the complainant’s
     allegations before filing criminal charges.

     The Commonwealth, in its argument to the jury, conceded that
     the initial interactions between complainant and Appellant were
     consensual. The Commonwealth asserted that the nature of the
     interaction changed when Appellant lowered his pants and
     exposed his penis, shortly before Appellant and the complainant
     moved to the area between two cars. The Commonwealth argued
     that once Appellant and the complainant moved between the two
     cars, he compelled her to engage in sexual intercourse.

     As to the complainant’s phone, the Commonwealth acknowledged
     that the surveillance video showed [her] handing Appellant a
     phone as they reached the garage doors. The Commonwealth
     argued that the phone seen on the surveillance video was
     Appellant’s phone and not the complainant’s.     Further, the
     Commonwealth argued that Appellant, at some time before
     assaulting the complainant between the two cars, took [her]
     phone to prevent her from calling for help.

     At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of two
     counts of attempted rape and one count of indecent assault—
     without consent. The jury acquitted [him] of nine other sexual
     offenses and the one count of theft related to the complainant’s
     phone.

     On October 25, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four
     to ten years’ imprisonment. The trial court determined that

                                   -6-
J-S31005-24


       Appellant was not a sexually violent predator and ordered him to
       register as a tier-three sexual offender. The trial court ordered
       restitution in the amount of $582.99 to replace the complainant’s
       phone.

Commonwealth v. Eaddy (“Eaddy I”), 222 A.3d 838, 2019 WL 5268638,

at *1-5 (Pa.Super. 2019) (non-precedential decision) (cleaned up).

       On appeal, we affirmed the judgment of sentence in all respects but for

the restitution component.1 Id. at *14. Since Appellant did not file a petition

for allowance of appeal in our Supreme Court, his judgment of sentence

became final on November 18, 2019.               See Commonwealth v. Eaddy

(“Eaddy II”), 309 A.3d 1057, 2023 WL 8052158, at *2 (Pa.Super. 2023)

(non-precedential decision).

       Appellant retained PCRA counsel, who filed a petition in September 2021

which the PCRA court dismissed as untimely.          On appeal, we affirmed the

dismissal but concluded that Appellant had the right to file a second PCRA

petition alleging the newly-discovered-fact exception to the PCRA’s one-year

time bar pursuant to Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123, 1132

(Pa. 2018) (holding that the untimely filing of a PCRA petition constitutes per


____________________________________________


1 As will be pertinent to our discussion, one of the issues Appellant raised on

direct appeal was whether the trial court erred “by excluding from the trial
record as irrelevant, any reference that [Ms. Doherty] . . . previously
approached police about having been raped in the vicinity of campus, at an
earlier point during the academic year.” Eaddy I, 2019 WL 5268638, at *5.
Among our reasons for rejecting Appellant’s challenge was our discerning “no
abuse of discretion in the trial courts balancing of the possibility of confusing
the jury against the relevance of Appellant’s proffer and [his] right to confront
Ms. Doherty.” Id. at *12.

                                           -7-
J-S31005-24


se ineffective assistance of counsel and is a fact capable of satisfying 42

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)).2 See Eaddy II, 2023 WL 8052158, at *5.

       Appellant promptly filed his second PCRA petition on April 8, 2022,

asserting the § 9545(b)(1)(ii) timeliness exception, stating claims challenging

the effectiveness of trial, direct appeal, and PCRA counsel. The PCRA court

concluded that Appellant successfully surmounted the PCRA’s time bar, and

that PCRA counsel was ineffective per se, but nonetheless issued Pa.R.Crim.P.

907 notice of intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing because his

challenges to trial and direct appeal counsel’s performance lacked merit. See

Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 1/17/24, at unnumbered 2-6 n.1. Unpersuaded

by Appellant’s response to the notice, the PCRA court dismissed his petition

by order entered February 7, 2024.

       This timely appeal followed. The PCRA court directed Appellant to file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and he timely complied.          The PCRA court

thereafter filed a memorandum pursuant to Rule 1925(a) specifying the

documents in the certified record that addressed Appellant’s claims of error.




____________________________________________


2 Appellant had sought a remand to challenge PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness

with the first PCRA proceeding in accordance with Commonwealth v.
Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021). See Eaddy II, 2023 WL 8052158, at *3.
Although we acknowledged that Bradley arguably allowed the requested
process, “for the sake of procedural transparency and simplicity,” we decided
that “the more appropriate pathway to addressing [Appellant’s] claims [wa]s
through a second petition to be addressed through the paradigm established
by Peterson.” Id. at *5.

                                           -8-
J-S31005-24


      Appellant posits that the PCRA court erred in dismissing the following

claims:

      1.    Direct appeal counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that
            evidence of [Ms.] Doherty’s prior sexual assault was
            admissible for the narrow and specific purpose of showing
            her perception bias.

      2.    Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to proffer that
            evidence of [the complainant’s] relationship with her
            boyfriend was admissible to demonstrate her motivation to
            lie.

      3.    Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the
            inadequate voir dire of a contaminated juror and in failing
            to request either the replacement of the contaminated juror
            or a mistrial

Appellant’s brief at 4 (reordered for ease of disposition).

      We begin with a review of the governing legal tenets. “In general, we

review an order dismissing or denying a PCRA petition as to whether the

findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and are free from legal

error.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 657 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(cleaned up). “It is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA court

erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157,

161 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).

      Appellant challenges the effectiveness of his trial and direct appeal

counsel. To prevail, he must establish:

      (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that
      counsel’s course of conduct was without a reasonable basis
      designed to effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) that he was
      prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness, i.e. there is a reasonable


                                      -9-
J-S31005-24


      probability that but for the act or omission in question the outcome
      of the proceeding would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Grayson, 212 A.3d 1047, 1054 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(cleaned up). This Court has elucidated these elements as follows:

      A claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if
      accurate, could establish cause for relief.

             ....
      When assessing whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his
      act or omission, the question is not whether there were other
      courses of action that counsel could have taken, but whether
      counsel’s decision had any basis reasonably designed to effectuate
      his client’s interest. This cannot be a hindsight evaluation of
      counsel’s performance, but requires an examination of whether
      counsel made an informed choice, which at the time the decision
      was made reasonably could have been considered to advance and
      protect the defendant’s interests. Our evaluation of counsel’s
      performance is highly deferential.

            ....

      To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is
      a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
      errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A
      reasonable probability is a probability that is sufficient to
      undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.

Commonwealth v. Evans, 303 A.3d 175, 182–83 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned

up). “The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will cause

the claim to fail.”    Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 595–96

(Pa.Super. 2021).

      Additionally, we note that a PCRA petitioner has no absolute right to a

hearing:

      The PCRA court has the discretion to dismiss a petition without a
      hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine

                                     - 10 -
J-S31005-24


      issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled
      to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose
      would be served by further proceedings. To obtain reversal of a
      PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an
      appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of fact which,
      if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that
      the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 604 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up).

      With these principles in mind, we turn to Appellant’s claims of error.

Appellant’s first two issues concern the failures of trial and direct appeal

counsel to properly vindicate his right to cross-examine Ms. Doherty and the

complainant, respectively. The arguable merit of these claims implicates the

following principles:

      The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment to the United
      States Constitution provides that all criminal defendants enjoy the
      right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
      Moreover, the exposure of a witness’[s] motivation in testifying is
      a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected
      right of cross-examination.

      Although the right of cross-examination is a fundamental right, it
      is not absolute. The trial court may place reasonable limits on
      defense counsel’s cross-examination of a prosecution witness
      based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,
      prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’[s] safety, or
      interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.
      Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an
      opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
      examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
      extent, the defense might wish.

Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077, 1087–88 (Pa.Super. 2016) (en

banc) (cleaned up).




                                     - 11 -
J-S31005-24


       Along these lines, our Rules of Evidence provide that “[t]he credibility

of a witness may be impeached by any evidence relevant to that issue, except

as otherwise provided by statute or these rules.” Pa.R.E. 607(b). Appellant’s

first two issues involve one such statute:       the Rape Shield Law.        That

enactment was designed “to prevent a trial from shifting its focus from the

culpability of the accused toward the virtue and chastity of the victim.

Moreover, the Rape Shield Law is intended to exclude irrelevant and abusive

inquiries regarding prior sexual conduct of sexual assault complainants.”

Commonwealth v. Jerdon, 229 A.3d 278, 285 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned

up).

       In that vein, the statute specifies:

       Evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim’s past sexual
       conduct, past sexual victimization, allegations of past sexual
       victimization, opinion evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual
       conduct, and reputation evidence of the alleged victim’s past
       sexual conduct shall not be admissible . . . except evidence of the
       alleged victim’s past sexual conduct with the defendant where
       consent of the alleged victim is at issue and such evidence is
       otherwise admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3104(a).

       This Court has explained that, “[a]lthough the literal language of the

Rape Shield Law would appear to bar a wide range of evidence, courts have

interpreted the statute to yield to certain constitutional considerations

implicating the rights of the accused.” Commonwealth v. K.S.F., 102 A.3d

480, 483 (Pa.Super. 2014). Pertinent to Appellant’s claims:




                                      - 12 -
J-S31005-24


      Evidence that tends to impeach a witness’[s] credibility is not
      necessarily inadmissible because of the Rape Shield Law. When
      determining the admissibility of evidence that the Rape Shield Law
      may bar, trial courts hold an in camera hearing and conduct a
      balancing test consisting of the following factors: (1) whether the
      proposed evidence is relevant to show bias or motive or to attack
      credibility; (2) whether the probative value of the evidence
      outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (3) whether there are
      alternative means of proving bias or motive or to challenge
      credibility.

Id. at 483-84 (cleaned up).

      Appellant first challenges the manner in which direct appeal counsel

argued that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that Ms. Doherty had

been a victim of sexual assault. By way of background, in its motion in limine,

the Commonwealth contended that evidence that Ms. Doherty had claimed to

be the victim of a sexual assault that she did not prosecute should be excluded

because it had no bearing on her ability to truthfully tell the jury what she

observed, and, even if relevant, was outweighed by unfair prejudice. On the

latter point, the Commonwealth expounded:

      First, there is something inherently inflammatory about discussing
      an unrelated “sex” case. It needlessly draws attention to a prior
      incident. Second, there is a clear risk that the jury will unfairly
      and unjustifiably discount [Ms.] Doherty’s testimony based on the
      stigma of her failure to prosecute. There are jurors who may infer
      that the reason [Ms.] Doherty chose not to report her own incident
      is that she was either lying or exaggerating. We would have to
      have a mini trial-within-a-trial to allow [her] to explain herself on
      an obviously collateral matter. For that reason, without the ability
      or the inclination to thoroughly go through the old case, the jury
      should not hear about it at all. If [Ms.] Doherty had indeed lied
      about a sexual assault in the past, perhaps it would be a different
      situation because that might go to her truth-telling ability. It is
      unfair and improper to quietly let the jury come to that conclusion
      by thrusting in front of them her failure to report. Therefore, [Ms.]

                                     - 13 -
J-S31005-24


      Doherty’s previous sexual assault has no bearing on whether or
      not [Appellant] sexually assault[ed the complainant]. Any inquiry
      into her experience as a survivor of sexual assault would only
      divert attention from the [Appellant’s] attack on the victim, which
      is the issue at trial.

Motion in Limine, 6/12/17, at 11-12 (cleaned up).

      Direct appeal counsel challenged the trial court’s ruling, asking this

Court to consider whether the court erred “by excluding from the trial record

as irrelevant, any reference that the eyewitness, who was the first person to

allege that a ‘rape’ occurred, previously approached police about having been

raped in the vicinity of campus, at an earlier point during the academic year.”

Eaddy I, 2019 WL 5268638, at *5 (quoting Appellant’s brief at 6-7). Counsel

argued “that Ms. Doherty misunderstood the situation in the parking

garage, tainted the complainant’s recollection of the incident, and

triggered the faulty police investigation into the complainant’s allegations of a

sexual assault.” Id. at *11 (emphases added).

      The trial court justified its ruling as follows:

      Following exhaustive research, the court is unable to locate any
      case law that opines upon the relevance of possible bias on the
      part of an eyewitness due to being a prior victim of a crime, not
      to mention the same crime as the accused. However, based upon
      the general rules of relevance, evidence of Ms. Doherty’s prior
      alleged assault and her failure to press charges is not relevant to
      the determination of this case . . . . The only possible relevance
      is an as-yet unsupported inference that Ms. Doherty’s prior
      experiences must have clouded her judgment in assessing what
      she saw in the garage that night. The details of Ms. Doherty’s
      prior incident, or whether or not she chose to prosecute the case,
      do not have a tendency to prove [Appellant]’s guilt or innocence
      in this case . . . . Assuming arguendo that Ms. Doherty’s prior
      alleged assault is relevant and creates a bias or motive to

                                      - 14 -
J-S31005-24


      fabricate, its probative value is outweighed by its danger of
      misleading the jury. Admitting evidence of the prior incident
      creates the risk of a trial within a trial, wherein Ms. Doherty’s
      conduct seven months prior to this incident becomes the focus of
      the jury’s attention.

Id. (cleaned up).

      This Court rejected Appellant’s challenge upon the following reasoning:

      [F]ollowing our review of the record, the trial court was entitled to
      find that Appellant’s proffer was irrelevant because Appellant only
      established that Ms. Doherty’s prior sexual assault allegation did
      not give rise to a prosecution. We also find no abuse of
      discretion in the trial court’s balancing of the possibility of
      confusing the jury against the relevance of Appellant’s
      proffer and [his] right to confront Ms. Doherty.

Id. at *12 (cleaned up, emphasis added).

      Appellant’s PCRA challenge posits that direct appeal counsel rendered

constitutionally-deficient performance by “failing to argue that evidence of

[Ms.] Doherty’s prior sexual assault was admissible for the narrow and specific

purpose of showing her perception bias.” Appellant’s brief at 34. He explains:

      While [A]ppellant does not contend that [Ms.] Doherty fabricated
      an elaborate lie to falsely accuse him, the eyewitness’s immediate
      assumption that a sexual assault had occurred and her
      subsequent access to the vulnerable, intoxicated complaining
      witness prior to any report being made warrants the admission of
      evidence that her perception could have been the result of
      internalized bias. In light of her own experience as a recent victim
      of sexual assault, she very likely could have been predisposed to
      interpret a fully consensual encounter as nonconsensual and it is
      a fair inference that her deep and immediate concern colored the
      inebriated complaining witness’s understanding of the situation.
      The fact that [Ms.] Doherty had recently experienced a campus
      sexual assault is relevant to and probative of her potential bias,
      and if asserted adequately, would have been admissible.




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J-S31005-24


Id. at 36-37.     Thus, Appellant insists, “properly formulated argument

challenging the trial court’s decision as to the admissibility of showing the

potential for eyewitness bias would have been meritorious at the direct appeal

stage.” Id. at 35.

      We disagree. First, the emphasized portions of this Court’s decision on

Appellant’s direct appeal indicate that counsel did argue that the excluded

evidence of Ms. Doherty’s own assault caused her to misunderstand the import

of what she saw and heard and thereafter taint the complainant’s recollection.

The trial court concluded that any probative value of the evidence toward that

end was outweighed by the danger of confusing the jury by shifting the focus

away from the events that Ms. Doherty witnessed and onto her own

experiences. This Court held that this balancing and resultant exclusion of the

evidence was within the trial court’s discretion. Hence, Appellant’s claim that

appellate counsel did not pursue the perception-bias angle is belied by the

record.

      Second, Appellant’s additional advocacy on the matter has not

convinced us that the exclusion of the evidence was erroneous.             The

Commonwealth did not offer Ms. Doherty to opine about whether she

witnessed a rape or other crime of sexual violence. It called her to relay to

the jury the concrete facts about what she saw and heard when she found

Appellant and the complainant in the parking garage.        Hearing that Ms.

Doherty herself had experienced a sexual assault would have had no bearing


                                    - 16 -
J-S31005-24


upon the jury’s assessment of whether she indeed saw the complainant on

the hood of a car before Appellant fled the scene.

      A review of the trial transcripts reveals that Ms. Doherty acknowledged

that she was “freaked out” when she encountered Appellant and the

complainant in the garage at 3:00 a.m. and only assumed the encounter was

non-consensual because Appellant jumped through a window and fled the

scene. She acknowledged that she did not witness any screams, struggle, or

other signs of violence, and only heard the complainant ask if she could have

her phone back. Additionally, Ms. Doherty testified that she did not tell the

complainant that the complainant had been raped.              Rather, when the

complainant went into a separate room to be interviewed by the police, a

police officer asked Ms. Doherty what she believed that she had seen, and she

said rape. See N.T. Trial, 7/10/17, at 261-66. Given these concessions about

the limited scope of what she witnessed, we conclude that there is no arguable

merit to Appellant’s claim that the trial court’s decision to exclude an additional

basis for Ms. Doherty to have merely assumed that she witnessed an assault.

Thus, Appellant’s first issue merits no relief.

      Appellant next argues that trial counsel ineffectively opposed the

Commonwealth’s motion to exclude, in accordance with the Rape Shield Law,

all evidence that the complainant had an existing sexual relationship with a

third party.   He maintains that text messages provided to the defense in

discovery revealed “that she was in a relationship, serious enough to


                                      - 17 -
J-S31005-24


constitute a significant, regular sexual partner” to whom she made “promises

of fidelity,” but counsel did not “adequately proffer [such] evidence . . . was

admissible as motivation to fabricate the nonconsensual characterization of

her encounter with [Appellant], in order to preserve her relationship.”

Appellant’s brief at 29, 32 n.2.   Citing Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227

(1988), for the proposition that preservation of a relationship provides a

motivation to lie about the consensual nature of the encounter with the

defendant, Appellant contends that trial counsel should have challenged the

Commonwealth’s motion by arguing that the Rape Shield Law may not be

utilized to exclude this “relevant evidence showing witness bias or attacking

credibility.” Appellant’s brief at 27 (cleaned up).

      Appellant further asserts that counsel lacked a reasonable basis for his

failure to invoke Olden, and that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to

properly advocate the admissibility of the text messages and other evidence

about complainant’s relationship status, highlighting that the trial court

indicated that it decided to exclude this evidence because counsel failed to

explain “how, if at all, this evidence would demonstrate the alleged victim’s

bias against [Appellant] or call into question her credibility.”    Id. at 29

(quoting Order, 7/10/17, at unnumbered 3).

      In Olden, the complainant, Starla Matthews, met the defendant at a

bar. She testified that, after she became intoxicated, Olden tricked her into

leaving with him and then raped her multiple times before, at her request,


                                     - 18 -
J-S31005-24


dropping her off at the home of Olden’s half-brother, Bill Russell.    Russell

“testified that on the evening in question he heard a noise outside his home

and, when he went out to investigate, saw Matthews get out of [the] car.

Matthews immediately told Russell that she had just been raped by [Olden].”

Olden, 488 U.S. at 228.      Olden, on the other hand, claimed Matthews

propositioned him at the bar, they had consensual sex there before leaving

for an ultimately unsuccessful search for cocaine, and, after additional

consensual sex, he dropped her off at Russell’s house. The High Court further

explained:

     Although Matthews and Russell were both married to and living
     with other people at the time of the incident, they were apparently
     involved in an extramarital relationship. By the time of trial the
     two were living together, having separated from their respective
     spouses.    [Olden’s] theory of the case was that Matthews
     concocted the rape story to protect her relationship with Russell,
     who would have grown suspicious upon seeing her disembark
     from [the] car. In order to demonstrate Matthews’[s] motive to
     lie, it was crucial, [Olden] contended, that he be allowed to
     introduce evidence of Matthews’[s] and Russell’s current
     cohabitation. Over [Olden’s] vehement objections, the trial court
     nonetheless granted the prosecutor’s motion in limine to keep all
     evidence of Matthews’[s] and Russell’s living arrangement from
     the jury. Moreover, when the defense attempted to cross-
     examine Matthews about her living arrangements, after she had
     claimed during direct examination that she was living with her
     mother, the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection.

Id. at 229–30.

     On appeal following his conviction, Olden asserted “that the trial court’s

refusal to allow him to impeach Matthews’[s] testimony by introducing




                                   - 19 -
J-S31005-24


evidence supporting a motive to lie deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right

to confront witnesses against him.” Id. at 230. The Supreme Court agreed:

      In the instant case, [Olden] has consistently asserted that he and
      Matthews engaged in consensual sexual acts and that Matthews—
      out of fear of jeopardizing her relationship with Russell—lied when
      she told Russell she had been raped and has continued to lie since.
      It is plain to us that a reasonable jury might have received a
      significantly different impression of the witness’[s] credibility had
      defense counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line of
      cross-examination.

Id.

      Here, the PCRA court deemed the circumstances of the case sub judice

to be more akin to those in Commonwealth v. Largaespada, 184 A.3d 1002

(Pa.Super. 2018). In that case, Largaespada was tried for sexually abusing

his daughter (“Victim”).   He sought to introduce the following evidence to

establish that Victim “had a motive to fabricate allegations of sexual abuse

against” him: “(1) Victim had an on-going sexual and monetary relationship

with her uncle; (2) Victim did not want Appellant to learn about the

relationship; and (3) Victim wanted to leave Appellant’s house so that Victim

could continue the relationship with her uncle.”      Id. at 1006.    This Court

affirmed the trial court’s refusal to admit the evidence, reasoning thusly:

      [T]he evidence of an extensive relationship between Victim and
      her uncle is just evidence of a relationship. The existence of a
      relationship alone is insufficient to infer a motive to fabricate.
      Even the fact that Victim did not want others to know about the
      relationship is insufficient to create a logical nexus that Victim
      would fabricate allegations about [Largaespada] to the police.

      This is true especially in light of the fact that [Largaespada] did
      not know about Victim’s relationship with her uncle at the time

                                     - 20 -
J-S31005-24


      Victim reported the sexual abuse to the police. If [Largaespada]
      knew about the relationship and tried to end it, maybe there could
      be some evidence from which to infer that Victim made allegations
      to retaliate against [Largaespada] and, thus, had a motive to lie.
      But, there was no evidence of [Largaespada] ever learning about,
      let alone trying to end, the relationship. To hold otherwise would
      eliminate the protections of the Rape Shield Law because we
      would allow the existence of any sexual relationship to be basis
      for inferring a motive to fabricate.

Id. at 1007–08.

      The PCRA court opined that Appellant was likewise asserting “that

evidence of the [complainant]’s relationship status, in and of itself, would

create a motive to fabricate a sexual assault, apparently in order to hide the

fact that she cheated on her partner.” Memorandum, 2/6/24, at unnumbered

3. It also stated that, “aside from [Appellant]’s claim in his petition, there is

no evidence of record that the [complainant] actually was in a relationship at

the time of this incident, aside from a passing reference to a classmate she

was attracted to around when this incident occurred.”        Id.    Therefore, it

rejected Appellant’s ineffectiveness challenge.

      We disagree with the PCRA court’s application of the law.        Appellant

does not allege that trial counsel had mere proof of the existence of a

relationship to offer as the basis for the complainant’s motive to lie. Rather,

he contends that counsel was aware of evidence that the complainant was in

a committed relationship in which she and her boyfriend pledged fidelity.

Whether that committed relationship involved sex need not have been

proffered to the jury in order to impeach the complainant.         Indeed, while


                                     - 21 -
J-S31005-24


Appellant argues that the romantic and sexual natures of the complainant’s

relationship with her boyfriend were admissible to impeach the complainant

despite the constraints of the Rape Shield Law, he also contends that, even if

the sexual conduct with her boyfriend must be excluded, “there was no

reasonable basis for trial counsel to fail to cross examine the complaining

witness regarding her relationship, without delving into her sexual conduct,

and argue that it gave her a motive to lie.”3 Appellant’s brief at 33.

       Here, the relevant consideration was whether the fact that she promised

not to have sex with anyone else was motivation for her to fabricate

allegations of rape when she was caught with Appellant, where “Appellant, the

complainant, the eyewitness, and the complainant’s boyfriend were students

at the same university, an environment where rumors and gossip abound and,

despite denying that she needed assistance, the complainant was followed out



____________________________________________


3 The Commonwealth suggests that Appellant waived the non-sexual aspect

of his claim by not raising it in his Rule 1925(b) statement.               See
Commonwealth’s brief at 37. Appellant’s statement included the assertion
that “[t]rial counsel was ineffective in failing to proffer appropriate grounds
supporting the admissibility of crucial impeachment evidence: that the
complaining witness was romantically and sexually involved with another
student thereby motivating her to mischaracterize her interactions with
[Appellant] as nonconsensual.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 3/18/24, at 2.
We deem this sufficient to include both the sexual and non-sexual aspects of
the claim of error, each of which he raised in the PCRA court. See
Memorandum of Law, 12/19/23, at 20-21 (asserting that the fact that the
complainant had a boyfriend did not implicate the Rape Shield Law and
suggested a motive to lie); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(v) (“Each error identified in
the Statement will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue that was raised
in the trial court[.]”).

                                          - 22 -
J-S31005-24


of the parking garage by the eyewitness who had inserted herself into the

situation.” Appellant’s brief at 12. Thus, a jury could, as in Olden, differently

assess the complainant’s credibility if it learned that a desire to preserve her

relationship provided a motive for her denial that the encounter was fully

consensual. Hence, we conclude that Appellant’s allegations, if substantiated

by evidence of the complainant’s commitment to another partner, have

arguable merit.

      Additionally, we conclude that Appellant’s averments satisfy the

remaining prongs of his claim.      Appellant alleged that counsel lacked a

reasonable basis for failing to advocate for the admissibility of the

impeachment evidence, and the certified record before us does not reflect that

counsel’s omission was a strategic choice.        Further, where Ms. Doherty

admitted that she merely assumed a rape was in progress, and the objective

video evidence supported Appellant’s defense of consent, the failure of counsel

to properly argue that the purportedly-available relationship evidence was

admissible to establish a motive to lie is sufficient “to undermine confidence

in the outcome of the proceeding.” Evans, 303 A.3d at 183 (cleaned up).

      For these reasons, we conclude that Appellant’s allegations make out a

prima facie case of ineffective assistance. Therefore, the court erred to the

extent that it rejected Appellant’s claim, without a hearing, based upon the

lack of record evidence.    Appellant alleged that he has concrete evidence,

supplied by the Commonwealth in discovery, to prove his allegations of the


                                     - 23 -
J-S31005-24


complainant’s relationship. That was sufficient to create a genuine issue of

fact to be resolved at a hearing. Accord Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154

A.3d 287, 307 (Pa. 2017) (remanding for a hearing “or fuller evidentiary

development” of a claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach key

witness with available evidence). See also Commonwealth v. Postie, 200

A.3d 1015, 1023 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc) (“Generally, an evidentiary

hearing on counsel’s strategy is preferred before the PCRA court decides if

counsel lacked a reasonable basis for his actions, except in those cases where

the reasons for counsel’s conduct are clear and apparent from the record.”).

      Therefore, we vacate the PCRA court’s order to the extent that it

dismissed Appellant’s claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to advocate

the relevancy of the complainant’s committed relationship with her boyfriend.

Upon remand, the PCRA court shall hold a hearing to allow Appellant to prove

the factual underpinnings of his claim, including counsel’s reasons for the

chosen course of action, and thereafter rule on his right to relief.

      Appellant’s final issue concerns trial counsel’s handling of a mid-trial

investigation into Appellant’s interactions with one of the jurors. The PCRA

court, relying on the trial court’s opinion for Appellant’s direct appeal,

explained the incident as follows:

      [Appellant] made a brief complimentary remark in passing to one
      of the jurors outside of the courtroom. When this issue was
      brought to the court’s attention, the juror was interviewed in
      chambers on the record in the presence of counsel. She confirmed
      that [Appellant] had had such contact with her, but denied that
      the incident would have any impact whatsoever on her impartiality

                                     - 24 -
J-S31005-24


     or her ability to continue to serve as a juror.    That chambers
     interview was recorded as follows:

     THE COURT:        We are now in my chambers with all three
     attorneys and Juror Number 4. Juror Number 4, one of my
     tipstaves just reported to me five minutes ago that you reported
     to her that on more than one occasion over the past couple of
     days, [Appellant] had or attempted to have some conversation
     with you at various locations in or around the Justice Center.

          Why don’t you tell us, ma’am, everything that you can recall
     about that with as much specificity as you can recall it, please.

     JUROR FOUR:       Yes. The first encounter I was in the elevator, I
     believe it was Tuesday, just more or less I had a Starbucks cup in
     my hand and just a general, I think, comment that the time [sic].
     I really didn’t think much of it. Oh, I should have gotten
     Starbucks, that is like really good, just works for me, as I was
     holding it.

     THE COURT:        Do you remember what time of the day?

     JUROR FOUR:       After lunch just as we were coming back from
     lunch. And then yesterday morning, in the hallway out, here I
     had gotten tied up in the garage because I couldn’t get through,
     I was running a little bit late. I was kind of in a bustle down the
     hallway. He said good morning to me.

     THE COURT:        Go ahead.

     JUROR FOUR:      And then today it was, good afternoon, Miss, on
     the street by New Haven’s Pizza.

     THE COURT:       What if any response, verbal, nonverbal or
     otherwise, did you give - did you make when he made those
     comments -

     JUROR FOUR:       Nothing.

     THE COURT:        - or remarks to you?

     JUROR FOUR:       Nothing. I just kept looking straight ahead.




                                   - 25 -
J-S31005-24


     THE COURT:        You certainly have done the right thing of
     bringing this to my tipstaff’s attention and to my attention.

           Do you believe that what you just described to me in any
     way influences your ability to continue to sit as a juror in this case?

     JUROR FOUR:        No.

     THE COURT:        It doesn’t make you less favorably inclined to
     the [Appellant] or his legal position in this case?

     JUROR FOUR:        It makes no difference.

     THE COURT:         Doesn’t make you more favorably inclined to his
     position in this case?

     JUROR FOUR:        No.

     THE COURT:         Does it change your view with regard to the
     Commonwealth or the Commonwealth’s presentation of evidence
     thus far in this case?

     JUROR FOUR:        No.

     THE COURT:       Given what you just told us, do you personally
     feel able and comfortable continuing to sit as Juror Number 4 in
     this trial?

     JUROR FOUR:        Yes.

     THE COURT:       Any questions from counsel? Hang on. Why
     don’t you step outside to my secretary’s area and I’ll come out
     shortly.

     JUROR FOUR:        Okay. Sure.

     THE COURT:         What’s you [sic] question?

     [DEFENSE COUSEL]:       If he was with anyone else and if she’s
     relayed this to anyone else? Was he alone or was he with -

     [THE COMMONWEALTH]:          Whether [Appellant] was alone or
     whether the juror was alone?


                                     - 26 -
J-S31005-24


       [DEFENSE COUSEL]:           Whether [Appellant] was alone when he
       said this.

       THE COURT:         I am satisfied with her bottom line that
       whatever it was that happened she felt duty bound and properly
       so to report it, but that it’s not had any impact upon her, is the
       way I firmly took her assessment to be.

       [DEFENSE COUSEL]:           Okay.

       THE COURT:           All right. Thanks.

Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 1/17/24, at unnumbered 3-5 n.1 (cleaned up).

Counsel did not offer further protest to the court’s conclusion of the

investigation and decision to allow the jury to remain on the panel.

       Appellant, relying heavily upon decisions by the federal district courts, 4

contends that trial counsel failed to enforce Appellant’s due process rights by

(1) not objecting to the court’s refusal to allow further questioning of the juror,

(2) not asking Appellant about the alleged interactions, (3) not finding out

whether anyone witnessed them, and (4) not requesting “any remedial

measures to combat the effects of a biased juror, such as an instruction not

to discuss the encounters with other jurors, the replacement of the

contaminated juror with an alternate, or a mistrial.” Appellant’s brief at 24.

Appellant alleges that he has shown a “potential for extreme prejudice under


____________________________________________


4 Appellant also cites a 2014 unpublished memorandum of this Court.        See
Appellant’s brief at 22. Since this violates § 65.37 of the Superior Court
Internal Operating Procedures, we do not consider that decision. See 210 Pa.
Code § 65.37(B) (providing, with exceptions not applicable here, that “[a]n
unpublished memorandum decision filed prior to May 2, 2019, shall not be
relied upon or cited by a Court or a party in any other action or proceeding”).

                                           - 27 -
J-S31005-24


these circumstances,” and further suggests that prejudice should be

presumed. Id. at 25 (citing Commonwealth v. Stewart, 295 A.2d 303 (Pa.

1972)).

      The PCRA court concluded that Appellant’s challenge was premised

“upon several critical assumptions without a basis in fact,” namely “that the

juror’s answers to [the trial court’s] questions were false, and [the court]

erroneously determined that the juror was not tainted.”          Memorandum,

2/6/24, at unnumbered 1. The court observed that, on the contrary, Appellant

had “no basis whatsoever to argue that, somehow, the juror was not being

truthful when she candidly and clearly stated that any out-of-court contact

with [him] would not impact her continued service as a juror.” Id. Since the

trial court held a hearing to determine whether the juror was capable of being

impartial, and found that she was truthful in so proclaiming, any further

pursuit of the matter by trial counsel would not have succeeded. Id.

      It is axiomatic that due process requires that a criminal defendant have

a fair trial by an impartial jury whose verdict is based upon evidence developed

“in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant’s

right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.” Turner v. State

of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965). Stated differently, “[d]ue process

means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence

before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences

and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.” Smith


                                     - 28 -
J-S31005-24


v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).             However, “due process does not

require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially

compromising situation.” Id.

       While,    in   some    extreme      circumstances,   outside   influences   or

interactions with jurors have been deemed presumptively prejudicial, 5 courts

generally analyze “outside intrusions upon the jury for prejudicial impact.”

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 738 (1993) (considering whether the

presence of alternate jurors during deliberations prejudiced the defendant).

See also Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 (1966) (determining there

was prejudice where a bailiff stated that the defendant was “wicked” and

“guilty” and one juror who overheard the statements testified that they

prejudiced her during deliberations); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S.

227, 230 (1954) (remanding for hearing as to prejudice where a person told

the jury foreperson that he could profit from a defense verdict). Either way,

“a presumption of prejudice as opposed to a specific analysis does not change




____________________________________________


5 See, e.g., Turner, 379 U.S. at 473-74 (presuming prejudice where two
deputy sheriffs who were key witnesses for the prosecution were in continual
contact with the jurors during three days of sequestration as the deputies
drove them to and from court, ran errands for them, and conversed and ate
meals with them); Stewart, 295 A.2d at 304 (presuming prejudice in murder
trial where “the father of the victim of the killing . . . was on the panel of jurors
from which the trial jury had been selected, and had been in the same room
with the jurors who were hearing the case for as long as two and one-half
days”).

                                          - 29 -
J-S31005-24


the ultimate inquiry:   Did the intrusion affect the jury’s deliberations and

thereby its verdict?” Olano, 507 U.S. at 739.

      This inquiry is plainly dependent on the particular factual circumstances

of the case. Where the defendant’s allegations “satisfy the threshold showing

of potential prejudice,” they require “further investigation to determine

whether [the intrusion] . . . improperly brought to bear an outside influence

upon” the affected juror or jurors. See Commonwealth v. Jeter, 296 A.3d

1187, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2023) (holding trial court erred in denying evidentiary

hearing on the impact of a juror’s discussion of the case with her father during

deliberations). See also Commonwealth v. Martin, 348 A.2d 391, 403 (Pa.

1975) (affirming trial court’s denial of relief based upon outside influences

upon jurors where the trial court conducted a hearing and allowed defense

counsel to question the jurors).

      As detailed above, the trial court in the instant case conducted an inquiry

into the facts surrounding the juror’s allegation that Appellant improperly

interacted with her outside of the courtroom. However, the court denied the

request of Appellant’s counsel to ask whether anyone else witnessed the

interactions or if the juror told anyone else about them. Counsel did not object

to this denial, ask the court to question the rest of the jury, or request other

relief such as dismissal of the juror, a mistrial, or a curative instruction. See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 834 A.2d 619, 623-24 (Pa.Super. 2003)

(affirming denial of mistrial after the defendant threw water on the jury as it


                                     - 30 -
J-S31005-24


recessed for deliberations where the court provided extensive curative

instructions and “then polled each juror individually to determine whether he

or she could still render a fair and impartial verdict following Tejeda’s

outburst”). Since it appears that trial counsel did not take measures to ensure

Appellant’s due process rights as pronounced in the cases described above,

we agree with him that this ineffectiveness claim has arguable merit.

       Furthermore, because the PCRA court declined to have a hearing on the

claim, we are unable to assess whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his

decision not to push the issue, and whether Appellant was prejudiced by

counsel’s inaction.6        Appellant was on trial to determine whether he

acknowledged       and     respected    rules   forbidding    non-consensual      sexual

interactions. Juror Four’s allegations were that Appellant repeatedly failed to

honor rules prohibiting interaction with jurors outside of court. By informing

the juror that she did the right thing in reporting the incidents, the trial court

appeared to make a finding that Appellant had in fact acted improperly without

permitting Appellant to dispute the accuracy of the juror’s allegations.              If

Appellant    had    been    given    the   opportunity   to   show   that   the    juror



____________________________________________


6 Appellant proffered that counsel was likely to testify at a hearing that he
“was caught off guard by the juror’s allegations” and was unfamiliar with “the
legal standards regarding juror bias.” Appellant’s brief at 24. He further
maintains that he and other witnesses will testify that the juror did not actually
speak with Appellant, but rather with other people who were with him during
accidental encounters. Id. at 25.


                                           - 31 -
J-S31005-24


misapprehended or misstated the incidents in question, the outcome of the

court’s ruling as to the juror’s ability to proceed impartially may have been

different.7 Further, even if Juror Four were able to put aside the incidents in

deciding Appellant’s fate, further investigation may have revealed that she

had informed other jurors whose impartiality was tainted by a belief that

Appellant had refused to respect rules and boundaries established by the

court.

         Therefore, we also vacate the PCRA court’s order to the extent that it

dismissed Appellant’s challenge to counsel’s stewardship on this matter, and

remand for a hearing to allow Appellant to attempt to prove the reasonable

basis and prejudice prongs of his claim.           As for prejudice, the PCRA court

should consider, inter alia, whether its confidence in the outcome of the

proceeding is undermined by the evidence Appellant would have proffered had

trial counsel properly litigated the matter in the trial court.

         In sum, while we affirm the trial court’s order to the extent that it

dismissed his claim concerning direct appeal counsel’s argument for the

admissibility of Ms. Doherty’s prior assault, we vacate the order insofar as it

dismissed his claims regarding trial counsel’s handling of the issues concerning


____________________________________________


7 The Commonwealth cites as a basis for rejecting this claim the fact that
Appellant himself caused the inappropriate juror contact.                  See
Commonwealth’s brief at 23-24. However, Appellant’s position is that counsel
did not take the necessary actions to disprove that fact by producing evidence
that he did not do what Juror Four claimed he had done. Such evidence, if
credited, would tend to undermine her claim of impartiality.

                                          - 32 -
J-S31005-24


the complainant’s boyfriend and Juror Four’s allegations and remand for a

hearing on those issues.

     Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded for further

proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.




Date: 2/26/2025




                                    - 33 -


Case Information

Court
Pa. Super. Ct.
Decision Date
February 26, 2025
Status
Precedential