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J-S31005-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
AUSTIN EADDY :
:
Appellant : No. 738 EDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 7, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-15-CR-0001537-2016
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2025
Austin Eaddy appeals from the order that dismissed his petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (âPCRAâ). We affirm in part, vacate
in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Appellant is serving a sentence of four to ten years of imprisonment for
convictions of attempted rape and indecent assault. We summarized the facts
and procedure of the case as follows on his direct appeal, and reproduce it
here at length due to their relevance to the issues we address infra:
The Commonwealth alleged Appellant took the complainantâs
phone and sexually assaulted her in a parking garage at West
Chester University. Appellant and the complainant were both
students at the university, but did not know each other before the
incident in question. Appellant and the complainant admitted
drinking alcohol at separate parties before meeting.
Surveillance video showed Appellant and the complainant meeting
on the street at approximately 2:00 a.m. on April 1, 2016. They
walked across campus together and eventually entered a parking
J-S31005-24
garage through a window in the concrete wall. Once inside the
parking garage, the complainant handed Appellant a phone, and
[he] put the phone in his pocket. Shortly thereafter, Appellant
and the complainant embraced near a set of garage doors, which
were closed at the time. The video showed the two apparently
embracing, kissing, and engaging in other intimacies by the
garage doors. Appellant and the complainant then walked from
the garage doors to a space between two parked cars. As
discussed below, Appellant and the complainant provided different
accounts of what happened between the two cars.
An independent witness, Catherine Doherty, entered the parking
garage. She could not recall where she parked and was pressing
the button on her key fob. She then heard a distressed female
voice asking for her phone. According to Ms. Doherty, she saw
Appellant standing in front of the complainant. The complainant
was on her back on top of the hood of a car, and the complainantâs
pants were down. When Ms. Doherty asked what was going on,
Appellant stated, âOh shit,â and ran. The complainant left in a
different direction than Appellant and was crying and pulling up
her pants. Ms. Doherty initially pursued Appellant, but [he] exited
the parking garage through the window in the concrete wall.
Ms. Doherty then caught up with the complainant. Ms. Doherty
did not know the complainant before the incident, but learned that
they both lived in the same residence hall. Ms. Doherty walked
with the complainant to the residence hall and opened the door
for her. A security guard noticed that the complainantâs knee was
bleeding and called West Chester University police. Although the
complainant initially stated that she wanted to go to her room,
[she] then told the guard she was sexually assaulted.
Officer Matthew Rychlak responded to the dispatch based on the
security guardâs initial call. As the officer was parking his car by
the residence hall, he received an update that the complainant
also reported a sexual assault. The officer entered the residence
hall and initially attempted to interview the complainant in a
common room of the residence hall. However, he then had Ms.
Doherty enter the room and interviewed the complainant with Ms.
Doherty present. The officer indicated that the complainant
appeared more comfortable with Ms. Doherty present.
During this interview, the complainant told the officer she was
sexually assaulted. [She] initially reported she was in the parking
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garage when a black male approached her and forced her to
engage in oral and vaginal intercourse.
An ambulance took the complainant to a hospital where she
underwent a sexual assault examination. Ms. Doherty
accompanied [her] to the hospital. A blood test revealed that the
complainantâs blood-alcohol concentration was over .20%. The
sexual assault examination did not detect the presence of
Appellantâs DNA on the complainant. Officer Rychlak separately
interviewed Ms. Doherty at the hospital, and she told the officer
that she witnessed a rape.
....
Appellant, who had left the campus sometime after the incident,
was taken into custody on April 6, 2016. The Commonwealth
subsequently filed an information charging Appellant with rape,
attempted rape, indecent assault, and theft, among other
offenses.
Appellant retained counsel and submitted numerous pretrial
motions seeking discovery and the admission of evidence
regarding the complainant . . . and Ms. Doherty. On June 12,
2017, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to preclude
Appellant from referring to . . . the complainantâs prior sexual
conduct, including her text messages to third parties . . . and
[also] Ms. Dohertyâs previous sexual assault.
On June 19, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the
Commonwealthâs motion in limine. The trial court heard [the]
partiesâ general arguments discussing the bases of the motion in
general terms. . . . The trial court scheduled an in camera
conference, with a court reporter present, for June 23, 2017, to
hear arguments based on more specific facts.
On July 10, 2017, the trial court entered an order granting the
Commonwealthâs motion in limine. The trial court, in a footnote
to its order, reasoned that (1) the Rape Shield Law, 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 3104, precluded Appellant from presenting the complainantâs
text messages regarding her âsexual proclivities,â . . . and (3) the
evidence of a previous sexual assault against Ms. Doherty w[as]
irrelevant and any relevant purpose would be outweighed by the
potential for prejudice. The docket and record contained no
indication that the trial court held a formal in camera hearing.
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However, the trial court later referred to âoff the recordâ proffers
made by Appellant.
....
At trial, the complainant testified that she had been drinking at
several parties before she met Appellant. [She] stated she could
not recall the events after the last party that she attended.
Specifically, the complainant testified that she did not remember
meeting Appellant on the street, walking with him to the parking
garage, or entering the parking garage. She could not explain
why she appeared to hand Appellant a phone after they entered
the garage. She also could not remember her interactions with
Appellant while they were by the garage doors.
According to the complainant, she first recalled being with
Appellant when they were between the two cars in the parking lot
and Appellant told her âto suck his dick.â Appellant pushed her
head down, and when she tried to stop, Appellant pushed her
aside and choked her. [She] testified that Appellant had his penis
in her mouth. Appellant eventually made her get up and get face
down on the hood of the car. [She] could not remember how
Appellant had her phone, but recalled asking him to give back her
phone. Appellant did not return her phone. Instead, she felt
Appellantâs penis at her âbutt.â [She] then heard a female, Ms.
Doherty, call out. The complainant pulled up her pants and left.
The complainant verified that her phone was later found outside
the garage. However, when the phone was returned to her, the
screen was shattered. She testified that the screen of the phone
was not damaged when she last remembered using the phone.
On cross-examination, the complainant acknowledged that she
was convicted for having a false identification several months after
the incident in the parking garage. [She] testified that she was
interested in education and became an education major after the
incident. She conceded that certain convictions or reports of
misbehavior, such as indecently exposing herself, could disqualify
her from becoming a teacher.
[Ms. Doherty testified as to the facts outlined above. During
cross-examination, she conceded that she was not certain that
she saw a rape but assumed so because Appellant ran away, that
the only thing she heard the complainant say to Appellant was to
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ask for her phone back, and that when she elected to chase
Appellant when he fled, she did not trigger any of the available
emergency call boxes.]
Appellant also testified at trial. [He] admitted that he was with
the complainant before the incident in question. According to
Appellant, he and the complainant met on the street, and they
engaged in small talk while walking together across campus. Once
they were outside the parking garage, he and the complainant
began kissing and groping each other. Appellant testified that
[she] suggested they âhang outâ without worrying about a
relationship. They then climbed into the parking garage though
the window in the concrete wall.
Appellant testified that while they were inside the parking garage,
the complainant asked him to hold her phone because it would not
fit in the pockets of her shorts. [She] then handed him her phone,
which he placed in his pocket. Appellant stated that he and the
complainant began kissing while they were by the garage door.
[She] pulled her top down to show him her pierced nipple.
According to Appellant, he and the complainant agreed to âhook
up,â which Appellant believed meant having sexual intercourse.
Throughout his testimony, Appellant suggested that the
complainant took the initiative throughout the incident. Appellant
further indicated that [she] pointed in the direction of the two cars
and suggested they move to that area.
Appellant testified that while he and the complainant were
between the two cars, Ms. Doherty interrupted them just as the
complainant started to pull down her shorts. Appellant asserted
that he and the complainant were both standing, and he was fully
clothed, standing behind the complainant. Appellant denied
choking or striking the complainant or otherwise forcing her to
perform any sexual act. Appellant also denied that any sexual
intercourse occurred during the incident.
Appellant testified that he and the complainant agreed to part
ways when they saw yellow lights flashing from a car. He fled
when he sensed someone approaching him. As he was exiting the
parking garage, he heard the complainant yell out for her phone
and state that he stole her phone. Once outside, Appellant
dropped the complainantâs phone in the grass by the parking
garage.
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In his arguments to the jury, Appellant asserted that the
complainant was a willing participant in their interactions and
voluntarily handed him her phone for him to hold as they reached
the garage door. Appellant challenged the complainantâs
credibility and her claims that he assaulted her. Appellant
specifically referred to the surveillance video and the absence of
any evidence that he left DNA on [her].
Appellant also emphasized that Ms. Doherty was the first person
to use the term ârape.â He argued that Ms. Doherty misconstrued
the incident and only assumed that she saw âa rape.â Appellant
suggested that Ms. Dohertyâs misunderstanding tainted the
complainantâs recollection of events, as well as the police
investigation. Further, Appellant asserted that the police
investigation into the reported sexual assault was deficient and
that the police failed to corroborate all of the complainantâs
allegations before filing criminal charges.
The Commonwealth, in its argument to the jury, conceded that
the initial interactions between complainant and Appellant were
consensual. The Commonwealth asserted that the nature of the
interaction changed when Appellant lowered his pants and
exposed his penis, shortly before Appellant and the complainant
moved to the area between two cars. The Commonwealth argued
that once Appellant and the complainant moved between the two
cars, he compelled her to engage in sexual intercourse.
As to the complainantâs phone, the Commonwealth acknowledged
that the surveillance video showed [her] handing Appellant a
phone as they reached the garage doors. The Commonwealth
argued that the phone seen on the surveillance video was
Appellantâs phone and not the complainantâs. Further, the
Commonwealth argued that Appellant, at some time before
assaulting the complainant between the two cars, took [her]
phone to prevent her from calling for help.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of two
counts of attempted rape and one count of indecent assaultâ
without consent. The jury acquitted [him] of nine other sexual
offenses and the one count of theft related to the complainantâs
phone.
On October 25, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four
to ten yearsâ imprisonment. The trial court determined that
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J-S31005-24
Appellant was not a sexually violent predator and ordered him to
register as a tier-three sexual offender. The trial court ordered
restitution in the amount of $582.99 to replace the complainantâs
phone.
Commonwealth v. Eaddy (âEaddy Iâ), 222 A.3d 838, 2019 WL 5268638,
at *1-5 (Pa.Super. 2019) (non-precedential decision) (cleaned up).
On appeal, we affirmed the judgment of sentence in all respects but for
the restitution component.1 Id. at *14. Since Appellant did not file a petition
for allowance of appeal in our Supreme Court, his judgment of sentence
became final on November 18, 2019. See Commonwealth v. Eaddy
(âEaddy IIâ), 309 A.3d 1057, 2023 WL 8052158, at *2 (Pa.Super. 2023)
(non-precedential decision).
Appellant retained PCRA counsel, who filed a petition in September 2021
which the PCRA court dismissed as untimely. On appeal, we affirmed the
dismissal but concluded that Appellant had the right to file a second PCRA
petition alleging the newly-discovered-fact exception to the PCRAâs one-year
time bar pursuant to Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123, 1132
(Pa. 2018) (holding that the untimely filing of a PCRA petition constitutes per
____________________________________________
1 As will be pertinent to our discussion, one of the issues Appellant raised on
direct appeal was whether the trial court erred âby excluding from the trial
record as irrelevant, any reference that [Ms. Doherty] . . . previously
approached police about having been raped in the vicinity of campus, at an
earlier point during the academic year.â Eaddy I, 2019 WL 5268638, at *5.
Among our reasons for rejecting Appellantâs challenge was our discerning âno
abuse of discretion in the trial courts balancing of the possibility of confusing
the jury against the relevance of Appellantâs proffer and [his] right to confront
Ms. Doherty.â Id. at *12.
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se ineffective assistance of counsel and is a fact capable of satisfying 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)).2 See Eaddy II, 2023 WL 8052158, at *5.
Appellant promptly filed his second PCRA petition on April 8, 2022,
asserting the § 9545(b)(1)(ii) timeliness exception, stating claims challenging
the effectiveness of trial, direct appeal, and PCRA counsel. The PCRA court
concluded that Appellant successfully surmounted the PCRAâs time bar, and
that PCRA counsel was ineffective per se, but nonetheless issued Pa.R.Crim.P.
907 notice of intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing because his
challenges to trial and direct appeal counselâs performance lacked merit. See
Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 1/17/24, at unnumbered 2-6 n.1. Unpersuaded
by Appellantâs response to the notice, the PCRA court dismissed his petition
by order entered February 7, 2024.
This timely appeal followed. The PCRA court directed Appellant to file a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and he timely complied. The PCRA court
thereafter filed a memorandum pursuant to Rule 1925(a) specifying the
documents in the certified record that addressed Appellantâs claims of error.
____________________________________________
2 Appellant had sought a remand to challenge PCRA counselâs ineffectiveness
with the first PCRA proceeding in accordance with Commonwealth v.
Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021). See Eaddy II, 2023 WL 8052158, at *3.
Although we acknowledged that Bradley arguably allowed the requested
process, âfor the sake of procedural transparency and simplicity,â we decided
that âthe more appropriate pathway to addressing [Appellantâs] claims [wa]s
through a second petition to be addressed through the paradigm established
by Peterson.â Id. at *5.
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Appellant posits that the PCRA court erred in dismissing the following
claims:
1. Direct appeal counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that
evidence of [Ms.] Dohertyâs prior sexual assault was
admissible for the narrow and specific purpose of showing
her perception bias.
2. Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to proffer that
evidence of [the complainantâs] relationship with her
boyfriend was admissible to demonstrate her motivation to
lie.
3. Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the
inadequate voir dire of a contaminated juror and in failing
to request either the replacement of the contaminated juror
or a mistrial
Appellantâs brief at 4 (reordered for ease of disposition).
We begin with a review of the governing legal tenets. âIn general, we
review an order dismissing or denying a PCRA petition as to whether the
findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and are free from legal
error.â Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 657 (Pa.Super. 2022)
(cleaned up). âIt is an appellantâs burden to persuade us that the PCRA court
erred and that relief is due.â Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157,
161 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).
Appellant challenges the effectiveness of his trial and direct appeal
counsel. To prevail, he must establish:
(1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that
counselâs course of conduct was without a reasonable basis
designed to effectuate his clientâs interest; and (3) that he was
prejudiced by counselâs ineffectiveness, i.e. there is a reasonable
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probability that but for the act or omission in question the outcome
of the proceeding would have been different.
Commonwealth v. Grayson, 212 A.3d 1047, 1054 (Pa.Super. 2019)
(cleaned up). This Court has elucidated these elements as follows:
A claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if
accurate, could establish cause for relief.
....
When assessing whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his
act or omission, the question is not whether there were other
courses of action that counsel could have taken, but whether
counselâs decision had any basis reasonably designed to effectuate
his clientâs interest. This cannot be a hindsight evaluation of
counselâs performance, but requires an examination of whether
counsel made an informed choice, which at the time the decision
was made reasonably could have been considered to advance and
protect the defendantâs interests. Our evaluation of counselâs
performance is highly deferential.
....
To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counselâs unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability that is sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.
Commonwealth v. Evans, 303 A.3d 175, 182â83 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned
up). âThe failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will cause
the claim to fail.â Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 595â96
(Pa.Super. 2021).
Additionally, we note that a PCRA petitioner has no absolute right to a
hearing:
The PCRA court has the discretion to dismiss a petition without a
hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine
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issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled
to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose
would be served by further proceedings. To obtain reversal of a
PCRA courtâs decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an
appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of fact which,
if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that
the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.
Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 604 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up).
With these principles in mind, we turn to Appellantâs claims of error.
Appellantâs first two issues concern the failures of trial and direct appeal
counsel to properly vindicate his right to cross-examine Ms. Doherty and the
complainant, respectively. The arguable merit of these claims implicates the
following principles:
The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that all criminal defendants enjoy the
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Moreover, the exposure of a witnessâ[s] motivation in testifying is
a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected
right of cross-examination.
Although the right of cross-examination is a fundamental right, it
is not absolute. The trial court may place reasonable limits on
defense counselâs cross-examination of a prosecution witness
based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witnessâ[s] safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.
Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
extent, the defense might wish.
Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077, 1087â88 (Pa.Super. 2016) (en
banc) (cleaned up).
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Along these lines, our Rules of Evidence provide that â[t]he credibility
of a witness may be impeached by any evidence relevant to that issue, except
as otherwise provided by statute or these rules.â Pa.R.E. 607(b). Appellantâs
first two issues involve one such statute: the Rape Shield Law. That
enactment was designed âto prevent a trial from shifting its focus from the
culpability of the accused toward the virtue and chastity of the victim.
Moreover, the Rape Shield Law is intended to exclude irrelevant and abusive
inquiries regarding prior sexual conduct of sexual assault complainants.â
Commonwealth v. Jerdon, 229 A.3d 278, 285 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned
up).
In that vein, the statute specifies:
Evidence of specific instances of the alleged victimâs past sexual
conduct, past sexual victimization, allegations of past sexual
victimization, opinion evidence of the alleged victimâs past sexual
conduct, and reputation evidence of the alleged victimâs past
sexual conduct shall not be admissible . . . except evidence of the
alleged victimâs past sexual conduct with the defendant where
consent of the alleged victim is at issue and such evidence is
otherwise admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3104(a).
This Court has explained that, â[a]lthough the literal language of the
Rape Shield Law would appear to bar a wide range of evidence, courts have
interpreted the statute to yield to certain constitutional considerations
implicating the rights of the accused.â Commonwealth v. K.S.F., 102 A.3d
480, 483 (Pa.Super. 2014). Pertinent to Appellantâs claims:
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Evidence that tends to impeach a witnessâ[s] credibility is not
necessarily inadmissible because of the Rape Shield Law. When
determining the admissibility of evidence that the Rape Shield Law
may bar, trial courts hold an in camera hearing and conduct a
balancing test consisting of the following factors: (1) whether the
proposed evidence is relevant to show bias or motive or to attack
credibility; (2) whether the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (3) whether there are
alternative means of proving bias or motive or to challenge
credibility.
Id. at 483-84 (cleaned up).
Appellant first challenges the manner in which direct appeal counsel
argued that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that Ms. Doherty had
been a victim of sexual assault. By way of background, in its motion in limine,
the Commonwealth contended that evidence that Ms. Doherty had claimed to
be the victim of a sexual assault that she did not prosecute should be excluded
because it had no bearing on her ability to truthfully tell the jury what she
observed, and, even if relevant, was outweighed by unfair prejudice. On the
latter point, the Commonwealth expounded:
First, there is something inherently inflammatory about discussing
an unrelated âsexâ case. It needlessly draws attention to a prior
incident. Second, there is a clear risk that the jury will unfairly
and unjustifiably discount [Ms.] Dohertyâs testimony based on the
stigma of her failure to prosecute. There are jurors who may infer
that the reason [Ms.] Doherty chose not to report her own incident
is that she was either lying or exaggerating. We would have to
have a mini trial-within-a-trial to allow [her] to explain herself on
an obviously collateral matter. For that reason, without the ability
or the inclination to thoroughly go through the old case, the jury
should not hear about it at all. If [Ms.] Doherty had indeed lied
about a sexual assault in the past, perhaps it would be a different
situation because that might go to her truth-telling ability. It is
unfair and improper to quietly let the jury come to that conclusion
by thrusting in front of them her failure to report. Therefore, [Ms.]
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Dohertyâs previous sexual assault has no bearing on whether or
not [Appellant] sexually assault[ed the complainant]. Any inquiry
into her experience as a survivor of sexual assault would only
divert attention from the [Appellantâs] attack on the victim, which
is the issue at trial.
Motion in Limine, 6/12/17, at 11-12 (cleaned up).
Direct appeal counsel challenged the trial courtâs ruling, asking this
Court to consider whether the court erred âby excluding from the trial record
as irrelevant, any reference that the eyewitness, who was the first person to
allege that a ârapeâ occurred, previously approached police about having been
raped in the vicinity of campus, at an earlier point during the academic year.â
Eaddy I, 2019 WL 5268638, at *5 (quoting Appellantâs brief at 6-7). Counsel
argued âthat Ms. Doherty misunderstood the situation in the parking
garage, tainted the complainantâs recollection of the incident, and
triggered the faulty police investigation into the complainantâs allegations of a
sexual assault.â Id. at *11 (emphases added).
The trial court justified its ruling as follows:
Following exhaustive research, the court is unable to locate any
case law that opines upon the relevance of possible bias on the
part of an eyewitness due to being a prior victim of a crime, not
to mention the same crime as the accused. However, based upon
the general rules of relevance, evidence of Ms. Dohertyâs prior
alleged assault and her failure to press charges is not relevant to
the determination of this case . . . . The only possible relevance
is an as-yet unsupported inference that Ms. Dohertyâs prior
experiences must have clouded her judgment in assessing what
she saw in the garage that night. The details of Ms. Dohertyâs
prior incident, or whether or not she chose to prosecute the case,
do not have a tendency to prove [Appellant]âs guilt or innocence
in this case . . . . Assuming arguendo that Ms. Dohertyâs prior
alleged assault is relevant and creates a bias or motive to
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fabricate, its probative value is outweighed by its danger of
misleading the jury. Admitting evidence of the prior incident
creates the risk of a trial within a trial, wherein Ms. Dohertyâs
conduct seven months prior to this incident becomes the focus of
the juryâs attention.
Id. (cleaned up).
This Court rejected Appellantâs challenge upon the following reasoning:
[F]ollowing our review of the record, the trial court was entitled to
find that Appellantâs proffer was irrelevant because Appellant only
established that Ms. Dohertyâs prior sexual assault allegation did
not give rise to a prosecution. We also find no abuse of
discretion in the trial courtâs balancing of the possibility of
confusing the jury against the relevance of Appellantâs
proffer and [his] right to confront Ms. Doherty.
Id. at *12 (cleaned up, emphasis added).
Appellantâs PCRA challenge posits that direct appeal counsel rendered
constitutionally-deficient performance by âfailing to argue that evidence of
[Ms.] Dohertyâs prior sexual assault was admissible for the narrow and specific
purpose of showing her perception bias.â Appellantâs brief at 34. He explains:
While [A]ppellant does not contend that [Ms.] Doherty fabricated
an elaborate lie to falsely accuse him, the eyewitnessâs immediate
assumption that a sexual assault had occurred and her
subsequent access to the vulnerable, intoxicated complaining
witness prior to any report being made warrants the admission of
evidence that her perception could have been the result of
internalized bias. In light of her own experience as a recent victim
of sexual assault, she very likely could have been predisposed to
interpret a fully consensual encounter as nonconsensual and it is
a fair inference that her deep and immediate concern colored the
inebriated complaining witnessâs understanding of the situation.
The fact that [Ms.] Doherty had recently experienced a campus
sexual assault is relevant to and probative of her potential bias,
and if asserted adequately, would have been admissible.
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Id. at 36-37. Thus, Appellant insists, âproperly formulated argument
challenging the trial courtâs decision as to the admissibility of showing the
potential for eyewitness bias would have been meritorious at the direct appeal
stage.â Id. at 35.
We disagree. First, the emphasized portions of this Courtâs decision on
Appellantâs direct appeal indicate that counsel did argue that the excluded
evidence of Ms. Dohertyâs own assault caused her to misunderstand the import
of what she saw and heard and thereafter taint the complainantâs recollection.
The trial court concluded that any probative value of the evidence toward that
end was outweighed by the danger of confusing the jury by shifting the focus
away from the events that Ms. Doherty witnessed and onto her own
experiences. This Court held that this balancing and resultant exclusion of the
evidence was within the trial courtâs discretion. Hence, Appellantâs claim that
appellate counsel did not pursue the perception-bias angle is belied by the
record.
Second, Appellantâs additional advocacy on the matter has not
convinced us that the exclusion of the evidence was erroneous. The
Commonwealth did not offer Ms. Doherty to opine about whether she
witnessed a rape or other crime of sexual violence. It called her to relay to
the jury the concrete facts about what she saw and heard when she found
Appellant and the complainant in the parking garage. Hearing that Ms.
Doherty herself had experienced a sexual assault would have had no bearing
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upon the juryâs assessment of whether she indeed saw the complainant on
the hood of a car before Appellant fled the scene.
A review of the trial transcripts reveals that Ms. Doherty acknowledged
that she was âfreaked outâ when she encountered Appellant and the
complainant in the garage at 3:00 a.m. and only assumed the encounter was
non-consensual because Appellant jumped through a window and fled the
scene. She acknowledged that she did not witness any screams, struggle, or
other signs of violence, and only heard the complainant ask if she could have
her phone back. Additionally, Ms. Doherty testified that she did not tell the
complainant that the complainant had been raped. Rather, when the
complainant went into a separate room to be interviewed by the police, a
police officer asked Ms. Doherty what she believed that she had seen, and she
said rape. See N.T. Trial, 7/10/17, at 261-66. Given these concessions about
the limited scope of what she witnessed, we conclude that there is no arguable
merit to Appellantâs claim that the trial courtâs decision to exclude an additional
basis for Ms. Doherty to have merely assumed that she witnessed an assault.
Thus, Appellantâs first issue merits no relief.
Appellant next argues that trial counsel ineffectively opposed the
Commonwealthâs motion to exclude, in accordance with the Rape Shield Law,
all evidence that the complainant had an existing sexual relationship with a
third party. He maintains that text messages provided to the defense in
discovery revealed âthat she was in a relationship, serious enough to
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constitute a significant, regular sexual partnerâ to whom she made âpromises
of fidelity,â but counsel did not âadequately proffer [such] evidence . . . was
admissible as motivation to fabricate the nonconsensual characterization of
her encounter with [Appellant], in order to preserve her relationship.â
Appellantâs brief at 29, 32 n.2. Citing Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227
(1988), for the proposition that preservation of a relationship provides a
motivation to lie about the consensual nature of the encounter with the
defendant, Appellant contends that trial counsel should have challenged the
Commonwealthâs motion by arguing that the Rape Shield Law may not be
utilized to exclude this ârelevant evidence showing witness bias or attacking
credibility.â Appellantâs brief at 27 (cleaned up).
Appellant further asserts that counsel lacked a reasonable basis for his
failure to invoke Olden, and that he was prejudiced by counselâs failure to
properly advocate the admissibility of the text messages and other evidence
about complainantâs relationship status, highlighting that the trial court
indicated that it decided to exclude this evidence because counsel failed to
explain âhow, if at all, this evidence would demonstrate the alleged victimâs
bias against [Appellant] or call into question her credibility.â Id. at 29
(quoting Order, 7/10/17, at unnumbered 3).
In Olden, the complainant, Starla Matthews, met the defendant at a
bar. She testified that, after she became intoxicated, Olden tricked her into
leaving with him and then raped her multiple times before, at her request,
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dropping her off at the home of Oldenâs half-brother, Bill Russell. Russell
âtestified that on the evening in question he heard a noise outside his home
and, when he went out to investigate, saw Matthews get out of [the] car.
Matthews immediately told Russell that she had just been raped by [Olden].â
Olden, 488 U.S. at 228. Olden, on the other hand, claimed Matthews
propositioned him at the bar, they had consensual sex there before leaving
for an ultimately unsuccessful search for cocaine, and, after additional
consensual sex, he dropped her off at Russellâs house. The High Court further
explained:
Although Matthews and Russell were both married to and living
with other people at the time of the incident, they were apparently
involved in an extramarital relationship. By the time of trial the
two were living together, having separated from their respective
spouses. [Oldenâs] theory of the case was that Matthews
concocted the rape story to protect her relationship with Russell,
who would have grown suspicious upon seeing her disembark
from [the] car. In order to demonstrate Matthewsâ[s] motive to
lie, it was crucial, [Olden] contended, that he be allowed to
introduce evidence of Matthewsâ[s] and Russellâs current
cohabitation. Over [Oldenâs] vehement objections, the trial court
nonetheless granted the prosecutorâs motion in limine to keep all
evidence of Matthewsâ[s] and Russellâs living arrangement from
the jury. Moreover, when the defense attempted to cross-
examine Matthews about her living arrangements, after she had
claimed during direct examination that she was living with her
mother, the trial court sustained the prosecutorâs objection.
Id. at 229â30.
On appeal following his conviction, Olden asserted âthat the trial courtâs
refusal to allow him to impeach Matthewsâ[s] testimony by introducing
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evidence supporting a motive to lie deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right
to confront witnesses against him.â Id. at 230. The Supreme Court agreed:
In the instant case, [Olden] has consistently asserted that he and
Matthews engaged in consensual sexual acts and that Matthewsâ
out of fear of jeopardizing her relationship with Russellâlied when
she told Russell she had been raped and has continued to lie since.
It is plain to us that a reasonable jury might have received a
significantly different impression of the witnessâ[s] credibility had
defense counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line of
cross-examination.
Id.
Here, the PCRA court deemed the circumstances of the case sub judice
to be more akin to those in Commonwealth v. Largaespada, 184 A.3d 1002
(Pa.Super. 2018). In that case, Largaespada was tried for sexually abusing
his daughter (âVictimâ). He sought to introduce the following evidence to
establish that Victim âhad a motive to fabricate allegations of sexual abuse
againstâ him: â(1) Victim had an on-going sexual and monetary relationship
with her uncle; (2) Victim did not want Appellant to learn about the
relationship; and (3) Victim wanted to leave Appellantâs house so that Victim
could continue the relationship with her uncle.â Id. at 1006. This Court
affirmed the trial courtâs refusal to admit the evidence, reasoning thusly:
[T]he evidence of an extensive relationship between Victim and
her uncle is just evidence of a relationship. The existence of a
relationship alone is insufficient to infer a motive to fabricate.
Even the fact that Victim did not want others to know about the
relationship is insufficient to create a logical nexus that Victim
would fabricate allegations about [Largaespada] to the police.
This is true especially in light of the fact that [Largaespada] did
not know about Victimâs relationship with her uncle at the time
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Victim reported the sexual abuse to the police. If [Largaespada]
knew about the relationship and tried to end it, maybe there could
be some evidence from which to infer that Victim made allegations
to retaliate against [Largaespada] and, thus, had a motive to lie.
But, there was no evidence of [Largaespada] ever learning about,
let alone trying to end, the relationship. To hold otherwise would
eliminate the protections of the Rape Shield Law because we
would allow the existence of any sexual relationship to be basis
for inferring a motive to fabricate.
Id. at 1007â08.
The PCRA court opined that Appellant was likewise asserting âthat
evidence of the [complainant]âs relationship status, in and of itself, would
create a motive to fabricate a sexual assault, apparently in order to hide the
fact that she cheated on her partner.â Memorandum, 2/6/24, at unnumbered
3. It also stated that, âaside from [Appellant]âs claim in his petition, there is
no evidence of record that the [complainant] actually was in a relationship at
the time of this incident, aside from a passing reference to a classmate she
was attracted to around when this incident occurred.â Id. Therefore, it
rejected Appellantâs ineffectiveness challenge.
We disagree with the PCRA courtâs application of the law. Appellant
does not allege that trial counsel had mere proof of the existence of a
relationship to offer as the basis for the complainantâs motive to lie. Rather,
he contends that counsel was aware of evidence that the complainant was in
a committed relationship in which she and her boyfriend pledged fidelity.
Whether that committed relationship involved sex need not have been
proffered to the jury in order to impeach the complainant. Indeed, while
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Appellant argues that the romantic and sexual natures of the complainantâs
relationship with her boyfriend were admissible to impeach the complainant
despite the constraints of the Rape Shield Law, he also contends that, even if
the sexual conduct with her boyfriend must be excluded, âthere was no
reasonable basis for trial counsel to fail to cross examine the complaining
witness regarding her relationship, without delving into her sexual conduct,
and argue that it gave her a motive to lie.â3 Appellantâs brief at 33.
Here, the relevant consideration was whether the fact that she promised
not to have sex with anyone else was motivation for her to fabricate
allegations of rape when she was caught with Appellant, where âAppellant, the
complainant, the eyewitness, and the complainantâs boyfriend were students
at the same university, an environment where rumors and gossip abound and,
despite denying that she needed assistance, the complainant was followed out
____________________________________________
3 The Commonwealth suggests that Appellant waived the non-sexual aspect
of his claim by not raising it in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See
Commonwealthâs brief at 37. Appellantâs statement included the assertion
that â[t]rial counsel was ineffective in failing to proffer appropriate grounds
supporting the admissibility of crucial impeachment evidence: that the
complaining witness was romantically and sexually involved with another
student thereby motivating her to mischaracterize her interactions with
[Appellant] as nonconsensual.â Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 3/18/24, at 2.
We deem this sufficient to include both the sexual and non-sexual aspects of
the claim of error, each of which he raised in the PCRA court. See
Memorandum of Law, 12/19/23, at 20-21 (asserting that the fact that the
complainant had a boyfriend did not implicate the Rape Shield Law and
suggested a motive to lie); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(v) (âEach error identified in
the Statement will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue that was raised
in the trial court[.]â).
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of the parking garage by the eyewitness who had inserted herself into the
situation.â Appellantâs brief at 12. Thus, a jury could, as in Olden, differently
assess the complainantâs credibility if it learned that a desire to preserve her
relationship provided a motive for her denial that the encounter was fully
consensual. Hence, we conclude that Appellantâs allegations, if substantiated
by evidence of the complainantâs commitment to another partner, have
arguable merit.
Additionally, we conclude that Appellantâs averments satisfy the
remaining prongs of his claim. Appellant alleged that counsel lacked a
reasonable basis for failing to advocate for the admissibility of the
impeachment evidence, and the certified record before us does not reflect that
counselâs omission was a strategic choice. Further, where Ms. Doherty
admitted that she merely assumed a rape was in progress, and the objective
video evidence supported Appellantâs defense of consent, the failure of counsel
to properly argue that the purportedly-available relationship evidence was
admissible to establish a motive to lie is sufficient âto undermine confidence
in the outcome of the proceeding.â Evans, 303 A.3d at 183 (cleaned up).
For these reasons, we conclude that Appellantâs allegations make out a
prima facie case of ineffective assistance. Therefore, the court erred to the
extent that it rejected Appellantâs claim, without a hearing, based upon the
lack of record evidence. Appellant alleged that he has concrete evidence,
supplied by the Commonwealth in discovery, to prove his allegations of the
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complainantâs relationship. That was sufficient to create a genuine issue of
fact to be resolved at a hearing. Accord Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154
A.3d 287, 307 (Pa. 2017) (remanding for a hearing âor fuller evidentiary
developmentâ of a claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach key
witness with available evidence). See also Commonwealth v. Postie, 200
A.3d 1015, 1023 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc) (âGenerally, an evidentiary
hearing on counselâs strategy is preferred before the PCRA court decides if
counsel lacked a reasonable basis for his actions, except in those cases where
the reasons for counselâs conduct are clear and apparent from the record.â).
Therefore, we vacate the PCRA courtâs order to the extent that it
dismissed Appellantâs claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to advocate
the relevancy of the complainantâs committed relationship with her boyfriend.
Upon remand, the PCRA court shall hold a hearing to allow Appellant to prove
the factual underpinnings of his claim, including counselâs reasons for the
chosen course of action, and thereafter rule on his right to relief.
Appellantâs final issue concerns trial counselâs handling of a mid-trial
investigation into Appellantâs interactions with one of the jurors. The PCRA
court, relying on the trial courtâs opinion for Appellantâs direct appeal,
explained the incident as follows:
[Appellant] made a brief complimentary remark in passing to one
of the jurors outside of the courtroom. When this issue was
brought to the courtâs attention, the juror was interviewed in
chambers on the record in the presence of counsel. She confirmed
that [Appellant] had had such contact with her, but denied that
the incident would have any impact whatsoever on her impartiality
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or her ability to continue to serve as a juror. That chambers
interview was recorded as follows:
THE COURT: We are now in my chambers with all three
attorneys and Juror Number 4. Juror Number 4, one of my
tipstaves just reported to me five minutes ago that you reported
to her that on more than one occasion over the past couple of
days, [Appellant] had or attempted to have some conversation
with you at various locations in or around the Justice Center.
Why donât you tell us, maâam, everything that you can recall
about that with as much specificity as you can recall it, please.
JUROR FOUR: Yes. The first encounter I was in the elevator, I
believe it was Tuesday, just more or less I had a Starbucks cup in
my hand and just a general, I think, comment that the time [sic].
I really didnât think much of it. Oh, I should have gotten
Starbucks, that is like really good, just works for me, as I was
holding it.
THE COURT: Do you remember what time of the day?
JUROR FOUR: After lunch just as we were coming back from
lunch. And then yesterday morning, in the hallway out, here I
had gotten tied up in the garage because I couldnât get through,
I was running a little bit late. I was kind of in a bustle down the
hallway. He said good morning to me.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
JUROR FOUR: And then today it was, good afternoon, Miss, on
the street by New Havenâs Pizza.
THE COURT: What if any response, verbal, nonverbal or
otherwise, did you give - did you make when he made those
comments -
JUROR FOUR: Nothing.
THE COURT: - or remarks to you?
JUROR FOUR: Nothing. I just kept looking straight ahead.
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THE COURT: You certainly have done the right thing of
bringing this to my tipstaffâs attention and to my attention.
Do you believe that what you just described to me in any
way influences your ability to continue to sit as a juror in this case?
JUROR FOUR: No.
THE COURT: It doesnât make you less favorably inclined to
the [Appellant] or his legal position in this case?
JUROR FOUR: It makes no difference.
THE COURT: Doesnât make you more favorably inclined to his
position in this case?
JUROR FOUR: No.
THE COURT: Does it change your view with regard to the
Commonwealth or the Commonwealthâs presentation of evidence
thus far in this case?
JUROR FOUR: No.
THE COURT: Given what you just told us, do you personally
feel able and comfortable continuing to sit as Juror Number 4 in
this trial?
JUROR FOUR: Yes.
THE COURT: Any questions from counsel? Hang on. Why
donât you step outside to my secretaryâs area and Iâll come out
shortly.
JUROR FOUR: Okay. Sure.
THE COURT: Whatâs you [sic] question?
[DEFENSE COUSEL]: If he was with anyone else and if sheâs
relayed this to anyone else? Was he alone or was he with -
[THE COMMONWEALTH]: Whether [Appellant] was alone or
whether the juror was alone?
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[DEFENSE COUSEL]: Whether [Appellant] was alone when he
said this.
THE COURT: I am satisfied with her bottom line that
whatever it was that happened she felt duty bound and properly
so to report it, but that itâs not had any impact upon her, is the
way I firmly took her assessment to be.
[DEFENSE COUSEL]: Okay.
THE COURT: All right. Thanks.
Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 1/17/24, at unnumbered 3-5 n.1 (cleaned up).
Counsel did not offer further protest to the courtâs conclusion of the
investigation and decision to allow the jury to remain on the panel.
Appellant, relying heavily upon decisions by the federal district courts, 4
contends that trial counsel failed to enforce Appellantâs due process rights by
(1) not objecting to the courtâs refusal to allow further questioning of the juror,
(2) not asking Appellant about the alleged interactions, (3) not finding out
whether anyone witnessed them, and (4) not requesting âany remedial
measures to combat the effects of a biased juror, such as an instruction not
to discuss the encounters with other jurors, the replacement of the
contaminated juror with an alternate, or a mistrial.â Appellantâs brief at 24.
Appellant alleges that he has shown a âpotential for extreme prejudice under
____________________________________________
4 Appellant also cites a 2014 unpublished memorandum of this Court. See
Appellantâs brief at 22. Since this violates § 65.37 of the Superior Court
Internal Operating Procedures, we do not consider that decision. See 210 Pa.
Code § 65.37(B) (providing, with exceptions not applicable here, that â[a]n
unpublished memorandum decision filed prior to May 2, 2019, shall not be
relied upon or cited by a Court or a party in any other action or proceedingâ).
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these circumstances,â and further suggests that prejudice should be
presumed. Id. at 25 (citing Commonwealth v. Stewart, 295 A.2d 303 (Pa.
1972)).
The PCRA court concluded that Appellantâs challenge was premised
âupon several critical assumptions without a basis in fact,â namely âthat the
jurorâs answers to [the trial courtâs] questions were false, and [the court]
erroneously determined that the juror was not tainted.â Memorandum,
2/6/24, at unnumbered 1. The court observed that, on the contrary, Appellant
had âno basis whatsoever to argue that, somehow, the juror was not being
truthful when she candidly and clearly stated that any out-of-court contact
with [him] would not impact her continued service as a juror.â Id. Since the
trial court held a hearing to determine whether the juror was capable of being
impartial, and found that she was truthful in so proclaiming, any further
pursuit of the matter by trial counsel would not have succeeded. Id.
It is axiomatic that due process requires that a criminal defendant have
a fair trial by an impartial jury whose verdict is based upon evidence developed
âin a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendantâs
right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.â Turner v. State
of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965). Stated differently, â[d]ue process
means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence
before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences
and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.â Smith
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v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). However, âdue process does not
require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially
compromising situation.â Id.
While, in some extreme circumstances, outside influences or
interactions with jurors have been deemed presumptively prejudicial, 5 courts
generally analyze âoutside intrusions upon the jury for prejudicial impact.â
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 738 (1993) (considering whether the
presence of alternate jurors during deliberations prejudiced the defendant).
See also Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 (1966) (determining there
was prejudice where a bailiff stated that the defendant was âwickedâ and
âguiltyâ and one juror who overheard the statements testified that they
prejudiced her during deliberations); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S.
227, 230 (1954) (remanding for hearing as to prejudice where a person told
the jury foreperson that he could profit from a defense verdict). Either way,
âa presumption of prejudice as opposed to a specific analysis does not change
____________________________________________
5 See, e.g., Turner, 379 U.S. at 473-74 (presuming prejudice where two
deputy sheriffs who were key witnesses for the prosecution were in continual
contact with the jurors during three days of sequestration as the deputies
drove them to and from court, ran errands for them, and conversed and ate
meals with them); Stewart, 295 A.2d at 304 (presuming prejudice in murder
trial where âthe father of the victim of the killing . . . was on the panel of jurors
from which the trial jury had been selected, and had been in the same room
with the jurors who were hearing the case for as long as two and one-half
daysâ).
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the ultimate inquiry: Did the intrusion affect the juryâs deliberations and
thereby its verdict?â Olano, 507 U.S. at 739.
This inquiry is plainly dependent on the particular factual circumstances
of the case. Where the defendantâs allegations âsatisfy the threshold showing
of potential prejudice,â they require âfurther investigation to determine
whether [the intrusion] . . . improperly brought to bear an outside influence
uponâ the affected juror or jurors. See Commonwealth v. Jeter, 296 A.3d
1187, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2023) (holding trial court erred in denying evidentiary
hearing on the impact of a jurorâs discussion of the case with her father during
deliberations). See also Commonwealth v. Martin, 348 A.2d 391, 403 (Pa.
1975) (affirming trial courtâs denial of relief based upon outside influences
upon jurors where the trial court conducted a hearing and allowed defense
counsel to question the jurors).
As detailed above, the trial court in the instant case conducted an inquiry
into the facts surrounding the jurorâs allegation that Appellant improperly
interacted with her outside of the courtroom. However, the court denied the
request of Appellantâs counsel to ask whether anyone else witnessed the
interactions or if the juror told anyone else about them. Counsel did not object
to this denial, ask the court to question the rest of the jury, or request other
relief such as dismissal of the juror, a mistrial, or a curative instruction. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 834 A.2d 619, 623-24 (Pa.Super. 2003)
(affirming denial of mistrial after the defendant threw water on the jury as it
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recessed for deliberations where the court provided extensive curative
instructions and âthen polled each juror individually to determine whether he
or she could still render a fair and impartial verdict following Tejedaâs
outburstâ). Since it appears that trial counsel did not take measures to ensure
Appellantâs due process rights as pronounced in the cases described above,
we agree with him that this ineffectiveness claim has arguable merit.
Furthermore, because the PCRA court declined to have a hearing on the
claim, we are unable to assess whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his
decision not to push the issue, and whether Appellant was prejudiced by
counselâs inaction.6 Appellant was on trial to determine whether he
acknowledged and respected rules forbidding non-consensual sexual
interactions. Juror Fourâs allegations were that Appellant repeatedly failed to
honor rules prohibiting interaction with jurors outside of court. By informing
the juror that she did the right thing in reporting the incidents, the trial court
appeared to make a finding that Appellant had in fact acted improperly without
permitting Appellant to dispute the accuracy of the jurorâs allegations. If
Appellant had been given the opportunity to show that the juror
____________________________________________
6 Appellant proffered that counsel was likely to testify at a hearing that he
âwas caught off guard by the jurorâs allegationsâ and was unfamiliar with âthe
legal standards regarding juror bias.â Appellantâs brief at 24. He further
maintains that he and other witnesses will testify that the juror did not actually
speak with Appellant, but rather with other people who were with him during
accidental encounters. Id. at 25.
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misapprehended or misstated the incidents in question, the outcome of the
courtâs ruling as to the jurorâs ability to proceed impartially may have been
different.7 Further, even if Juror Four were able to put aside the incidents in
deciding Appellantâs fate, further investigation may have revealed that she
had informed other jurors whose impartiality was tainted by a belief that
Appellant had refused to respect rules and boundaries established by the
court.
Therefore, we also vacate the PCRA courtâs order to the extent that it
dismissed Appellantâs challenge to counselâs stewardship on this matter, and
remand for a hearing to allow Appellant to attempt to prove the reasonable
basis and prejudice prongs of his claim. As for prejudice, the PCRA court
should consider, inter alia, whether its confidence in the outcome of the
proceeding is undermined by the evidence Appellant would have proffered had
trial counsel properly litigated the matter in the trial court.
In sum, while we affirm the trial courtâs order to the extent that it
dismissed his claim concerning direct appeal counselâs argument for the
admissibility of Ms. Dohertyâs prior assault, we vacate the order insofar as it
dismissed his claims regarding trial counselâs handling of the issues concerning
____________________________________________
7 The Commonwealth cites as a basis for rejecting this claim the fact that
Appellant himself caused the inappropriate juror contact. See
Commonwealthâs brief at 23-24. However, Appellantâs position is that counsel
did not take the necessary actions to disprove that fact by producing evidence
that he did not do what Juror Four claimed he had done. Such evidence, if
credited, would tend to undermine her claim of impartiality.
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the complainantâs boyfriend and Juror Fourâs allegations and remand for a
hearing on those issues.
Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded for further
proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 2/26/2025
- 33 -
Case Information
- Court
- Pa. Super. Ct.
- Decision Date
- February 26, 2025
- Status
- Precedential