Com. v. Harris, K.

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11202507","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
J-S35042-25


NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                :
                v.                              :
                                                :
                                                :
  KEVIN LEEMON HARRIS                           :
                                                :
                       Appellant                :   No. 788 MDA 2025

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 14, 2025
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-54-CR-0001954-2021

BEFORE:       OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.:                                 FILED: NOVEMBER 13, 2025

       Kevin Leemon Harris (“Harris”) appeals from the order dismissing his

first, timely petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act1 (“PCRA”). We affirm.

       The    Commonwealth         charged     Harris    with   attempted   homicide,

aggravated assault, strangulation,2 and related offenses, in connection with

his assault on and stabbing of Lilliana Fowler (the “Victim”).              Appointed

counsel, Jeffrey Markosky, Esquire (“Trial Counsel”), represented Harris at the

jury trial. We summarize the trial evidence.

       The Victim testified to all of the following. In November 2021, she, her

friend, Kylie Cicero (“Cicero”), and others went to the home of Harris, whom

the Victim did not previously know, and his brother, Kashif Harris (“Brother”).

____________________________________________


1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.


2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1), (4), 2718(a)(1).
J-S35042-25


Eventually, Cicero and the others left, and for a “few days,” the Victim and

Harris “hung out” together and consumed methamphetamine, and “things

seem[ed] normal.” N.T., 3/6/23, at 123-24. However, in his bedroom, Harris

“flipped on” the Victim and became “really agitated” and aggravated. Id. at

123. Harris brandished a knife and “started slashing [her] with it.” Id. at

125. Harris: stabbed the Victim in the rib cage, causing a collapsed lung, and

in the buttocks; threatened to mutilate or cut her genitals; hit her in the head;

used “hairspray or something . . . flammable, like[ an] aerosol type of can . .

. to make a flamethrower . . . and caught [her] hair [and shirt] on fire;”

strangled the Victim’s throat “and kept saying, Why won’t you die, Why won’t

you die?;” and told her she was not allowed to leave. Id. at 130, 132-37.

The Victim initially fought back, but then “put [her] hands up” and tried to

crawl away.    Id. at 129.     At some point thereafter, the Victim walked

downstairs to get a drink. She did not think to leave the house because she

was cold, it was cold outside, and she “wanted to put the covers back on and

go back to whatever — unconscious [sic].”         Id. at 139.   The Victim thus

returned to the bedroom. Subsequently, the Victim’s friend Cicero arrived,

along with Brother, and they called the police.

      The Commonwealth also called Leahna Conney, M.D. (“Dr. Conney”),

who treated the Victim, as an expert in the field of trauma surgery.         Dr.

Conney testified the Victim suffered a collapsed lung, which could have caused

death. See N.T., 3/6/23, at 72, 75, 92. Additionally, the Victim had numerous


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“slice wound[s]” in her buttocks, inner thigh, abdomen, wrist, and arm, and

blunt trauma to her face.    Id. at 84-91.    An occupational therapist, who

administered screening tests for a concussion, testified that the Victim showed

signs of a concussion. See id. at 102-09.

      The Victim’s friend, Cicero, testified to the following. She, the Victim,

and a friend named Brandon went to Harris’ house around 7:30 p.m.; Brother

was also present.   Harris and the Victim used methamphetamine.        Cicero,

Brandon, and Brother left around 11:30 p.m., while the Victim stayed with

Harris. The Victim appeared “normal” and did not have any cuts, bruises,

bleeding, or stab wounds. Id. at 185. Three days later, around 2:00 p.m.,

Cicero, Brother, and a friend name Raekwon Smith (“Smith”) returned to the

house. Harris was there, “yelling and making it look as if he was hurt,” and

he stated that “he was stabbed in the groin area.” Id. at 187. Cicero entered

Harris’ bedroom and saw the Victim, unconscious, “wrapped up in [a] blanket

[and] covered in blood.” Id. at 189. There was also blood on the mattress.

“[T]hings were thrown everywhere” and the Victim’s purse was “dumped out

and scattered.” Id. at 188-89. One of the men called the police.

      Brother and Smith testified and corroborated Cicero’s descriptions of the

Victim and the room. See N.T. Trial, 3/7/23, at 275-76, 288.

      Finally, the Commonwealth called Pottsville Bureau Police Officer

Timothy Youse (“Officer Youse”), who responded to the scene. Upon entering

Harris’ room, he observed the Victim lying in the bed, bleeding, with a swollen


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face. The Victim’s clothes were “extremely bloody,” and there was dry blood

“all underneath her.” N.T., 3/6/23, at 204. The Commonwealth played the

video taken by Officer Youse’s body worn camera.

      Harris testified in his own defense to the following. He did not live at

that house, which was his mother’s house. Instead, he happened to go there

because he had his car towed there.     Harris was out walking with Brother

when they encountered Cicero, the Victim, and Brandon. They all returned to

his mother’s house and used drugs, including methamphetamine.           Harris

described the Victim as “weird,” as she carried around deer antlers, had

knives, talked to herself, and talked “[a]bout dumping her stuff out.” Id. at

390, 404. Nevertheless, Harris also thought the Victim “was cool” and asked

her to stay and “chill.” Id. at 391. They stayed at the house for several days.

On the last morning, Harris’ mother awoke at 4:00 or 4:30 a.m., and Harris

and the Victim were lying in his bed under the blanket. Harris heard Brother’s

voice, and then Brother and Smith entered his room, with Smith telling Brother

“to hurry up.” Id. at 402. The Victim was “groaning” and “making noises.”

Id. Harris looked up and saw “it’s coming down over top of [him], somebody’s

swinging [sic].” Id. at 402-03. Harris “tented the blanket up,” but Smith

“kept coming down on the blanket” with what Harris suspected was a rock.

Id. at 403. When Harris “came to, it was daylight,” the room was a “wreck,”

and the Victim was not moving.      Id. at 404-05.   Harris called out for his




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mother, but instead, Brother, Cicero, and Smith came upstairs. Harris asked

Brother for help, and denied that he stated he was stabbed.

     At this juncture, we summarize that during his testimony, Harris

explained he took drugs out of his car and into his mother’s house because he

did not have his key fob and thus could not lock the car door. A juror spoke

out loud and Harris responded to him as follows:

           JUROR NO. 4: Just push the lock button.

           [Harris]: I wouldn’t have been able to unlock it then. See,
     I could have pushed the lock button, but then would have been
     locked out.

N.T., 3/7/23, at 417. The following exchange then occurred:

          THE COURT: . . . Juror No. 4, did you say something to your
     neighbor?

           JUROR NO. 4: Just all he had to do was push it down, push
     the button.

           THE COURT: Push his hand down?

           [Harris]: No. He said all I had to do was push the lock
     button. But then I would have been locked out of my car.

           THE COURT: You can’t — I’m going to instruct everyone to
     disregard what just happened. You cannot say things like that.

            In my instructions I told you, you are not to talk about the
     case with anyone. You’re to pay attention and listen to everything
     that’s said. . . .

Id. at 417-18.

     A prior panel of this Court summarized:

          The trial court then directed a sidebar discussion[ and]
     asked the attorneys, “What do you want to do with No. 4?”

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     [Harris] requested a mistrial, arguing that Juror No. 4 was “talking
     to another juror, contradicting the testimony of [Harris].” The
     court [denied] a mistrial but concluded that dismissal of Juror No.
     4 was warranted.

           The parties were not sure, however, if Juror No. 3, to whom
     [Harris] had apparently directed the comment, said anything in
     response. The Commonwealth stated, “I think [Juror] No. 3 just
     kind of . . . shook his head yes. He didn’t verbalize any response.”
     The court again expressed reluctance to declare a mistrial[, as
     only the two jurors] were involved.[ Harris] stated, “[Y]ou may
     have to ask Juror No. 3, did this have any effect on him. He did
     nod, but that could mean many different things.”

           The trial court then excused all the jurors but numbers three
     and four. The court informed Juror No. 4 he [was] excused but
     did not ask him any questions. The court then asked Juror No. 3,
     “[D]id you hear what he said to you?” Juror No. 3 confirmed that
     he did, and the court asked additional questions[.]

Commonwealth v. Harris,
311 A.3d 606
(Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished

memorandum at 3) (paragraph break added and transcript citations omitted).

     In response to the trial court’s questions, Juror No. 3 stated: he did not

respond to Juror No. 4’s comment; however, he may have shook or nodded

his head, as he looked at Juror No. 4 and then the witness stand; and he may

have “nonverbally” acknowledged the other juror’s comment because he

“shook [his] head like, Why would you say that? Because then it started that

[sic].” N.T., 3/7/23, at 421. “The parties declined to ask Juror No. 3 any

questions. The court asked [Harris] if he were seeking removal of Juror No.

3, and [he] replied that he was not. [Harris] did not renew his request for a

mistrial or ask to make inquiry of any other juror.” Harris,
311 A.3d 606
(unpublished memorandum at 4).


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       The jury found Harris guilty of: attempt to commit murder in the first

degree;3 two counts of aggravated assault; four counts of simple assault; two

counts of recklessly endangering another person; and one count each of

strangulation and terroristic threats.4 On May 5, 2023, the trial court imposed

an aggregate sentence of thirty to sixty years’ imprisonment.

       Harris filed a direct appeal, still represented by Trial Counsel. He raised

one issue: whether the trial court erred in denying a mistrial based on the

juror’s improper statement.          This Court concluded, however, that Harris

waived this claim for failing to develop an argument “why, in light of the

particular circumstances presented, Juror No. 4’s comment deprived him of a

fair trial.”     Harris,
311 A.3d 606
(unpublished memorandum at 7).

Nevertheless, the panel stated that even if Harris had presented a reviewable

issue, it would conclude no relief was due. The panel reasoned: (1) the trial

court removed Juror 4; (2) Harris declined to question the remaining jurors if

they overheard Juror 4’s comment, and if so, whether it affected their ability

to impartially render a verdict; and (3) Harris raised no claim that the jurors

shared Juror 4’s sentiment or that the comment infected the rest of the jury.




____________________________________________


3 With respect to this count, the jury further found the Victim suffered serious

bodily injury.

4 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2705, 2706(a)(1).


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Thus, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence.       Harris did not file a

petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.5

       On December 19, 2024, Harris filed the underlying, timely pro se PCRA

petition,6 raising various claims of ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel and

Brady7 violations. The PCRA court appointed present counsel, Michael Fiorillo,

Esquire (“PCRA Counsel”), who did not file an amended petition. The PCRA

court conducted an evidentiary hearing, at which Harris and Trial Counsel

testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court directed Harris to file a

brief, and he complied.

       On May 14, 2025, the PCRA court issued the underlying order, denying

Harris’ PCRA petition. Harris, still represented by PCRA Counsel, filed a timely

pro se notice of appeal. The PCRA court then directed Harris to file a Pa.R.A.P.



____________________________________________


5 After the period for filing a petition for allowance of appeal expired, Harris

sought leave to file a petition nunc pro tunc. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
denied relief. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 34 MM 2024 (Pa. 2024)
(order).

6 This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on December 22, 2023.        The
thirty-day period to file a petition for allowance of appeal expired on Monday,
January 22, 2024. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a); see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908
(providing that when last day of any period of time referred to in any statute
falls on Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, such day shall be omitted from
computation). For PCRA purposes, Harris’ judgment of sentence became final
on that same day, and generally, he had one year, or until January 22, 2025,
to file a PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), (3). As noted above,
he filed the instant pro se petition on December 19, 2024.

7 See Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83
(1963).




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1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Harris filed a pro

se statement.8

____________________________________________


8 This Court has explained:



       [H]ybrid representation is not permitted. Accordingly, this Court
       will not accept a pro se motion while an appellant is represented
       by counsel; indeed, pro se motions have no legal effect and,
       therefore, are legal nullities. When a counseled defendant files a
       pro se document, it is noted on the docket and forwarded to
       counsel pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4), but no further action
       is to be taken.

Commonwealth v. Williams,
151 A.3d 621, 623
(Pa. Super. 2016) (citations
omitted).

       However, “[b]ecause a notice of appeal protects a constitutional right,
it is distinguishable from other filings that require counsel to provide legal
knowledge and strategy[. Thus,] this Court is required to docket a pro se
notice of appeal despite [the appellant] being represented by counsel.”
Id.
at 624
. Here, Harris sent a pro se notice of appeal to this Court, which then
forwarded it to the trial court. Although PCRA Counsel was attorney of record,
we deem this notice of appeal timely and properly filed. See
id.
With respect to the pro se Rule 1925(b) statement, however, there is
no indication in the certified record that the trial court forwarded it to PCRA
Counsel nor treated it as a legal nullity. See
id. at 623
; see also Pa.R.Crim.P.
576(A)(4). Indeed, the court accepted the pro se statement and addressed
its merits. See Order, 6/30/25 (stating that “upon receipt of” Harris’ Rule
1925(b) statement, the PCRA court submits its prior opinion in compliance
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)).       PCRA Counsel has not filed a Rule 1925(b)
statement.

       Generally, the failure to file a court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement will
result in waiver of all issues on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).
However, we deem a criminal defendant’s attorney’s failure to file a Rule
1925(b) statement to be per se ineffectiveness, for which the defendant is
entitled to prompt relief. See Commonwealth v. Andrews,
213 A.3d 1004,
1010
(Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Here, the PCRA court has not
commented on the untimely filing and has addressed all the issues raised
(Footnote Continued Next Page)


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       Harris presents six issues for our review:

       1. Whether the [PCRA] court erred and abused its discretion in
          denying [Harris’] PCRA petition where the evidence established
          that [T]rial [C]ounsel failed to adequately develop issues on
          appeal, and as such, deprived [Harris] of effective assistance
          of counsel?

       2. Whether the [PCRA] court erred and abused its discretion in
          denying [Harris’] PCRA petition as a result of [T]rial [C]ounsel’s
          failure to request that the trial court poll the jury following Juror
          #4’s interaction with [Harris] during his trial?

       3. Whether the [PCRA] court erred and abused its discretion in
          failing to grant [Harris’] PCRA petition where the evidence
          established that [T]rial [C]ounsel failed to provide [Harris] with
          discovery, which deprived [Harris] of his ability to effectively
          assist [T]rial [C]ounsel?

       4. Whether the [PCRA] court erred and abused its discretion in
          denying [Harris’] PCRA petition where [T]rial [C]ounsel failed
          to assert a Batson[9] violation during jury selection?

       5. Whether the [PCRA] court erred and abused its discretion in
          denying [Harris’] PCRA petition where the evidence established
          that [Harris] did not receive effective representation as a result
          of [T]rial [C]ounsel’s failure to challenge expert testimony?

       6. Whether the [PCRA] court erred and abused its discretion in
          failing to grant [Harris’] PCRA petition where [[T]rial [C]ounsel
          failed to introduce evidence, including social media messages
          and testimony of a witness that would have been favorable to
          [Harris] at his trial?




____________________________________________


therein. Additionally, PCRA Counsel has filed an appellate brief, addressing
the issues in the pro se statement. We therefore need not remand this matter
for a new Rule 1925(b) statement nor PCRA court opinion. We proceed to
review the appeal. See
id.
9 See Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79
(1986).


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J-S35042-25


Harris’   Brief   at   4-5   (unnecessary      capitalization   omitted   and   issues

reordered).10

       In Harris’ first issue, he avers the PCRA court erred in denying relief on

his claim that Trial Counsel was ineffective with regard to the direct appeal.

We first note:

       With respect to our standard of review, we are limited “to
       examining whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported
       by the record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from
       legal error.” We view the evidence of record in a light most
       favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below.
       We are bound by the PCRA court’s credibility determinations,
       unless those determinations are not supported by the record;
       however, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Flor,
259 A.3d 891
, 902 (Pa. 2021) (citations omitted).

       When evaluating claims of counsel ineffectiveness, we begin with
       the presumption that counsel is effective. In order to prevail on
       an ineffectiveness claim, a PCRA petitioner must comply with the
       test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland
       v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668
. . . (1984).                   In this
       Commonwealth, we have distilled . . . the following three-pronged
       test for ineffectiveness, which the PCRA petitioner bears the
       burden to prove: “(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit;
       (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to
       act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of
       counsel’s error such that there is a reasonable probability that the
       result of the proceeding would have been different absent such
       error.”



____________________________________________


10  The statement of questions involved and the argument section are
inconsistent with regard to both the number and order of the issues. We
remind PCRA Counsel that the argument section of a brief “shall be divided
into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the
head of each part — in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed — the
particular point treated therein.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

                                          - 11 -
J-S35042-25
Id.
(citations omitted).

       On appeal, Harris contends Trial Counsel failed to consult with him after

sentencing, and therefore “Harris was denied the opportunity to discuss

appellate strategy.” Harris’ Brief at 16-17. Second, Harris asserts that Trial

Counsel raised only one issue on direct appeal —the denial of a mistrial based

on Juror 4’s statement — yet the Superior Court panel deemed this issue

waived. Third, Harris claims Trial Counsel should have presented a “challenge

to the weight or sufficiency of the evidence.”11 Id. at 17.

       In denying relief, the PCRA court credited Trial Counsel’s testimony at

the PCRA hearing. Counsel testified to the following: (1) both before and after

sentencing, he discussed with Harris “which issues, if any, could be raised on

appeal;” (2) Trial Counsel “had no recollection of [Harris] instructing him to

raise numerous issues on appeal;” and (3) “[i]n fact, [Trial Counsel] advised

[Harris] that in his professional opinion he only felt there was one issue to

pursue, namely the juror interaction.” PCRA Court Opinion, 5/13/25, at 5.

Additionally, Trial Counsel testified he

       felt that any weight . . . or sufficiency of the evidence argument[
       was] not meritorious because the Commonwealth had presented
       substantial and sufficient evidence at trial with testimony from the
       [V]ictim, three lay witnesses ( . . . Cicero, . . . Smith, and
       [Brother]), and police body camera footage.

Id. at 5. The PCRA court agreed with Trial Counsel. See id.


____________________________________________


11 Additionally, Harris avers Trial Counsel erred in not raising, on direct appeal,

a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. We address this claim in his third issue.

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      After review, we determine the record supports the PCRA court’s denial

of relief. See Flor, 259 A.3d at 902. First, we observe that Harris fails to

address the PCRA court’s discussion, especially Trial Counsel’s testimony and

the court’s crediting it.   Harris ignores that this Court is bound by this

credibility determination. See id. Second, Harris vaguely claims that Trial

Counsel prevented the “opportunity to discuss appellate strategy,” but does

not explain what “appellate strategy” he would have wished to pursue. Harris’

Brief at 16-17. To this end, Harris also ignores Trial Counsel’s explanation

that while Harris’ defense was that “he didn’t do it,” counsel did not believe it

was a “viable defense.” N.T., 3/3/25, at 35. In any event, at trial Harris

plainly presented his innocence defense to the jury: he denied causing the

Victim’s injuries, and claimed instead that while he and the Victim were

sleeping, Brother and Smith entered his room and repeatedly swung with a

rock. See N.T. Trial, 3/7/23, at 402-03.

      Additionally, Trial Counsel opined, at the PCRA hearing, their “best

defense” was that the Victim “exhibited some bizarre behavior,” including

regularly carrying “around deer antlers with a chain” and having “three to five

knives on her” at the time of the incident. N.T., 3/3/25, at 36. Additionally,

although the assault “lasted hours” and the Victim had a phone, she “[n]ever

called [or] screamed out for help,” and she did not try to leave when she went

downstairs for water. Id. at 36-37. Trial Counsel thus “pointed [these] out

to the jury.” Id. at 36. Harris similarly fails to address this testimony.


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      Next, with respect to the juror issue, Harris wholly ignores the PCRA

court’s extensive discussion, as well as the Superior Court’s direct appeal

panel’s decision.   Although the panel determined he had waived his main

claim, the panel also clearly stated that it “would disagree” with any claim that

“the juror’s comment warranted a new trial per se, presumably on the basis

that [the juror] prejudiced [Harris’] guilt, which in turn deprived him of a fair

trial.” Harris,
311 A.3d 606
(unpublished memorandum at 7). In support,

the panel considered that “Juror No. 4 did not claim knowledge of facts

concerning [Harris] or his crimes,” and ultimately, the trial court removed

Juror No. 4. Id. at 8, 10.

      With respect to Harris’ claim that Trial Counsel should have challenged

the sufficiency and weight of the evidence on direct appeal, we likewise

determine no relief is due. Harris has failed, both before the PCRA court and

this Court, to develop an argument. He does not explain which offense, of his

eleven convictions, that he wishes to challenge, let alone what element of

those offenses.     Furthermore, although Harris broadly avers the trial

testimony of Brother, Cicero, and Smith differed both from their own prior

testimony and from the other witnesses’ testimony, he does not identify any

particular line of testimony or point of conflict. In any event, at trial, it was

the jury’s task to weigh any inconsistencies in the testimony, pass “upon the

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,” and the jury




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was “free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v.

Dunkins,
229 A.3d 622, 631
(Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

      For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Harris has not established his

underlying claims are of arguable merit.        See Flor, 259 A.3d at 902.

Additionally, he has wholly failed to present any argument that: (1) “the

particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable

basis designed to effectuate his interests; and [(2)] but for counsel’s

ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the

proceedings would have been different.” Id. Thus, Harris’ first issue warrants

no relief.

      The second issue in Harris’ statement of questions involved is whether

the PCRA court erred in denying relief on his claim that Trial Counsel was

ineffective for not requesting a poll of the entire jury following Juror No. 4’s

statement. Harris does not present any discussion of this claim. Thus, he has

waived it. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring the argument section of a brief

to include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed

pertinent”).

      Harris’ third issue concerns alleged Brady violations.     Our Supreme

Court has explained:

      Under Brady and subsequent decisional law, a prosecutor has an
      obligation to disclose all exculpatory information material to the
      guilt or punishment of an accused[.] To establish a Brady
      violation, an appellant must prove three elements:




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J-S35042-25


            [1] the evidence [at issue] was favorable to the
            accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it
            impeaches; [2] the evidence was suppressed by the
            prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3]
            prejudice ensued.

Commonwealth v. Spotz,
18 A.3d 244, 275-76
(Pa. 2011) (citations

omitted)

      Harris’ argument is, in sum:

      In the instant matter, . . . Harris testified that he was unaware of
      testimony that was being proffered by various witnesses. Further,
      he was unaware of photographic evidence that was submitted at
      trial. To the extent that this information was not conveyed to
      [Trial Counsel], there was a clear Brady violation. Alternatively,
      if the information had been provided to [Trial Counsel], he failed
      to communicate it to . . . Harris, further supporting his claim for
      PCRA relief.

Harris’ Brief at 18.

      Within his first issue, Harris also characterizes these alleged actions as

prosecutorial misconduct. See id. at 17. Under a different heading, entitled

“Discovery,” Harris also asserts: (1) he “was not provided all of the discovery

that presumably[] was provided to” Trial Counsel; and thus (2) he “was under

the reasonable belief that the prosecution failed to disclose much of the

evidence that was presented at trial.” Id. at 19. Harris reasons he was thus

unaware the Commonwealth would present this evidence, and that he was

“effectively deprived of the opportunity to assist [Trial Counsel] in preparing

a defense” Id.




                                     - 16 -
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      The PCRA court found: “[Harris’] testimony failed to demonstrate how

the Commonwealth breached its duty to disclose.”           PCRA Court Opinion,

5/13/25, at 6.

      After review, we determine the record supports the PCRA court’s denial

of relief. See Flor, 259 A.3d at 902. First, to the extent Harris avers the

Commonwealth committed a Brady violation, he has waived this claim, as he

could have raised it before or during his trial proceedings. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9544(b) (stating “an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but

failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, [or] on appeal”).

      Second, with respect to Harris’ claims that Trial Counsel did not object

to the Commonwealth’s alleged Brady violations, and did not provide him with

discovery, Harris has failed to present, both before the PCRA court and this

Court, a sufficiently developed argument. At the PCRA hearing, Harris vaguely

averred the Commonwealth failed to advise him that Cicero, Brother, and

Smith would testify, and failed to provide photos of knives. However, Harris

did not offer any explanation why this evidence was exculpatory in nature, as

required for a Brady violation, nor how it would have affected the outcome of

his trial. We thus conclude that no relief is due on Harris’ third issue.

      In Harris’ fourth issue, he avers Trial Counsel was ineffective for not

raising a Batson challenge during jury selection. The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court has explained:




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           In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the
      Equal Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from challenging a
      potential juror solely based upon the juror’s race. . . .

             When a post-conviction petitioner raises a Batson claim for
      the first time on collateral review, he . . . “bears the burden in the
      first instance, and throughout of establishing actual, purposeful
      discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Reid,
235 A.3d 1124
, 1188-89 (Pa. 2020) (citations

omitted).

      Harris avers, in sum:

            In Batson[,] the Supreme Court held that peremptory
      challenges to remove a potential juror for the jury pool based on
      race violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

            . . . Harris testified that there was a person of color in the
      jury pool and that person was removed by the prosecution using
      a peremptory strike. That issue was never raised by [Trial
      Counsel], and as such, waived. That waiver was prejudicial to . . .
      Harris.

Harris’ Brief at 19 (paragraph break added).

      The PCRA court considered Harris’ testimony, at the PCRA hearing, “that

there was a person of color in the jury pool who was removed by the

prosecution using a peremptory strike.” PCRA Court Opinion, 5/13/25, at 8.

However, the court found that Harris “offered no evidence to substantiate this

allegation.”
Id.
Meanwhile, Trial Counsel testified that he “did not recall any

person of color . . . on the jury panel, nor the Commonwealth having stricken

a potential juror because of race.     He recalled the Commonwealth having

other, valid reasons for striking potential jurors.”
Id.
The PCRA court

specifically found this testimony credible.

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J-S35042-25


       After review, we determine the record supports the PCRA court’s denial

of relief. See Flor, 259 A.3d at 902. Harris again fails to address the PCRA

court’s discussion, let alone the testimony of Trial Counsel. We reiterate that

we are bound by the PCRA court’s credibility determinations, and thus

conclude no relief is due on Harris’ fourth issue.

       In his fifth issue, Harris cites law describing “the Frye[12] standard for

admissibility of expert testimony.” Harris’ Brief at 18. He then presents the

following argument, in sum:

             Expert testimony was offered at . . . Harris’s trial and there
       was no attempt to challenge the admissibility of the expert
       testimony. This is critical in that one of the medical expert’s
       testimony related directly to the attempted murder charge for
       which . . . Harris was found guilty.

Id. at 19 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       We note: “Under Frye, ‘novel scientific evidence is admissible if the

methodology underlying the evidence has general acceptance in the relevant

scientific community.’” Commonwealth v. Hopkins,
231 A.3d 855, 868
(Pa.

Super. 2020) (citation omitted). “Frye precludes expert testimony when the

expert’s methodology (1) is ‘novel science’ and (2) is not generally accepted

in the relevant field.”
Id. at 871
(citations omitted).

       Although Harris does not identify which expert witness allegedly gave

what improper testimony under Frye, the PCRA court surmised that Harris



____________________________________________


12 See Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923).


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J-S35042-25


refers to Dr. Cooney, the trauma surgeon. The court observed that at the

PCRA hearing, Trial Counsel “correctly recalled Dr. Cooney’s testimony

pertain[ing] to the [V]ictim’s wounds and collapsed lung, which [Dr. Cooney]

opined could have caused [the Victim’s] death.”          PCRA Court Opinion,

5/13/25, at 7.    Trial Counsel testified that “[a]fter reviewing Dr. Cooney’s

curriculum vitae as well as her medical report, [he believed] it was never an

issue that Dr. Cooney’s opinion would not have been generally accepted by

the medical community.”
Id.
The PCRA court agreed.

      We determine that Harris has waived his issue for failure to develop an

argument on appeal.       See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).     Saliently, Harris does not

acknowledge, let alone address, the PCRA court’s rationale. Indeed, on appeal

Harris does not even identify the particular expert opinion allegedly at odds

with Frye, nor even the witness. Instead, he vaguely states that “one of the

medical expert’s testimony related directly to the attempted murder charge

for which . . . Harris was found guilty.” Harris’ Brief at 19. Harris presents no

discussion in support of a claim that the expert opinion was “novel science” or

“not generally accepted in the relevant field.” Hopkins,
231 A.3d at 868
.

Finally, Harris makes no reference to any of the three prongs of an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. See Flor, 259 A.3d at 902. Accordingly, no relief

is due on Harris’ fifth issue.

      In Harris’ last two issues, he presents the following statements, in sum:

      Social media messages between . . . Harris and the alleged victim
      were never submitted and would have assisted in undermining the

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J-S35042-25


      evidence against . . . Harris. [The Victim] testified that she was
      allegedly held against her will for several days, and the social
      media messages would have undermined her testimony.

                                   *****

      Starr Kline, who would have testified about a phone call between
      . . . Harris’s brother . . . and . . . Kline wherein [Brother]
      threatened to kill . . . Harris was never presented to the jury, as .
      . . Kline was never called as a witness.

Harris’ Brief at 21.

      We determine Harris has waived both issues for lack of development

and discussion of the relevant facts and legal authority.        See Pa.R.A.P.

2119(a) (requiring argument to include “the particular point treated therein,

followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed

pertinent”); see also Commonwealth v. Hardy,
918 A.2d 766, 771
(Pa.

Super. 2007) (stating this Court may find issues waived “when defects in a

brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review,” and “[t]his

Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an

appellant”).    Neither issue includes any law, nor refers to Trial Counsel

whatsoever. In the fifth issue, concerning social media messages, Harris fails

to identify who failed to “submit[]” the evidence, and to whom. See Harris’

Brief at 21. In his sixth issue, even if we were to deduce a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, Harris has not addressed any of the three prongs of

such a claim. Saliently, he has failed to discuss any law nor explain why he is

entitled to relief.




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J-S35042-25


     For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Harris has failed to establish

grounds for relief. We affirm the order denying his PCRA petition.

     Order affirmed.




Judgment Entered.




Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary



Date: 11/13/2025




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