Com. v. Nabried, T.

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"10743947","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
J-S30012-24
2024 PA Super 276
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TROY SCOTT NABRIED                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1527 MDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 11, 2023
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0001136-2022


BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J.E., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.:                        FILED: NOVEMBER 19, 2024

       Troy Scott Nabried appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County after his conviction of one

count each of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance

(“PWID”) and criminal use of a communication facility.1 Nabried asserts the

trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain pieces of physical evidence

and testimony and in denying his request to hire an expert. Upon review, we

affirm.

       On June 27, 2023, the Commonwealth filed an amended information

charging Nabried with the above crimes. These charges stemmed from a

controlled purchase of crystal methamphetamine between a confidential

informant (“CI”) and Nabried that took place on March 31, 2022.

____________________________________________


* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.


1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a), respectively.
J-S30012-24



      On July 10, 2023, a two-day jury trial commenced. At trial, three

witnesses testified: the two investigating officers, Peter Petrucci and Brandon

Walters, and a drug identification expert, Lauren Force. Also, an audio/video

recording of the controlled buy was admitted into evidence.

      On the day of the transaction, the officers were with the CI at her home.

The CI placed multiple calls to Nabried that went unanswered. Nabried

responded with a text message informing the CI that he would come to see

her in about 15 minutes. Shortly thereafter, the officers observed Nabried

arrive at the CI’s house in his vehicle. The officers provided the CI with

$500.00. The CI requested crystal methamphetamine and “white girl,” which

was a reference to powder cocaine. The CI gave Nabried the $500.00 but did

not initially receive the drugs. Nabried left the CI’s house to retrieve the drugs.

When he returned, he provided the CI with one ounce of what would later be

identified as crystal methamphetamine. Nabried was not taken into custody

at that time and was later arrested on April 26, 2022.

      At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Nabried guilty of both counts.

On October 11, 2023, the court sentenced Nabried to an aggregate term of

48 to 120 months’ incarceration. This timely appeal followed. Nabried

complied with the trial court’s order to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

      Nabried raises six issues for our review.

      1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
      Commonwealth Exhibit 1, AT&T phone records, into evidence


                                       -2-
J-S30012-24


     without being properly authenticated, and therefore the records
     constituted inadmissible hearsay.

     2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
     Commonwealth Exhibit 2, text messages, to be admitted without
     being properly authenticated because no testimony was presented
     from the person(s) who sent or received the text messages.

     3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the
     defense “opened the door” which allowed the Commonwealth to
     introduce testimony regarding other uncharged drug transactions,
     when the defense’s questioning was narrowly tailored to avoid
     “opening the door.”

     4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
     affiant, Officer Peter Petrucci, to testify to the contents of a
     clandestine video and audio recording, instead of the Confidential
     Informant, in violation of the Rule against Hearsay.

     5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
     affiant, Officer Peter Petrucci, to testify to the contents of a
     clandestine video and audio recording, instead of the Confidential
     Informant, in violation of Mr. Nabried’s right to [c]onfront
     [w]itnesses under the United States and Pennsylvania
     Constitutions.

     6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr.
     Nabried’s request to hire an expert witness to testify to the
     industry standard of Narcotics Investigations and Techniques.

Appellant’s Brief, at 3-4 (suggested answers omitted).

     Most of the issues raised by Nabried relate to the admissibility of

physical evidence and testimony. “The admissibility or exclusion of evidence

are subject to the abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” Commonwealth

v. Ellis,
313 A.3d 458, 462
(Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). The party

challenging the trial court’s evidentiary ruling carries a heavy burden in

establishing that the trial court abused its discretion. See Commonwealth v.


                                    -3-
J-S30012-24


DiStefano,
265 A.3d 290
, 297 (Pa. 2021). The trial court abuses its discretion

only if it misapplies the law, or its exercise of judgment is manifestly

unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. See
id. at

298
.

       In his first issue, Nabried argues that the trial court abused its discretion

in admitting cell phone records into evidence because the records were

inadmissible hearsay and did not meet the business record or public record

exceptions    to   the   hearsay   rule.    See   Appellant’s   Brief,   18-23.   The

Commonwealth responds that the cell phone records met the business records

exception to the hearsay rule. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 5-11.

       Hearsay is a statement: “(1) the declarant does not make while

testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to

prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c).

Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions set forth at

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803. See Pa.R.E. 802.

       One such exception is the business records exception, which provides:

       The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay,
       regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:
       ...

       (6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record
       (which includes a memorandum, report, or data compilation in any
       form) of an act, event or condition if:

             (A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from
             information transmitted by—someone with knowledge;




                                           -4-
J-S30012-24


            (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly
            conducted activity of a “business”, which term includes
            business, institution, association, profession, occupation,
            and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
            profit;

            (C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

            (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the
            custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification
            that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute
            permitting certification; and

            (E) the opponent does not show that the source of
            information or other circumstances indicate a lack of
            trustworthiness.

Pa.R.E. 803(6).

      Similarly, the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act provides, in

pertinent part, that

      A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be
      competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness
      testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it
      was made in the regular course of business at or near the time of
      the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the tribunal,
      the sources of information, method and time of preparation were
      such as to justify its admission.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(b).

      As observed by the trial court, “cell phone records that a company keeps

in the regular course of business are not excluded by the rule against hearsay

and are admissible under the business records exception.” Trial Court Opinion,

2/20/24, at 15 (citation omitted). To satisfy the business record exception the

testifying witness need not be the custodian of the record or have personal

knowledge of the facts reported in the business record. Commonwealth v.


                                      -5-
J-S30012-24



McEnany,
732 A.2d 1263, 1272
(Pa. Super. 1999). Instead, “[a]s long as the

authenticating witness can provide sufficient information relating to the

preparation and maintenance of the records to justify a presumption of

trustworthiness of the business records of a company, a sufficient basis is

provided to offset the hearsay character of the evidence.”
Id.
(citations

omitted).

      Here, AT&T kept the subject cell phone records in the normal course of

business. Although the custodian of the records did not testify, the

trustworthiness of the cell phone records was established through Officer

Petrucci’s knowledge of them. Specifically, the CI told Officer Petrucci what

Nabried’s cell phone number was and the officer secured a court order to

obtain the subscriber information from AT&T for that cell phone number. See

N.T., 7/10/24, at 45. Further, Officer Petrucci did a public record check of that

phone number which revealed that Nabried was the owner. See
id.
At trial, Officer Petrucci identified Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 as

subscriber information from AT&T for the cell phone number. See
id.
at 47-

48. The document was obtained through court order from AT&T. See id. at

48. Officer Petrucci testified that the exhibit was a fair and accurate depiction

of the information that AT&T provided, and that it was the same information

he had obtained during the public records check. See id. The court overruled

defense     counsel’s   objection   because   Officer   Petrucci   confirmed   the

trustworthiness of the AT&T information through his own records. See id. at

49.

                                       -6-
J-S30012-24



     Because the information in the record from AT&T was corroborated by

Officer Petrucci’s personal knowledge, which established the trustworthiness

of the business record, we discern no abuse of discretion.

     Next, Nabried argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing

text messages to be admitted without proper authentication because there

was no testimony presented from the sender or recipient of the text messages.

See Appellant’s Brief, at 23. The Commonwealth responds that the text

messages were properly authenticated through circumstantial evidence. See

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 12-16.

     “[T]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of

evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding

that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E. 901(a).

“[A]uthentication generally entails a relatively low burden of proof[.]”

Commonwealth v. Bowens,
265 A.3d 730, 759
(Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc)

(citation omitted). “[A]uthentication of electronic communications, like

documents, requires more than mere confirmation that the number or address

belonged to a particular person. Circumstantial evidence, which tends to

corroborate the identity of the sender, is required.”
Id. at 760
(citation

omitted). Accordingly, authentication of text messages “turns upon the depth

of direct and circumstantial evidence of authorship marshaled by the

proponent of the text messages.” Commonwealth v. Orr,
255 A.3d 589, 601
(Pa. Super. 2021); see also Pa.R.E. 901(b)(11).




                                     -7-
J-S30012-24



      In Orr, we rejected the appellant’s argument that the Commonwealth

failed to authenticate certain text messages by failing to demonstrate that the

appellant authored the messages. See Orr,
255 A.3d at 601
. The

circumstantial evidence demonstrated that the appellant was the author of the

text messages. See
id.
Specifically, testimony from a witness that she bought

the phone for the appellant, the phone was found among the appellant’s

belongings when he was apprehended, and the content of the text messages—

the appellant’s ongoing custody dispute with the victim—indicated that the

appellant was the author of the text messages. See
id.
Similarly, here, Nabried’s authorship of the text messages was

authenticated through circumstantial evidence. The text message came from

the phone number that was authenticated as Nabried’s cell phone. See N.T.,

7/10/23, at 50-52. The CI called Nabried’s cell phone, which prompted a

response from Nabried at 3:42 p.m. that he would see her in about 15

minutes. See id. at 51-53, 56. Consistent with that text message, shortly

thereafter Nabried called the CI to inform her that he arrived and police

observed Nabried in his vehicle outside of the CI’s house. See id. at 61. This

depth of circumstantial evidence demonstrated that Nabried was the author

of the text messages. See Orr,
255 A.3d at 601
. Therefore, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in admitting the text messages.

      Nabried next argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the defense

“opened the door” to testimony about any uncharged drug deliveries. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 36. Nabried argues that defense counsel did not open the

                                     -8-
J-S30012-24



door because his questions were narrowly tailored not to elicit an answer

related to any prior conduct. See id. at 39. We disagree.

      The trial court ruled that defense counsel “opened the door” on two

occasions. First, the trial court ruled that the following exchange during

defense counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Petrucci “opened the door to

the other undercover controlled buys that would show [the CI’s] reliability.”

N.T., 7/10/23, at 108.

      Q. You said you never worked with this person before?

      A. Correct. . . .

      Q. Okay, so you had no way to gauge her reliability? And when I
      say reliable, I mean that she’s going to do what she says she does
      and she’s done it well in the past. But you have no way to gauge
      her reliability because you’ve never worked with her and she’s
      never been an informant to your knowledge before, correct?

      A. She’s never been an informant of mine prior to this
      investigation. But I worked with her for several weeks during this
      investigation.

      Q. But you had no way to gauge her reliability prior to beginning
      this investigation?

Id. at 107-108. The trial court ruled that this exchange “opened the door” to

the other controlled buys to show the CI’s reliability. See id. at 108-10.

      The   next    exchange   during   Officer   Petrucci’s   cross-examination

concerned how an unanswered phone call from the CI to Nabried indicated to

Nabried that the CI wanted drugs. Officer Petrucci testified that “the fact that

there was a phone call to Mr. Nabried alerted him to the fact that the [CI]

wanted an ounce of crystal methamphetamine[,]” and that “the phone call


                                     -9-
J-S30012-24



placed the order for the drug.” Id. at 131, 133. This led to the following

exchange between defense counsel and Officer Petrucci:

      Q. No one ever answered that phone call?

      A. No.

      Q. So nothing was set up with a phone call?

      A. Wrong. Yes, it was. The phone call was enough for Mr. Nabried
      to know that she wanted to order narcotics.

      Q. He never answered the phone.

      A. I understand that.

      Q. Then how could he know?

Id. at 134. The trial court ruled that this exchange “opened the door” to prior

drug transactions to demonstrate how a phone call from the CI informed

Nabried that the CI was seeking to buy drugs. See id. at 134-36.

      “If [a] defendant delves into what would be objectionable testimony on

the part of the Commonwealth, then the Commonwealth can probe further

into the objectionable area.” Commonwealth v. Lewis,
885 A.2d 51, 54-55
(Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted). “A litigant opens the door to

inadmissible evidence by presenting proof that creates a false impression

refuted by the otherwise prohibited evidence.” Commonwealth v. Gross,
241 A.3d 413, 420
(Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

      Here, defense counsel’s questions created a false impression that the CI

had never bought drugs before from Nabried and that there was no reason for

Nabried to know that a phone call from the CI indicated that she wanted drugs.


                                    - 10 -
J-S30012-24



This false impression was only dispelled by Officer Petrucci’s testimony on

redirect that the CI had previously bought drugs from Nabried and that based

on these previous drug transactions Nabried knew that a phone call from the

CI indicated that the CI wanted drugs. See N.T., 7/10/23, at 147-48.

Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion.

       In his fourth issue, Nabried argues that statements made in the

audio/video recording were inadmissible hearsay statements made by the CI

and the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Officer Petrucci to testify

about them. See Appellant’s Brief, at 26. Specifically, Nabried contests Officer

Petrucci’s testimony that the CI asked to purchase crystal methamphetamine

and “white girl” and his testimony that “white girl” refers to powder cocaine.2

See id. at 27. The Commonwealth argues that the CI’s statements were not

hearsay because they were offered to provide context rather than for the truth

of the matter asserted, and that Officer Petrucci’s definition of “white girl” was

not derived from hearsay because it was based on his training and experience.

See Commonwealth’s Br. at 19-22.

       As we previously observed, hearsay is a statement: “(1) the declarant

does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party

offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”

Pa.R.E. 801. However, an out-of-court statement “offered for a purpose other

____________________________________________


2 Considering Nabried was convicted of PWID for crystal methamphetamine,

not cocaine, we fail to see, and Nabried does not explain, how the statements
about “white girl” are relevant to this appeal.

                                          - 11 -
J-S30012-24



than proving the truth of its contents, . . . is not hearsay and is not excludable

under the hearsay rule.” Commonwealth v. Dargan,
897 A.2d 496, 500
(Pa.

Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “[S]upplying context is a non-hearsay

purpose.” See Commonwealth v. Ames,
290 A.3d 691
, at 8 n.10 (Pa. Super.

filed Dec. 19, 2022) (unpublished memorandum) (citing 1 McCormick On Evid.

§ 56 (8th ed.)).3

       First, Officer Petrucci’s testimony about the definition of “white girl” was

based on his own training and experience, not on hearsay. See N.T., 710/23,

at 68. Second, the trial court reasoned that the CI’s statements about her

intent to purchase methamphetamine and “white girl” did not violate the rule

against hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter

asserted but rather were offered to put into context statements made by

Nabried. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/24, at 5-6. We discern no abuse of

discretion. The CI’s statement on the recording that she was requesting to

buy drugs from Nabried provided context to the interaction between the CI

and Nabried. Without this context, the interaction between the CI and Nabried

would be incomplete and confuse the jury. Thus, the trial court’s admission of

the CI’s statements from the audio/video recording did not violate the rule

against hearsay and was not an abuse of discretion.

       Further, the admission of Officer Petrucci’s testimony regarding the

content of the audio/video recording of the controlled buy was not an abuse
____________________________________________


3 Non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited as
persuasive authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(2).

                                          - 12 -
J-S30012-24



of discretion.4 An officer may testify to the contents of a surveillance video if

their testimony is based on their own personal observations and experience.

See Commonwealth v. Bair, 1681 MDA 2018, at 7 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 14,

2019) (unpublished memorandum) (holding that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in allowing a police officer’s testimony regarding the contents of

a recorded controlled buy where the officer was physically present at the scene

and his testimony was based on his personal knowledge, training, and

experience with investigating drug crimes).

       In this case, the trial court reasoned that Officer Petrucci’s testimony

was admissible because it was based on his own observations and personal

knowledge of the scene. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/24, at 4-6. We agree.

Officer Petrucci observed the drug transaction in real time. See N.T., 7/10/23,




____________________________________________


4 To the extent that Nabried challenges the admission of Officer Petrucci’s
testimony regarding the content of the audio/video recording, rather than the
CI’s statements therein, he has waived this issue. Issues not raised in the trial
court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Pa.R.A.P.
302(a). Further, “[t]he rule is well settled that a party complaining on appeal
of the admission of evidence in the [c]ourt below will be confined to the
specific objection there made.” Commonwealth v. Santiago-Burgos,
314
A.3d 535, 545
(Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “[i]f counsel
states the grounds for an objection, then all other unspecified grounds are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth
v. Lopez,
57 A.3d 74, 82
(Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted). At trial,
defense counsel only objected to the admission of the CI’s statements in the
audio/video recording but never objected to Officer’s Petrucci’s testimony.
See N.T., 7/10/23, at 13-15, 63. Defense counsel’s failure to object on these
specific grounds resulted in waiver. However, as discussed above, even if not
waived, the claim would not merit relief.

                                          - 13 -
J-S30012-24



at 66. Thus, his testimony was based on his own observations of the events

that occurred. Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion.

      In his next issue, Nabried asserts that allowing Officer Petrucci to testify

about the CI’s hearsay statements violated his right to confront the witness in

violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Pennsylvania and United States

constitutions. See Appellant’s Brief, at 28. Nabried’s claim warrants no relief.

      A defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to confront a witness

under the Confrontation Clause of the United States and Pennsylvania

Constitutions is a pure question of law for which our standard of review is de

novo. See Commonwealth v. Grush,
295 A.3d 247, 250
(Pa. Super. 2023),

appeal denied,
308 A.3d 770
(Pa. 2023). “The focus of the Confrontation

Clause is testimonial hearsay.” Commonwealth v. Agnew,
299 A.3d 1001,

1007
(Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Confrontation

Clause is not implicated by the admission of non-testimonial or non-hearsay

statements. See
id.
Testimonial statements are statements “made for the purpose of

establishing or proving some fact.” Commonwealth v. Yohe,
79 A.3d 520,

531
(Pa. 2013) (quoting Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 51
(2004)).

To determine whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial, courts

consider whether the statements were made for the primary purpose of

establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal

prosecution.”
Id.
(quoting Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 822
(2006)).

Further, “the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the

                                     - 14 -
J-S30012-24



individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that

reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals’

statements and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter

occurred.” Michigan v. Bryant,
562 U.S. 344, 360
(2011) (footnote omitted).

      As stated above, the out of court statements of the CI on the

audio/video recording were not hearsay because they were only introduced to

provide context. See Ames, 1387-88 MDA 2021, at 8 n.10. Further, the

statements were non-testimonial because they were made for the purpose of

purchasing drugs, not for establishing past events relevant to later criminal

prosecutions. See Yohe,
79 A.3d at 521
. Since the statements were non-

hearsay and non-testimonial the protections of the confrontation clause are

not implicated. See Agnew,
299 A.3d at 1007
. Therefore, Nabried’s claim

that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated is without merit.

      In his final issue, Nabried argues that the trial court erred in denying his

request to hire an expert in the field of narcotics investigation. See Appellant’s

Brief, at 40. He claims that this was critical to his defense to challenge the

integrity of the Commonwealth’s investigative methods in conducting the

controlled buy. See
id.
Further, Nabried contends that the male officer’s

failure to “strip search” the female CI was unsatisfactory and warranted

further review by an expert. See id. at 42-43. We disagree.

            It is well-established that indigent defendants have a right
      to access the same resources as non-indigent defendants in
      criminal proceedings. The state has an affirmative duty to furnish
      indigent defendants the same protections accorded those
      financially able to obtain them. Procedural due process guarantees

                                     - 15 -
J-S30012-24


      that a defendant has the right to present competent evidence in
      his defense, and the state must ensure that an indigent defendant
      has fair opportunity to present his defense.

             However, the provision of public funds to hire experts to
      assist in the defense against criminal charges is a decision vested
      in the sound discretion of the court and a denial thereof will not
      be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.

Commonwealth v. Melvin,
172 A.3d 14
, 22–23 (Pa. Super. 2017) (brackets

and citations omitted). “Generally, the trial court will not be found to have

abused its discretion in the absence of a clear showing as to the content,

relevancy and materiality of the testimony of the potential witnesses.”

Commonwealth v. Bell,
706 A.2d 855, 862
(Pa. Super. 1998) (citation

omitted).

      “[T]he Commonwealth is not obligated to pay for the services of an

expert simply because a defendant requests one. There must be some

showing as to the content and relevancy of the proposed expert testimony

before such a request will be granted.” Commonwealth v. Tighe,
184 A.3d

560, 580
(Pa. Super. 2018), aff’d but criticized,
224 A.3d 1268
(Pa. 2020)

(internal citations omitted). Similarly, a defendant is not entitled to public

funds to hire an expert witness where the defendant “fails to identify a

particularized need for such assistance related to a colorable issue presented

in his defense[.]” Commonwealth v. Howard,
719 A.2d 233, 242
(Pa.

1998). Importantly, an expert is not essential to the defense where cross-

examination of a witness at trial serves the same purpose as the expert




                                    - 16 -
J-S30012-24



testimony. See Commonwealth v. Lambert,
270 A.3d 1153
, at *9 (Pa.

Super. filed Dec. 21, 2021) (unpublished memorandum).

      The trial court explained it denied Nabried’s request because he failed

to demonstrate how the police officers’ handling of the CI was relevant to the

recording of the controlled buy. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/24, at 11.

Furthermore, the trial court points out that defense counsel cross-examined

the officers “at length” about their training and experience in handling

confidential informants, so an expert’s speculative testimony would not have

offered more than what was accomplished with cross-examination. See
id.
(citing Lambert, supra.). We discern no abuse of discretion. Defense counsel

was able to question the officers about their investigation tactics on cross-

examination. Defense counsel cross-examined both officers about their

handling of the CI and particularly why they did not have a female officer to

conduct a more thorough strip search of the CI. See N.T., 7/10/23, at 110-

20; N.T., 7/11/23, at 20-28. This cross-examination served the same purpose

as the proposed expert witness of calling into question how the officers used

the CI in their investigation. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Nabried’s request to hire an expert witness.




                                    - 17 -
J-S30012-24



     Judgment of sentence affirmed.


Judgment Entered.




Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary



Date: 11/19/2024




                                 - 18 -