Com. v. Schuback, J.

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11173550","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
J-S26018-25


NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JUSTIN SCHUBACK                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1836 MDA 2024

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 10, 2024
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-35-CR-0001218-2023


BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., OLSON, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                             FILED: OCTOBER 20, 2025

       Appellant, Justin Schuback, appeals from the July 10, 2024 judgment of

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County after

a jury convicted Appellant of murder of the first degree, robbery – infliction of

serious bodily injury, and burglary – overnight accommodation.1 As discussed

in greater detail infra, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment,

to be followed by an aggregate term of 7½ to 15 years’ incarceration. We

affirm.

       The trial court summarized the factual circumstances which led to

Appellant’s convictions as follows:

       This homicide prosecution arises from the death of Robert Scott
       Baron (“Baron”), who was reported missing on January 26, 2017,
       and whose skeletal remains were discovered more than six years
____________________________________________


1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 3701(a)(1)(i), and 3502(a)(1)(i), respectively.
J-S26018-25


       later on March 28, 2023. On January 26, 2017, Baron’s wife,
       Maria Baron, [(“Mrs. Baron”)] informed the Old Forge Police
       Department that Baron [] failed to pick up his son, Robert Alfred
       Baron (“Robert Jr.”), [on January 26, 2017,] for work at Baron’s
       business, Ghigiarelli’s Restaurant. Robert Jr. advised the police
       that his father’s 2006 silver Hyundai Elantra was not parked at the
       restaurant, that the early morning delivery of pizza dough was left
       on the sidewalk, and that Baron was not present in the restaurant.
       [Mrs.] Baron reported that Baron ate dinner with her at their
       residence on January 25, 2017, and left [the residence] at
       approximately 9:30 p.m. to return to Ghigiarelli’s Restaurant[,]
       which had an upstairs apartment where Baron “stayed at during
       the nighttime.” Baron [was last] seen by his family when he drove
       [Robert] Jr. home between 10:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. on
       January 25, 2017, before Baron returned to the restaurant in his
       Hyundai vehicle.

       The Old Forge Police Department obtained a search warrant to
       access Ghigiarelli’s Restaurant on January 26, 2017, and upon
       observing visible evidence of an apparent crime, contacted the
       Pennsylvania State Police [(“PSP”)] Forensic Services Unit to
       process the crime scene. The evidence discovered by the [PSP]
       included spattered blood, broken glass, a human tooth in the
       utility sink, cash missing from the register, an empty safe, and
       swiping and wiping patterns indicating efforts to clean the [crime]
       scene. The [PSP] treated the restaurant waiting area and bar
       [area] with Luminol to determine if certain items or areas
       [illuminated with a blue glow] and revealed additional blood
       evidence, and also collected samples of the spattered blood for
       testing.[2]

       When the police interviewed Robert Jr. on the morning of January
       26, 2017, he “indicated that [Appellant] might have something to
       do with his father’s disappearance” since Robert Jr. was angry with
       [Appellant] for failing to purchase drugs with money that Robert
       Jr. [] provided him for that purpose.           Upon interviewing
       [Appellant] on January 26, 2017, the police learned that
       [Appellant] and Robert Jr. were friends and fellow drug users, that
       [Appellant] knew from Robert Jr. that Baron kept large sums of
____________________________________________


2 “Luminol” is “a chemical that illuminates when it contacts the iron component

of blood.” Commonwealth v. Williams,
854 A.2d 440, 443
(Pa. 2004),
cert. denied,
546 U.S. 829
(2005).


                                           -2-
J-S26018-25


     cash at Ghigiarelli’s Restaurant, and that Robert Jr.[, on occasion,]
     would leave an upstairs window unlocked and use a nearby ladder
     to enter the locked restaurant at night in order to steal money to
     purchase drugs. The preliminary investigation also revealed that
     [Appellant’s] drug dealer, Patrick Boyle, [(“Boyle”)] was actively
     “threatening to beat up” [Appellant] for money that [Appellant]
     owed him, and that [Appellant] advised [Boyle] on the afternoon
     of January 25, 2017, that “I’ll be down to see you later with the
     money, I have some work to do.”

     [Appellant’s] live-in girlfriend, Kourtney Rake, [(“Rake”)]
     informed the police that [Appellant] left their residence [located
     on] Foundry Street[ in] Old Forge, [Pennsylvania] between
     9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.[,] on January 25, 2017, after informing
     her that he was meeting [Boyle] “to work on a car and potentially
     pick up drugs.” At 12:25 a.m.[,] on January 26, 2017, [Appellant]
     met [Boyle] near a [retail] store and paid him the $60.00 that
     [Appellant] owed him[. D]espite the fact that [Appellant] was
     unemployed, he gave [Boyle] an additional $180.00 to purchase
     11 bags of heroin.[FN1] After [Appellant] initially failed to answer
     [Rake’s] telephone calls and text messages inquiring about his
     whereabouts, [Appellant] transmitted a text message to her at
     1:27 a.m.[,] on January 26, 2017, stating “shhhh, I’ll explain
     when I get there.”

        [Footnote 1: Boyle] advised the police that although
        [Appellant] typically arrived from the direction of his
        Foundry Street residence when he purchased drugs from
        [Boyle] at the [designated] location, [Appellant,] instead,
        approached from the direction of Ghigiarelli’s Restaurant at
        the time of their drug transaction on January 26, 2017, at
        12:25 a.m.

     [Rake] told the [] police that [Appellant] eventually returned
     home and entered their residence via his bedroom window at
     approximately 3:00 a.m.[,] on January 26, 2017. At that time,
     she noted that [Appellant] “was sweaty and his clothes were
     muddy” and that “he seemed out of breath.” When she asked
     [Appellant] where he had been, he replied “that he saw police”
     and “was hiding from them because he had drugs on him” and
     believed “that they were actually following him.” [Rake and
     Appellant] “took the drugs after he got cleaned up” and “then went
     to bed.”




                                     -3-
J-S26018-25


     In light of the preliminary information gathered from Robert Jr.
     and [Appellant], Detective Sheryl Turner of the Lackawanna
     County District Attorney’s Office forwarded a letter to Verizon
     Wireless on January 26, 2017, requesting that it preserve and
     retain specific data pertaining to [Appellant’s cellular telephone],
     such as [text-based short messages service] messages, call logs,
     [multimedia messaging service messages containing pictures or
     videos], browsing history, and [internet protocol] logs, for the
     period from January 21, 2017, to January 26, 2017, but she did
     not demand or receive any such information at that time.

     [] Kevin Snyder, [(“Snyder”) whose residence is located on
     Connell Street in Old Forge] informed the police that on January
     26, 2017, at 6:45 a.m., he observed a 2006 silver Hyundai Elantra
     parked at the “dead end” of that street. However, when his wife[]
     “went out to walk her dogs” at 9:00 a.m.[,] on January 26, 2017,
     “the vehicle was gone.” Additionally, [Appellant’s] cousin, Jason
     Cistola, [(“Cistola”)] advised the police that he sold heroin to
     [Appellant] for $300.00 on January 26, 2017, and for $150.00 on
     January 28, 2017, even though [Appellant] was not gainfully
     employed.

     On January 29, 2017, Baron’s Hyundai Elantra was discovered at
     [a location on] Howard Street in] Old Forge. Blood stains were
     observed in the interior of the vehicle, including the steering wheel
     and the interior door handle on the driver’s side. The vehicle was
     [examined by] the PSP Forensic Services Unit, which swabbed the
     various blood stains to retrieve samples for [deoxyribonucleic acid
     (“DNA”)] testing.

     On March 22, 2017, the forensic DNA scientists with the PSP
     laboratory issued a report concluding that the DNA retrieved from
     the tooth found in the [utility] sink at Ghigiarelli’s Restaurant, the
     blood located in [the] bar and restaurant area[s], the blood in the
     Hyundai vehicle, and the blood on the [blanket] found in the
     restaurant matched the DNA profile derived from Baron’s
     toothbrushes. The DNA extracted from the Hyundai’s steering
     wheel contained “a DNA mixture profile” indicating “that more
     than one person’s DNA [was] present,” and that Baron’s DNA
     “could not be excluded as a contributor to this profile.” In their
     supplemental report[,] dated September 12, 2017, [the forensic
     DNA] scientists reported that the DNA obtained from a napkin and
     newspaper found in the Hyundai [vehicle] and from the interior
     door frame [on the front passenger’s side of the vehicle] matched
     Baron’s DNA. On May 31, 2018, a second consensual search of

                                     -4-
J-S26018-25


     the Hyundai [vehicle] was conducted at the PSP barracks, and
     blood [deposits] present on the interior front driver's side door
     handle [were] swabbed for DNA testing.

     In response to a search warrant dated July 5, 2018, [Appellant’s]
     wireless carrier, Verizon Wireless, furnished [the] Commonwealth
     with [] range-to-tower information which identified the locations
     and movements of [Appellant’s cellular telephone] on January 26,
     2017. The “timing advance” or “range-to-tower data” produced
     by Verizon Wireless reflected that [Appellant’s cellular telephone]
     was at Ghigiarelli’s Restaurant from 12:39 a.m. to 1:45 a.m.[,]
     on January 26, 2017.         It is noteworthy that [Appellant]
     transmitted a [textual message] to [Rake] at 1:27 a.m., stating
     “shhhh, I’ll explain when I get there,” thereby reflecting that he
     sent that text [message] while his [cellular telephone] was
     [located] at the restaurant. [Cell tower tracking of the cellular
     telephone showed that the cellular telephone moved] in a
     southerly direction at 1:56 a.m., and [the cellular telephone was]
     situated at Pagnotti Park from 2:01 a.m. to 2:15 a.m.            At
     2:20 a.m., [Appellant’s cellular telephone] was located at the
     Connell Street site where Baron’s Hyundai [vehicle] was later
     observed by [Snyder] at 6:45 a.m. From that point, the [cellular
     telephone] moved in the direction of [Appellant’s] residence,
     where [Rake] stated [Appellant] arrived at approximately
     3:00 a.m. and “was sweaty,” “out of breath,” and wearing
     “muddy” clothes.

     The range-to-tower data indicated that from 6:26 a.m. to
     8:26 a.m.[,] on January 26, 2017, [Appellant’s cellular telephone]
     was present in Pagnotti Park. From 8:31 a.m. to 8:33 a.m., [the
     cellular telephone] was detected at the Connell Street location
     where the Hyundai [vehicle] was observed by [Snyder] at
     6:45 a.m., but gone [from that location] by 9:00 a.m. according
     to [Snyder’s wife.     Appellant’s cellular telephone] was next
     present[, from 8:38 a.m. to 8:41 a.m.,] at the second car drop
     site [along] Howard Street, where Baron’s Hyundai [vehicle] was
     later found on January 29, 2017[.] Shortly after 8:41 a.m.,
     [Appellant] was depicted on video surveillance [obtained from a
     gas station and convenience store] as he was walking within
     three-tenths of a mile of [the location along] Howard Street, and
     approximately 10 minutes later, his [cellular telephone] was
     situated at his residence at 8:51 a.m.[,] on January 26, 2017.

     During the ensuing investigation, [Appellant] provided a buccal
     swab of his cheek cells so that his DNA profile could be

                                    -5-
J-S26018-25


     determined. The electronic file of the mixed DNA profile retrieved
     from the interior driver’s side door handle was forwarded to
     Cybergenetics, which created the TrueAllele software that
     separates DNA mixtures for identification purposes. Utilizing that
     generally accepted technology, Cybergenetics determined[,] on
     October 24, 2019, that Baron “is thirteen point three thousand
     times more probable than a coincidental match” and [Appellant]
     “is two hundred and ninety million times more probable than a
     coincidental match” of the DNA extracted from the [interior
     portion of the driver’s side door] handle. Cybergenetics conducted
     the same testing of the DNA mixture profile from the Hyundai's
     steering wheel[] and[,] on November 25, 2020, issued a report
     concluding that Baron was “[one] hundred forty[-]one quintillion
     times more probable than a coincidental match,” while [Appellant]
     was a “five point five thousand times more probable than a
     coincidental match” of that [DNA] profile. Thus, both Baron and
     [Appellant] were statistical matches for the DNA retrieved from
     the Hyundai's steering wheel and interior driver's side door handle
     using “the most conservative match statistics.”

     On March 24, 2023, [Appellant] submitted to a voluntary interview
     at his residence that was conducted by PSP Trooper Gregory Allen
     [(“Trooper Allen”)] and Detective Turner. [Appellant] “stated he
     was never in Baron’s Hyundai vehicle,” but admitted that he []
     witnessed “[Robert] Jr. break into Ghigiarelli’s [Restaurant] a few
     times through a window” on the second floor of the property “with
     a ladder.” He also acknowledged that he was aware of “the cash
     register” at Ghigiarelli’s Restaurant and [Robert] Jr.’s “access to
     money” there, and “that he had stolen fifty dollars from [Robert]
     Jr.” the day before Baron went missing. [Appellant] informed
     Trooper Allen and Detective Turner that he met [Boyle] at the
     [retail] store location [in] the early morning [hours on] January
     26, 2017, in order to pay him the money that he owed him and to
     purchase narcotics from him.

     On March 28, 2023, the Old Forge Police Department, Detectives
     from the Lackawanna County District Attorney’s Office, the PSP,
     the [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and “the New York State
     Police with their cadaver dogs” conducted a search at Pagnotti
     Park of a 1200 square foot area that had been devised utilizing
     the range-to-tower data for [Appellant’s cellular telephone].
     Within 10 to 15 minutes, the cadaver dogs located skeletal
     remains that the Lackawanna County Coroner, Timothy Roland,
     [(“Coroner Roland”)] forwarded to a forensic anthropologist, Dr.
     Dennis Dirkmaat, who identified them as human bones. A femur

                                    -6-
J-S26018-25


        bone was transported to the PSP laboratory to be analyzed by its
        forensic DNA scientists, and based upon their DNA testing, they
        concluded that the DNA from that bone was “ten septillion times
        more likely to have belonged to [Baron].” Therefore, Coroner
        Rowland amended Baron’s earlier death certificate to identify his
        cause of death as traumatic injuries and the manner of his death
        as homicide.

Trial Court Memorandum and Order, 4/24/24, at 3-9 (record citations, original

brackets, extraneous capitalization, and ellipsis omitted).

        On May 15, 2024, a jury convicted Appellant of the aforementioned

criminal charges. On July 10, 2024, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life

imprisonment for his conviction of first-degree murder.3 That same day, the

trial court imposed a sentence of 5½ to 11 years’ incarceration for Appellant’s

robbery conviction and a sentence of 2 to 4 years’ incarceration for his

burglary conviction.      The sentences imposed for the robbery and burglary

convictions were set to run consecutively to each other and to run

consecutively to the sentence of life imprisonment.           Thus, Appellant’s

aggregate sentence was life imprisonment to be followed by a term of 7½ to

15 years’ incarceration.

        On July 19, 2024, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion that

asserted, inter alia, that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

Appellant filed his brief in support of the post-sentence motion on August 23,

2024.     The Commonwealth filed its brief in opposition to the motion on

September 19, 2024, and filed a supplemental brief on October 24, 2025. The
____________________________________________


3 The trial court gave Appellant a credit of 467 days for time served.




                                           -7-
J-S26018-25



trial court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s post-sentence motion on

October 25, 2024.

       On December 15, 2024, Appellant filed a notice of appeal challenging

his judgment of sentence. The following day, December 16, 2024, Appellant

filed a praecipe to enter an order denying the post-sentence motion by

operation of law on November 15, 2024. On December 17, 2024, the trial

court entered an order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion.

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:4

       1.     Whether [Appellant] was denied his right to cross-examine
              witnesses when he was precluded from questioning two
              witnesses regarding their conduct surrounding their
              respective polygraph examinations[?]

       2.     Whether the trial court erred in allowing a jailhouse
              informant to testify regarding alleged statements made by
              [Appellant?]

       3.     Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on
              accomplice liability[?]

       4.     Whether the guilty verdict was against the weight of the
              evidence   because    the    Commonwealth      relied   on
              impermissible evidence to establish “manner of death[?].”

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

       Preliminarily we examine the procedural posture of this case as it

implicates our jurisdiction.      Commonwealth v. Valentine,
928 A.2d 346,

349
(Pa. Super. 2007) (stating, “this Court can raise jurisdictional issues sua

____________________________________________


4 Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 1925.


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sponte”).   Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720, which addresses

procedures pertaining to the filing of a post-sentence motion, states, in

pertinent part, that,

      3) Time Limits for Decision on Motion. The [trial court] shall
      not vacate sentence pending decision on the post-sentence
      motion, but shall decide the motion as provided in this paragraph.

         (a) Except as provided in paragraph (B)(3)(b), the [trial
         court] shall decide the post-sentence motion, including any
         supplemental motion, within 120 days of the filing of the
         motion. If the [trial court] fails to decide the motion within
         120 days, or to grant an extension as provided in paragraph
         (B)(3)(b), the motion shall be deemed denied by operation
         of law.

         (b) Upon motion of the defendant within the 120-day
         disposition period, for good cause shown, the [trial court]
         may grant one 30-day extension for decision on the motion.
         If the [trial court] fails to decide the motion within the
         30-day extension period, the motion shall be deemed denied
         by operation of law.

         (c) When a post-sentence motion is denied by operation of
         law, the clerk of courts shall forthwith enter an order on
         behalf of the [trial] court, and, as provided in Rule 114,
         forthwith shall serve a copy of the order on the attorney for
         the Commonwealth, the defendant’s attorney, or the
         defendant if unrepresented, that the post-sentence motion
         is deemed denied.         This order is not subject to
         reconsideration.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a-c). Pursuant to Rule 720(B), when a post-sentence

motion is denied by operation of law, the clerk of courts is required to file an

order, on behalf of the trial court, indicating that the post-sentence motion is

deemed denied by operation of law so the parties have appropriate notice that

the 30-day window to perfect an appeal has begun.          Commonwealth v.



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Khalil,
806 A.2d 415, 419-420
(Pa. Super. 2002) (explaining that, upon

notice of the denial of a post-sentence motion by operation of law, the

defendant has 30 days to perfect an appeal), appeal denied,
818 A.2d 503
(Pa. 2003); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 Comment (stating, “[u]nder paragraph

(B)(3)(a), on the date when the [trial] court disposes of the motion, or the

date when the motion is denied by operation of law, the judgment becomes

final for the purposes of appeal”). It is well-established that “where the clerk

of courts does not enter an order indicating that the post-sentence motion is

denied by operation of law and notify the [parties] of the same, a breakdown

in the court system has occurred.” Commonwealth v. Perry,
820 A.2d 734,

735
(Pa. Super. 2003).

       In the case sub judice, Appellant filed his timely post-sentence motion

on July 19, 2024. Appellant did not file a motion requesting an extension of

the 120-day disposition period for his post-sentence motion. Mechanically,

the trial court had until Monday, November 18, 2024, to enter an order

disposing of the post-sentence motion or the motion would be deemed denied

by operation of law.5 Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). Because the trial court did

not enter an order disposing of the post-sentence motion before the expiration

of the 120-day disposition period, Appellant’s post-sentence motion was

____________________________________________


5 See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (stating that, whenever the last day of any period

of time referred to in a statute “shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or on any
day made a legal holiday by the laws of this Commonwealth or of the United
States, such day shall be omitted from the computation”).


                                          - 10 -
J-S26018-25



deemed denied by operation of law on November 18, 2024.6 Id. The clerk of

courts for the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County failed, however,

to enter an order on November 18, 2024 that stated the post-sentence motion

was deemed denied by operation of law and to provide proper notice of the

same to the parties. As such, a breakdown in the judicial system occurred.

Despite this breakdown in the judicial system, Appellant filed a notice of

appeal on December 15, 2024, before the expiration of the 30-day period in

which to perfect the appeal. Therefore, we find that Appellant’s judgment of

sentence became final on November 18, 2024, and, despite the breakdown in

the judicial system, Appellant perfected an appeal of his judgment of sentence

when he filed a timely notice of appeal on December 15, 2024. Consequently,

we proceed to review Appellant’s issues raised on appeal.

       In his first issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s April 24, 2024

order that granted the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to preclude reference

to, and the results of, polygraph tests undergone by certain individuals,

namely Robert Jr. and Cistola, that the Commonwealth anticipated calling as

witnesses during Appellant’s trial.

       It is well-settled that in reviewing a trial court’s order granting or

denying a motion in limine, “we apply an evidentiary abuse of discretion
____________________________________________


6 Because the trial court was without power to deny Appellant’s post-sentence

motion after the motion was deemed denied, by operation of law, on
November 18, 2024, the trial court’s December 17, 2024 order denying
Appellant’s post-sentence motion is a legal nullity. Khalil,
806 A.2d at
419-420
.


                                          - 11 -
J-S26018-25



standard of review.”     Commonwealth v. Stokes,
78 A.3d 644, 654
(Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that, “[t]he admissibility of evidence is a matter

directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court may

reverse only upon a showing that the trial court abused that discretion”),

appeal denied,
89 A.3d 661
(Pa. 2014).

      “The rule in Pennsylvania is that reference to a [polygraph] test or the

result thereof which raises inferences concerning the guilt or innocence of a

defendant is inadmissible.” Commonwealth v. Cain,
369 A.2d 1234, 1241
(Pa. 1977); see also Commonwealth v. Chester,
587 A.2d 1367, 1376
(Pa.

1991) (stating that, results of a polygraph test have been repeatedly and

consistently held to be inadmissible for any purpose), cert. denied,
502 U.S.

959
(1991); Commonwealth v. Saunders,
125 A.2d 442, 445
(Pa. 1956)

(stating that, reference to a polygraph test, or its results, “is not judicially

acceptable”); Commonwealth ex rel. Riccio v. Dilworth,
115 A.2d 865,

866
(Pa. Super. 1955); Commonwealth v. A.R.,
990 A.2d 1, 6
(Pa. Super.

2010), aff’d,
80 A.3d 1180
(Pa. 2013). “This rule was established to protect

the defendant in a criminal trial[,] and it is based on [our Supreme] Court’s

refusal to recognize the scientific accuracy or validity of such tests.” Cain,
369 A.2d at 1241-1242
.

      Appellant asserts that “it is not the results of the polygraph or computer

voice stress analyzer [examinations] that are relevant, but the statements

and conduct of [Robert] Jr. and Cistola before, during, and after the

administration of the polygraph and computer voice stress analyzer

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J-S26018-25



[examinations].” Appellant’s Brief at 21. Appellant contends that Robert Jr.’s

and   Cistola’s   “behavior   and   conduct    before,   during,    and    after   the

administration of the computer voice stress analyzer and polygraph

examinations is inconstant with the conduct and behavior of innocent and

honest individuals.” Id. at 22. Appellant alleges that after Robert Jr. was

informed that he did not pass the computer voice stress analysis test, “he

explained that he pushed off scheduling the polygraph examination for nearly

nine months because he knew he would fail the [test] and [his failure of the

test] would be blown out of proportion.” Id. Appellant also alleges that, after

Cistola was informed that he did not pass the polygraph test, he “told

investigators that he had snorted three bags of heroin [prior to the

administering of the examination] – despite denying recent drug and alcohol

use during the pre-test interview.” Id. Appellant argues that he had “the

right to confront both [individuals] on their inconsistent behavior and

conduct.” Id. Appellant asserts that “any questioning would be elicited not

to show the reliability of the tests, but to show that [Robert] Jr.’s and []

Cistola’s conduct and behavior was inconsistent with innocence and honesty.”

Id. at 24.   Appellant argues that “it would be natural for [Robert] Jr. to

cooperate with law enforcement [] in finding his father.           The fact that he

delayed his cooperation is relevant[,] and he should be allowed to be

cross-examined on his inconsistent conduct and behavior.”                 Id. at 26.

Appellant also asserts that Robert Jr.’s “belief that he would fail the polygraph

[test and not the accuracy of the polygraph examination] is relevant.” Id. at

                                      - 13 -
J-S26018-25



27 (emphasis in original).     Similarly, Appellant asserts that “it’s not the

polygraph [test’s] actual reliability [that is at issue,] but [] Cistola’s conduct

and behavior surrounding his belief of its reliability.”       Id. (emphasis in

original).   Appellant further contends that “after agreeing to take the

polygraph [test] – and failing – [] Cistola invoked his Fifth Amendment Right

to Counsel under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436
(1966).                Cistola’s

subsequent cooperation with law enforcement after his initial invocation of his

right to counsel [(namely, his explanation that he ‘snorted’ bags of heroin

prior to taking the polygraph examination)] should have been subject to

impeachment and cross[-]examination.” Id. at 28.

      The trial court explained its rationale for granting the Commonwealth’s

motion in limine as follows:

      [Appellant] correctly notes that statements made before, during,
      or after a polygraph examination may be admitted into evidence,
      provided that they do not mention or reference the performance
      or results of the polygraph examination. However, the contents
      of Robert Jr.’s foregoing statements that [Appellant] seeks to
      introduce are inextricably interwoven with the results of the
      polygraph examination.        Robert Jr. cannot be questioned
      regarding his supposed reason for delaying his polygraph
      examination (i.e., because he knew that he would fail it) without
      disclosing the actual administration of the test or revealing its
      results. Since a redaction which eliminates any reference to the
      test and its results cannot be accomplished, the Commonwealth’s
      motion in limine will be granted as to Robert Jr.’s trial testimony.

      [Appellant] also argues that “the conduct and behavior” of “Cistola
      is contrary to that of innocen[ce] and honesty” in that “after []
      Cistola was informed of the results of the polygraph examination,
      he told investigators that he had snorted three bags of heroin
      before the exam - despite denying using drugs and alcohol in the
      twenty-four hours preceding the polygraph examination[-]during


                                     - 14 -
J-S26018-25


      the pre-test interview.” [Appellant] posits that “a jury can
      reasonably infer that [] Cistola snorted heroin, and lied about it,
      in an attempt to deceive the test.” [T]he defense presented no
      evidence in support of its claim that [] Cistola’s reported use of
      heroin before the polygraph examination somehow affected the
      results of that test.

      ...

      Regardless of the existence or lack of scientific evidence
      suggesting that heroin use may impact the detection of deception
      during a polygraph test, [Appellant’s] proffered cross-examination
      of [] Cistola likewise is so intrinsically intertwined with evidence
      of the performance and results of his polygraph examination as to
      render it inadmissible. The defense has not offered any means of
      questioning [] Cistola concerning his admitted heroin use in an
      alleged attempt to alter the outcome of his polygraph examination
      without mentioning or alluding to the test itself or its results. For
      that reason, any reference to [] Cistola’s heroin use as a pretext
      to influence the polygraph test results is similarly prohibited.

      ...

      Furthermore, witnesses may not be contradicted on a “collateral”
      matter, which “is one that has no relationship to the case at trial.”
      The proposed cross-examination of [] Cistola concerning his
      pre-polygraph heroin use, in contradiction of his earlier
      representation that he was not under the influence of drugs or
      alcohol, clearly constitutes impeachment on a collateral matter.

Trial Court Memorandum and Order, 4/24/24, at 21-24 (case citations,

original brackets, and record citations omitted; formatting modified).

      Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the

trial court’s order granting the Commonwealth’s motion in limine as it relates

to Appellant’s proposed cross-examination of Robert Jr. or Cistola.       At the

hearing on the motion in limine, the trial court noted, and the record supports,

that Appellant sought to introduce evidence that after Robert Jr. underwent

the polygraph examination and failed the test, he stated that the reason he


                                     - 15 -
J-S26018-25



delayed taking the test was he knew he would fail the test. N.T., 4/5/24, at

21. When asked how counsel for Appellant would introduce the statements

without mentioning that Robert Jr. underwent and failed a polygraph test,

counsel for Appellant conceded that it “would be cutting the line very closely”

as to the rule prohibiting evidence concerning a polygraph test. Id. Regarding

statements made by Cistola that he used illegal narcotics prior to undergoing

the polygraph test, counsel for Appellant asserted that these statements

“would go to show that he was possibly trying to trick the [polygraph] test”

and to impeach his statement to law enforcement that he was not under the

influence of, inter alia, a controlled substance prior to undergoing the

polygraph test. Id. at 23. As the trial court noted, and we agree, this Court

has permitted introduction of statements that were made before, during, or

after the administration of a polygraph test.   Aside from other evidentiary

hurdles that must be met before a statement may be introduced into evidence,

i.e., relevance, voluntariness, and hearsay, the admission of such statements

may only occur if the statements can be introduced without reference to a

polygraph test or the results thereof. See Commonwealth v. Schneider,
562 A.2d 868, 870-872
(Pa. Super. 1989) (stating that, “a statement given

after being advised that one has failed a [polygraph test] may be admitted

into evidence” provided law enforcement has not misled the individual

regarding the admissibility of the results of a polygraph test), appeal denied,
575 A.2d 564
(Pa. 1990); see also Commonwealth v. Santiago,
591 A.2d

1095
, 1104 n.15 (Pa. Super. 1991) (reiterating that, a statement made during

                                    - 16 -
J-S26018-25



the polygraph examination may be admissible provided the results of the

[examination] are not disclosed), appeal denied,
600 A.2d 953
(Pa. 1991);

Commonwealth v. Hoffman,
311 A.3d 625
,
2023 WL 9018418
, at *3

(Pa. Super. filed Dec. 29, 2023) (unpublished memorandum) (finding that,

the trial court properly admitted statements Hoffman made during the

polygraph interview because no reference was made to the polygraph

examination or the results thereof), appeal denied,
322 A.3d 151
(Pa. 2024);

Commonwealth v. Vasquez,
237 A.3d 462
,
2020 WL 2537214
, at *4

(Pa. Super. filed May 19, 2020) (unpublished memorandum). Here, the trial

court found, and the record supports, that the statements made by Robert Jr.

and Cistola could not be introduced without mentioning, or implying, to the

jury that the two individuals had undergone polygraph examinations and,

ultimately, failed those tests. Therefore, we discern no error in the trial court’s

ruling that precluded Appellant from cross-examining Robert Jr. and Cistola

regarding their statements to law enforcement because Appellant’s proposed

inquiry could not be conducted without reference to the polygraph tests, or

the results thereof. See Commonwealth v. Handfield,
34 A.3d 187, 212
(Pa. Super.    2011)    (affirming    that,    a   trial   court   may   preclude

cross-examination of a witness where the inquiry would reference a polygraph

examination, and the results thereof), appeal denied,
54 A.3d 347
(Pa. 2012).

      In his second issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s order that

denied his motion in limine to preclude certain testimony from Carlos Perez,

who, according to Appellant, is a jailhouse informant. Appellant argues that

                                      - 17 -
J-S26018-25



his statements to Perez were made while under the influence of Suboxone, a

controlled substance, supplied by Perez and the Commonwealth benefited

from Perez’s illegal acts.7 Appellant’s Brief at 29-31. As stated supra, we

review the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion in limine for an abuse

of discretion. Stokes,
78 A.3d at 654
.

       It is well-established that

       The Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel attaches
       at the initiation of formal judicial proceedings against an individual
       by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
       information, or arraignment.          Any statement made by the
       individual thereafter which is “deliberately elicited” by police,
       without the individual making a valid waiver of the right to
       counsel, is deemed a contravention of this right. A statement may
       be “deliberately elicited” by police through use of an informant.
       “Information secured by an informant acting as an agent of the
       government must be suppressed where the informant acts under
       instructions as an informant for the government, where he
       presents himself as no more than a fellow inmate rather than a
       governmental agent, and where the suspect is in custody and
       under indictment at the time of the questioning by the informant
       because such questioning outside the presence of the accused’s
       counsel violates the accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

       In order to prove such a violation, the defendant must
       demonstrate the police and the informant took some action,
       beyond mere listening, designed deliberately to elicit incriminating
       remarks. Additionally, the defendant must show the informant
       was acting as a government agent. Individual acts do not become
____________________________________________


7 Suboxone is a prescription medication that contains buprenorphine, which is

classified as a Schedule III controlled substance, and naloxone, which is an
opioid antagonist that is used to temporarily reverse the effects of an opioid
overdose. Commonwealth v. Arnold,
284 A.3d 1262
, 1266 n.3 (Pa. Super.
2022); see also 35 P.S. § 780-104(3)(i)(11); Commonwealth v. Jackson,
2020 WL 918813
, at *1 n.2 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 26, 2020) (unpublished
memorandum). Suboxone is used to treat opioid addiction.


                                          - 18 -
J-S26018-25


      governmental action merely because they are later relied upon
      and used by the government in furtherance of governmental
      objectives.

Commonwealth v. Hannibal,
156 A.3d 197, 212-213
(Pa. 2016) (citations

and some quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,
583 U.S. 830
(2017).

      Appellant asserts that Perez was acting as a government informant

when “he obtained Suboxone and illegally administered that substance to

[Appellant] with the intent of eliciting incriminating statements for his own

benefit.”   Appellant’s Brief at 29.   Appellant contends that any alleged

incriminating statements he made to Perez were “drug-induced” and “not of

[his] free will” and, therefore, should have been suppressed.       Id. at 31.

Appellant further argues that “serious policy considerations are implicated

when an inmate, whether acting at the direction of the government[,] or not,

may believe [that he or she] can gain favor with [the Commonwealth] by

drugging other inmates[.]” Id.

      In denying Appellant’s motion in limine to suppress the incriminating

statements that he allegedly made to Perez while incarcerated, the trial court

explained that

      [Appellant] presented no proof that [] Perez was acting as an
      agent for the [Commonwealth] at the time of their jailhouse
      conversations, and the only material contained in the record
      reflects that [] Perez did not contact the authorities until after
      [Appellant] allegedly confessed to [] Perez that [Appellant] killed
      Baron. Under those circumstances, [Appellant] cannot establish
      a constitutional basis for precluding evidence of any statements
      that he made to [] Perez [while incarcerated. A] voluntary
      jailhouse admission to a fellow inmate is not subject to any more
      protection than a confession made by [a] defendant outside of his
      [or her] jail cell to another person willing to notify authorities.

                                    - 19 -
J-S26018-25


     [Appellant] alternatively contends that his statements to [] Perez
     should be excluded on the ground that they were not given
     knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily since “[Appellant] was
     intoxicated from Suboxone given to him by [] Perez.”
     [Appellant’s] argument in this regard is misplaced since the
     requirement that statements be furnished “knowingly,
     intelligently, and voluntarily” applies to the admissibility of
     statements given by a defendant during custodial interrogation by
     police after the defendant has been advised of [his or her] rights
     under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436
(1966) and has
     knowingly , intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights. The
     case sub judice does not involve an instance where a defendant
     was so intoxicated or impaired that [he or she] was “too
     incoherent to knowingly or intelligently waive [his or her]
     Miranda rights and voluntarily confess while in custody” and,
     therefore, lacked sufficient cognitive awareness to understand
     those rights and effectively waive them.

     Rather, the record presented for review establishes that
     [Appellant] voluntarily used Suboxone with [] Perez and[,]
     therefore[,] provided inculpatory statements directly to him, not
     the police. To the extent that [Appellant] was intoxicated or
     impaired as a result of his Suboxone use, his condition does not
     affect the admissibility of his alleged confession, and instead[,]
     merely impacts the weight to be accorded to [] Perez’s testimony
     concerning [Appellant’s] apparent confession.

Trial Court Memorandum and Order, 4/24/24, at 26-28 (citations omitted).

     In Commonwealth v. Franciscus,
710 A.2d 1112
(Pa. 1998), our

Supreme Court found that, prior to “deliberately [eliciting] inculpatory

information from Franciscus,” the jailhouse informant “expected to receive a

lenient recommendation in exchange for information” based upon his prior

history with law enforcement. Franciscus,
710 A.2d at 1120
. The record

demonstrated that the jailhouse informant had an “express understanding”

with law enforcement that the information he provided would be rewarded

“with the appearances of the law enforcement officers at the sentencing


                                   - 20 -
J-S26018-25



hearing” and that law enforcement officers deposited funds into his prison

account, protected the informant from other inmates, and transferred the

informant to another prison system once his cooperation with law enforcement

had been discovered by other inmates in order that he could continue to

supply information to law enforcement.
Id.
Under the circumstances of that

case, our Supreme Court agreed that the jailhouse informant was acting as a

government agent and that his solicitation of incriminating information

violated Franciscus’s Sixth Amendment rights.8
Id. at 1121
.

       In contrast, our Supreme Court, in
Hannibal, supra,
found that the

jailhouse informant was not acting as a government agent when Hannibal

confessed to him that he murdered another individual. Hannibal,
156 A.3d

at 213
.     The Hannibal Court noted that “[t]here was no evidence the

government enlisted or directed [the jailhouse informant] to initiate contact

with [Hannibal] and elicit details about the [case.]”
Id. at 214
. The jailhouse

informant “testified he was not expecting any leniency in his [own pending

criminal matter] in exchange for his testimony” implicating Hannibal.
Id. at

213
; see also
id. at 214
(noting that, although the jailhouse informant “may

have hoped his cooperation might result in consideration in his own cases,

there was no promise of leniency in exchange for testimony”). The Hannibal
____________________________________________


8 The Franciscus Court “noted that the situation [involving Franciscus and
the jailhouse informant] was distinguishable from the case in which an inmate
unexpectedly comes forward with incriminating information about a fellow
inmate, or where an informant is a passive listener to a heartfelt confession.”
Franciscus,
710 A.2d at 1120
.


                                          - 21 -
J-S26018-25



Court further expressed that “whatever promises or expectations arose after

[the jailhouse informant] came forward do not operate retroactively to make

[the informant] an interrogating agent of the police.” Id. at 214.

       In his motion in limine, Appellant asserted that Perez knew the

circumstances of       Appellant’s criminal case   and that Perez “drugged

[Appellant] in an effort to make him confess his involvement in the murder of

[Baron].” Motion In Limine, 3/5/24, at ¶22(b)(i). Appellant averred that,

Perez’s statement, during a police interview, - “I have been doing this for a

long time and I know the . . .” – “suggests [Perez] has acted as an informant

in the past.”9 Id. at ¶22(a)(i) and (ii). At the hearing on Appellant’s motion

in limine, Appellant presented no additional evidence, or argument, regarding

Appellant’s assertion that Perez was working as a government agent at the

time Appellant confessed to him beyond the mere allegations contained in

Appellant’s motion in limine. See generally, N.T., 4/5/24. Upon review, we

concur with the trial court, and the record supports, that Perez’s actions of

obtaining Suboxone, sharing the controlled substance with Appellant, and

engaging in a discussion with Appellant regarding the murder of Baron do not

give rise to “governmental actions.” Absent evidence, which Appellant did not

provide, that Perez undertook these actions at the direction of, or with the

____________________________________________


9 The full context of Perez’s statement to law enforcement, according to
Appellant, was “I’ve been doin’ this for a long time and like I know the . . . I
know when a motherfucker is lyin’ to me ya know?” Motion In Limine, 3/5/24,
at ¶20.


                                          - 22 -
J-S26018-25



knowledge    of,   law   enforcement    to   obtain   rewards    in   exchange   for

incriminating testimony, Appellant failed to establish that Perez was acting as

a government agent. As such, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion

in the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion in limine to preclude

Perez’s testimony.

      In his third issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s jury instruction

on accomplice liability. Appellant’s Brief at 32-33. To preserve a claim that a

jury instruction was erroneously given, Appellant must have objected to the

charge at trial before the jury retired to deliberate.      Commonwealth v.

Parker,
104 A.3d 17, 29
(Pa. Super. 2014) (finding that, the failure to object

at the conclusion of the charge and prior to the retirement of the jury for

deliberation constituted waiver, despite the defendant having objected to the

charge during the charging conference), appeal denied,
117 A.3d 296
(Pa.

2015); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C) (stating, “No portions of the charge nor

omissions from the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific objections

are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.         All such objections

shall be made beyond the hearing of the jury.”). “[T]he mere submission and

subsequent denial of proposed points for charge that are inconsistent with or

omitted from the instructions actually given will not suffice to preserve an

issue, absent a specific objection or exception to the charge or the trial court’s




                                       - 23 -
J-S26018-25



ruling respecting the points.”10 Commonwealth v. Pressley,
887 A.2d 220,

225
(Pa. 2005) (emphasis added). “Although obligating counsel to take this

additional step where a specific point for charge has been rejected may appear

counterintuitive, as the requested instruction can be viewed as alerting the

trial court to a defendant’s substantive legal position, it serves the salutary

purpose of affording the [trial] court an opportunity to avoid or remediate

potential error, thereby eliminating the need for appellate review of an

otherwise correctable issue.”
Id. at 224
(footnote omitted); see also Parker,
104 A.3d at 29
; Commonwealth v. Knight,
241 A.3d 620
, 625 (Pa. 2020)

(stating, “no portion of a jury charge or omissions therefrom may be assigned

as error, unless specific objections are made before the jury retires to

deliberation”); Commonwealth v. Crosby,
224 A.3d 372, 422
(Pa. Super.

2019) (stating, “objections [raised] at the charging conference [are] not

sufficient to preserve [a] challenge to [a jury instruction] issued by the trial

court; the party must object after the charge is given to the jury), vacated on

other grounds,
252 A.3d 1092
(Pa. 2021).

       In the case sub judice, Appellant, after the conclusion of the charging

conference on May 13, 2024, raised an objection to the trial court’s proposed




____________________________________________


10 After the trial court announced its decision regarding Appellant’s objection

to the accomplice liability instruction, Appellant did not lodge an objection on
the record prior to the charge being given to the jury. N.T., 5/14/24, at 9.


                                          - 24 -
J-S26018-25



jury instruction on accomplice liability.11 N.T., 5/14/24, at 2. The following

day, the trial court, prior to charging the jury, overruled Appellant’s objection.

Id. at 9. The trial court then proceeded to instruct the jury on, inter alia, the

accomplice liability theory as it pertained to Appellant’s criminal charge of

murder of the second degree, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b).           N.T., 5/14/24, at

22-26.    After concluding its charge of the jury, the trial court asked both

parties if they wished to raise any matters before the jury retired for

deliberation.    Id. at 99.      Both Appellant, as well as the Commonwealth,

responded in the negative. Id. Because Appellant failed to object to the jury

instruction on accomplice liability after the charge was provided to the jury

and before the jury retired for deliberation, we find Appellant waived this

issue.12 Pressley,
887 A.2d at 225
; see also Parker,
104 A.3d at 29
.
____________________________________________


11 The trial court provided the parties with proposed jury instructions on May

13, 2024, and asked the parties to raise any objections at a charging
conference scheduled for later that same day. N.T., 5/14/24, at 2. At the
charging conference, the only objection raised pertained to a typographical
error on the verdict slip.
Id.
Later that same evening, Appellant raised, via
electronic mail, an objection to the proposed jury instruction on accomplice
liability, and the Commonwealth subsequently provided a response.
Id.
Despite Appellant’s failure to raise his objection to the jury instructions at the
charging conference, the trial court proceeded to dispose of the objection on
May 14, 2024. Id. at 5-9.

12 Moreover, we concur with the trial court, and the record supports, that even

if the jury instruction on accomplice liability was in error, Appellant was not
harmed by the error since the instruction was provided as part of the charge
regarding the criminal charge of second-degree murder, which the jury did
not consider in light of its decision to convict Appellant of the first-degree
murder charge. See N.T., 5/14/24, at 22 (instructing the jury to consider the
verdict slip question regarding second-degree murder only if the jury does not



                                          - 25 -
J-S26018-25



       Appellant’s final issue raises a claim that the jury’s verdict was against

the weight of the evidence on the ground that the Commonwealth relied on

impermissible evidence to establish the manner of death. Appellant’s Brief at

33-35.

       Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
       [the trial court’s] discretion, not of the underlying question of
       whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because
       the trial [court] had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence
       presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
       to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial [court] when
       reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is[, or is
       not,] against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
       assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the [trial]
       court’s conviction that the verdict was[,] or was not[,] against the
       weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in
       the interest of justice.

Commonwealth v. Horne,
89 A.3d 277, 285
(Pa. Super. 2014), citing

Commonwealth v. Widmer,
744 A.2d 745
(Pa. 2000); see also

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez,
340 A.3d 334
, 349 (Pa. Super. 2025)

(stating, “the function of an appellate court is to review the trial court's

exercise of discretion based upon a review of the record, rather than to

consider de novo the underlying question of the weight of the evidence”

(citation omitted)).      A trial court abuses its discretion “where the course

____________________________________________


find Appellant guilty of first-degree murder); see also Commonwealth v.
Frein,
206 A.3d 1049, 1075
(Pa. 2019) (stating, “[a] jury is presumed to
follow the trial court’s instructions on the law”); Commonwealth v.
Allshouse,
36 A.3d 163, 182
(Pa. 2012) (stating, “a defendant is entitled to
a fair trial but not a perfect one” (citation, original quotation marks, and
brackets omitted)).


                                          - 26 -
J-S26018-25



pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment

is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record

shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill-will.”

Horne,
89 A.3d at 285-286
(citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v.

Clay,
64 A.3d 1049, 1055
(Pa. 2013) (stating, “[t]he term ‘discretion’ imports

the exercise of judgment, wisdom[,] and skill so as to reach a dispassionate

conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the

purpose of giving effect to the will of the [trial court]”). By comparison, “the

role of the trial court is to determine whether, notwithstanding all the

evidence, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them, or

to give them equal weight with all the facts, is to deny justice.” Rodriguez,

340 A.3d at 349 (citation omitted). For an appellant to prevail on a weight of

the evidence claim, “the evidence must be so tenuous, vague[,] and uncertain

that the verdict shocks the conscience of the [trial] court.” Commonwealth

v. Sullivan,
820 A.2d 795, 806
(Pa. Super. 2003) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted), appeal denied,
833 A.2d 143
(Pa. 2003).

      Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth presented the testimony of

Coroner Rowland to establish the manner of death as homicide. Appellant’s

Brief at 33. Appellant argues that “the Commonwealth’s reliance solely on

case history, as told to the [c]oroner, without supporting physical evidence is

legally insufficient in supporting the determination on [manner] of death.” Id.

at 34-35, relying on, Commonwealth v. Walters,
323 A.3d 151
(Pa. 2024).

Appellant contends that “because the determination of the coroner that the

                                     - 27 -
J-S26018-25



manner of death was homicide was not based on any competent medical or

scientific evidence, the coroner’s testimony was impermissible.”13 Appellant’s

Brief at 35.    According to Appellant, the trial court erred in admitting the

coroner’s testimony regarding the manner of death and, as such, the

Commonwealth failed to establish the manner of death as homicide.14
Id.
Without an established manner of death, that is to say proof of an unlawful

killing, the jury’s guilty verdict, according to Appellant, was against the weight

of the evidence.
Id.
____________________________________________


13 To the extent that Appellant challenges the testimony of Coroner Rowland

in the context of his weight claim, we find Appellant’s evidentiary claim to be
waived for failure to lodge an objection at the time Coroner Rowland presented
his testimony at trial. See N.T., 5/13/24, at 11 (demonstrating that Appellant
did not object to Coroner Rowland’s testimony regarding either the cause of
death or the manner of death, nor did Appellant cross-examine Coroner
Rowland); see also Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1)(A) (stating that, a party may claim
error in a ruling to admit evidence only if the party makes, inter alia, a timely
objection); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating, “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).

14  To the extent that Appellant asserts there was insufficient evidence to
establish the element of an unlawful killing to support a conviction of
first-degree murder, we find this issue waived for failure to raise the issue in
his Rule 1925(b) statement. Commonwealth v. Lord,
719 A.2d 306, 309
(Pa. 1998) (stating, “[a]ny issues not raised in a [Rule] 1925(b) statement
will be deemed waived”); see also Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/21/25, (failing
to set forth a sufficiency of the evidence claim); Commonwealth v.
Johnson,
985 A.2d 915, 920
(Pa. 2009) (stating that, to convict a person of
first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove that “(1) a human being
was unlawfully killed; (2) the person accused is responsible for the killing; and
(3) the accused acted with specific intent to kill” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, a weight of the evidence claim “concedes that there is sufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict but contends, nevertheless, that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence.” Rodriguez, 340 A.3d at 349 (citation
and original quotation marks omitted).


                                          - 28 -
J-S26018-25



       In considering Appellant’s claim that his first-degree murder conviction

was against the weight of the evidence,15 the trial court stated,

       the jury was at liberty to accept and believe the plethora of DNA,
       [cellular telephone] range-to-tower, serology, forensic, electronic
       communication, testimonial, and photographic evidence of
       [Appellant’s] guilt[.     Appellant] has not established that
       notwithstanding all that evidence, certain other facts are so clearly
       of greater weight that it constitutes a denial of justice to ignore
       them or to not accord them equal weight. Nor has the defense
       demonstrated that the Commonwealth’s evidence was so tenuous,
       vague and uncertain that the jury’s verdict shocks the conscience
       of the court.

Trial Court Memorandum and Order, 12/17/24, at 41 (quotation marks

omitted).

       Based upon our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion

or error of law in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s post-sentence motion

asserting a claim that his conviction of first-degree murder was against the

weight of the evidence based upon the admission of Coroner Rowland’s

testimony. As the trial court detailed in great length, see id. at 2-16, the

Commonwealth presented “an ocean” of evidence demonstrating Appellant’s

____________________________________________


15 In his post-sentence motion, Appellant asserted that his first-degree murder

conviction was against the weight of the evidence because, inter alia, “[t]here
was no medical testimony provided to establish the cause of [Baron’s]
death[.]” Post-Trial Motion, 7/19/24, at ¶27(a). In so arguing Appellant
conflates the term “cause of death,” meaning the “but-for” cause of the death,
i.e., specific injury or disease, with the term “manner of death,” which refers
to the circumstances under which the death occurs, i.e., accident, suicide, or
homicide.      See Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick,
316 A.3d 987
, 1000
(Pa. Super. 2024) (distinguishing between the terms “cause of death” and
“manner of death”).


                                          - 29 -
J-S26018-25



culpability in the murder of Baron of which Coroner Rowland’s testimony that

the cause of death was “traumatic injuries” and, in particular, the manner of

death was “homicide” represented only a granular of sand in that vast ocean.

To the extent that Appellant’s claim invites this Court to reassess the

witnesses’ credibility and reweigh the evidence in an attempt to convince us

to reach a result different than the one reached by the jury, as fact-finder, we

decline Appellant’s invitation. The jury, as fact-finder, while passing on the

credibility of the witnesses and weight of the evidence, was free to believe all,

part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Dunkins,
229 A.3d 622,

631
(Pa. Super. 2020), aff’d,
263 A.3d 247
(Pa. 2021), cert. denied,
142

S.Ct. 1679
(2022).

      Judgment of Sentence affirmed.



Judgment Entered.




Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary



Date: 10/20/2025




                                     - 30 -