Commonwealth v. Torres

                                                         E-FILED
                                                         CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                         E-filed: Aug 22 2025 05:00PM
                                                         Clerk Review: Aug 22 2025 05:00PM
                                                         Filing ID: 76913185
                                                         Case No.: 2024-SCC-0017-CRM
                                                         NoraV Borja




                           IN THE
                   Supreme Court
                          OF THE

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

   COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS,
                 Plaintiff-Appellant,

                             v.

             RALPH ANTHONY DLG. TORRES,
                  Defendant-Appellee.

         Supreme Court No. 2024-SCC-0017-CRM



                      SLIP OPINION

                     Cite as: 2025 MP 5

                  Decided August 22, 2025


           ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
         JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE ROBERT J. TORRES, JR.
         JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE SABRINA S. MCKENNA

       Superior Court Criminal Action No. 22-0050-CR
       Judge Pro Tempore Arthur R. Barcinas, Presiding
                        Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



MANGLOÑA, J.:
¶1      The Commonwealth appeals a trial court determination disqualifying the
 entire Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) from prosecuting criminal
 charges against Appellee Ralph DLG. Torres (“Torres”) because of a lack of
 screening between the prosecutors and other attorneys with privileged
 information about Torres and his legal defense. We REVERSE the trial court’s
 determination disqualifying the entire OAG, but AFFIRM the disqualification of
 specific attorneys based on the record.
                      I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2       The detailed factual history of this case is set forth in the companion to
 this opinion, Commonwealth v. Torres (“Torres II”), 2025 MP 6. This appeal
 arises from a complex procedural history involving multiple motions, evidentiary
 hearings, and reconsideration proceedings spanning from 2022 to 2024.
 Understanding this sequence is essential to evaluating the trial court’s
 disqualification order and the Commonwealth’s arguments on appeal.
¶3     In 2022, then-Governor Torres was charged with multiple counts of
 misconduct in public office, theft, and contempt—all relating to or stemming
 from allegations of improper public expenditure on airline tickets. Appendix at
 678–82.
¶4      Torres moved to disqualify the entire OAG, and the court held an
 evidentiary hearing in May and June 2022. After hearing testimony and receiving
 declarations from various government attorneys, the court determined that the
 attorney of record for the Commonwealth, Chief Solicitor J. Robert Glass, Jr.
 (“Glass”), had been exposed to privileged information regarding the contempt
 charge and dismissed the one count without prejudice. The court further
 determined that the OAG screening procedures for the remaining counts were
 sufficient and denied the motion to disqualify further.
¶5     Special Prosecutor James R. Kingman (“Kingman”) subsequently joined
 the OAG to represent the Commonwealth in 2023. Torres filed several motions
 aimed at removing Kingman from the prosecution, culminating in an April 2023
 motion to reconsider the initial disqualification order filed in August 2022.
¶6       The court heard arguments in December 2023 and determined that the
 initial order was clearly erroneous in finding that Torres was not a client of the
 OAG, granting reconsideration of the decision to disqualify. It further found that
 the purported screening by the OAG was nonexistent, determining that the
 relationship described in Kingman’s contract with the OAG was inconsistent
 with the OAG’s screening procedures described in testimony from the 2022
 hearing. The court found that the attorneys tainted by privileged information
 were not sufficiently screened from the case and vicariously disqualified the
 entire OAG. As a final matter, the court declined to appoint a special prosecutor
 to replace the OAG, leaving “it to the executive branch to take up the
 prosecutorial mantle if it so chooses.” Appendix at 34. The Commonwealth
 timely appeals.
                        Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



                                II. JURISDICTION
¶7      We have jurisdiction over final orders and judgments of the Superior
 Court. NMI CONST. art. IV, § 3. When a non-final order is appealed without a
 constitutional or statutory basis for appeal, we may still consider the appeal
 through the common law collateral order doctrine. To satisfy the doctrine, the
 order must conclusively determine a disputed question, resolve an important
 issue separate from the merits of the complaint, and be effectively unreviewable
 on appeal from a final judgment. Reyes v. Commonwealth, 2024 MP 8 ¶ 5.
¶8      Federal circuit courts have consistently found that disqualification of an
 entire prosecutorial office satisfies all three elements of the collateral order
 doctrine. In United States v. Bolden, the Tenth Circuit found that it had
 jurisdiction to hear the appeal of an order disqualifying the whole United States
 Attorney’s Office and appointing an Assistant United States Attorney from
 another district. 353 F.3d 870 (10th Cir. 2003). The court determined that the
 Constitution granted the Executive the power to “take care that the laws are
 faithfully executed,” US CONST. art. II, § 3, the alleged injury “is grounded in
 separation of powers,” and could not be vindicated on final appeal. Bolden, 353
 F.3d at 877. The court distinguished Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259
 (1984), where the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant could not
 immediately appeal a pretrial order disqualifying their attorney, because
 “appellate vindication [and reinstatement of the prosecutor] cannot undo such an
 invasion of Executive authority.” Id. at 878.
¶9      Citing Flanagan, this Court held in 1993 that disqualification of the
 Attorney General’s office from representing a defendant in a criminal case was
 not immediately appealable through the collateral order doctrine. Commonwealth
 v. Guerrero, 3 NMI 479 (1993). The Court held that the third element was not
 met because a new trial could be granted if—after a final judgment—the court
 determined that the disqualification was in error. Id. at 482. The disqualification
 of private civil attorneys has also been held to not satisfy the collateral order
 doctrine on similar grounds. Olopai v. Hillblom, 3 NMI 528 (1993).
¶ 10     The lower court based its reasoning in Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment,
  Inc., 408 Fed. Appx. 45 (9th Cir. 2011), in which the Ninth Circuit determined
  that the collateral order doctrine was not satisfied to allow the appeal of a
  disqualification order. In Mattel, private counsel was vicariously disqualified
  after an attorney previously representing one party was hired by the opposing
  counsel. Id. at 46. Like in Flanagan, Guerrero, and Olopai, the Mattel attorney
  disqualification did not involve any constitutional powers.
¶ 11     Prosecutorial offices are distinct from other attorneys because of their
  innate executive power. Decisions on the appealability of disqualification orders
  for private or defense counsel are unpersuasive on the question of disqualifying
  an entire prosecutorial office; those types of attorney disqualifications do not
  mirror the same scope of considerations involved in the type of disqualification
  here. This is especially true in the Commonwealth, where the OAG has a
  constitutional duty to prosecute violations of the law. Compare NMI CONST. art.
                        Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



 III, § 11 with 28 U.S.C. § 547 (empowering United States Attorneys to prosecute
 offenses by statute). Hence, we adopt the rationale of the various federal circuit
 courts and find that the disqualification of the entire OAG from prosecuting a
 criminal case satisfies the three elements of the collateral order doctrine.
¶ 12     First, the order determined that the OAG could not continue with any
  prosecution of Torres. The “effect of any attorney disqualification is fairly
  irreversible because it materially changes the party’s position.” United States v.
  Williams, 68 F.4th 564, 570 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Coordinated Pretrial
  Proc. in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1981)
  (internal quotations removed). The court made the determination that the OAG
  in its entirety was vicariously disqualified in two separate cases. See
  Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 6.
¶ 13    Second, it resolves an important question separate from the merits. Reyes,
  2024 MP 8 ¶ 5. The order did not decide Torres’s guilt or innocence for any of
  the charges, but did decide an issue of high importance to the general public.
  Williams, 68 F.4th at 570. Immediate appellate review is warranted when
  separation of powers is implicated by the disqualification order. Id; Bolden, 353
  F.3d at 876.
¶ 14      Lastly, the disqualification would be effectively unreviewable after a final
  judgment. An issue is effectively unreviewable on appeal only if it involves an
  asserted right that would be lost if not vindicated before trial. Reyes, 2024 MP 8
  ¶ 5. This Court, and most other jurisdictions, have generally interpreted few
  rights as satisfying this element—losses of liberty, like bail orders and transfers
  from juvenile to adult courts are immediately appealable, but denials of sovereign
  immunity and rights to be free from litigation are not. In re JJC, 2000 MP 8;
  CDA v. Camacho, 2010 MP 19; id; Takasi v. Yoshizawa, 2022 MP 1; Island Star
  Int’l v. Yu, 2025 MP 2 ¶ 11.
¶ 15     Potential harm to the separation of powers cannot be remedied after a final
  judgment—in this case, a determination of guilt or innocence. Williams, 68 F.4th
  at 570. Under any possible outcome from a final judgment, the Commonwealth
  would be unable to vindicate its right to prosecute these charges. Double jeopardy
  would prevent further prosecution if Torres prevailed and statutory limitations
  on the right to appeal a guilty verdict would limit the Commonwealth’s ability to
  raise this issue if it prevailed. Id.; see 6 CMC § 8101. We may assert jurisdiction
  over this appeal under the collateral order doctrine and must also address the
  Commonwealth’s ability to bring an interlocutory appeal.
¶ 16    The Commonwealth Criminal Code only allows the Commonwealth to
  appeal a criminal case under narrow circumstances. Relevant to this appeal, it
  only has the right to appeal “when a written enactment intended to have the force
  and effect of law has been held invalid” or when “a decision, judgment, or order
  of the Superior Court dismiss[es] an information or grant[s] a new trial after
  verdict or judgment, as to any one or more counts.” 6 CMC § 8101(a)–(b).
                         Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



¶ 17    The Commonwealth argues that the appealed order invalidates Article III,
  Section 11 of the Commonwealth Constitution and 1 CMC § 2154. The order
  holds neither invalid. The lower court’s decisions would not prevent the Attorney
  General from prosecuting violations of the law except in narrow circumstances,
  as deemed necessary to comply with the court’s interpretation of the Rules of
  Professional Conduct, nor would they prevent the employment of staff in the
  OAG—only limit their participation in conflicted matters.
¶ 18     However, to find that this order is unappealable would be a disservice of
  justice. Federal courts have allowed similar appeals by government attorneys
  under the collateral order doctrine, without requiring a statutory basis for the right
  to appeal. United States v. Caggiano, 660 F.2d 184, 189 (6th Cir. 1981). By
  finding that the collateral order doctrine allows this appeal, we decide the
  appealed order is equivalent to a final order. Caggiano allowed the government
  to appeal a disqualification of the United States Attorney’s Office under 28
  U.S.C. § 1291, as if the order was a final decision from the lower court, rather
  than 18 U.S.C. § 3731, which allowed interlocutory appeals in criminal cases. Id.
  Section 3731 is similar to 6 CMC § 8101 because it creates nearly identical
  limitations on the prosecutor to bring appeals of nonfinal judgments, and our own
  constitutional jurisdiction over appeals is mostly coextensive with that created
  by 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
¶ 19     “It is true that certain orders relating to a criminal case may be found to
  possess sufficient independence from the main course of prosecution to warrant
  treatment as plenary orders, and thus be appealable on the authority of 28 U.S.C.
  § 1291 without regard to the limitations of 18 U.S.C. § 3731.” Id. at 189 (quoting
  Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 403 (1957)). This matter certainly
  presents such a scenario, predicated upon our finding that the collateral order
  doctrine is satisfied. Supra at ¶ 15. Section 8101(b) of the Commonwealth Code
  permits appeals of plenary or near-plenary orders adverse to the prosecution’s
  case—namely orders of dismissal and for new trials. 6 CMC § 8101(b). To allow
  this appeal is not far removed from the statutory provisions and does not offend
  our common law construction of appellate jurisdiction.
¶ 20     The Commonwealth may bring an appeal under the collateral order
  doctrine as if the order is final and subject to our constitutional jurisdiction,
  without need to appeal under any section of 6 CMC § 8101. As this Court finds
  that the disqualification order is appealable, it is unnecessary to address the
  Commonwealth’s petition for a writ of mandamus. Having established
  jurisdiction, we now examine the substantive issues raised on appeal.
                            III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶ 21     Numerous interconnected issues are presented on appeal. First, we review
  the court’s decision to hear the motion for reconsideration de novo as a question
  of law. Commonwealth v. Eguia, 2008 MP 17 ¶ 4. Second, whether Torres has
  been charged in his official capacity as the governor is also reviewed de novo.
  Id.
                         Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



¶ 22     Finally, disqualifications of individual attorneys are reviewed for abuse of
  discretion. Commonwealth v. Oden, 3 NMI 186, 191 (1992). “An abuse of
  discretion exists if the court based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or
  on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Campbell,
  4 NMI 11 (1993). The Court thus reviews the disqualification of the entire office
  of attorneys, including the procedure employed by the court, for abuse of
  discretion. Williams, 68 F.4th at 571.

                                   IV. DISCUSSION
                    A. Timeliness of the motion for reconsideration
¶ 23      We begin our discussion with the timeliness of the motion for
  reconsideration filed around seven months after the court’s initial order was
  entered. Motions for reconsideration in criminal cases are judicial constructions,
  not proscribed by any court rules. United States v. Healy, 376 U.S 75, 79–80
  (1964). In allowing these motions, however, we have specified that they should
  be approved using the same standard as in civil cases: when there is “an
  intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the
  need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Eguia, 2008 MP 17
  ¶ 7 (quoting Camacho v. J.C. Tenorio Enterprises, Inc., 2 NMI 408, 414 (1992)).
  No deadline for filing a reconsideration motion in criminal cases has been
  identified to date.
¶ 24      In granting the motion, the lower court used NMI Rule of Civil Procedure
  54(b) to determine that the initial order “may be revised at any time before the
  entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and
  liabilities.” The court reasoned that using this Rule was appropriate because the
  order being reconsidered was interlocutory and the standard was “similar to those
  for a motion for reconsideration” under Civil Procedure Rule 59(e), which
  applies to motions filed after an entry of judgment. Appendix at 21.
¶ 25    The Commonwealth alleges that the court specifically erred in applying
  the Rules of Civil Procedure to a criminal case, and more generally in taking up
  a motion filed so long after the initial order was entered. Appellant’s Br. at 12–
  14. We consider this issue of law de novo for the first time. Eguia, 2008 MP 17
  ¶ 4.
¶ 26      Delays in criminal prosecutions are harmful to the right to a speedy trial
  generally and to the public’s interest in a resolution to the question of misconduct
  by an elected official. Commonwealth v. Superior Court (Ada), 2004 MP 14 ¶ 13.
  It is in the best interest of justice to limit the time in which parties can move for
  reconsideration and delay forward progress in criminal cases.
¶ 27     The Rules of Civil Procedure are not applicable to criminal prosecutions,
  and it is erroneous to apply them outright, but courts may look to civil rules to
  create necessary procedures under the common law. See Eguia, 2008 MP 17 ¶ 7;
  see also United States v. Warren, 22 F.4th 917, 922 (10th Cir. 2022). The creation
  of procedures governing motions for reconsideration is necessary to allow courts
  to exercise their authority to actually reconsider non-plenary orders in criminal
                         Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



 proceedings. United States v. Rollins, 607 F.3d 500, 502 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing
 Healy, 376 U.S at 77–80).
¶ 28     Without a guiding statute or rule for this issue, we determine that the
  proper deadline to file a motion for reconsideration during a criminal prosecution
  is generally 30 days. This time requirement is consistent with the deadline for
  filing a notice of appeal under Supreme Court Rule 4(b). See also Healy, 376
  U.S. at 78 (allowing a petition for rehearing to be filed within the 30-day appeal
  window). Many federal jurisdictions also use the equivalent appellate window
  for this purpose. See, e.g., Warren, 22 F.4th at 927. Some states also require
  criminal motions for reconsideration be filed on a similar timeline. See, e.g., State
  v. Franson, 921 N.W.2d 783, 785 n.1 (Minn. App. 2018) (permitting the trial
  court to “entertain such a motion before the state’s time for appeal has expired”);
  LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 881.1 (requiring motions to reconsider a felony
  sentence be filed within 30 days unless a longer period is allowed by the trial
  court).
¶ 29      While courts have generally “approved of the judicial economy that results
  from the pretrial reconsideration” of trial court orders, explicit deadlines for
  judicially constructed reconsideration procedures outside the federal system are
  rare. United States v. Rabb, 752 F.2d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 1984), abrogated in
  part on other grounds by Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). Most
  state courts that permit motions for reconsideration leave broad procedural
  discretion to the trial courts and do impose special limitations beyond the
  inherent limitation that reconsideration must occur before final judgment or close
  of trial and meet a high standard to be granted.. See State v. Villegas, 506 S.W.3d
  717, 767 (Tex. App. 2016). Cognizant of the fact that creating a deadline for a
  pretrial motion for reconsideration puts the Commonwealth in the minority of
  jurisdictions for this issue, we do so with a caveat.
¶ 30     Future motions for reconsideration may be properly considered if filed
  within 30 days of the initial order or with a showing of good cause for any
  untimely filing. A good cause determination for a motion brought after more than
  30 days is within the discretion of the trial court. See Healy, 376 U.S. at 79–80;
  see also State v. Hagberg, 220 P.3d 47, 50 (Or. 2009) (recognizing a rule
  allowing court to waive a motion for reconsideration deadline for “good cause”).
  Such a motion, if considered after the initial 30 days, must still meet a high
  standard to be granted. Interlocutory motions for reconsideration may only be
  approved in criminal cases because of “an intervening change of controlling law,
  the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
  manifest injustice.” Eguia, 2008 MP 17 ¶ 7 (quoting Camacho, 2 NMI at 414).
  A non-rigid deadline for these motions balances the interests of the parties in a
  criminal prosecution with the reality of finite judicial resources and the ultimate
  interest of justice. As noted by the Supreme Court,
         “Of course, speedy disposition of criminal cases is desirable, but to
        deprive the [trial court] of the opportunity. . . for the correction of
        errors might, in some circumstances, actually prolong the process
                          Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



         of litigation—since plenary consideration of a question of law here
         ordinarily consumes more time than disposition of a petition for
         rehearing—and could, in some cases, impose an added and
         unnecessary burden of adjudication upon this Court.”
         Healy, 376 U.S. at 80.
¶ 31      Even though Torres brought this motion well beyond 30 days after the
  initial order was filed, there was good cause shown for the delay in filing. Torres
  raised in the motion that “the wall or screen purportedly erected by the OAG is
  nonexistent,” predicated on new evidence. Appendix at 20, 27. Such new
  evidence was related to the engagement of Kingman as a Special Prosecutor for
  the OAG. Id. at 27. Kingman was admitted pro hac vice for this Superior Court
  case, pursuant to the terms of his contract, on March 6, 2023. Id. at 683; In re
  Kingman, 2023 MP 6 ¶ 3. This motion was then filed on April 6, 2023—31 days
  later. The pro hac vice admission, as a public record, provided new evidence
  relevant to the initial order and the assumptions that the court made regarding the
  OAG screening procedures. Appendix at 51 (“The OAG has met the general
  standards for screening Glass as laid out in Model Rule 1.10 and is therefore
  presumed sufficiently screened.”) Given that we now construct a flexible
  deadline for filing these interlocutory motions, the court made no error in
  considering the motion.
     B. Criminal charges brought against individuals in their personal capacity
¶ 32     Next, we address the trial court’s determination regarding the capacity in
  which Torres was charged. The Commonwealth argues that the court clearly
  erred in determining that Torres was criminally charged in his official capacity
  as the former Governor. The initial order determined that the criminal charges in
  these cases were “leveled against an individual, even if the crime could only have
  been committed by an individual holding an office.” Id. at 46. The court used this
  determination to find that the OAG did not have an attorney-client relationship
  with Torres, but only with the office of the governor. Id. at 48–49.
¶ 33      The disqualification order reversed this finding, stating it was a clear error
  to determine the charges were brought against Torres in his personal capacity.
  Id. at 26. The court summarily stated that 1 CMC § 7407(f) can be brought only
  against someone acting in their capacity as a government employee.
¶ 34     Section 7407(f), in relevant part, says “The Commonwealth Government
  shall not purchase . . . an airline ticket for travel in first class, business class, or
  any other premium class designation. . . . Any government employee who causes
  an airline ticket to be issued in violation of this section shall pay a civil fine of
  one-thousand dollars.” This is the statute that Torres is alleged to have violated,
  leading to the misconduct in public office charges filed in 2022. A violation of
  section 7407(f) would also constitute a violation of 6 CMC § 3202(b)(1): “A
  person, being a public official, commits the offense of misconduct in public
  office if the person: does any illegal act under the color of office.”
                         Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



¶ 35     Interpreting the Commonwealth Code and our precedent to suggest that
  criminal charges are brought against individuals in their official capacities would
  be inconsistent with established precedent and statutory language. The statute
  Torres is accused of violating specifically states that the crime is committed by
  “a person” acting with the color of office. 6 CMC § 3202(b)(1). In
  Commonwealth v. Atalig, this Court further specified that the elements for
  Misconduct in Public Office which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
  are that the defendant is “1. A public official who does 2. any illegal act 3. under
  color of office.” 2002 MP 20 ¶ 46. To state that the charges must be brought
  against an officer in their official capacity would negate the first element of the
  crime misconduct in public office.
¶ 36      This Court has examined the elements of this statute several times, with
  no indication that the various charges were all brought against the public officers
  in their official capacities. To do so now would complicate their holdings. In
  Commonwealth v. Ogumoro, the Court found that the statute of limitations for
  the misconduct charges began the day the defendant was fired as a police officer
  strictly because he could no longer act as a public official under color of office.
  2020 MP 8 ¶ 40. Ogumoro cited Commonwealth v. Kaipat, which similarly held
  that police are public officials because of their ability to act under color of office.
  2 NMI 322, 333 (1991). No opinion analyzing section 3202 has ever mentioned
  that the charges were brought against public officials because they were actually
  acting in their official capacity.
¶ 37     Unlike the scenario created by the lower court, civil suits—when brought
  against public officials in their official capacity—are widely treated as suits
  against the government, rather than the individual. Typically, the Commonwealth
  will step in for an employee sued for a tort committed while acting in their official
  capacity. Reyes, 2024 MP 8 ¶ 23. The Court has also stated that most other
  jurisdictions consider criminal actions to be outside the scope of employment.
  Kabir v. CNMI PSS, 2009 MP 19 ¶ 47.
¶ 38     Furthermore, to find that the charges were brought against Torres in his
  official capacity would mean that the charges are now irrelevant. In Torres v.
  House Standing Committee on JGO, this Court noted that a lawsuit initiated by
  former Governor Torres was mooted, in part, by his term ending. See 2023 MP
  10 ¶ 11 (declaring an appeal moot because former Governor Torres was no longer
  in office and was not an appellant in his personal capacity).
¶ 39     The court erred in determining that the initial order committed clear error
  in finding that the criminal charges were brought against Torres in his personal
  capacity. Charges of violations of Commonwealth law, particularly misconduct
  in public office in violation of 6 CMC § 3202, are not brought against individuals
  in their official capacities. Since the court relied on this erroneous view of the
  law, the disqualification order must be reversed.
                        Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



       C. Vicarious disqualification of the Office of the Attorney General
¶ 40 We now turn to the broad question of whether the entire Office of the
 Attorney General may be vicariously disqualified. The Commonwealth argues
 that the trial court erroneously applied a portion of the Model Rules of
 Professional Conduct to the OAG, which then caused the court to improperly
 impute a conflict of some attorneys on the entire office and vicariously disqualify
 the whole of the OAG from the prosecution. Opening Br. at 20–25. The
 Commonwealth then claims that the screen enacted by the OAG is sufficient for
 the misconduct in public office and theft charges brought in this case. Id. at 26.
¶ 41      The disqualification order declared that the entire OAG failed to screen
  two tainted attorneys, Attorney General Edward Manibusan and Glass, who
  possessed privileged information regarding the dismissed contempt charge.
  Appendix at 29. The court found that the Attorney General “effectively ‘switched
  sides’” by bringing contempt charges after advising the Governor on responding
  to the subpoena that led to Torres being held in contempt by the Legislature. Id.
  Though that charge has been dismissed from this case, the court still determined
  that it “springs from and is inherently tied to the charges in this case,” creating
  an irrebuttable presumption that Manibusan and Glass’s conflict is imputed to
  the office at large. Id. at 29–30 (citing Mattel, 408 Fed.Appx. at 46).
¶ 42     Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10 imputes the conflict of one
  attorney in a firm onto all others in the firm so that “none of them shall knowingly
  represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited
  from doing so.” ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a)
  (hereinafter “MRPC”). Two exceptions to this rule permit proper screening
  procedures to allow the conflicted representation to continue if it is a personal
  conflict of interest or based upon the disqualified attorney’s association with a
  prior firm. Id.
¶ 43     Model Rule 1.10 only applies to this case if there are attorneys prohibited
  from representing a client, working in a firm where that conflict could be imputed
  to other attorneys. Manibusan stated in the 2022 evidentiary hearing that he is
  screened from participation in this prosecution because of a conflict. Appendix
  at 241. In Torres II, we determine that Kingman and Glass are both disqualified
  from prosecuting the charges against Torres because of the cumulative
  appearance of impropriety and insufficient screening procedure. 2025 MP 6 ¶¶
  20, 25–26.
¶ 44     The Commonwealth asks this Court to reverse the finding from the trial
  court that the bifurcated contempt and misconduct in public office charges are
  insufficiently distinct and are cross-contaminated. See Appendix at 30. While the
  disqualification of an attorney is based on a factual analysis of the conflict, we
  must also consider the preservation of public confidence in the bar and the legal
  process as a whole. See Williams, 68 F.4th at 573 (requiring “a strong factual
  predicate for blanket disqualification”); but see McCuin v. Texas Power & Light
  Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1265 (5th Cir. 1983) (allowing disqualification where there
  is the possibility for an appearance of professional impropriety).
                         Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



¶ 45     There is little discernible distinction between this case and Torres II. 2025
  MP 6 ¶ 24. The initial charges were all filed in the same information, predicated
  on the same body of facts. Appendix at 678. Much of the relevant procedural
  history for the companion case is identical. The same parties are proceeding in
  both cases, with assistance from the same sets of attorneys. Id. These parallel
  cases are likely indistinguishable in the public eye.
¶ 46     Public confidence in the legal system may be eroded when attorneys with
  known conflicts and who have been publicly disqualified continue to participate
  in related prosecutions. This is particularly true for the OAG as the
  representatives of the Commonwealth, prosecuting charges that this Court has
  identified of special interest to the public. Manibusan, 2018 MP 4 ¶ 27; Ada,
  2004 MP 14 ¶ 13. We cannot say it was clear error for the trial court to consider
  the two parallel prosecutions of Torres to be “inherently tied” together. Appendix
  at 30. We uphold the disqualifications of individual attorneys Glass and
  Kingman, as announced in Torres II, 2025 MP 6 ¶¶ 20, 25-26.
¶ 47     Given that attorneys in the OAG have a conflict with this prosecution,
  Model Rule 1.10 will apply only if this conflict can be imputed to the other
  attorneys employed in the office as if they are “associated in a firm.” MRPC
  1.10(a). The Commonwealth argues that Model Rule 1.10 does not apply to the
  OAG at all, because it is not a firm.
¶ 48     This issue has not been addressed by this Court, though we have stated
  that the Model Rules generally apply to the OAG. Torres v. Manibusan, 2018
  MP 4 ¶ 23 n.5. In his 2022 testimony, Manibusan also stated that he believed the
  Model Rules in its entirety apply to the Attorney General. Appendix at 275. The
  Model Rules themselves define “firm” in Rule 1.1 and the comments of Rule
  1.10 as “lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole
  proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers
  employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation
  or other organization.” MRPC 1.10 cmt. 1. The Model Rules further clarify that,
  “[w]ith respect to the law department of an organization, including the
  government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department
  constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct.”
  MRPC R. 1.1 cmt. 3. Under a strict reading of the Model Rules, the OAG could
  be considered a firm for the purposes of conflict imputation under Model Rule
  1.10.
¶ 49     However, the Model Rules should not be applied to the OAG in a rigid or
  mechanical manner. See State v. Klattenhoff, 801 P.2d 548, 603 (Haw.
  1990)(“[D]ue to the [attorney general]’s statutorily mandated role in our legal
  system, we cannot mechanically apply the Code of Professional Responsibility
  to the [attorney general]’s office.”). Our analysis of this issue as it applies in the
  Commonwealth must leave room for the nuances of local law and the unique
  position that the OAG occupies in the Commonwealth government. Prosecutors
  and government attorneys are exempted by the Model Rules from other
  requirements that may be inconsistent with their duties. See MRPC Scope at ¶ 18
                        Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



 (recognizing that government attorneys have greater vested authority than private
 counsel and “may be authorized to represent several government agencies . . . in
 circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private
 clients”); MRPC R. 1.13 cmt. 9 (allowing a unique balancing test applicable only
 to government attorneys). Prosecutors are otherwise subject to additional
 responsibilities beyond those of other attorneys, including upholding the
 constitutional rights of defendants. MRPC R. 3.8.
¶ 50      The unique clients of the OAG also assuage concerns for protection of
  client rights and information applicable to private attorneys. The constitutionally
  mandated clients of the OAG are the Governor, executive departments, and the
  Commonwealth itself. NMI CONST. art. III, § 11. It is an uncommon scenario,
  such as presented in this appeal, where the clients of the OAG find themselves in
  adverse or conflicting positions. Additionally, Model Rule 1.10 only allows for
  an exception to the imputation of conflicts for work from a “prior firm”—not a
  prior or concurrent client government office while employed by the same “firm.”
  MRPC 1.10(a).
¶ 51     Consistent with the Model Rules’ special treatment of government
  attorneys to accommodate for their unique responsibilities and authorities, the
  imputation of one attorney’s conflict to the entire OAG is not practical or in the
  interest of justice in the Commonwealth. The mechanical application of Model
  Rule 1.10 to the OAG would result in a scenario where the conflict of Manibusan,
  Glass, or Kingman would be automatically imputed to the entire OAG, without
  an opportunity for the OAG to implement screening procedures. Such application
  of the Rules would limit the ability of the OAG to serve its constitutionally
  mandated duty, without recourse. Public policy beyond the scope of the Model
  Rules requires that the conflicts in this case not be imputed to the entire OAG
  and the OAG be allowed to enact screening procedures for this conflict of
  interest.
¶ 52     Other jurisdictions allow screening procedures for attorneys exposed to
  privileged information regarding a prosecution being undertaken by their office.
  Grand Jury Subpoena of Ford v. United States concluded that disqualified
  attorneys could and should be screened off prosecutions and the entire office
  should not be disqualified from a prosecution. 756 F.2d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 1985).
  The court used various policy considerations to make this decision. First, the
  disqualification rule was designed to protect an attorney’s clients, and United
  States Attorneys have only one real client—the government. Id. Next, federal
  regulations allow for Assistant United States Attorneys to substitute into a case
  when others recuse, and that case law has allowed former government attorneys
  to be screened out of their law firms. Id. Finally, the court stated that the
  defendant would not be without recourse to argue any impropriety, as “it will be
  the government's burden to show that any investigation or prosecution . . . has
  not been tainted” by the conflict of interest. Id.
¶ 53   “Before disqualifying an entire U.S. Attorney's Office, a district court
  must make specific factual findings that show that the office's continued
                        Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



 representation would result in a clear legal or ethical violation.” Williams, 68
 F.4th at 574. Federal circuits do not allow for broad disqualifications of entire
 prosecutorial offices only due to vicarious disqualification or imputations of
 conflicts on the entire office. Blanket disqualifications are considered extreme
 remedies “only appropriate in the most extraordinary circumstances” after the
 court has determined that the United State Attorney’s Office’s continued
 representation of the government would result in a legal or ethical violation. Id.
 at 573.
¶ 54     Guam has also recently held that the Office of the Attorney General may
  use screening procedure to contain one attorney’s conflict of interest. In In re
  Request of Lourdes A. Leon Guerrero, the Guam Supreme Court stated that
  assistant attorneys general may continue a prosecution when another, uninvolved
  assistant attorney general has a conflict. 2024 Guam 18 ¶ 57. Only “in
  extraordinary circumstances—such as where a conflicted assistant attorney
  general remains unscreened and continues to participate in or discuss the matters
  where they have a conflict—is disqualification of the entire office necessary.” Id.
  The Guam court concluded that, when the Attorney General has a conflict of
  interest due to having advised a government officer in their “official capacity on
  matters related to an offense with which the officer is charged,” whether the
  conflict is imputed to entire office “should be decided case by case after
  considering the entire complex of facts surrounding the conflict.” Id. ¶ 61.
¶ 55     In re Request of Lourdes A. Leon Guerrero relied upon state court
  decisions which applied Model Rule 1.10 in a flexible manner, forgoing rigid or
  mechanical application. Indiana does not require disqualification of the entire
  prosecutor’s office because of an uninvolved conflicted attorney, absent a
  showing from the defendant that they will be actually prejudiced by the
  prosecution. Page v. State, 689 N.E.2d 707, 709 (Ind. 1997). Washington allows
  chief prosecutors to delegate authority and be “scrupulously” screened off of
  prosecutions where they have privileged information where “the previous case is
  not the same case (or one closely interwoven therewith) that is being prosecuted,
  and where, for some other ethical reason, the prosecuting attorney may be totally
  disqualified from the case.” State v. Stenger, 760 P.2d 357, 360 (Wash. 1988).
  Likewise, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court recognizes the availability of screening
  measures for attorneys with conflicts within the attorney general’s office. See
  Wong v. Cayetano, 143 P.3d 1, 19 (Haw. 2006) (implicitly approving screening
  measures between attorney general criminal division attorneys pursuing charges
  against trustee of charitable trust and civil division attorneys seeking removal of
  trustee in probate court). We recognize that there are states that take a contrary
  view, but they are in the minority and only adopt this position under extenuating
  circumstances. See State ex rel. Keenan v. Hatcher, 557 S.E.2d 361, 370 (2001)
  (Entire prosecutor’s office disqualified where an attorney was previously the
  defendant’s counsel and some of the charges were predicated on the prior
  conviction, “simply raise[ing] too great a danger that a client's confidences may
  be betrayed.”).
                          Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



¶ 56     There is no justification to disqualify the entire OAG here. There is no
  evidence that all attorneys associated with the OAG have been exposed to
  privileged information or other conflicts arising from the representation of the
  Governor and executive departments. Williams, 68 F.4th at 574. It is not apparent
  from the record that other, unnamed attorneys associated with the OAG are
  unscreened and have been included in discussions of the conflicted information.
  In re Request, 2024 Guam 18 ¶ 57.
¶ 57     Instead, the record reveals that Assistant Attorneys General in the OAG
  were screened and separated from the prosecution team. Attorney General
  Manibusan testified that all screening procedures outlined in the OAG’s Policies
  and Procedures Manual were applied with substantial compliance for other
  attorneys in the OAG. Appendix at 38, 200. Glass was physically removed from
  the office housing attorneys providing representation to the executive branch, all
  prosecution files were separated from the regular filing system, and necessary
  employees of the OAG were provided notice of the screen. Id. at 38. Though we
  affirm Glass’s disqualification from this prosecution, we find that this screening
  procedure prevents imputation of a conflict onto the entire office.1 The trial court
  erred in imputing the conflict to the OAG and vicariously disqualifying the office
  without an explicit finding of fact that the entire office had been tainted.
    D. The OAG is required to provide notice of screening procedures to Torres.
¶ 58     In its argument that screening procedures were sufficient, the
  Commonwealth argues that it provided all necessary notices regarding the
  screening procedure employed for this case in the OAG. See Opening Br. at 26
  n.18. In light of our findings on disqualification, we clarify the OAG’s
  obligations regarding notice of screening procedures to individuals with whom it
  has had a professional relationship transcending the traditional attorney-client
  relationship.
¶ 59     Attorneys may not represent a client if doing so creates a concurrent
  conflict of interest. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly prohibits
  attorneys from taking on a client where “there is a significant risk that the
  representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
  responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal

1
    If the entire Office of the Attorney General was disqualified from prosecuting a
    criminal case, the court may not prevent the Attorney General from appointing a new
    special prosecutor. The Constitution places the duty of prosecuting violations of the
    law solely with the Attorney General. NMI CONST. art. III, § 11. HLI 17-2, passed in
    2012, significantly reduced the authority of the Governor over the Attorney General,
    notably removing appointment power from the Governor and converting the Attorney
    General into an elected office. Manibusan, 2018 MP 04 ¶ 18-19. Under the Constitution
    and Commonwealth Code, the Attorney General retains the power to appoint
    prosecutors. See 1 CMC 2154. Such appointments are administrative tasks that do not
    inherently breach any conflict screening wall. However, the Attorney General and other
    attorneys in the OAG must not be further associated with the prosecution beyond what
    initial administrative orientation is practically required.
                         Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



 interest of the lawyer.” MRPC R. 1.7(a)(2). The exception to this is if, among
 other necessary criteria, the current client gives informed, written consent to the
 attorney undertaking the new representation. MRPC R. 1.7(b).
¶ 60     The trial court initially determined that Torres was never a client of the
  OAG. Appendix at 47. The reconsideration order then improperly reversed this
  finding, based on the premise that the charges were brought against Torres in his
  official capacity. Id. at 26; supra at ¶ 39. Torres, in his personal capacity—as he
  appears before this Court, has not been represented by the OAG.
¶ 61     It is indisputable under the Constitution that the Governor and the
  Commonwealth are both concurrent clients of the OAG. NMI CONST. art. III, §
  11. As recognized in Torres v. Manibusan, however, this relationship is not a
  traditional attorney-client relationship. The Governor is limited “from interfering
  with the attorney general’s power to prosecute cases” and the Attorney General
  has the power to decline to prosecute cases and appeals. Id. Furthermore, the
  Governor or any executive departments may not hire outside counsel to subvert
  the Attorney General’s power and pursue an appeal that has been declined by the
  OAG. Id. Under this constitutional framework, the Governor—as the client—
  does not hold the power to choose his own counsel, a hallmark right for private
  clients. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
¶ 62     The Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognize that a government
  attorney faces difficulty meshing the authority inherent in their position with the
  ideals of private attorney-client relationships enshrined in the Rules. MRPC
  Scope at ¶ 18. The Model Rules generally apply to the OAG, even if not every
  rule contained therein applies. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lot 218-5 R/W, 2013
  MP 5 ¶ 11.
¶ 63     The OAG and Torres do not have an attorney-client relationship for the
  purpose of applying Model Rule 1.7 to the OAG. The representation of the Office
  of the Governor is not “directly adverse” to the prosecutorial power, nor is there
  “a significant risk that the representation [of the Commonwealth in a criminal
  case] will be materially limited by the [OAG’s] responsibilities” to the Office of
  the Governor. MRPC R. 1.7(a). Where one OAG attorney’s representation of a
  client could create a concurrent conflict, screening may allow the representation
  to continue without an inherent ethical violation. See supra at ¶ 51.
¶ 64     The court erred in finding that Model Rule 1.7 must be applied to the
  parties as if Torres is a current client. The OAG is not required to receive written,
  informed consent from Torres before continuing his prosecution, as required by
  MPRC R. 1.7(b) if he were a client, nor is the OAG required by this rule to “wall
  off the conflicted portions of the OAG” because two clients are in adverse
  positions. Appendix at 26.
¶ 65     Attorneys, including the OAG, have ethical requirements beyond those
  codified in the Model Rules. We hold that an attorney in the OAG who has been
  exposed to privileged information which requires the use of screening procedures
  must still provide notice of the screening procedure to the individual or
                        Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



 organization whose privileged information has been exposed, as if in compliance
 with Model Rule 1.10. Such written notice should be “promptly given to [the
 individual] to enable [them] to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this
 Rule, which shall include a description of the screening procedures employed; a
 statement of the firm's and of the screened lawyer's compliance with these Rules;
 a statement that review may be available before a tribunal; and an agreement by
 the firm to respond promptly to any written inquiries or objections by the former
 client about the screening procedures.” MRPC R. 1.10(a)(2)(ii).
¶ 66     Even though Torres individually is not, and never has been, a client of the
  OAG, the relationship between the two parties is like that of an attorney and
  client. Government employees in their official capacities who receive advice
  from government attorneys may later face criminal prosecution in their personal
  capacity. See Jasper v. Quitugua, 1999 MP 04; see also Appendix at 39 (noting
  that the OAG provided the Office of the Governor legal advice on responding to
  a legislative subpoena of which Torres was later held in contempt for defying).
  The relationship between the OAG and other government officials in this
  situation would be of such consequence as to rise to the level of necessitating the
  sort of protection available to a former client.
¶ 67     This requirement is analogous to the written notice requirement owed to a
  former client under Model Rule 1.10 because the purpose of the notice is the
  same for former clients and individuals such as Torres. The certification provided
  in writing by an attorney complies with Model Rule 1.10’s requirement and gives
  “the former client assurance that the client’s material confidential information
  has not been disclosed or used inappropriately, either prior to timely
  implementation of a screen or thereafter.” MRPC R. 1.10 cmt. 10. “The notice is
  intended to enable the former client to evaluate and comment upon the
  effectiveness of the screening procedures.” MRPC R. 1.10 cmt. 9.
¶ 68     The OAG must provide written notice of compliance with adequate
  screening procedures when prosecuting a current or former government official
  for whom an attorney with the OAG has been exposed to privileged information
  while representing the Commonwealth or a client agency. Though Model Rule
  1.10 is not mechanically applicable to the OAG, supra at ¶ 49, it still can provide
  a vehicle for disclosing the necessary screening procedures.
                      E. Evidentiary hearing on disqualification
¶ 69      Finally, we consider whether the trial court erred by failing to hold an
  evidentiary hearing before disqualifying the OAG in July 2024. Opening Br. at
  28. As part of the larger review of the disqualification of the OAG, we review
  this issue on the abuse of discretion standard. Williams, 68 F.4th at 571.
¶ 70    In re San Nicolas allows for the disqualification of the entire OAG office
  “under narrow circumstances” when the OAG has had notice and a hearing. 2013
  MP 8 ¶¶ 20–21. A conflict of interest cannot be imputed to an entire office
  without direct evidence of officewide involvement. Williams, 68 F.4th at 574.
                           Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



¶ 71     Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
  particular situation demands. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
  Here, notice was provided to the Commonwealth in May 2022. Appendix at 2. A
  complete evidentiary hearing was also held that month, including testimony
  about the OAG screening procedures and Glass’s exposure to privileged
  information. Id. at 242. This is sufficient to satisfy due process under San
  Nicolas. 2
                                   V. CONCLUSION
¶ 72    In summary, we hold the Office of the Attorney General cannot be
  summarily disqualified through the imputation of a conflict to the entire Office
  without sufficient justification. The trial court did not err in disqualifying the
  named, individual attorneys, but should not have imputed such conflicts to the
  Office as a whole. We REVERSE in part and AFFIRM in part.


         SO ORDERED this 22nd day of August, 2025.



 /s/
JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
Associate Justice


 /s/
ROBERT J. TORRES, JR.
Justice Pro Tempore


 /s/
SABRINA S. MCKENNA
Justice Pro Tempore


                                          COUNSEL

J. Robert Glass, Jr., Chief Solicitor, Saipan, MP, for Plaintiff-Appellant.



2
    It is the best practice for the OAG to memorialize its case screening procedures in
    writing, even if notice to another party or the court is not required, so that there is no
    need to rely on an evidentiary hearing to explain what procedure, if any, was applied
    to the case. Cf. Appendix at 242 (testimony from Attorney General Manibusan that
    this case may not have had written notice as required by the OAG’s policies and
    procedures manual).
                           Commonwealth v. Torres, 2025 MP 5



Anthony H. Aguon, Joaquin DLG. Torres, Victorino DLG. Torres, and Viola Alepuyo,
Saipan, MP, for Defendant-Appellee.

                                          NOTICE
This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication
in the permanent law reports. Until certified, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. In any
event of discrepancies between this slip opinion and the opinion certified for publication,
the certified opinion controls. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, P.O. Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950, phone (670) 236–9715,
fax (670) 236–9702, e-mail Supreme.Court@NMIJudiciary.gov.