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[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"11105500","type":"100trialcourt","part":"other","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
ROBERT R. COTE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 23-346 WES
)
DONNA TRAVIS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Robert R. Cote sues Defendants for removing him
from a Warwick City Council meeting, claiming the removal violated
his First Amendment rights and constituted a false arrest. See
generally Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 29. Before the Court are
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendants’ Motion”),
Dkt. No. 35, and Plaintiff’s Conditional Rule 56(d) Motion
(“Plaintiff’s Discovery Motion”), Dkt. No. 42. For the reasons
explained below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Discovery Motion and
GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Warwick City Council: An Overview
“The legislative powers of the city” of Warwick are vested in
one City Council. Warwick, R.I., City Charter art. II, § 2-1.
The City Council consists of nine elected members, who in turn
elect one of its members to serve as President and another of its
members to serve as President pro-tem. Id. §§ 2-1, 2-5. The
President presides over all City Council meetings. Id. § 2-5.
The President pro-tem acts as President in the President’s
temporary absence. Id.
“The council by resolution shall determine its own rules and
order of business . . . .” Id. § 2-6. These rules govern the
conduct of City Council meetings. Defs.’ Statement Undisputed
Facts (“DSUF”) ¶ 2, Dkt. No. 37. Two of these rules are relevant
to this litigation.1 First, Rule 1 provides that, during City
Council meetings, “[t]he President shall preserve decorum and
order, and shall decide all questions and points of order subject
to an appeal to the City Council by any one member.” Id. Ex. A,
at 1. Under Rule 1, if an appeal is made, then the President’s
“decision may be overturned by a majority of the members present.”
Id. Second, Rule 41 directs that:
[A]t each City Council Public Hearing meeting, there
shall be a fifteen (15) minute period during which
citizens may comment about Warwick City Government
issues subject to the following stipulations:
a. The total period of time for public comment shall
be fifteen (15) minutes. Comments need to be
brief in order to allow as many citizens as
possible to participate.
b. The topics for comment shall be issues directly
affecting City government.
1 The Court recites the rules as they were in effect as of
July 17, 2023, the day of the events in issue in this litigation.
See DSUF ¶ 1.
c. City Council members will not respond to
questions during the public comment period.
d. The public comment session will terminate at the
expiration of fifteen (15) minutes. Waiver of
this provision requires a unanimous vote of the
Council.
Id. Ex. A, at 18.
B. Factual History
Plaintiff Robert R. Cote is a U.S. citizen and Warwick
resident. Pl.’s Statement Additional Undisputed Facts (“PSAUF”)
¶ 14, Dkt. No. 41. He “frequently comment[s] on matters of public
concern and the Providence Journal has on several occasions
described him as a ‘watchdog.’” Id. ¶ 22. One former City
Councilmember, Defendant Donna Travis, has independently described
him as being “always on the hunt.” Id. ¶ 36.
In July 2023, Cote caught the scent of a brewing potential
scandal: he read a newly published piece in the Providence Journal
that he believed “related to Travis’[s] ethics as a member of the
City Council.” See id. ¶¶ 23-26. July 17 was the next scheduled
City Council public hearing meeting, so Cote signed up to speak
during the meeting’s public comment period. DSUF ¶¶ 1, 6.
At the July 17 meeting, as things turned out, City Council
President Defendant Stephen McAllister was absent; presiding over
the meeting, in her capacity as President pro-tem, was Travis.
DSUF ¶¶ 7-8. The other seven Councilmembers, also named as
Defendants in this action (collectively, the “Present
Councilmembers”), were present. Id. ¶ 9. When Cote’s time came
to speak, this exchange occurred:
Cote: Good evening. Just a little bit about some local
politics and I have some official City documents to
share. Um, first, I’d like to congratulate Councilwoman
Travis for another front page of the Providence Journal
(holding up newspaper).
Travis: You will be talking about City government or
you’ll be leaving.
Cote: This is about the government . . .
Travis: Stick to the topic of City government or else
you’ll be escorted out.
Cote: This is about City government it’s actually
mentioned about the Warwick . . .
Travis: Did you hear what I just said?
Cote: Ok.
Travis: I don’t care, any one of the Council people, you
do not take attack to. Stick to a City government issue
and then we’ll go forward.
Cote: This is about City government issues we have an
elected official . . .
Travis: Ok. Somebody want to take him out?
Cote: You know this is gonna be with the ACLU.
Travis: He’s all done.
Cote: This is about . . .
Travis: You get away with it every month, you’re not
gonna do it with me. You’re leaving now. I’m sure he
can read, go. Go. Goodbye.
City of Warwick, Warwick City Council Meeting – 7.17.2023, at 2:18-
2:20 (YouTube, July 17, 2023),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PUPaSHtA6Ac&t=8405s.
Law enforcement then escorted Cote out of the meeting. PSAUF
¶ 30. None of the Present Councilmembers appealed Travis’s
decision to eject Cote. Id. ¶ 33.
Three days later, the Warwick Beacon published an article
about the July 17 meeting. Id. ¶ 35. The article quoted Travis
as saying that “it was the unwritten practice of the City Council
not to allow ‘personal attacks’ during the public comment period.”
Id. “Travis also said that she has ‘dealt with Cote in the past,’”
and “described how he had made a flier with her picture on it and
put it on windshields in a Stop & Shop parking lot ‘to expose her
taxes which included a temporary payment plan.’” Id. ¶ 36.
Finally, “[t]he article adds that Travis also said, ‘[Cote’s] been
doing this forever . . . [.] Every time he comes, he has to complain
about something. He’s said bad things about the mayor, council
people[,] and me.’” Id.
On August 29, McAllister sent Cote (via Cote’s attorney) a
letter, personally inviting him “to ‘appear before the Warwick
City Council at its next meeting . . . to speak about matters he
intended to address on July 17, 2023.’” DSUF ¶ 11 (quoting id.,
Ex. B). McAllister also made clear that Cote was welcome “‘to
participate in future opportunities available to members of the
public to address the Council and its Committees, including Rule
41 Public Comment.’” Id. (quoting id., Ex. B). Cote has since
addressed the City Council during public comment periods on
numerous occasions, each time without interruption. Id. ¶ 13.
C. Procedural History
On August 28, 2023, Cote commenced this lawsuit. See
generally Compl., Dkt. No. 1. His Amended Complaint names the
following parties as Defendants:
•
Donna Travis, in both her personal and official capacities;
•
The seven Present Councilmembers - William Foley, Vincent
Gebhart, Timothy Howe, Edgar Ladouceur, James McElroy,
Jeremy Rix, and Anthony Sinapi - in both their personal
and official capacities;
•
Stephen McAllister, in his official capacity;
•
Peder Shaefer, in his official capacity as Finance Director
of the City of Warwick; and
•
The City of Warwick.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-8. The Amended Complaint makes the following
claims and requests for relief:
•
Count I alleges all Defendants violated Cote’s First
Amendment right of free speech. Cote seeks injunctive
relief against all Defendants, and compensatory and
punitive damages against all Defendants except McAllister.
•
Count II alleges all Defendants violated Cote’s First
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of
wrongs. Cote seeks injunctive relief against all
Defendants, compensatory damages against all Defendants
except McAllister, and punitive damages against Travis.
•
Count III alleges Travis retaliated against him for
protected First Amendment activity. Cote seeks
compensatory and punitive damages.
•
Count IV alleges all Defendants subjected him to a false
arrest. Cote seeks compensatory damages against all
Defendants except McAllister, and punitive damages against
Travis.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31-57.
Defendants move for summary judgment. See generally Defs.’
Mot. Cote opposes Defendants’ Motion and moves to defer a ruling
on it until he has an opportunity to take discovery. See generally
Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot. (“Pl.’s Resp.”), Dkt. No. 39; Pl.’s
Discovery Mot.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court must grant summary judgment to Defendants if they
show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
[they are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). “[A] dispute is genuine when the evidence is such ‘that
a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving
party.’” Quintana-Dieppa v. Dep’t of the Army,
130 F.4th 1, 7
(1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Doe v. Trs. of Bos. Coll.,
892 F.3d 67,
79
(1st Cir. 2018)). A fact is material when it has “the ‘potential
to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.’”
Id.
(quoting Cherkaoui v. City of Quincy,
877 F.3d 14, 23
(1st Cir.
2017)).
The Court must view “‘the entire record in the light most
hospitable to the [nonmoving party],’” drawing “‘all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor.’”
Id.
(quoting McCarthy v. Nw.
Airlines, Inc.,
56 F.3d 313, 315
(1st Cir. 1995)). But it shall
not rely on “‘conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, [or]
unsupported speculation.’”
Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting
Medina–Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
896 F.2d 5, 8
(1st Cir.
1990)).
Finally, the nonmoving party may show “by affidavit or
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts
essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). In
that circumstance, the Court “may: (1) defer considering the motion
or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or
to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.”
Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Applying these standards to the applicable law and facts, the
Court concludes that: (1) Travis is entitled to summary judgment
on Counts I-III in her personal capacity, but not in her official
capacity; (2) the Present Councilmembers are entitled to summary
judgment on Counts I and II in their personal capacities, but not
their official capacities; (3) the City is not entitled to summary
judgment on Count I or Count II; (4) McAllister, sued solely in
his official capacity, is not entitled to summary judgment on Count
I or Count II; and (5) all Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Count IV.
A. Counts I-III: Section 1983 Claims
The Court begins with Defendants’ Motion, specifically its
challenges to Cote’s Section 1983 claims stated in Counts I-III.
But before adjudicating those challenges, the Court reviews the
legal principles governing Section 1983 lawsuits.
Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983
, a plaintiff may hold civilly liable
any “person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects [him], or causes
[him] to be subjected . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
To succeed on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show “‘(1)
that the complained-of conduct was committed under the color of
state law, and (2) that such conduct violated [his] constitutional
or federal statutory rights.’” Wadsworth v. Nguyen,
129 F.4th 38,
50
(1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Miller v. Town of Wenham,
833 F.3d 46,
51
(1st Cir. 2016)).
“[M]unicipalities and other local government units [are]
included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 690
(1978).
To recover on a Section 1983 claim against such a “person,” a
plaintiff must prove that “the action that is alleged to be
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body’s officers.”
Id.
Alternatively, a
plaintiff can succeed by showing that the alleged unconstitutional
action resulted from “governmental ‘custom’ even though such a
custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official
decisionmaking channels.”
Id. at 691
.
The Section 1983 claims in this lawsuit assert violations of
the First Amendment, which “protects (among other things) the right
to free speech and the right to petition all branches of the
government.” Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water Dist.,
821 F.3d
134, 141
(1st Cir. 2016) (citing Powell v. Alexander,
391 F.3d 1,
16
(1st Cir. 2004)). And “[w]hen a government actor retaliates
against someone for exercising constitutionally protected First
Amendment rights, that individual has a cognizable retaliation
claim pursuant to § 1983.” Id. (citing Powell,
391 F.3d at 16
).
Bearing these principles in mind, the Court considers whether
any Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
1. Travis
Cote seeks to hold Travis liable for the claims stated in
Counts I-III. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31-50. In defense, Travis says that
she is immune to liability under the formidable shields of both
absolute legislative immunity and qualified immunity. Defs.’ Mem.
L. Supp. Mot. (“Defs.’ Mem.”) 7-13, Dkt. No. 36; Defs.’ Supp. Mem.
Supp. Mot. (“Defs.’ Suppl. Mem.”) 3-14, Dkt. No. 51. The Court
agrees that she is protected by legislative immunity.2
2 Absolute immunity – like qualified immunity – applies to
Travis solely in her personal capacity. See Bd. of Comm’rs,
Wabaunsee Cnty. v. Umbehr,
518 U.S. 668
, 677 n.* (1996) (noting
that legislative immunity “under § 1983 extends to public servants
only in their individual capacities”).
The Supreme Court, relying on federal common law, has held
that “[l]ocal legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from
§ 1983 liability for their legislative activities.” Bogan v.
Scott-Harris,
523 U.S. 44, 54
(1998). This immunity “is an
analogue to the Speech and Debate Clause of the federal
Constitution that reflects the importance that Anglo-American law
traditionally has placed on protecting ‘legislators acting within
their traditional sphere’ from being subject to suit.” Cushing v.
Packard,
30 F.4th 27, 36
(1st Cir. 2022) (citing Tenney v.
Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 376
(1951)). But critically, this shield
protects only those “actions taken ‘in the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity.’” Bogan,
523 U.S. at 54
(quoting Tenney,
341 U.S. at 376
).
Legitimate legislative activity consists of acts that are
“integral steps in the legislative process.” Id. at 55.3 This
3 The parties, in their briefings, utilize a test designed to
determine “whether an act is legislative or administrative in
nature.” Defs.’ Mem. 8; see also Pl.’s Resp. 10. But that test
is designed for cases where “the legislative immunity analysis
centers on function.” Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood,
69
F.3d 622
, 631 n.9 (1st Cir. 1995). Here, like in Harwood, the
Court is instead “dealing with a procedural rule adopted by [the
City Council] as a whole for the management of its own business.”
Id.
“Hence, we are not concerned with whether the adoption of the
rule comprises a legislative act . . . but, rather, with whether
that act is more than ‘casually or incidentally related’ to core
legislative functions.”
Id.
(quoting United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501, 528
(1972)).
contrasts with those “activities that are merely ‘casually or
incidentally related to legislative affairs.’” Cushing,
30 F.4th
at 49
(quoting United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501, 528
(1972)). Examples of legitimate legislative activity include “not
only speech and debate per se, but also voting, circulation of
information to other legislators, participation in the work of
legislative committees, and a host of kindred activities.” Nat’l
Ass’n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood,
69 F.3d 622, 630
(1st Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted) (collecting cases). And the First Circuit has
held that “[a]s a rule, a legislature’s regulation of the
atmosphere in which it conducts its core legislative activities –
debating, voting, passing legislation, and the like – is part and
parcel of the legislative process, and, hence, not subject to a
judicial veto.”
Id.
at 635 (citing Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s
Fund,
421 U.S. 491, 509
(1975)). On the flip side, examples of
activities that are only casually or incidentally related to
legislative affairs include “disseminat[ing] press releases to the
public” and “activities that are more political than legislative
in nature,” such as “‘legitimate “errands” performed for
constituents, the making of appointments with Government agencies,
[and] assistance in securing Government contracts.’”
Id.
at 630-
31 (first citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111, 133
(1979);
and then quoting Brewster,
408 U.S. at 512
).
Against this backdrop, the core question at hand stands in
stark relief: Was Travis’s act of interpreting and enforcing Rule
1, by ejecting Cote from the Rule 41 public comment period, within
the sphere of legitimate legislative activity?
Neither the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit has decided
whether interpreting and enforcing a rule to moderate a legislative
session’s public comment period constitutes a legitimate
legislative activity. In Hansen v. Bennett, the Seventh Circuit
decided that it does not.
948 F.2d 397
, 401 (7th Cir. 1991). As
the Hansen court noted, granting absolute immunity to the
legislator in this context risks immunizing “an activity which is
not ‘a part of the legislative process itself.’” Id. (quoting
Brewster,
408 U.S. at 528
). But that approach opts for an
altogether different risk: failing to apply a privilege “‘deemed
so essential for representatives of the people that it was written
into the Articles of Confederation and later into the
Constitution[’s]’ Speech and Debate Clause.” Cushing,
30 F.4th at
36
(alteration in original) (quoting Tenney,
341 U.S. at 372
).
Indeed, “the [Supreme] Court has further explained that this
‘privilege’ from suit is ‘indispensabl[e]’ to ‘enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public
trust with firmness and success.’”
Id.
(second alteration in
original) (quoting Tenney,
341 U.S. at 373
).
Facing this difficult question, the Court believes that both
precedent and prudence favor the conclusion that Travis’s action
under Rule 1 was within the sphere of legitimate legislative
activity. As an initial matter, the law of the First Circuit holds
that if “a legislative body adopts a rule, not invidiously
discriminatory on its face, that bears upon its conduct of frankly
legislative business,” then “the doctrine of legislative immunity
must protect legislators and legislative aides who do no more than
carry out the will of the body by enforcing the rule as part of
their official duties.” Harwood,
69 F.3d at 631
(citation omitted)
(collecting cases). There is no question that the City Council
adopted Rule 1; that it is not invidiously discriminatory on its
face; and that Travis interpreted and enforced it as part of her
official duties as President pro-tem. There is also no question
that Rule 1, if enforced during other portions of a City Council
meeting, bears upon legitimate legislative business. The only
question, then, is whether action taken under Rule 1 during the
Rule 41 public comment period also relates to genuine legislative
business. The Court believes that it does.
A public comment period is bona fide legislative business,
and not simply casually or incidentally related to legislative
affairs. In the words of a sister court, “[a] city council is
acting in its legislative capacity when it exercises its
investigatory power by presiding over a public comment period.”
Timmon v. Wood,
633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 460
(W.D. Mich. 2008)
(granting legislative immunity for legislator’s actions taken to
moderate city council meeting public comment period); see also
Murray v. City of New Buffalo,
708 F. Supp. 3d 1313
, 1337-38 (W.D.
Mich. 2023) (finding that absolute immunity protected mayor who
ejected plaintiffs from the public comment periods of multiple
city council meetings). “‘A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.’”
Timmon,
633 F. Supp. 2d at 460
(quoting McGrain v. Daugherty,
273
U.S. 135, 175
(1927)). Rule 41 public comment periods – which
restrict speech to issues directly affecting City government - are
inherently designed to collect such information and are thus an
“integral step[] in the legislative process.” Bogan,
523 U.S. at
55
. And the act of interpreting and enforcing Rule 1 no doubt
“regulat[es] the legislative environment” in which this vital
legislative business occurs. Harwood,
69 F.3d at 633
.
Prudential considerations are equally compelling. As one
judge of the Fourth Circuit has put it,
[e]very presiding official in a public meeting must, at
some time, make a spontaneous judgment as to whether a
speaker is abusing the forum. Section 1983 was not
intended to make actionable isolated incidents in which
politicians show poor judgment at a public meeting in
calling someone out of order.
Collinson v. Gott,
895 F.2d 994, 1005
(4th Cir. 1990) (Wilkinson,
J., concurring) (arguing that absolute immunity applies to a
presiding officer of a public meeting). Travis’s (and normally,
the City Council President’s) duty to enforce Rule 1 during the
Rule 41 public comment period is essential to maintaining an
orderly and effective proceeding. “The flow of information through
that [period] could be severely jeopardized if every public meeting
carried with it the threat of civil liability, not to mention
punitive damages.”
Id. at 1008
(Wilkinson, J., concurring).
Resisting this conclusion, Cote makes three counterarguments.
None is persuasive.
First, Cote argues that precedent supports his position that
a public comment period is not legitimate legislative activity,
marshaling an array of cases from several federal district courts
and courts of appeals. Pl.’s Resp. 8-13. Some of these cases are
somewhat analogous to this case. Others, less so. Cote also
spends much time distinguishing this case from cases that Travis
cites. Id. at 13-17. The flaw in his approach lies in the fact
that none of the cases he or Travis references is binding authority
on this Court, for this set of facts. The Court considers each of
those cases for their persuasive value.
Second, Cote contends that the facts show the public comment
period at issue here was not legislative in nature because
Defendants “were not promulgating an ordinance or passing a budget
or even discussing those matters. Rather, they were listening to
members of the public comment on matters directly affecting City
government, as required by Council Rule 41.” Id. at 12. The Court
disagrees with this premise, siding with courts that have held
that the City Council exercises its investigatory power when it
takes public comment on matters directly affecting City government
under Rule 41.
Finally, Cote urges the Court to consider Travis’s
(potentially malign) motive when determining whether her action in
interpreting and enforcing Rule 1 was legislative in nature. Id.
at 36-37. He points to evidence in the record to show her
“hostility against him.” Id. at 37. But this argument also falls
short, because “[w]hether an act is legislative turns on the nature
of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official
performing it.” Bogan,
523 U.S. at 54
. This inquiry is “stripped
of all considerations of intent and motive.”
Id. at 55
. Indeed,
in confirming this principle, the Court in Bogan explained that
“it simply is ‘not consonant with our scheme of government for a
court to inquire into the motives of legislators.’”
Id.
(quoting
Tenney,
341 U.S. at 377
). For that reason, the Court in Tenney
“held that the defendant . . . had acted in a legislative capacity
even though he allegedly singled out the plaintiff for
investigation in order ‘to intimidate and silence plaintiff and
deter and prevent him from effectively exercising his
constitutional rights.’”
Id.
(quoting Tenney,
341 U.S. at 371
).
* * *
The bottom line is this: Travis’s act of interpreting and
enforcing Rule 1 against Cote was “taken ‘in the sphere of
legitimate legislative activity.’” Bogan,
523 U.S. at 54
(quoting
Tenney,
341 U.S. at 376
). So she is protected by absolute
legislative immunity, and thus entitled to summary judgment in her
personal capacity on Counts I-III.
Travis’s act indeed may have violated Cote’s constitutional
rights, may have evinced poor judgment, and may even have been
done in service of an inappropriate motive or intent. But
legislative immunity “is not forfeited simply because the
activities, if unprotected, might violate a plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.” Harwood,
69 F.3d at 634
. Nor is it lost
due to an improper motive, for “there can be no inquiry into
legislative motive no matter how corrupt, for purposes of § 1983
damages liability, so long as the [legislator] is acting in
traditional legislative areas.” Torres Rivera v. Calderon Serra,
412 F.3d 205, 214
(1st Cir. 2005) (citing Tenney,
341 U.S. at 377
).
Ultimately, “[i]f [Travis] overstepped the boundary of sound
judgment, [s]he should be called to account, not under § 1983, but
at the ballot box.” Collinson,
895 F.2d at 1006
(Wilkinson, J.,
concurring).4
4 It appears that Travis was, in fact, called to account for
her alleged actions. See PSAUF ¶¶ 38, 43-44 (describing how Travis
decided to not seek reelection and “agreed to plead nolo contendere
to a misdemeanor charge respecting” the issue about which Cote
sought to raise at the July 17, 2023, City Council meeting).
2. The Present Councilmembers
Cote also seeks to hold the Present Councilmembers liable for
Counts I and II. These Defendants raise two defenses. They
adamantly assert that they “had no legal duty to prevent
Councilwoman Travis from potentially violating [Cote’s]
constitutional rights.” Defs.’ Mem. 13. And they reluctantly
argue that, even if they had a legal duty to intervene, they are
protected by qualified immunity. Defs.’ Suppl. Mem. 2 n.1.
But the Court, having found that absolute legislative
immunity applies to Travis, cannot avoid the inevitable result
that it also applies to the Present Councilmembers. Cote’s
argument regarding their liability is, at bottom, no different
than it is for Travis’s liability: an unlawful application of Rule
1. See Pl.’s Resp. 17-20 (noting that the Present Councilmembers
failed, under their Rule 1 authority, to raise an appeal or “point
of order”). So the same analysis pertains. And although these
Defendants do not argue for legislative immunity, even Cote appears
to realize that if it applies to Travis, then it applies to the
Present Councilmembers. See id. at 1, 8-17 (arguing that none of
these Defendants are entitled to legislative immunity). Thus,
because the Court found Travis to be protected by legislative
immunity, so too are the Present Councilmembers.5 The Present
5 The privilege of absolute legislative immunity applies to
the Present Councilmembers solely in their individual capacities.
Councilmembers are therefore entitled to summary judgment in their
personal capacities on Counts I and II.6
3. The City of Warwick
Cote also seeks to hold the City liable for the claims set
out in Counts I and II, which require him to show that (1) an
official City policy or custom (2) caused him to be deprived of
his First Amendment protected right. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31-46; see
also Wadsworth,
129 F.4th at 66
. The City argues that the
undisputed facts “do not establish a deprivation of rights by means
of policy or custom and, consequently, [Cote’s] First Amendment
claims . . . must fail.” Defs.’ Mem. 16. The Court disagrees.
The Supreme Court has found that a policy or custom, “duly
promulgated by city lawmakers, [can] trigger municipal liability
if the decision itself [was] found to be unconstitutional.” Bd.
of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 406
(1997).
But a municipal policy or custom need not itself be
See Umbehr,
518 U.S. at 677
n.*.
6 Had the Court not granted these Defendants absolute
legislative immunity, it is likely that it would have rejected
their argument that they had no legal duty to prevent the alleged
violation of Cote’s First Amendment rights. See Ocasio-Hernandez
v. Fortuño-Burset,
640 F.3d 1, 16
(1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that
individual defendants may be liable under Section 1983 “if a
plaintiff can establish that his or her constitutional injury
‘resulted from the direct acts or omissions of the official, or
from indirect conduct that amounts to condonation or tacit
authorization’” (quoting Rodríguez–García v. Miranda–Marín,
610
F.3d 756, 768
(1st Cir. 2010))).
unconstitutional to be “actionable” under Section 1983, if it is
unconstitutionally applied. City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S.
378, 387
(1989). And the Court has further held that “municipal
liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal
policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” Pembaur v.
Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 480
(1986) (emphasis added). Indeed,
even “a final decisionmaker’s [one-time] adoption of a course of
action ‘tailored to a particular situation and not intended to
control decisions in later situations’ may, in some circumstances,
give rise to municipal liability under § 1983.” Brown,
520 U.S.
at 406
(quoting Pembaur,
475 U.S. at 481
).
Under these principles, the City’s argument does not pass
muster at this stage. For one thing, at the City Council meeting
in-issue, Travis (as President pro-tem) unquestionably acted as
the City’s final decisionmaker with respect to the enforcement of
Rule 1. Under Harris and Pembaur, if that application of Rule 1
was unconstitutional, then that single act could subject the City
to liability. See Harris,
489 U.S. at 387
; Pembaur,
475 U.S. at
480
. Moreover, Cote draws on several undisputed facts to infer
that the City Council has “an unwritten practice . . . of excluding
certain persons who criticize[] [Councilmembers] during the public
comment period.” Pl.’s Resp. 21. If that inference is true, the
City could face liability on that basis too. Accordingly, the
City is not entitled to summary judgment on Counts I and II.
4. McAllister
Cote further contends that McAllister is liable for the claims
asserted in Counts I and II. McAllister argues that he is not
liable because he was not present at the July 17, 2023 City Council
meeting. Defs.’ Mem. 19-20. But Cote sues McAllister exclusively
in his official capacity as City Council President, and he may do
so to obtain equitable prospective relief. See Reed v. Goertz,
598 U.S. 230, 234
(2023) (citing Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123,
159-61
(1908)). For this reason, McAllister is not entitled to
summary judgment on Counts I and II.
C. Count IV: False Arrest Claim
Finally, Cote brings a claim against all Defendants for false
arrest.7 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51-57. Defendants contend that they are
entitled to summary judgment on this claim because (1) Cote’s
ejection from the City Council meeting was legally justified and
(2) they are protected by qualified immunity. Defs.’ Mem. 16-19.
And although they choose not to argue the point, Defendants note
7 The Court notes that it cannot decipher whether Cote’s
Amended Complaint alleges a claim for an unconstitutional false
arrest in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983
or, alternatively, an
unlawful false arrest in violation of Rhode Island tort law. See
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51-57. But the elements of the two claims are nearly
identical. Henshaw v. Doherty,
881 A.2d 909, 919
(R.I. 2005)
(citing Scott v. District of Columbia,
101 F.3d 748, 753
(D.C.
Cir. 1996)). Thus, because Cote gestures at both federal law and
state law frameworks in his briefing, and because Defendants argue
the issue under state law, the Court assesses Cote’s claim under
Rhode Island law. See Pl.’s Resp. 22-23; Defs.’ Mem. 16-19.
that “[i]t is undisputed that none of the Defendants in this case
subjected [Cote] to a custodial arrest.” Defs.’ Reply Pl.’s Resp.
13, Dkt. No. 46 (citing PSAUF ¶ 30). Yet this undisputed fact is
impossible to overlook because, as both parties agree, Cote’s claim
hinges on whether “he was detained ‘without legal justification.’”
Defs.’ Mem. 16 (quoting Dyson v. City of Pawtucket,
670 A.2d 233,
239
(R.I. 1996)); see Pl.’s Resp. 22; see also Illas v. Przybyla,
850 A.2d 937
, 942 n.4 (R.I. 2004) (citing Beaudoin v. Levesque,
697 A.2d 1065, 1067
(R.I. 1997)). Indeed, Cote himself argues the
detention issue and legal justification issue separately. Pl.’s
Resp. 22-28.
To determine whether a person was detained, “the central
inquiry is whether, ‘in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable
person would believe that he or she was not free to leave.’” State
v. Jimenez,
276 A.3d 1258
, 1267 (R.I. 2022) (quoting State v. Diaz,
654 A.2d 1195, 1204
(R.I. 1995)). In ejecting Cote from the City
Council meeting, the undisputed facts show that Defendants did not
subject him to a detention. Cote argues that he believed he was
unable to leave, and thus under arrest, because (1) law enforcement
“escort[ed] him out of the meeting over his objection”; (2) he
“was reasonably concerned that he would be arrested if he did not
leave”; and (3) “dozens of people have [since] asked [him] or his
family members about his ‘arrest’ at the City Council meeting.”
Pl.’s Resp. 23; see also PSAUF ¶ 30. But the first two arguments
show only that Cote was not free to stay, and not that he was
unable to leave. And the last argument is not relevant to whether
he was, in fact, under arrest.
On the undisputed facts, no reasonable person in Cote’s shoes
would have believed that he was unable to leave, considering that
is exactly what he was asked to do. So Cote was not arrested or
otherwise detained, and thus cannot prove “[t]he essential
element” of his false arrest claim. Mailey v. De Pasquale’s
Estate,
177 A.2d 376, 379
(R.I. 1962). Accordingly, all Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on Count IV.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court concludes that:
•
For Count I: Travis and the Present Councilmembers are
entitled to summary judgment in their personal capacities,
but not in their official capacities. The City and McAllister
are not entitled to summary judgment.
•
For Count II: Travis and the Present Councilmembers are
entitled to summary judgment in their personal capacities,
but not in their official capacities. The City and McAllister
are not entitled to summary judgment.
•
For Count III: Travis is entitled to summary judgment in her
personal capacity, but not in her official capacity.
•
For Count IV: All Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Some final words. None of the identified material sought by
Cote in his Discovery Motion would have influenced the Court’s
conclusions, and thus he is not entitled to relief under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). Because of the Court’s conclusions,
all individually named Defendants remain solely in their official
capacities - so in the end, this lawsuit reduces to an action
between Cote and the City. See Rosaura Bldg. Corp. v. Mun. of
Mayaguez,
778 F.3d 55, 62
(lst Cir. 2015) (“A suit against a public
official in his official capacity is a suit against the government
entity.”).
* *
For all the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Cote’s
Discovery Motion, Dkt. No. 42, and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
PART Defendants’ Motion, Dkt. No. 35.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Weemue
Senior District Judge
Date: July 22, 2025
25Case Information
- Court
- D.R.I.
- Decision Date
- July 22, 2025
- Status
- Precedential