Cutshall v. Potter

 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-1059 WILLIAM B. CUTSHALL, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, versus JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General, U. S. Postal Service, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge. (CA-03-93-1) Submitted: September 30, 2005 Decided: November 1, 2005 Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. John C. Hunter, BIGGERS & HUNTER, PLLC, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Paul B. Taylor, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). PER CURIAM: William B. Cutshall, Jr., a white male, filed suit against his employer, the Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service (“Employer”), alleging that Employer violated his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating against him based on his race in its decisions not to promote him for the positions of Human Resources Specialist and Supervisor of Distribution Operations. The district court entered summary judgment against Cutshall and dismissed the action. We affirm. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In light of this standard, we have carefully reviewed the formal briefs and materials submitted by the parties and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting Employer’s motion for summary judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are - 2 - adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED - 3 -