DeCastro v. Branker

                       PUBLISHED


UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
             FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT


EUGENE TYRONE DECASTRO,                
               Petitioner-Appellant,
                 v.
                                             No. 10-5
GERALD BRANKER, Warden, Central
Prison, Raleigh, North Carolina,
              Respondent-Appellee.
                                       
        Appeal from the United States District Court
   for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
            James C. Dever III, District Judge.
                    (5:08-hc-02075-D)

                  Argued: March 25, 2011

                   Decided: June 3, 2011

  Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and
              WYNN, Circuit Judges.



Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opin-
ion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Wilkinson con-
curred.


                         COUNSEL

ARGUED: Jonathan Lee Megerian, MEGERIAN & WELLS,
Asheboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra Wallace-
2                    DECASTRO v. BRANKER
Smith, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Paul M.
Green, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Roy Cooper,
Attorney General of North Carolina, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellee.


                           OPINION

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

   Petitioner Eugene Tyrone DeCastro seeks habeas relief
from his capital sentence for slaying Leon and Margaret Bat-
ten. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel and that the State of North Carolina violated his
Eighth Amendment and due process rights by presenting to
the jury evidence and argument that contradicted those pres-
ented in the trials of his co-defendants. A state court denied
Petitioner habeas relief, and the federal district court correctly
determined that the state court’s decision did not constitute an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or
an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, we
affirm.

                                I.

   In 1993, Petitioner Eugene DeCastro was charged with the
murders of Leon and Margaret Batten and robbery with a dan-
gerous weapon of Leon Batten. A Johnston County, North
Carolina jury found Petitioner guilty of two counts of first-
degree murder and one count of robbery with a dangerous
weapon. After a sentencing hearing, the jury recommended a
death sentence for each murder conviction. The trial court
imposed the recommended death sentences, as well as an
additional consecutive sentence of forty years’ imprisonment
for the robbery conviction. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, which detailed the salient facts in
State v. DeCastro, 342 N.C. 667, 467 S.E.2d 653 (1996).
                    DECASTRO v. BRANKER                      3
   At about 5:20 p.m. on February 29, 1992, George Goode,
his brother Chris Goode, Glenn Troublefield, and Petitioner
went for a ride in George Goode’s car. Id. at 676, 467 S.E.2d
at 657. In Smithfield, North Carolina, they saw a man walking
along the road, and George Goode stopped the car. Id. Peti-
tioner, George Goode, and Chris Goode got out of the car and
assaulted and robbed the man. Id. George Goode, Chris
Goode, and Petitioner then returned to the car, and George
Goode drove away at a high rate of speed. Id.

   George Goode played "chicken" with other vehicles and
eventually lost control of his car and ran into a ditch. Id. at
677, 467 S.E.2d at 657. After freeing the car, Petitioner,
George Goode, and Chris Goode went to a store and bought
a bottle of wine. Id. George Goode’s reckless driving contin-
ued until he lost control of the car again and stranded it near
the Dallas Mobile Home Park. Id. After unsuccessfully trying
to free the car, Petitioner, George Goode, and Chris Goode
began walking toward the Dallas Mobile Home Park, where
George Goode and his wife rented a mobile home. Id. Trou-
blefield, who had asked to be brought home several times, left
the area. Id.

   At about 6:35 p.m., a friend of George Goode’s wife saw
George Goode and several other men at the Goodes’ mobile
home. Id. Earlier that day, the owner of the Dallas Mobile
Home Park, Leon Batten, informed one of the Goodes’ neigh-
bors that the Goodes’ mobile home was vacant and that he
was seeking new tenants. Id. The Goodes had apparently been
delinquent in paying their rent. Id. Between 6:30 p.m. and
7:30 p.m., the neighbor saw a strange man in the mobile home
and informed Leon Batten. Id. Leon Batten drove his truck to
the Goodes’ home. Id. A few minutes later, witnesses saw
several African-American men standing over and beating
Leon Batten in the Goodes’ yard. Id. A park resident drove to
the Batten residence and informed Leon Batten’s wife, Mar-
garet, of the skirmish, and Margaret Batten drove to the
4                    DECASTRO v. BRANKER
Goodes’ mobile home. Id. Other witnesses drove to the home
of a deputy sheriff and informed him of the trouble. Id.

   At about 7:30 p.m., a deputy sheriff arrived at the Goodes’
mobile home and saw three African-American men standing
in the yard. Id. At trial, the deputy identified two of the men
as Petitioner and George Goode. Id. The men fled, and the
deputy was unable to catch them. Id. The deputy then discov-
ered the bodies of Leon and Margaret Batten in the cargo bed
of Leon Batten’s truck. Id. They had been stabbed multiple
times, and neither had any vital signs. Id.

   Another deputy sheriff approaching the scene spotted
George Goode two-tenths of a mile from the mobile home
park. Id. George Goode was quickly walking away from the
area. Id. When taken into custody, George Goode had Leon
Batten’s wallet. Within an hour after George Goode was taken
into custody, Chris Goode approached the crime scene seek-
ing his brother. After noticing bloodstains on Chris Goode’s
clothing, officers placed him in custody and discovered Leon
Batten’s partial dental plate in his pocket. Id. at 677-78, 467
S.E.2d at 657.

   Investigators continued their search. Id. Around 6:00 a.m.
the next morning, with the aid of a State Bureau of Investiga-
tion ("SBI") airplane, officials spotted Petitioner walking
along a dirt road in the area. Id. at 678, 467 S.E.2d at 657.
Officials found Petitioner lying at the base of a tree and
arrested him. Id.

   Investigators later found three sets of human tracks leading
from an area near the Goodes’ mobile home and were able to
follow the tracks despite several gaps. Id. The tracks diverged,
and one set of tracks ended approximately fifty yards from
where Petitioner was arrested. Id. at 678, 467 S.E.2d at 657-
58.

  Investigators found a wine bottle in the passenger compart-
ment of Leon Batten’s truck. Id. at 678, 467 S.E.2d at 658.
                     DECASTRO v. BRANKER                       5
Petitioner’s fingerprints matched one of two fingerprint lifts
taken from the bottle. Id. Further, the inside of the truck tail-
gate was smeared with a blood-like substance that had a hand-
print in it. Id. That handprint matched Petitioner’s. Id. And
blood taken from the camouflage jacket Petitioner was wear-
ing when arrested matched Leon Batten’s. Id.

   An SBI agent and a sheriff’s detective testified regarding a
statement Petitioner made while they were collecting his
clothing at the jail. Id. The officers took Petitioner’s clothes
and told him to remove everything from his pockets and place
it on a nearby bench. Id. Petitioner removed $13.00 from his
pockets, and the detective asked the agent "if it was okay for
[Petitioner] to keep the money." Id. The agent then turned
toward Petitioner and saw some money in Petitioner’s top
pocket. Id. Before the agent could say anything, Petitioner
said, "I had some of my own money, too, now." Id.

   The medical examiner who conducted the autopsies on
Leon and Margaret Batten also testified. Id. She described the
eight stab wounds to Margaret Batten’s head and neck, the fif-
teen stab wounds to her chest and abdomen, and the numerous
defensive wounds on the backs of her hands. Id. The medical
examiner testified that Margaret Batten’s death was neither
quick nor painless; rather, she was likely to have remained
conscious for the five to ten minutes it took her to die. Id. at
679, 467 S.E.2d at 658. As for Leon Batten, the medical
examiner described several stab and puncture wounds on his
body, internal injuries, blunt trauma to his head and face, and
the stab wound to the heart that ultimately killed him. Id.

  Petitioner did not testify or offer any evidence during the
guilt phase of the trial. Id. The jury found him guilty of mur-
dering Leon and Margaret Batten as well as robbing Leon
Batten. Id. at 676, 467 S.E.2d at 656.

   During the sentencing phase of Petitioner’s trial, the State
offered testimony from the medical examiner regarding the
6                      DECASTRO v. BRANKER
painful nature of the victims’ deaths. Id. at 679, 467 S.E.2d
at 658. The State also introduced evidence that when Peti-
tioner was seventeen, he was convicted of voluntary man-
slaughter and common law robbery and received a six-year
sentence for those offenses. Id.

   In response, Petitioner offered the testimony of several wit-
nesses during the sentencing proceeding. A police detective
testified about the circumstances of Petitioner’s prior convic-
tion for voluntary manslaughter. Id. The detective testified
that Petitioner had been at a birthday party when one of his
friends got into a fight. Id. Petitioner handed his friend a
knife, and the friend stabbed the other person and ran. Id. The
detective testified that Petitioner did not stab anyone and was
very cooperative during the investigation of the crime. Id.
Prison and jail officials also testified that Petitioner was well-
behaved and cooperative while awaiting trial in this case. Id.

   Petitioner’s mother and aunt testified about his childhood
and family life. Id. They spoke about the separation of Peti-
tioner’s parents but gave an impression of a relatively normal
childhood and loving family that would suffer if Petitioner
were executed. They also testified that Petitioner had been
regularly employed at the time of the murders and robbery. Id.
at 680, 467 S.E.2d at 659. Petitioner then addressed the jury,
stating that he was very sorry about the Battens’ deaths. Id.
Nevertheless, the jury returned recommendations for death on
both murder counts. Id. at 676, 467 S.E.2d at 656.

   Petitioner appealed his sentence to the Supreme Court of
North Carolina. That court rejected Petitioner’s argument that
a knife found in a local pond1 was improperly admitted to evi-
dence on relevance grounds. Id. at 680, 467 S.E.2d at 659.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed
    1
   "The knife in question was found on 5 June 1992 by a boy while fish-
ing in a pond some distance away from the crime scene." Id. at 681, 467
S.E.2d at 659.
                     DECASTRO v. BRANKER                       7
with Petitioner’s contention that he was deprived of a fair trial
when the prosecutor argued that no physical evidence con-
nected key witness Troublefield to the crime scene. Id. at 682,
467 S.E.2d at 660. The Supreme Court of North Carolina fur-
ther rejected Petitioner’s argument that the statement he made
while in police custody—"I had some of my own money, too,
now"—was improperly admitted despite Petitioner’s having
requested counsel prior to making the statement. Id. at 683-
84, 467 S.E.2d at 661-62. Petitioner also unsuccessfully urged
that the trial court erred in admitting Troublefield’s testimony
that he was afraid of Petitioner. Id. at 685, 467 S.E.2d at 662.

   Additionally, Petitioner unsuccessfully argued that the trial
court made various errors in instructing the jury. Id. at 686-
700, 467 S.E.2d at 662-71. Petitioner also contended that the
trial court improperly allowed potential jurors with reserva-
tions about the death penalty to be struck and improperly
refused to impanel a new jury for sentencing—but the court
had rejected both of those arguments in prior cases. Id. at 699-
700, 467 S.E.2d at 670-71 (citing, inter alia, State v. Jones,
336 N.C. 229, 443 S.E.2d 48 (1994), and State v. Gladden,
315 N.C. 398, 340 S.E.2d 673 (1986)).

   The Supreme Court of North Carolina further rejected argu-
ments regarding the aggravating circumstances submitted to
the jury and the constitutionality of the death penalty gener-
ally. Id. at 693-701, 467 S.E.2d at 666-71. Finally, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina determined that the evi-
dence supported the aggravating circumstances that the jury
had found, that no arbitrary factor influenced the jury’s impo-
sition of the death penalty, and that the death penalty was, in
this case, neither excessive nor disproportionate. Id. at 701-
04, 467 S.E.2d at 671-73. Petitioner sought further review by
the Supreme Court of the United States, but it denied certio-
rari. DeCastro v. North Carolina, 519 U.S. 896 (1996).

  Petitioner then pursued habeas relief, through a Motion for
Appropriate Relief ("Motion") filed in state court in North
8                     DECASTRO v. BRANKER
Carolina. Petitioner made various allegations, including that
mutually incompatible theories of motive, level of participa-
tion, and relative culpability at Petitioner’s and his co-
defendants’ trials denied him due process, equal protection,
and the right to be free from unusual punishment. Petitioner
also contended that his counsel was ineffective in, among
other things, failing to investigate, prepare, and present miti-
gating evidence. On February 2, 2005, the state court granted
Petitioner an evidentiary hearing on one of his claims but
denied him an evidentiary hearing as to the rest, which the
court dismissed in a 106-page order. In March 2005, Peti-
tioner amended his Motion, adding claims regarding forensic
blood evidence and ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. The
state court held an evidentiary hearing on March 20 through
March 22, 2006 but ultimately denied all three remaining
claims.

   Petitioner sought further review by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, but that court denied his petition for a writ of
certiorari. Petitioner then turned to the federal courts and filed
his habeas corpus petition in federal district court on May 22,
2008. Petitioner made multiple arguments as to how he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and sentenc-
ing and on appeal. Petitioner then contended that the State
improperly failed to disclose exculpatory evidence at trial and
sentencing. Petitioner also maintained that his Eighth Amend-
ment and due process rights were violated when the State
presented evidence and argument contradicted by those pre-
sented in the trials of Petitioner’s co-defendants George and
Chris Goode. Finally, Petitioner argued that the trial court
erred in its jury instructions. Petitioner asked the district court
to vacate his convictions or death sentences. On cross-
motions for summary judgment, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Respondent Gerald Branker,
Warden of Central Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina, denied
Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner moved to amend
the order and judgment denying him a writ of habeas corpus;
                     DECASTRO v. BRANKER                        9
this, too, the district court denied. On July 13, 2010, Petitioner
appealed to this Court.

                               II.

   While we review the district court’s denial of habeas relief
de novo, Lewis v. Wheeler, 609 F.3d 291, 300 (4th Cir. 2010),
we generally view this appeal through the highly deferential
lens mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As the Supreme
Court recently underscored in its unanimous opinion in Har-
rington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), AEDPA deference
helps to ensure "confidence in the writ and the law it vindi-
cates." Id. at 780. We may grant habeas relief on claims adju-
dicated on their merits in state court only if that

    adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary
    to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
    clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
    Supreme Court of the United States or resulted in a
    decision that was based on an unreasonable determi-
    nation of the facts in light of the evidence presented
    in the State court proceeding.

Cummings v. Polk, 475 F.3d 230, 237 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

   "A state court’s decision is contrary to clearly established
federal law ‘if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite
to that reached by th[e Supreme] Court on a question of law’
or ‘confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from
a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at’" an oppo-
site result. Lewis, 609 F.3d at 300 (alteration in original)
(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)). Fur-
ther, a state court unreasonably applies federal law when it
"‘identifies the correct governing legal rule from th[e] Court’s
cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular
. . . case,’" or "‘unreasonably extends a legal principle from
10                   DECASTRO v. BRANKER
[the Court’s] precedent to a new context where it should not
apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a
new context where it should apply.’" Id. at 300-01 (alteration
in original) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 407). Stated differ-
ently, to obtain federal habeas relief, "a state prisoner must
show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented
in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was
an error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Har-
rington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87.

                              III.

   Most of Petitioner’s arguments revolve around whether his
counsel was effective. We therefore begin with a brief over-
view of the "high bar" that Petitioner attempts to surmount.
Id. at 788 (internal quotations omitted).

   To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner
must show "that counsel’s performance was deficient, and
that the deficiency prejudiced the defense." Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Regarding the first prong, a "defi-
cient" performance is one that falls "below an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness." Id. at 511. Petitioner must show "that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not function-
ing as the counsel guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment."
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984) ("First, the defendant must show that counsel’s perfor-
mance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amend-
ment.").

   Our deferential assessment of counsel’s performance must
"include[ ] a context-dependent consideration of the chal-
lenged conduct as seen from counsel’s perspective at the time
. . . ." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523 (internal quotation marks
                     DECASTRO v. BRANKER                     11
omitted). Further, we must resist the temptation to "second-
guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sen-
tence" and make "every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting
effects of hindsight." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Indeed, we
must review with "scrupulous care, lest intrusive post-trial
inquiry threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the
right to counsel is meant to serve." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at
788 (internal quotation marks omitted).

   Regarding the second prong—that is, whether counsel’s
deficiency prejudiced the defense—"the prejudice inquiry
centers on ‘whether there is a reasonable probability that,
absent [counsel’s] errors, the sentencer . . . would have con-
cluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances did not warrant death.’" Williams v. Ozmint, 494 F.3d
478, 484 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
695). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ("Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance preju-
diced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable."). Such a showing "requires a
substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different
result." Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011)
(internal quotations omitted). In making this determination we
review the "totality of the evidence before the . . . jury."
Ozmint, 494 F.3d at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted).

                              A.

   Petitioner first argues that his counsel’s attempt to suggest
that he was not present at the crime scene, instead of conced-
ing Petitioner’s presence but arguing that he played a lesser
role, was ineffective. The state court concluded that Petitioner
failed to satisfy either Strickland prong, noting that, in addi-
tion to arguing that the State failed to show beyond a reason-
able doubt that Petitioner was at the scene, the defense also
argued that it was more likely that George and Chris Goode
committed the crimes. The federal district court agreed and
12                    DECASTRO v. BRANKER
further stated that Petitioner "fail[ed] to present any informa-
tion to rebut the [state] court’s finding that counsel’s decision
was trial strategy that counsel selected after reasonable inves-
tigation and consideration." [J.A. 311] We agree.

     In Harrington, the Supreme Court emphasized that

      [t]here are . . . countless ways to provide effective
      assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal
      defense attorneys would not defend a particular cli-
      ent in the same way. Rare are the situations in which
      the wide latitude counsel must have in making tacti-
      cal decisions will be limited to any one technique or
      approach. . . . Counsel was entitled to formulate a
      strategy that was reasonable at the time and to bal-
      ance limited resources in accord with effective trial
      tactics and strategies.

131 S. Ct. at 788-89 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). If the chosen defense strategy is unsuccessful, "even
the most experienced counsel may find it difficult to resist
asking whether a different strategy might have been better
. . . ." Id. at 790. But which strategy might have been best is
not the pertinent inquiry; instead, we ask whether the strategy
counsel chose was objectively reasonable. Id.

   Here, defense counsel chose a strategy of casting reason-
able doubt as to whether Petitioner was present at the scene
of the crime. Counsel pursued this strategy after consulting
with attorneys from the Death Penalty Resource Center as
well as with Petitioner and after investigating the case. While
other advocates may not have chosen the same strategy, that
does not make its employment a Sixth Amendment violation.
We recognize that the chosen strategy had weaknesses, partic-
ularly in light of evidence such as the blood found on Peti-
tioner’s clothing and the handprint found at the crime scene.
Nevertheless, the state court supportably determined that the
chosen strategy was objectively reasonable, in light of facts
                     DECASTRO v. BRANKER                      13
such as Petitioner’s being found relatively far from the crime
scene (as opposed to George Goode, for example, who was
found close by); the State’s acting-in-concert theory (which
would make anyone involved, even if to a lesser extent, culpa-
ble); and witness testimony indicating that everyone present
at the crime scene participated in the attack on the Battens.

  Further, defense counsel did argue that the real culprit was
George Goode. During closing argument, for example,
defense counsel stated:

    Now getting to who had the motive to do this? Who
    did have the motive? The people who walked up
    with the teeth and the people who walked up with
    the pocketbook of Mr. Batten. That’s who had the
    motive. The tenant who was trying to beat Mr. Bat-
    ten out of his rent, who had every reason in the
    world to start a problem with him, Mr. George
    Goode. . . . He was acting crazy. His brother was
    going right along with him. They were there and
    they—they’re the ones who had the motive to do
    this.

[J.A. 3168-69] The state court, in ruling on Petitioner’s
Motion, therefore noted that, in addition to arguing that the
State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Peti-
tioner was present when the crimes were committed, defense
counsel had argued that the Goodes were the primary perpe-
trators. The state court was not unreasonable in holding that
defense counsel’s strategy was not constitutionally ineffec-
tive. The district court therefore correctly held that the strat-
egy cannot serve as the basis for federal habeas relief.

                               B.

   Petitioner next argues that he received ineffective assis-
tance because his counsel failed to investigate and present
evidence that co-defendant George Goode had confessed to a
14                   DECASTRO v. BRANKER
fellow prisoner, Patrick Byrd. Petitioner argues that Byrd’s
testimony would have shown that George Goode was primar-
ily responsible for the murders.

   Byrd’s statement indicated that Petitioner, George Goode,
and Chris Goode were in George Goode’s trailer when Leon
Batten came to ask for the rent money. Per Byrd’s account of
George Goode’s account, George Goode argued with Leon
Batten; Petitioner then initiated the attack on Leon Batten by
hitting him. When Margaret Batten arrived, both Goodes and
Petitioner attacked her. Byrd indicated that both Goodes and
Petitioner moved the bodies into Leon Batten’s truck bed and
passed around Leon Batten’s false teeth.

   Defense counsel discussed Byrd’s statement with Petitioner
but did not interview Byrd. Defense counsel’s notes indicate
that Petitioner told counsel that Byrd’s statement was "inaccu-
rate." [J.A. 1533A] Petitioner instructed his attorneys not to
use Byrd’s statement or to call Byrd as a witness. Indeed,
Byrd’s statement would not only place Petitioner at the crime
scene as an active participant in the attack on the Battens—it
would establish that Petitioner was the first assailant to strike
Leon Batten, that he actively participated in the attack on
Margaret Batten, and that he engaged in gruesome behavior
such as passing around Leon Batten’s dental plate.

   Defense counsel’s decision not to call Byrd as a witness
was not ineffective. Nor was his failure to interview
Byrd—the substance of whose testimony counsel already
knew. See Huffington v. Nuth, 140 F.3d 572, 580 (4th Cir.
1998) ("The Sixth Amendment . . . does not always compel
counsel to undertake interviews and meetings with potential
witnesses where counsel is familiar with the substance of their
testimony."). The state court was, accordingly, not unreason-
able in holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally
ineffective on this issue, and it thus cannot serve as the basis
for federal habeas relief.
                    DECASTRO v. BRANKER                      15
                              C.

   Petitioner contends that defense counsel failed to effec-
tively present evidence showing that George Goode had a
motive to kill because he suspected his wife had cheated on
him, allegedly with Leon Batten. As an initial matter, we note
that defense counsel did argue to the jury that the Goodes, and
not Petitioner, had the motive to kill the Battens. Petitioner,
however, focuses on letters that George Goode wrote to his
wife—and particularly a letter dated February 25, 1992, four
days before the murders. That letter, which was not admitted
into evidence, states:

    I really need to talk to you because I don’t want us
    to part this way. Please let me know what happened.
    As you might already know some people told me
    that you had cheated on me while I was away. At
    first I was ready to just kill someone anyone but as
    the days went by I had a chance to think and all I
    want to know is [whether] what they said was true.
    . . . If you really love me like I thought you did you
    will be at your mothers house Friday afternoon about
    6 pm. We really need to talk. Just me and you.

[J.A. 696-97] Petitioner argues that the letter evidenced
George Goode’s motive and murderous intent and shows that
George Goode was the leader of the crimes against the Bat-
tens.

   To begin, Petitioner’s argument overlooks the second half
of the February 25, 1992 letter, indicating that George
Goode’s murderous thoughts had dissipated. Further, George
Goode never indicated in the February 25 letter—or any other
letter in the record—that Petitioner was not involved in the
Batten murders as alleged or that George Goode himself was
planning to attack Leon Batten. As the state court noted, even
if introduced into evidence, the letter "would not necessarily
show that George Goode had acted on his anger, or that
16                    DECASTRO v. BRANKER
DeCastro was not otherwise involved as alleged." [J.A. 1987]
The state court therefore concluded that the letter’s not being
introduced was neither unreasonable nor prejudicial.

   Petitioner points to the fact that the State used the letters to
show the jury in George Goode’s trial that George Goode was
the ringleader with a motive. As the district court accurately
noted, however, "simply because the State chose to use the
letter at George Goode’s trial does not establish a reasonable
probability of a different result had the letter been introduced
at DeCastro’s sentencing." [J.A. 319] We agree with the dis-
trict court that "[u]ltimately, given the limited significance of
George Goode’s letters and considering the evidence pre-
sented against DeCastro at his trial, the [state court ruling on
the Motion] did not act unreasonably in finding no prejudice
under Strickland and its progeny." Id.

                                D.

   Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective by failing
to rebut evidence that a knife found in a local pond was a
missing murder weapon and argument that only Petitioner
could possibly have thrown it into the pond. The record
reveals, however, that defense counsel did throw into question
whether the knife found in the pond was, in fact, the murder
weapon. Indeed, the State’s pathologist conceded on cross-
examination that there was nothing special about the pond
knife and that any knife of that size could have caused the
Battens’ wounds.

   Petitioner nevertheless maintains that later-adduced evi-
dence showed that the pond knife did not fit in the knife stand
inside George Goode’s home. In contrast, other knives
obtained from a knife company after Petitioner’s conviction
were more consistent with the Battens’ wounds than the pond
knife and did fit in the knife stand but were not recovered
from the crime scene.
                     DECASTRO v. BRANKER                      17
   As the state court indicated, whether the pond knife fit
inside the Goodes’ knife stand is not particularly relevant; the
knife could have come from the Goodes’ home—regardless of
whether it was in a stand, on a counter-top, or in a drawer.
Moreover, the State’s pathologist conceded that the pond
knife was not necessarily a murder weapon and that any knife
of similar size could have been used. Under these circum-
stances, we agree with the district court that the state court
was not unreasonable in dismissing this claim, nor was there
any reasonable probability, in light of the substantial evidence
against Petitioner, that the jury would have reached a different
verdict had it received further information about the pond
knife, knife stand, and other later-obtained knives.

                               E.

   Petitioner contends that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate and introduce into evidence George
Goode’s conduct history as a Marine, and specifically his
prior assault of a fellow Marine with a Gerber knife, the same
type of knife as the smaller of the knives used in the Batten
murders. Petitioner maintains that such evidence would have
led the jury to conclude that Petitioner was a lesser partici-
pant.

    In response to this argument, the state court determined that
"[a]ny evidence elicited at trial by DeCastro about the earlier
knife assault by George Goode would have created, at best, a
speculative inference that George Goode and not DeCastro
was involved in the killing of the Battens—an inference that
does not ‘point directly’ to the guilt of George Goode." [J.A.
2083] Further, the state court noted that the evidence at issue
would "not prove that George Goode’s knife was not used by
DeCastro, or that some other knife was not used by DeCastro
. . . ." [J.A. 2084] In other words, the fact that George Goode
owned the Gerber knife and had previously used it against
someone would not negate the State’s case that DeCastro
acted in concert with others to murder the Battens with two
18                   DECASTRO v. BRANKER
knives. The state court therefore concluded that Petitioner
failed to show prejudice under Strickland.

   On appeal, as before the district court, Petitioner has failed
to show that the state court’s determination of this issue was
unreasonable. Indeed, Petitioner has failed to explain how this
argument could prevail in the face of the State’s concession
that the Gerber knife was found in a location indicating that
George Goode dropped it after the attack on the Battens. Fur-
ther, the State did not argue that Petitioner wielded the Gerber
knife—but did argue that "he who runs with the pack is
responsible for the kill." [J.A. 3171] Under these circum-
stances, the state court’s determination was not unreasonable,
and the district court did not err in refusing habeas relief on
this ground.

                               F.

   Petitioner next argues that defense counsel failed to ade-
quately respond to the State’s evidence of the robbery. Under
North Carolina’s statutory provision pursuant to which a jury
selects life imprisonment or death, aggravating circumstances
that may be considered are limited to certain categories. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(e). Those categories include whether
"[t]he defendant had been previously convicted of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person . . . ."
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(e)(3). To support the aggravating
circumstance that Petitioner had a prior conviction for a fel-
ony involving the threat or use of violence, the State intro-
duced evidence that Petitioner had previously been convicted
of manslaughter and common law robbery. Petitioner main-
tains that the facts of the robbery are not as aggravating as the
conviction suggests and that it was prejudicial not to present
those facts to the jury.

   In support of this argument, Petitioner asserts that he was
seventeen when he committed the common law robbery, and
that he was with four nineteen-year-olds when one of the oth-
                     DECASTRO v. BRANKER                      19
ers suggested that they rob a pizza deliverer. Petitioner asserts
that he simply went along with the plan but did not possess
the weapon and did not personally threaten the victim.

   Petitioner fails to mention that other circumstances of the
robbery could well have damaged his case, had the jury
learned of them. Specifically, Petitioner and several other
young men ganged up on a pizza delivery boy and robbed him
using a butcher’s knife. In other words, Petitioner’s robbery
conviction shared similarities with the crimes against the Bat-
tens—it involved a large knife, multiple perpetrators ganging
up on a victim, and theft.

   The record reveals that defense counsel knew details of
Petitioner’s prior robbery conviction as well as his other con-
victions, discussed the prior convictions with Petitioner, and
obtained materials such as records and guilty plea transcripts.
Indeed, in the case of Petitioner’s prior manslaughter convic-
tion, the circumstances of which were indeed more mitigating
than the conviction itself would convey, defense counsel
ensured that the jury learned of helpful details. Defense coun-
sel put a detective who had investigated the manslaughter
conviction on the witness stand. The detective testified that
Petitioner, then seventeen, handed a knife to a friend, who in
turn used the knife to defend himself against other youths who
had attacked him at a party.

   On this record, Petitioner has failed to "overcome the pre-
sumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, Peti-
tioner has failed to show prejudice such that there exists a
"substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different
result." Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1403 (internal quotations omit-
ted). As the district court noted, "[u]nlike in Rompilla [v.
Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005),] where counsel failed to investi-
gate [a] rape conviction, DeCastro’s counsel investigated the
common law robbery conviction. Moreover, evidence of
20                   DECASTRO v. BRANKER
DeCastro’s role in the common law robbery is not the type of
substantial and persuasive mitigating evidence that counsel
failed to discover in Rompilla." [J.A. 335] Accordingly, the
state court did not act unreasonably in denying habeas relief
on this basis, nor did the district court err in denying relief.

                              G.

   Petitioner next contends that he received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel because his attorneys failed to investigate
and present mitigating evidence at sentencing. Specifically,
Petitioner argues that the evidence that was presented inaccu-
rately portrayed a happy childhood when, in reality, Petition-
er’s father was an alcoholic and drug user who gave Petitioner
and his brother drugs at an early age; Petitioner’s mother had
a criminal history; and Petitioner was in the borderline range
of normal intellectual functioning.

   The state court determined that, contrary to Petitioner’s
assertions, defense counsel worked diligently to develop rea-
sonable trial and sentencing strategies based upon thorough
investigation. While the state court’s evaluation may be some-
what overly optimistic, this case differs from those cited by
Petitioner, in which counsel’s scant investigation and presen-
tation of mitigation evidence failed to pass constitutional mus-
ter. For example, in Gray v. Branker, 529 F.3d 220, 229-31
(4th Cir. 2008), despite repeated indications of the defen-
dant’s mental impairment, defense counsel did not investigate
the defendant’s mental health after the defendant instructed
counsel not to do so. This Court held, among other things, that
a reasonable lawyer would not rely on such a defendant’s self-
assessment and instruction not to investigate his mental
health. Id. at 231.

   Similarly, in Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510, the only significant
mitigating factor the defendant’s capital jury heard was that
the defendant had no prior convictions. While defense counsel
had indications that the defendant’s childhood had been mis-
                     DECASTRO v. BRANKER                     21
erable, defense counsel conducted only a minimal investiga-
tion and failed to discover that the defendant experienced
severe, long-term physical and sexual abuse and torment
throughout his childhood, including repeated rape while in
foster care. Id. at 535. The Supreme Court held that such com-
pelling mitigating evidence might well have produced a dif-
ferent outcome and that counsel’s scant efforts were
prejudicially deficient. Id. at 536.

   Here, counsel investigated Petitioner’s personal back-
ground and presented related mitigating evidence during the
sentencing phase of Petitioner’s trial. Counsel investigated
Petitioner’s personal history, speaking with Petitioner, his
mother, and his aunt. Further, counsel retained an investiga-
tor, who obtained information about Petitioner, including
school and criminal records. Additionally, counsel had a psy-
chiatric expert with extensive capital experience—Dr. Claudia
Coleman—evaluate Petitioner. Dr. Coleman found Petitioner
to be mentally stable, with no indication of any mental health
illness or psychological factors that might be helpful in the
defense. Dr. Coleman stated: "I can find no psychological fac-
tors which might be helpful in your defense of this case."
[J.A. 1572]

   In his post-conviction case, Petitioner re-approached Dr.
Coleman, who submitted an affidavit underscoring that her
work was for guilt-only issues and that her time spent on the
case would have been inadequate to assess potential psychiat-
ric mitigation evidence. Dr. Coleman further indicated that,
upon a more detailed post-conviction review, she found
potential mitigation areas, including, for example, Petitioner’s
exposure to "poor parental role modeling," Petitioner’s long
history of drug and alcohol abuse, and Petitioner’s suffering
from a learning disability in childhood. [J.A. 961] These
potential mitigating factors are, however, not on a par with the
substantial mitigation evidence missed by counsel in Gray
and Wiggins.
22                       DECASTRO v. BRANKER
   Further, Petitioner apparently relayed information about at
least some of these mitigation factors only after his conviction
and sentence. Petitioner conceded that he "obviously did not
understand that these very private facts about [his] family and
personal background could be presented in his favor at the
sentencing hearing, even though they involved illegal conduct
and would be otherwise embarrassing." [J.A. 601] Regardless,
the state court did not act unreasonably in refusing Petition-
er’s attempt to upend his conviction and sentence based on the
information that he failed to timely provide to counsel.

   Finally, we note that defense counsel presented not insub-
stantial mitigating evidence on Petitioner’s behalf. Specifi-
cally, defense counsel pursued a strategy of depicting
Petitioner’s family life in a positive light, emphasizing his
loving parents and aunt, who would suffer greatly if Petitioner
were executed. As a result, the jury found Petitioner’s loving
relationship with his mother to be a mitigating circumstance.
Defense counsel also presented evidence through two wit-
nesses that Petitioner was a well-behaved, obedient prisoner.
And defense counsel put on evidence regarding the mitigating
circumstances of Petitioner’s prior manslaughter conviction.
The state court was not unreasonable in refusing to grant
relief on this basis. The district court therefore correctly
denied federal habeas relief.

                                    IV.

     With his last argument,2 Petitioner contends that the State
   2
     While not identified as a distinct "argument," Petitioner emphasized in
his briefing and oral argument that the state court, in ruling on Petitioner’s
Motion, allowed the State to draft its order. Petitioner attempts to cast a
shadow over the order by noting that it "originated from the word proces-
sor of Respondent’s counsel and consists mainly of the State’s MAR
Answer . . . ." Reply Brief at 1. In Harrington, however, the Supreme
Court made clear that a state court need not even issue an opinion explain-
ing its denial of habeas relief. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785 ("This Court
now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does not require a state court to
give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated
on the merits.’"). We therefore decline Petitioner’s invitation to look
behind the state court order to consider how it was drafted.
                     DECASTRO v. BRANKER                      23
violated his due process and Eighth Amendment rights by
presenting at his trial evidence and argument that contradicted
evidence and argument later used at the trials of George and
Chris Goode. According to Petitioner, the State persuaded the
jury to sentence him to death by arguing that he was the ring-
leader who murdered the victims but then made the same
claims about George Goode at his trial. Meanwhile, Petitioner
contends that at Chris Goode’s trial, the State conceded that
it could not prove which defendant actually stabbed the Bat-
tens.

   A habeas petitioner’s conviction must be reviewed with an
eye toward the "law prevailing at the time [his] conviction
became final . . . ." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, a habeas peti-
tioner, with only narrow exceptions, may not benefit from
either 1) a new Supreme Court rule decided after his convic-
tion became final, or 2) a novel expansion of a rule estab-
lished by preexisting precedent. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S.
222, 227-28 (1992). As the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he inter-
ests in finality, predictability and comity underlying our new
rule jurisprudence may be undermined [either] . . . by the
invocation of a rule that was not dictated by precedent . . . [or
by] the application of an old rule in a manner that was not dic-
tated by precedent." Id. at 228.

   At issue here is the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bradshaw v.
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005). In that case, the Sixth Circuit
had held that a prosecutor’s use of inconsistent, irreconcilable
theories (involving two separately prosecuted defendants,
where the prosecution claimed in each case that the defendant
was the shooter) violated due process, invalidating the defen-
dant’s plea. See Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F.3d 594 (2004).

   On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the prosecutors’
pursuit of irreconcilably inconsistent theories in the petition-
er’s and his co-defendant’s cases did not void the petitioner’s
guilty plea, where Ohio law did not distinguish between a
24                    DECASTRO v. BRANKER
principal actor and an aider and abettor and where the change
in the prosecution’s theory occurred after the defendant’s
guilty plea. But the Supreme Court also indicated that the
inconsistent, irreconcilable theories may have prejudiced the
petitioner at his capital sentencing, where the sentencing
panel concluded that the petitioner was the shooter. Id. at 187-
88. The Supreme Court stated:

         The prosecutor’s use of allegedly inconsistent the-
      ories may have a more direct effect on Stumpf’s sen-
      tence, however, for it is at least arguable that the
      sentencing panel’s conclusion about Stumpf’s princi-
      pal role in the offense was material to its sentencing
      determination. The opinion below leaves some
      ambiguity as to the overlap between how the lower
      court resolved Stumpf’s due process challenge to his
      conviction, and how it resolved Stumpf’s challenge
      to his sentence. . . . In these circumstances, it would
      be premature for this Court to resolve the merits of
      Stumpf’s sentencing claim . . . . Accordingly, we
      vacate the portion of the judgment below relating to
      Stumpf’s prosecutorial inconsistency claim, and we
      remand the case for further proceedings . . . .

Id.

   Before Bradshaw, the Supreme Court had not suggested
that inconsistent prosecutorial theories could constitute a due
process violation. Id. at 190 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("This
Court has never hinted, much less held, that the Due Process
Clause prevents a State from prosecuting defendants based on
inconsistent theories."). This court mentioned, in dictum, in
United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 326 (4th Cir. 2003), that
"due process may be violated if ‘an inconsistency . . . exist[s]
at the core of the prosecutor’s cases against the defendants for
the same crime,’ see Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052
(8th Cir. 2000) (finding due process violation where prosecu-
tion obtained two convictions for the same murder based on
                         DECASTRO v. BRANKER                              25
conflicting statements from the same cooperating codefen-
dant) . . . ." But this Court’s dictum is not binding, and in any
event Higgs, as well as Groose, post-date the finality of Peti-
tioner’s state proceedings here, rendering them irrelevant.3

   State convictions are final under Teague "when the avail-
ability of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted
and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has
elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally denied."
Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411 (2004). Petitioner’s con-
viction became final on October 7, 1996. DeCastro, 519 U.S.
at 896. Because Bradshaw (and Higgs and Groose) post-dated
the finality of Petitioner’s conviction, they cannot help him in
his quest for habeas relief.

   To avert this outcome, Petitioner does not argue that his
case fits into a Teague exception.4 Instead, he argues cases
establishing that a state cannot present false evidence and can-
not, for example, present testimony that it knows is false. See,
e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). Petitioner then suggests
that the State acted deceptively. But Petitioner’s contentions
revolve around inconsistent arguments and theories, not false
evidence.

  The state court rejected this claim, and the district court
determined that the state court, in so doing, did not act unrea-
  3
     Petitioner also cites a concurring opinion out of the Eleventh Circuit
(Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Clark, J. con-
curring)), and a vacated opinion out of the Ninth Circuit (Thompson v.
Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated, 523 U.S. 538 (1998)).
These opinions, too, carry no precedential weight.
   4
     The first Teague exception is for rulings that place "certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe." Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 311 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The second is for "watershed" rulings implicat-
ing fundamental fairness, i.e., "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
Id. Neither exception is applicable here.
26                   DECASTRO v. BRANKER
sonably. As the district court noted, "because Bradshaw did
create a new rule, Teague bars DeCastro’s claim. Alterna-
tively, even if Bradshaw did not create a new rule, DeCastro
has failed to show the [state court’s] ruling is contrary to, or
based on an unreasonable application of, clearly established
federal law." [J.A. 357-58] We agree and likewise deny Peti-
tioner habeas relief on this basis.

                              V.

  Petitioner has failed to show that the state court that denied
him habeas relief unreasonably applied clearly established
federal law or unreasonably determined the facts. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief.

                                                   AFFIRMED