Dida v. Hvarre

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"10646485","type":"100trialcourt","part":"other","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
             FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS                       


MOHAMED DIDA,                  )                                         
                               )                                         
            Plaintiff,         )                                         
                               )                                         
vs.                            )    Case No. 3:24-cv-00131-GCS           
                               )                                         
KIMBERLY HVARRE,               )                                         
                               )                                         
            Defendant.         )                                         


                    MEMORANDUM & ORDER                                   
SISON, Magistrate Judge:                                                  
                  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND                            
    This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to consolidate. (Doc. 66). 
Specifically, Plaintiff moves the Court to consolidate the following cases: (1) 3:23-cv-
02836-SMY; (2) 3:24-cv-00131-GCS; (3) 3:24-cv-00132-GCS; (4) 3:24-cv-00238-GCS; (5) 3:24-
cv-00283-MAB;  (6)  3:24-cv-00714-SPM;  (7)  3:24-cv-00835-SMY  and  (8)  3:24-cv-01407-
GCS.1 Plaintiff sees his cases as one claim. Based on the following, the Court DENIES the 
motion.                                                                   

1    Three of these cases are closed in this Court. Case No. 3:23-cv-02836-SMY, a habeas corpus 
petition pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254
, was transferred to the Central District of Illinois on October 
3, 2023. See Dida v. State of Illinois, 3:23-cv-02836-SMY, (Doc. 12). Case No. 3:24-cv-00283-MAB, a 
prisoner civil rights suit, was dismissed with prejudice as Plaintiff’s claims lacked legal merit 
because prisoners have no constitutional right to attend educational, vocational, or rehabilitative 
courses, or obtain a prison job. See Dida v. Hvarre, 3:24-cv-00283-MAB, (Doc. 9, 14). Case No. 3:24-
cv-00714-SPM, a prisoner civil rights suit, was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim 
finding that Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to have access to a computer so that he 
could participate in a doctoral program while incarcerated. See Dida v. Hvarre, et al., 3:24-cv-00741-
SPM, (Doc. 12). These latter two cases are on appeal.                     
    On January 18, 2024, Plaintiff Mohamed Dida, an inmate of the Illinois Department 
of Corrections (“IDOC”) currently incarcerated at Big Muddy Correctional Center (“Big 

Muddy”), brought this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983
for alleged deprivations of his 
constitutional rights. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. In Plaintiff’s complaint, he asserts 
that he is a devout Muslim and practices his faith by engaging in the fasting and prayers 
of David. (Doc. 1). On January 23, 2024, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court screened 
Plaintiff’s complaint and allowed him to proceed on the following claims:  Count 1: First 
Amendment Claim for denying Plaintiff diet in compliance with his religious practices; 

and Count 2: Religious Land Use and Institutional Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claim for 
denying Plaintiff a diet in compliance with his religious practices. (Doc. 11, p. 2-3). The 
Court also construed the complaint as a request for a preliminary injunction. Id. at p. 3.2  
    Also, on January 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed another
42 U.S.C. § 1983
action for alleged 
deprivations of his constitutional rights asserting that he was denied treatment for 

various medical and dental conditions. See Dida v. Hvarre, et al., 3:24-cv-00132-GCS, (Doc. 
1). On May 29, 2024, the Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed against Dr. Larson for 
deliberate indifference in Counts 1, 2, and 5 relating to complaints of numbness, swollen 
and painful feet, and spinal pain.
Id.
at (Doc. 19, p. 6-7). In addition, the Court allowed 
Plaintiff  to  proceed  against  Defendants  Van  Dyke,  Lady  Smith,  and  B.  Wilson  for 

deliberate indifference in Count 2.
Id.
The Court also allowed Plaintiff to proceed on two 
counts against the Jane Doe Healthcare Administrator in Counts 3 and 7 for deliberate 

2    The  Court  denied  the  preliminary  injunction  on  April  24,  2024.  (Doc.  44).  Plaintiff 
appealed this Memorandum & Order on May 7, 2024. (Doc. 45).               
indifference for unsatisfactory dental treatment and failure to provide medication and 
treatment for his B-12 deficiency.
Id. at p. 7
. However, the Court severed claims 3 and 7 

into a separate lawsuit (Id. at p. 8-9) finding that “two groups of claims arose from 
different transactions/occurrences and do not share common question of law or fact. See 
FED. R. CIV. PROC. 18, 20, and 21. See also Owens v. Godinez,
860 F.3d 434, 436
(7th Cir. 2017) 
(noting that district courts should not allow inmates to combine multiple lawsuits into a 
single complaint).” Claims 3 and 7 were severed into Dida v. Issack, 3:24-cv-01407-GCS, 
(Doc. 1).                                                                 

    Thereafter, on February 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed another civil rights suit alleging that 
the prison was not providing adequate opportunities to pray or to observe other tenants 
of his religion. See Dida v. Hvarre, et al., 3:24-cv-0238-GCS, (Doc. 1, 17). On June 26, 2024, 
the Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed on a First Amendment or RLUIPA claim against 
Defendants Hvarre and Jeffrey Fernberg and concerning Plaintiff’s access to adequate 

prayer times/facilities, and his ability to observe important religious celebrations.
Id.
at 
(Doc. 24).                                                                
    Lastly, on March 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint alleging that he 
has been denied the right to purchase food at the commissary. See Dida v. Hvarre, 3:24-cv-
00835-SMY,  (Doc.  1).  This  case  is  at  the  beginning  stage  of  litigation  as  Plaintiff’s 

complaint is awaiting screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.            
                           DISCUSSION                                    
     Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides in part: “[i]f actions before the court 
involve a common question of law or fact, the court may . . . consolidate the actions . . . 
.” FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 42(a)(2). Whether to consolidate cases is “a matter of convenience 
and economy in judicial administration.” 9A Wright & Miller, FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 2383 
(3rd  ed.  2008).  See also Mutual  Life Ins.  Co.  of New  York v.  Hillmon,
145  U.S.  285,  292
(1892) (stating that consolidating “of like nature and relative to the same question” is 
within trial court’s discretion). 
     As evident, the Court finds that Plaintiff's many claims are not related and do not 
involve common questions of law or fact to warrant consolidation. The Court previously 
found the same in severing two of his claims into a new lawsuit. Further, his cases are 
progressing through the court system at different speeds and Plaintiff has not shown that 
consolidation would promote trial convenience and economy in administration. Thus, 
consolidation is not appropriate. 
                                CONCLUSION 
     For the above-stated reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to consolidate. 
(Doc. 66). 
     IT IS SO ORDERED. 
                                                        Digitally signed by 
     DATED:  October 2, 2024.             Ap     DRae arson 302 
                                                        15:43:23 -05'00' 
                                         GILBERTC.SISON 
                                         United States Magistrate Judge 

                                 Page 4 of 4