dineen/shibata <strong>v</strong>. Kotchka

                                 IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                              DIVISION ONE


                      In the Matter of the Estate of:

             GLORIA DOLORES B. ACCIAVATTI, Deceased.
             __________________________________________

                    KIM DINEEN, Petitioner/Appellee,

                                   and

                  JILL K. SHIBATA, Respondent/Appellee,

                                    v.

               JEFFREY KOTCHKA, Respondent/Appellant.


                          No. 1 CA-CV 25-0606 PB
                             FILED 07-15-2026

          Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                          No. PB2023-003522
            The Honorable Sarah Selzer, Judge, Pro Tempore

                               AFFIRMED


                                COUNSEL

Jeffrey Kotchka, Peoria
Respondent/Appellant

Tiffany & Bosco, Phoenix
By Nora L. Jones, Vanessa R. Heim, Krysta C. Furnell
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee Kim Dineen
                    DINEEN/SHIBATA v. KOTCHKA
                         Opinion of the Court


                                OPINION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.


F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1           Jeffrey Kotchka appeals the superior court’s admission of his
mother’s will to formal probate and the appointment of his sister, Kim
Dineen, as the personal representative of the estate. Because his arguments
are unsupported by any valid authority, we affirm.

¶2            More concerning, however, is Mr. Kotchka’s failure to ensure
the validity of legal citations in his opening brief that he obtained through
use of generative artificial intelligence (“Gen-AI”), including his inclusion
of hallucinated authorities. Because of these misrepresentations of law, we
impose sanctions under Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure
(“ARCAP”) 25, Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 12-349, and the
court’s inherent powers to manage its affairs.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3            On June 18, 2023, Gloria B. Dolores Acciavatti (“Decedent”)
died at the age of 93 years old, leaving behind her three adult children: Kim
Dineen, Jeffrey Kotchka, and Jill Shibata. A few months after her death,
Dineen applied for informal appointment as Special Administrator of the
Estate, and upon reviewing the Decedent’s records, discovered the Estate
had no assets for her to marshal because they were titled in Kotchka’s name.
In February 2024, Dineen filed a Petition for Adjudication of Intestacy,
Determination of Heirs, and Appointment of Personal Representative. Both
of Dineen’s siblings opposed this petition.

¶4           The trial court held a hearing on the matter and then
appointed Dineen as the Personal Representative of the Estate in July 2025.
Later that month, the trial court issued an Order for Formal Probate of Will
and Appointment as Personal Representative. Kotchka timely appealed this
Order.

¶5            In his appeal, Kotchka made various arguments regarding
“Due Process & Fair Hearing” and “Material Errors of Fact & Law.”
However, Kotchka’s opening brief contained “legal citations” that were
inaccurate and false. Upon reviewing these citations, we ordered Kotchka


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                     DINEEN/SHIBATA v. KOTCHKA
                          Opinion of the Court

to appear at a show cause hearing and testify under oath as to them. Before
this hearing, we also asked Kotchka to submit an explanation addressing
his citations, which he did. In his written explanation, Kotchka stated that
he relied on “independent internet research . . . utiliz[ing] artificial-
intelligence-assisted research tools.”

¶6            We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. Section 12-2101(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

I.     Because Kotchka’s Opening Brief Violated ARCAP 13, We Strike
       its Inaccurate and False Citations.

¶7             An appellant’s opening brief must contain, among other
things, a statement of the background facts, the issues presented on appeal,
and an “argument” containing the appellant’s contentions. ARCAP
13(a)(5)–(7). That argument must include citations to applicable legal
authorities, references to the record, and a statement of the appropriate
standard of review. ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A)–(B). “An appellant who fails to
make a bona fide and reasonably intelligent effort to comply with the rules
will waive issues and arguments not supported by adequate explanation,
citations to the record, or authority.” Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522 ¶ 8
(App. 2022) (citation modified). The Arizona Supreme Court has stated that
self-represented litigants “must not only respect the dignity of the
courtroom, but also ‘comply with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law.’” State v. Gomez, 231 Ariz. 219, 223 ¶ 15 (2012) (quoting
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975)). Thus, in Arizona, self-
represented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys and are
not afforded any special leniency. Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 522 ¶ 8. When faced
with misconduct by either attorneys or self-represented litigants, we “may
impose sanctions that are appropriate in the circumstances of the case, and
to discourage similar conduct in the future.” ARCAP 25. Sanctions can
include, among other things, dismissal, see, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991) (stating courts may “fashion an appropriate
sanction for conduct” including “outright dismissal”), or striking all or part
of a brief, see, e.g., Burney v. Huntimer, 1 CA-CV 19-0542 FC, 2020 WL
5666901, at *1 n.1 (Ariz. App. Sept. 24, 2020) (“Noncompliance with ARCAP
13 is ground for either striking the brief or imposing another type of
sanction[.]”).

¶8            Here, Kotchka’s brief provides no citations to the record on
appeal. Further, Kotchka’s brief fails to cite proper legal authority. Instead,
it contains eight citations, six of which are deficient. The citation errors



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                    DINEEN/SHIBATA v. KOTCHKA
                         Opinion of the Court

include the use of cases for principles that are not supported by the case,
mis-citation to wrong pages or paragraphs, misstatement of rules
enunciated in cases, and misrepresentation of case facts. Most concerning,
the brief cites two cases that simply do not exist.

¶9            Because of the brief’s inaccurate and false citations, we strike
each such citation. Significantly, the brief contains no other supportive legal
authority for its arguments.

¶10           In his written explanation in response to our order to show
cause, Kotchka stated he relied on Gen-AI in writing his brief and blames it
for the inaccuracies and falsities of his citations. At the show-cause hearing,
Kotchka testified that he had not reviewed this court’s publicly-available
materials to assist self-represented litigants found on its website.1 His
testimony made clear he did not use legal research tools or materials
provided by public law libraries to verify the citations in his brief. He did
not seek professional legal help to assist in verifying his citations. Indeed,
he admitted he did nothing to independently verify the citations. We
appreciate his candor, but all litigants, whether appearing through lawyers
or in their own person, must ensure their filings comply with all applicable
rules and law. Gomez, 231 Ariz. at 223 ¶ 15; see also ARCAP 25 (noting we
may impose sanctions for violations of ARCAP). Reliance on Gen-AI does
not excuse or ease this requirement. Thus, Kotchka has not made a “bona
fide and reasonably intelligent effort” to comply with ARCAP 13’s
requirements. Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 522 ¶ 8. This failure to comply with
ARCAP 13 may be treated as a waiver of all issues and the superior court’s
order may be affirmed on this ground. See id. at 523 ¶¶ 10–11; see also
ARCAP 25. We do so here and affirm the court’s order.

II.    The Use of Hallucinated Case Citations Constitutes Abuse of Gen-
       AI and Is Sanctionable Conduct.

¶11           Because the issue of Gen-AI inaccuracies and hallucinated
authorities in court filings—whether included in those filed by self-
represented litigants or attorneys—poses a recurring and increasing




1       These materials are accessible, without cost, through the court’s
official website: coa1.azcourts.gov, by clicking on the links under the menu
labeled “Self-Represented.” They include the court’s “Guides for Self-
Represented Litigants,” which advise of the need to read and follow
applicable rules.


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                     DINEEN/SHIBATA v. KOTCHKA
                          Opinion of the Court

problem that has not been squarely addressed by any prior published
Arizona authority, we do so now.

              A.     Non-Abusive Use of Gen-AI

¶12             To begin, we emphasize that using Gen-AI is not, in and of
itself, objectionable. We recognize the promise artificial intelligence tools,
including those leveraging Gen-AI, offer for enhancing access to justice for
those without the resources to retain counsel or to represent themselves
effectively, provided the person signing the brief checks to make sure all
the cases they cite are real and accurately cited, and provided the person
signing the brief checks to make sure they are correctly citing true facts in
the record. Participating in litigation can present challenges to self-
represented litigants that Gen-AI may be able to help address. For example,
presently, Gen-AI can check grammar, suggest edits for clarity and
concision, summarize large documents and other data, and conduct a host
of other helpful tasks that have the potential to aid self-represented litigants
in preparing legal documents and filings. As long as new technology is used
in ways that comply with the important rules requiring truth and diligence
in court filings—like Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and ARCAP 25—
then that new technology can be a great aid to self-represented litigants and
lawyers alike.

              B.     Dangers and Limitations in Using Gen-AI in Legal
                     Drafting

¶13            While Gen-AI can help with editing and processing large
amounts of information, it also presents dangers if used to perform legal
research and write a brief without careful and diligent work to check the
material it creates. In short, when left unchecked, it is an unreliable narrator
and researcher. Gen-AI sometimes—perhaps even frequently—produces
inaccurate or meritless legal theories and research results. Included among
those inaccuracies are citations to legal authorities that simply do not exist,
a phenomenon commonly known as “hallucination.” Thus, careless use of
Gen-AI can lead to creation of briefs and other filings which present
meritless legal theories or cite misleading, fake, or nonexistent legal
authorities, an issue that is rapidly becoming common in our courts. An
ever-growing body of evidence and experience demonstrates that Gen-AI
is woefully inadequate at reliably providing accurate and trustworthy
citations to valid legal authorities. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 176 Fed.
Cl. 163, 169 (2025) (“It is no secret that generative AI programs are known
to ‘hallucinate’ nonexistent cases, and with the advent of AI, courts have
seen a rash of cases in which both counsel and pro se litigants have cited


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                     DINEEN/SHIBATA v. KOTCHKA
                          Opinion of the Court

such fake, hallucinated cases in their briefs.”); Hardy v. Whitaker, 351 F.R.D.
84, 97 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026) (noting work by legal analyst tracking “more
than 500 legal decisions about AI-generated hallucinated content in the
United States”), appeal filed, No. 26-1277 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2026). See also D.
Charlotin,                AI                Hallucination                 Cases
https://www.damiencharlotin.com/hallucinations/ (last accessed July 13,
2026) (cataloguing 1,751 instances of AI-generated hallucinated content in
legal documents described in court decisions from across the globe, 1208 of
which were found in U.S. court filings).

¶14           Nor does it appear that Gen-AI tools will soon be able to fix
the problem. As one federal circuit court put it, “[t]he hallucination problem
has no end in sight, as AI’s tendency to fabricate results arises from the
training and structures of AI programs.” Fletcher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc.,
168 F.4th 231, 233 (5th Cir. 2026).

¶15            Despite its limitations, Gen-AI tools do not meaningfully
restrict or prohibit users from attempting to employ them for legal research
or writing legal arguments, at least in their present incarnations. Self-
represented litigants can input a simple prompt into Gen-AI tools and
instantly receive a lengthy complaint, motion, or brief that includes
plausible-looking legal theories and arguments with apparently supportive
citations. If not carefully checked, the results can look, superficially, like
competent and convincing legal work product. But they very often are not.

             C.      Abusive Use of Gen-AI in Legal Drafting

¶16            Despite the dangers, both attorneys and self-represented
litigants are increasingly relying on Gen-AI tools to conduct legal research
and to draft filings, including briefs. See e.g., In re Domestic P’ship of Torres
Campos & Munoz, 342 Cal. Rptr. 3d 227, 236 (App. 2026) (recognizing the
“increasing incidence of hallucinated case citations generated by AI tools”).
A major problem in using Gen-AI for legal work of this kind, however, is
that many litigants do little to nothing to verify the accuracy of Gen-AI-
produced legal work product, essentially abdicating their own duty to
ensure accuracy in their filings, see Gomez, 231 Ariz. 219, 223 ¶ 15; ARCAP
13, 25; Ariz. R. Civ. P. 11(b), to the tool, which is not designed to assure the
accuracy that the law requires. Failure to act with reasonable diligence to
check—and correct—any work product created using Gen-AI that is
submitted to the courts constitutes abuse of Gen-AI tools in litigation.

¶17          We acknowledge that self-represented litigants in particular
face challenges when using Gen-AI tools for legal research because such



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                     DINEEN/SHIBATA v. KOTCHKA
                          Opinion of the Court

litigants may be unaware that these tools frequently generate
hallucinations. Indeed, use of Gen-AI can give self-represented litigants a
false sense of confidence in their filings. And often, these litigants lack
convenient access to professional legal databases to verify citations,
requiring them to visit public law libraries or hire professional legal help
for that purpose. But this cannot, and does not, excuse filing of legal
documents that contain and rely on nonexistent or otherwise inaccurate
legal authorities or present meritless legal arguments. See Gomez, 231 Ariz.
219, 223 ¶ 15 (self-represented litigants must “comply with relevant rules
of procedural and substantive law”); ARCAP 25; see also Ariz. R. Civ. P.
11(b) (requiring litigants to conduct reasonable inquiry into the basis in fact
and law for all claims represented in a pleading or motion prior to filing).

¶18           Thus, whether attorney or self-represented litigant, all who
file documents with the courts remain directly and personally responsible
for the content, accuracy, and quality of legal filings submitted to all courts,
including this court. Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 522 ¶ 8. Providing hallucinated case
citations to the court fails to fulfill this requirement, since reasonable
diligence in verifying citations with trusted sources will reveal their falsity.
Accordingly, citing a hallucinated case in a legal filing is sanctionable
conduct. See ARCAP 25.

             D.     The Opening Brief’s Abusive Use of Gen-AI Is
                    Sanctionable

¶19           Dineen requests award of her costs and attorneys’ fees, citing
ARCAP 25 and A.R.S. Sections 12-341, 12-349, and 14-1105. As the
prevailing party, Dineen is awarded her costs pursuant to A.R.S. Sections
12-341 and -342(A). In the exercise of our discretion, we deny fees under
A.R.S. Section 14-1105.

¶20            We turn to consideration of an award of attorneys’ fees under
A.R.S. Section 12-349 and ARCAP 25, specifically as a sanction for
Kotchka’s abusive use of Gen-AI. The court shall order attorneys’ fees
against a party if the party “[b]rings or defends a claim without substantial
justification.” A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1). A claim is “without substantial
justification” if it “is groundless and is not made in good faith.” A.R.S. § 12-
349(F). “A fees award under § 12-349(A)(1) requires groundlessness and the
absence of good faith.” Ariz. Republican Party v. Richer, 257 Ariz. 237, 247 ¶
34 (2024).

¶21          “A claim is groundless if the proponent can present no
rational argument based upon the evidence or law in support of that claim.”



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                     DINEEN/SHIBATA v. KOTCHKA
                          Opinion of the Court

Id. at 243 ¶ 15 (citation modified). And though a claim is not groundless
when it is “fairly debatable” or a “long shot,” “a party’s indifference to a
claim’s invalidity may constitute the absence of good faith even without an
intent to harass or delay or other evidence of affirmative bad faith.” Id. at
243, 248 ¶¶ 15, 38. Thus, a claim is made in bad faith when it is both
objectively groundless and when “the party or attorney knows or should
know that it is groundless, or is indifferent to its groundlessness, but pursues
it anyway.” Id. at 248 ¶ 38 (emphasis added).

¶22            Additionally, we have long held that courts have “the
inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct during litigation independent
of the authority granted by” procedural rule or statute. Hmielewski v.
Maricopa Cnty., 192 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 14 (App. 1997). “These powers are governed
by ‘the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so
as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” Id. (quoting
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)).

¶23            Misrepresenting the law to the court constitutes bad faith
conduct in litigation. The courts are places for resolution of disputes based
on fact and law. As such, courts must be able to presume that those who
come before them are acting truthfully, and the rule of law requires us to
call out untruthfulness, as here. Misrepresenting the law to the courts by
presenting hallucinated cases as legitimate authority poses a profound
danger that threatens to undermine the legal process. Thus, imposing
sanctions on litigants engaging in misrepresentation through abuse of Gen-
AI services and tools promotes the integrity of the judicial process. See
generally, Whiting v. City of Athens, 170 F.4th 455, 466 (6th Cir. 2026)
(discussing how misuse of Gen-AI tools may harm our adversarial system).

¶24             Here, the opening brief presented no arguments supported by
accurately cited legal authority and offered no record citations to evidence
in support of its claims, making those claims objectively groundless.
Kotchka’s claims were also not made in good faith because he admitted to
taking no action whatsoever to assure the validity of the work product
produced by his use of Gen-AI, demonstrating indifference to the
groundlessness of his claim. Nor did Kotchka move to amend his brief to
correct its failings or offer to withdraw his appeal after the Appellee made
him aware of those failings in its answering brief. Nor did he do so after his
appearance at the show-cause hearing. Instead, at each of these steps, he
chose to continue to maintain his claims despite his opening brief’s
containing hallucinations and no adequate supportive legal authority. As a
result, Kotchka violated A.R.S. Section 12-349 in both asserting and
maintaining his claims because they were groundless and not made in good


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                     DINEEN/SHIBATA v. KOTCHKA
                          Opinion of the Court

faith. See Richer, 257 Ariz. at 249 ¶ 41 (applying A.R.S. § 12-349(A) to
maintaining sanctionable claims).

¶25            Kotchka stated that he is not a trained lawyer and his
inclusion of the hallucinated cases and misrepresentations as to other
citations was unintentional, and so he requests indulgence. But as noted,
both attorneys and self-represented litigants must abide by the same rules,
Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 522 ¶ 8, and it is not permissible for either to
misrepresent the law to the courts, Gomez, 231 Ariz. 219, 223 ¶ 15. And
Kotchka admitted that he did nothing to independently verify the accuracy
of the authorities he cited in his opening brief. As explained, we rely on
litigants to base their arguments upon facts and law that are truthful and
accurate. Submission of hallucinated case citations—intentional or
unintentional—is unjustifiable. To accept a defense of lack of ill intent
would legitimize reckless indifference to the truth and accuracy of court
filings and tolerate some level of misrepresentation. This we will not do. See
id. at 466. Instead, any person who files pleadings, motions, or briefs with
the courts may not offload their duty to ensure the truth and accuracy of
their representations of fact and law in their filings to any technological
tool, including Gen-AI tools. See ARCAP 13, 25.

¶26           In using hallucinated case citations provided by Gen-AI and
doing nothing to discover and correct the falsity of those citations, Kotchka
presented filings to this court that misrepresented the law. Kotchka’s lack
of conscious intent to deceive this court is no defense to failing to act
reasonably to ensure his briefs accurately represented the facts and law.
Gomez, 231 Ariz. 219, 223 ¶ 15. Therefore, in view of this record, Kotchka’s
conduct in this case is sanctionable as a violation of A.R.S. Section 12-349,
ARCAP 25, and the court’s inherent powers to manage its affairs. See
Whiting, 170 F.4th at 461 (“Citing even a single fake case can be sanctionable
. . . .”).

¶27           In imposing sanctions for this conduct, we join the many
courts nationwide that have confronted this problem by imposing sanctions
on both attorneys and self-represented litigants who file briefs containing
hallucinations. See, e.g., Whiting, 170 F.4th at 466–67; Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr.
Co. v. LeTennier, 250 N.Y.S. 3d 260, 266 (App. Div. 2026) (“Courts
throughout the country which have been confronted with AI-generated
authorities have concluded that filing papers containing hallucinated cases
and fabricated legal authorities may be sanctionable[.]”); Wilcox v.
Gingrinch, 274 N.E.3d 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (similar); Kruse v. Karlen, 692
S.W.3d 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024) (similar); Shahid v. Esaam, 918 S.E.2d 198 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2025) (similar).


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                    DINEEN/SHIBATA v. KOTCHKA
                         Opinion of the Court

             E.     Awarding Dineen Attorneys’ Fees Appropriately
                    Sanctions the Opening Brief’s Abusive Use of Gen-AI

¶28          Sanctions must be “appropriate in the circumstances of the
case” and are meant to “discourage similar conduct in the future.” ARCAP
25. Sanctions may include contempt, dismissal, monetary fines, or
withholding or imposing costs or attorneys’ fees. Id.

¶29          Although Kotchka’s asserted lack of intent to purposefully
deceive and his lack of legal training do not excuse his misrepresentation of
the law to this court and will not absolve him from sanctions, those
circumstances do inform our inquiry as to what sanctions may be
appropriate. Thus, we turn to the question of what sanctions to impose for
his abusive use of Gen-AI in this case.

¶30           Kotchka’s pursuit of this appeal required Dineen to expend
more resources than usual and reasonable to decipher the record and
arguments, as well as identify the hallucinated cases Kotchka wrongly
presented and maintained. Dineen was compelled to file the necessary
briefing and attend a show cause hearing for an appeal that lacked merit.

¶31          Because the opening brief relies on hallucinated and
misrepresented case citations and because of the failure to ensure the
accuracy of those citations, the appropriate sanction here is to award
Dineen that portion of her reasonable attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. Section
12-349 and ARCAP 25 incurred due to the use of hallucinated and
misrepresented case citations. We award those fees against Kotchka and in
favor of Dineen, contingent upon Dineen’s compliance with ARCAP 21.
And we award Dineen her costs on appeal, also contingent upon her
compliance with ARCAP 21.

                                CONCLUSION

¶32          We affirm.




                          MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED:           JR




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