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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
JANE DOE K.R.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 6:23-cv-1012-JSS-LHP
CHOICE HOTELS, WHG SU
DELEGATES, LLC, CHOICE
HOTELS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
and CHOICE HOTELS
INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
CORP.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER
Defendants have filed Daubert1 motions to exclude opinions offered by Mr.
Salvatore Caccavale, a proffered expert on hotel security. (Dkts. 126, 136.) Plaintiff
opposes the motions. (Dkts. 159, 160.) Upon consideration, for the reasons outlined
below, the court grants the motions in part and denies them in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants owned and operated a hotel in Orlando,
Florida, where she was a victim of sex trafficking between February and May 2013.
(Dkt. 150.) She sues Defendants under the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). (Dkt. 150 at 51–54.) In support
1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
of her claims, Mr. Caccavale has furnished a thirteen-page report, in which he offers
four opinions:
(1) The incident involving [Plaintiff] was foreseeable and predictable.
The hotel’s ownership entities [i.e., Defendants] and their employees
should have anticipated this incident.
(2) Inconsistent documented staff training and the failure to adhere to
corporate policies contributed to the ease of [the] trafficking of
[Plaintiff] at the subject hotel location.
(3) Hotel ownership [i.e., Defendants] and their employees should have
recognized the correlation between drug use and trafficking at their
hotel and collaborated with local law enforcement to investigate,
assist, and offer solutions to remedy the nuisances and thereby prevent
or deter the sex trafficking of [Plaintiff].
(4) The failures and inattention by hotel ownership and hotel leadership
[i.e., Defendants] exacerbated the open and obvious illicit drug use
and sex trafficking on their property. Based on the police incident
reporting, relevant crime statistics, the high crime area, and the
obvious red flags of trafficking [Plaintiff] exhibited at the [Orlando
hotel,] it is reasonable to conclude that the hotel management and
staff knew that [Plaintiff] was being trafficked.
(Dkt. 126-1 at 8, 10–11, 13.) Following each opinion, Mr. Caccavale explains its bases
in fact. (Id. at 8–13.)
With respect to his qualifications, Mr. Caccavale lists the committees on which
he has served in his industry, the prior testimony he has given, and the industry
certification he holds. (Id. at 3–5.) He relates his decades of experience involving hotel
security, and he identifies the resources he uses and events he attends “to develop [his]
knowledge and keep current on industry trends.” (Id. at 6–7.) His curriculum vitae
(attached to his report) supplies additional information about his job experience and
accomplishments, professional affiliations, trainings, and the cases on which he has
worked. (See Dkt. 126-2.) During his deposition, Mr. Caccavale admitted that his
area of expertise is not human trafficking but hotel safety and security. (Dkt. 136-2 at
4, 18–19.)
With respect to his methodology, Mr. Caccavale describes “a four-part process
for rendering analysis concerning security matters.” (Dkt. 126-1 at 7.) The process
entails reviewing evidence of an incident, assessing threats, conducting a security
survey to identify vulnerabilities (“security weaknesses or opportunities for criminal
activity”), and engaging in analysis to opine about the “adequacy of the security effort
at the incident location.” (Id. at 7–8.) According to Mr. Caccavale, this methodology
is endorsed by the International Association of Professional Security Consultants
(IAPSC) and “is designed to allow . . . security expert[s] to use their education,
training, and experience to identify and utilize those factors that apply to the particular
facts of the matter under review.” (Id. at 8; see Dkt. 126-4 at 5–10 (the IAPSC’s
description of the methodology).)
In his report, Mr. Caccavale lists the discovery documents and other materials
that he reviewed to form his opinions. (Dkt. 126-1 at 3–4.) These materials include a
CrimeCast Basic Report “indicat[ing] the likelihood of crime and loss occurring” at
the Orlando hotel. (Dkt. 126-5 at 2.) The CrimeCast report, created December 16,
2024, scores the risks of different types of crime around the hotel for 2017 (the database
year) and shows a past score for 2010 and a projected score for 2022. (Id. at 2, 4.) The
CrimeCast report provides scores for categories of crimes against persons and property
and maps the crime risks for the area around the hotel. (Id. at 3–4.) Although the
CrimeCast report lists rape, for example, as a category of crimes against persons, it
does not mention prostitution, sex trafficking, or human trafficking. (Id.) In addition
to the CrimeCast report, Mr. Caccavale relies on records from the Orange County
Sheriff’s Office and information about the hotel and environs obtained from online
sources and discovery responses. (Id. at 3–4, 8–13.)
During his deposition, Mr. Caccavale stated that he did not perform a threat or
vulnerability assessment at the Orlando hotel because he did not “physically go to the
property.” (Dkt. 136-2 at 41.) However, he testified to following the IAPSC’s
methodology by performing a vulnerability assessment based on calls for service
around the hotel, online reviews of the hotel, and the CrimeCast Report. (Id.) He
testified that he looked to calls for service from 2010 to 2013 and consulted the
CrimeCast report for the crime around the hotel. (Id.) When asked for details about
how the CrimeCast report was compiled, Mr. Caccavale stated: “[W]e would have to
get the [CrimeCast] folks to come in here and explain.” (Id. at 24–25.) As to the online
reviews, Mr. Caccavale testified that Plaintiff’s counsel assembled them for him, that
the earliest review was from 2015, and that this review referenced prostitution. (Id. at
5, 20–21.) Mr. Caccavale further expressed his position that a negative review
generally carries more weight than a positive review. (Id. at 21.) When asked about
the bases for his second opinion, which concerns training at the Orlando hotel, Mr.
Caccavale stated that he did not know what training policies were in place at the time
of the alleged sex trafficking of Plaintiff. (Id. at 31–32.) As to his opinions on drug
use, Mr. Caccavale acknowledged that drug use does not necessarily indicate human
trafficking. (Id. at 40.) He also testified that Plaintiff used only alcohol and marijuana,
as opposed to more serious substances, while she was trafficked. (Id.)
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
“To fulfil their obligation under Daubert, district courts must engage in a
rigorous inquiry” focusing on three issues: (1) whether “the expert is qualified to testify
competently regarding the matters he intends to address,” (2) whether “the
methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable,” and
(3) whether “the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific,
technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact.”
Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
“[T]he party seeking to introduce the expert at trial”—here, Plaintiff—“bears the
burden of establishing [the expert’s] qualifications, reliability, and helpfulness.”
Knepfle v. J-Tech Corp., 48 F.4th 1282, 1294 (11th Cir. 2022). The court must “ensure
that speculative, unreliable expert testimony does not reach the jury.” McCorvey v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002). “[T]o be admissible, an
expert’s testimony must be based on more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation.” Haggerty v. Upjohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1167 (S.D. Fla. 1996)
(quotation omitted).
ANALYSIS
Defendants challenge Mr. Caccavale’s qualifications and the overall reliability
of his methodology before making reliability and helpfulness arguments against each
of his four opinions. (See Dkts. 126, 136.) The court addresses Defendants’ general
arguments on qualifications and methodology before turning to the opinion-specific
arguments.2
As to qualifications, Defendants do not dispute that Mr. Caccavale is generally
qualified to opine on matters related to hotel safety and security; however, they
maintain that he cannot offer opinions as to human trafficking because he is not
qualified in that area of expertise. (Dkt. 126 at 4–7; Dkt. 136 at 6–8.) Given his
curriculum vitae, which reflects his decades of experience involving hotel security, (see
Dkt. 126-2), the court is satisfied as to Mr. Caccavale’s qualifications. See Skypoint
Advisors, LLC v. 3 Amigos Prods. LLC, 585 F. Supp. 3d 1326, 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2022)
(“The qualification standard for expert testimony is not stringent, and so long as the
expert is minimally qualified, objections to the level of the expert’s expertise go to
credibility and weight, not admissibility.” (quotation omitted)); Tillman v. C.R. Bard,
Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (“As long as an expert stays within
the reasonable confines of his subject area, a lack of specialization does not affect the
admissibility of the expert opinion[] but only its weight.” (alterations adopted and
quotation omitted)); Doe E.M.B. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 9:23-CV-00173-MJT-CLS, 2025
WL 2556106, at *16, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175050, at *51 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2025)
2 The Choice Hotels Defendants additionally argue that all of Mr. Caccavale’s opinions are baseless
as to them because in their franchisor role for the Orlando hotel, these Defendants do not implement
safety measures on a day-to-day basis. (Dkt. 136 at 13–14.) Plaintiff responds: “[T]he franchisee is a
party to the case, so the extent to which [Mr. Caccavale’s opinions] may also apply to the franchisor
Defendants is irrelevant as to [the opinions’] admissibility.” (Dkt. 160 at 10.) Plaintiff’s point is well
taken. Further, Mr. Caccavale’s opinions do not seem limited to a day-to-day perspective. (See Dkt.
126-1 at 8–14.)
(“As to his purported lack of specialization in sex trafficking, . . . [Mr.] Caccavale is
not strictly confined to his area of practice[] but may testify concerning related
applications[:] in this instance, the well-established nexus between sex trafficking and
hotel security measures.” (quotation omitted)). The court notes that each of Mr.
Caccavale’s opinions in this case concerns hotel safety and security. (See Dkt. 126-1
at 8, 10–11, 13.)
As to methodology, Defendants contend that Mr. Caccavale failed to follow the
methodology endorsed by the IAPSC that he claims to have used. (Dkt. 126 at 7–8;
Dkt. 136 at 8–12.) Defendants do not ask the court to consider the reliability of the
IAPSC’s methodology but to exclude Mr. Caccavale’s opinions for failure to follow
that methodology. (Dkt. 126 at 7–8; Dkt. 136 at 8–12.) Courts appear to be divided
as to the reliability of the IAPSC’s methodology. See Hopkins v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp., No. 08-CV-2965 (NGG) (RML), 2015 WL 13741721, at *11, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 196952, at *35 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2015) (“Other district courts have divided
over whether the IAPSC’s methodology is sufficiently reliable.” (collecting cases)).
However, absent any argument from Defendants on the subject, (see Dkt. 126 at 8
(“[T]he [c]ourt does not even have to address whether the IASPC methodology is
actually reliable or not.”); Dkt. 136 at 12 (describing “whether the IAPSC
methodology is a reliable one” as “a question this [c]ourt need not decide”)), the court
agrees with the Hopkins court that the IAPSC’s methodology is sufficiently reliable, see
2015 WL 13741721, at *11, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196952, at *36 (“[B]ecause the
IAPSC method has been subjected to substantial peer review at each step of its
creation, has gained substantial acceptance in the field, and has standards controlling
its operation, it is sufficiently reliable.”). That said, minor deviation from the IAPSC’s
methodology may itself constitute a sufficiently reliable methodology. (See Dkt. 159
at 6 (“[T]he [IAPSC’s] methodology expressly recognizes that it is permissible—and
expected—that a forensic consultant [such as Mr. Caccavale] may depart from the
guidelines depending on the circumstances of the case.” (emphasis omitted)).)
Defendants describe three ways in which Mr. Caccavale did not follow the
IAPSC’s methodology. (Dkt. 126 at 7–8; Dkt. 136 at 9–12.) First, Defendants assert
that Mr. Caccavale did not conduct threat and vulnerability assessments at the physical
property, as required. (Dkt. 136 at 9–10.) Second, according to Defendants, Mr.
Caccavale looked to calls for service without sufficiently contextualizing them with
other crime records such as incident reports. (Dkt. 126 at 7–8; Dkt. 136 at 9–10.)
Third, Defendants argue, Mr. Caccavale improperly relied on CrimeCast information
postdating the alleged 2013 trafficking incident and could not provide details about
how the CrimeCast report was compiled. (Dkt. 126 at 8; Dkt. 136 at 10–12.)
However, regarding these points, Mr. Caccavale testified that he conducted a
vulnerability assessment based on calls for service, the CrimeCast report, and online
reviews of the hotel, (Dkt. 136-2 at 41), and the CrimeCast report shows past crime
risk scores for the area around the Orlando hotel in 2010, (Dkt. 126-5 at 4). Further,
Defendants’ arguments can be adequately addressed through the usual litigation
strategies. See United States v. Ware, 69 F.4th 830, 848 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he proper
cure for sufficiently reliable but allegedly shaky scientific evidence is not exclusion[]
but vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof.” (alteration adopted and quotations omitted)); In
re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust, 329 F.R.D. 336, 390 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (“[W]hether
an expert’s opinion is accurate in light of his use of certain data goes to the weight of
the evidence, not to its admissibility.” (quotation omitted)); Tillman, 96 F. Supp. 3d at
1332 (concluding that criticism of the quality of an expert’s underlying data is “more
appropriately directed to the weight, rather than the admissibility[,] of th[e]
evidence”).
Defendants’ opinion-specific arguments fare better than their general challenges
to Mr. Caccavale’s qualifications and methodology but are not wholly persuasive. As
to the first opinion, about the predictability of the alleged sex trafficking incident,
Defendants maintain that the bases cited by Mr. Caccavale in support of the opinion
do not actually support it or fit the facts of this case, thereby rendering the opinion
unhelpful to the factfinder. (Dkt. 126 at 9–10; Dkt. 136 at 14–15.) Because the
arguments about the opinion’s bases can be adequately addressed through the usual
litigation strategies, the court does not exclude the first opinion. See Ware, 69 F.4th at
848; In re Disposable, 329 F.R.D. at 390; Tillman, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 1332. Further, the
opinion may be helpful to determining whether Defendants knew or should have
known about Plaintiff’s alleged sex trafficking. See Doe v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th
714, 725 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he defendant must have either actual or constructive
knowledge that the venture—in which it voluntarily participated and from which it
knowingly benefited—violated the TVPRA as to the plaintiff. Section 1595(a) requires
that the defendant knew or should have known that the venture has engaged in an act
in violation of [18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1597].” (alteration adopted and quotation
omitted)).
As to the second opinion, about the adequacy of the training at the Orlando
hotel, Defendants contend that the opinion is unreliable because Mr. Caccavale
admitted to not knowing what training policies were in place at the time of the alleged
sex trafficking incident. (Dkt. 126 at 10–11; Dkt. 136 at 15–17; see Dkt. 136-2 at 31–
32.) The court agrees and thus excludes the second opinion. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of
Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to
existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”); Cordoves v. Miami-Dade County, 104
F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1363–64 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (excluding an expert’s opinion that
“personnel were not properly trained” when the expert “did not review any
documentation concerning training”).
As to the third opinion, Defendants challenge only the statement that they
“should have recognized the correlation between drug use and trafficking at their
hotel.” (See Dkt. 126 at 11–12; Dkt. 136 at 17–19.) Defendants assert that this
statement “has no basis in fact” because, according to Mr. Caccavale, drug use does
not always indicate human trafficking and Plaintiff used marijuana and alcohol rather
than “illicit drugs that would result in discarded paraphernalia.” (Dkt. 126 at 11–12;
accord Dkt. 136 at 17–18.) Defendants further fault Mr. Caccavale for relying on
“materials that post[]date the alleged trafficking period.” (Dkt. 136 at 17–18.) Plaintiff
responds that opining as to a correlation between drug use and trafficking does not
equate to opining that drug use always indicates trafficking. (Dkt. 159 at 13; Dkt. 160
at 16.) She also points to her marijuana use and to other drug use at the hotel, and she
argues that Mr. Caccavale “logically linked [the post-trafficking materials] with the
earlier trafficking.” (Dkt. 160 at 15–16 & n.8; accord Dkt 159 at 13 & n.2.) The court
agrees with Plaintiff that the challenged statement is not due to be excluded.
Defendants’ arguments can be adequately addressed through the usual litigation
strategies. See Ware, 69 F.4th at 848; In re Disposable, 329 F.R.D. at 390; Tillman, 96
F. Supp. 3d at 1332.
As to the fourth opinion, Defendants challenge only the statement that “it is
reasonable to conclude that the hotel management and staff knew that [Plaintiff] was
being trafficked.” (See Dkt. 126 at 12–13; Dkt. 136 at 19–20.) Defendants contend
that the court should not permit Mr. Caccavale to offer this “impermissible legal
conclusion.” (Dkt. 126 at 12; Dkt. 136 at 19.) At trial, the jury will be called upon to
decide whether Defendants, through their management and staff, had actual or
constructive knowledge of Plaintiff’s trafficking. See Doe, 21 F.4th at 725. The court
thus agrees with Defendants and excludes the challenged statement. See Doe E.M.B.,
2025 WL 2556106, at *17, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175050, at *52–53 (excluding the
challenged statement as an impermissible legal conclusion); see also Lorente-Garcia v.
Giraldo-Navarro, No. 24-23066-CIV, 2025 WL 2271614, at *3, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
153886, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2025) (“[W]hile an expert may opine on an ultimate
issue of fact, he may not invade the province of the jury . . . .” (quotation omitted)).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly:
1. Defendants’ Daubert motions concerning Mr. Caccavale (Dkts. 126, 136) are
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
2. Mr. Caccavale’s second opinion and the challenged statement in his fourth
opinion are EXCLUDED. The motions are otherwise denied.
ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on October 9, 2025.
ae
JUFIE S. SNEED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
-12- Case Information
- Court
- M.D. Fla.
- Decision Date
- October 9, 2025
- Status
- Precedential