Donna Fryer and Barbara Davison v. UMIA, an insurance company, and Constellation, Inc., a mutual insurance holding company, doing business as “Constellation®”

                IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
                    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA 
                            BILLINGS DIVISION 
 DONNA FRYER and BARBARA 
 DAVISON,                                       CV 22-14-BLG-SPW 
                    Plaintiffs, 
                                                 ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ 
 Vs.                                              MOTION IN LIMINE TO 
                                                     PRECLUDE JOHN 
 UMIA, an insurance company, and                       SULLIVAN 
 CONSTELLATION, INC., a mutual 
 insurance holding company, doing 
 business as “Constellation®”, 
                    Defendants. 

     Before the Court is Plaintiffs’  Motion to Preclude in Limine John Sullivan 
(Doc.  198).   Defendants  UMIA  and  Constellation,  Inc.  (collectively  “UMIA”) 

oppose the Motion.  (Doc. 202).  For the following reasons, the Motion is denied in 

part and reserved for ruling in part. 
I.     Background 
     In July 2025, UMIA’s retained expert, William Mercer, was nominated to the 
federal  bench  for the  District of Montana.  As  such,  the  Court granted UMIA’s 
motion  to  modify  the  scheduling  order,  allowing  UMIA  to  designate  a  new 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) expert to replace Mr. Mercer.  (Doc.  163). 
     UMIA designated attorney John Sullivan of Holland & Hart LLP.  (See Doc. 
199-1).  Plaintiffs’ counsel deposed Mr. Sullivan on October 8, 2025.  (Doc. 199-3).

     Plaintiffs now seek a Court order precluding Mr. Sullivan from testifying at 

trial, arguing that Sullivan: (1) has no personal knowledge of the DOJ’s investigation 
into Dr. Enrico Arguelles; (2) is not a properly qualified expert; (3) is not reliable 
and will not assist the trier of fact;  (4) bases his opinions on inadmissible “after- 
acquired” evidence; and (5) offers prejudicial and confusing opinions.  (Doc. 199 at 

2). 
Il.    Legal Standard 
     A motion in limine is used to preclude prejudicial or objectionable evidence 
before it is presented to the jury.  Agan v.  BNSF Ry.,  CV  19-83-BLG, 2022 WL 
3700052,  at  *1  (D.  Mont.  Aug.  26,  2022).  The Court shall  exclude  evidence in 
limine only  if the  evidence  is inadmissible on all potential grounds.  Jd.  Unless 
evidence meets this high standard, the Court shall defer evidentiary rulings until trial 

so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice are resolved in 

proper context.  Jd.   “A motion in  limine  should not be  used to  resolve  factual 
disputes or weigh evidence.”  BNSF Ry.  v.  Quad City Testing Lab’y, Inc., CV-07- 
170-BLG, 2010 WL 4337827, at *1 (D. Mont. Oct. 26, 2010). 
    Motions in limine must specifically “identify the evidence at issue and state 
with specificity why such evidence is  inadmissible.”  Colton  Crane Co.  v.  Terex 
Cranes  Wilmington,  Inc.,  2010  WL  2035800,  at  *1  (C.D.  Cal.  May  19,  2010). 
“Orders  in  limine  which  exclude  broad  categories  of evidence  should  rarely  be

employed.  A better practice is to deal with questions of admissibility of evidence as 
they arise.”  Sperberg v.  Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 
1975). 
     The  decision  on  a  motion  in  limine  is  consigned  to  the  district  court’s 
discretion—including the decision of whether to rule before trial at all.  United States 

v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999).  Rulings on motions in limine are 
provisional, and the trial judge may always change their mind during trial.  Luce v. 
United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984). 
Ill.   Discussion 
     A.     Personal Knowledge 
     Plaintiffs first argue that Mr. Sullivan should be precluded from testifying as 

a  lay  witness  under  Federal  Rule  of Evidence  602  because  he  lacks  personal 
knowledge of the DOJ’s investigation into Dr. Arguelles.  (Doc.  199 at 14).  While 
it is generally true that a witness may not testify unless there is sufficient evidence 
demonstrating their personal knowledge of the matter, experts are exempt from the 
personal knowledge requirement.’  Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“This rule does not apply to a 
witness’s expert testimony under Rule 703.”). 

  Plaintiffs do not point to record evidence demonstrating Defendants’ designation of Mr. Sullivan 
as a hybrid witness, and the Court is unaware of such a designation.

    The Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion to exclude Mr. Sullivan’s “commentary” 

on the basis that he lacks personal knowledge because Rule 602 does not apply to 

his expert testimony.  (See Doc. 199 at 14). 
    B.     Expert Qualifications, Subject Matter to Assist the Jury, and Reliability 
     Plaintiffs next seek to exclude Mr.  Sullivan’s testimony under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702, arguing he is not qualified as an expert, lacks knowledge to assist 
the  trier  of fact,  and  is  otherwise  unreliable.   (Doc.  199  at  14-19).   The  Court 
disagrees. 
    District courts are the “gatekeepers” to determine the admissibility of expert 
opinion testimony.  Fed. R. Evid. 702.  Expert testimony may not be admitted unless 
the proponent demonstrates the testimony meets the requirements  set out in Rule 
702: 
    A  witness  who  is  qualified  as  an  expert by  knowledge,  skill,  experience, 
    training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the 
    proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that: (a) the 
    expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier 
    of fact to understand the  evidence  or to  determine  a fact in  issue;  (b) the 
    testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product 
    of reliable  principles  and methods;  and (d) the  expert’s  opinion reflects  a 
    reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
    “One of the preliminary gate-keeping determinations a  trial court must make 
relative  to  the  admission  of  an  expert’s  testimony  is  whether  the  witness  is 
appropriately qualified as an expert on the particular subject matter.”  Hardesty v.

Barcus, CV 11-103-M, 2012 WL 5906797, at *2 (D. Mont. Nov. 26, 2012).  If the 

expert is not qualified, the testimony must be excluded. 
     If the  expert is  deemed qualified,  the next inquiry  is whether the  expert’s 
testimony  will  assist the  trier of fact.   This  inquiry  embraces  a  wide  variety  of 

subjects and hinges on the relevance of the testimony.  See,  e.g., Maffei v. N. Ins. 

Co.  of N.Y.,  12  F.3d  892,  897-98  (9th  Cir.  1993)  (helpful  and necessary  expert 
testimony  as  to  whether the  release  of fumes  was  caused by a  fire  or  chemical 
reaction); Knight through Kerr v. Miami-Dade County, 856 F.3d 795, 807-11 (11th 
Cir. 2017) (helpful and necessary expert testimony about police practices in a case 
alleging excessive-use-of force);  Tekoh v.  County of Los Angeles, 75 F.4th  1264, 
1265-66  (9th  Cir.  2023)  (helpful  and  necessary  testimony  about  how  coercive 
interrogation techniques can lead to false confessions). 
    If the subject matter will assist the trier of fact, the Court must then determine 
whether the testimony is reliable.  “To carry out its gatekeeping role, a district court 
must find that an expert’s testimony is reliable—an inquiry that focuses not on ‘what 
the experts say,’  or their qualifications,  ‘but what basis they have for saying it.’” 
United States  v.  Holguin,  51  F.4th  841,  854 (9th Cir.  2022) (quoting Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,  1316 (9th Cir.  1995)).  This gatekeeping 
function applies to all expert opinion testimony, not just to testimony of a scientific 

nature.  See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.  137, 148 (1999).

    In sum, “[e]xpert opinion testimony is relevant if the knowledge underlying it 

has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry.  And it is reliable if the knowledge 
underlying it has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant 

discipline.”  United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 654 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(citation modified). 
                 1,     Qualifications 
    Plaintiffs  first  attack  Mr.  Sullivan’s  qualifications,  arguing  he  has  no 
professional  experience  prosecuting  healthcare  fraud  claims,  handling  medical 
malpractice cases, litigating declaratory judgment actions, or interpreting insurance 
policies, which are relevant to the case.  (Doc.  199 at 3—5, 15). 
    There  are  no  definite  guidelines  for  determining  the  knowledge,  skill,  or 
experience required either in a particular case or of a particular witness.  “The test is 
whether,  under  the  totality  of the  circumstances,  the  witness  can  be  said  to  be 
qualified as an expert in a particular field through any one or more of the five bases 
enumerated  in  Rule  702—knowledge,  skill,  experience,  training,  or  education.” 
Santos v. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs., Inc., 452 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2006). 
    After law school, Mr. Sullivan worked as a law clerk for the Honorable Sam 
E. Haddon of the United States District Court for the District of Montana.  (Doc. 
199-2).  He then worked  as an Assistant U.S.  Attorney  (““AUSA”)—in the same 
office that investigated Dr. Arguelles both criminally and civilly—for four years in

the criminal division.  (Doc.  199-3  at 5).  For the last seven years, Mr. Sullivan’s 

practice   has   involved   defending  healthcare   providers   against   government 
investigation into suspected healthcare fraud.  (Doc.  199-1  at 2; Doc.  199-2).  His 

expertise includes investigations related to healthcare and financial fraud, the False 

Claims Act, the Controlled Substances Act, and environmental laws.  (Doc.  199-2). 
     Mr.  Sullivan’s  expected trial  testimony  will  explain  and  contextualize  the 

DOJ’s  investigation of Dr.  Arguelles.  Mr.  Sullivan will  opine on how the facts 

known to UMIA could support a reasonable belief that Dr.  Arguelles committed 
fraud or violated the law.  (Doc. 202 at 4, 5, 7-9, 11, 12).  He plans to provide expert 
insight into how DOJ investigations are generally conducted, including what level 
of evidence  is necessary  for the  government to  seek a search warrant,  and DOJ 
decision-making processes regarding whether to pursue matters as criminal or civil 

cases.  Cd. at 5; Doc.  199-1 at 9-11). 
    Here, the combination of Mr. Sullivan’s prosecutorial experience (as  a DOJ 
attorney)  and  defense  experience  (representing  healthcare  providers/entities  in 

government investigations) qualifies him to offer opinions about DOJ investigations 
and the reasoning behind them. 
    Moreover, Mr. Sullivan’s experience is relevant to the scope of his testimony. 
He will not offer an opinion on the viability of the underlying medical malpractice 
claims, or justify UMIA’s declaratory judgment action, or provide expert opinions

on  insurance  coverage  law.   (Doc.  202  at  7).   His  opinion  is  related  to  the 
foundational facts surrounding the DOJ investigations and Plaintiffs’ initial lawsuits. 
Based on his experience, Mr. Sullivan is qualified to provide such an opinion. 
                 2.     Subject Matter to Assist the Jury 
      Plaintiffs next argue that Mr. Sullivan’s opinions “about the federal method 
of collecting  documents  via  search  warrants  and  subpoenas  has  no  relation  to 
advancing a material aspect of this bad faith case,” and will not assist the trier of 
fact.  (Doc.  199 at 16). 
     Expert testimony is admissible if it concerns “scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge [that] will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 

to determine a fact in issue.”  Fed. R. Evid. 702(b).  “Whether testimony is helpful 
within the meaning of Rule 702 is in essence a relevancy inquiry.”  Hemmings v. 
Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002). 
     Here, whether UMIA had a  reasonable basis to contest coverage remains a 
factual  issue  for  the  jury.   Mr.  Sullivan’s  testimony  will  help  explain  and 
contextualize the DOJ’s  investigation to  support UMIA’s  defense—that it had a 
reasonable basis to contest coverage.  The “federal method” of collecting documents 
by search warrants and subpoenas is part of that contextualization.  Search warrants 
and  subpoenas give meaning to  an  investigation and that meaning—if known to 
UMIA at the time—would likely have influenced UMIA’s actions while adjusting

Plaintiffs’ claims.  Mr. Sullivan’s opinions are therefore relevant and will assist the 

jury in determining whether UMIA had a  reasonable basis to contest coverage. 
                 3.     Reliability 
      Finally, Plaintiffs challenge Mr. Sullivan’s reliability on the grounds that: (1) 
he is unsure if the underlying information—which forms the bases of his opinions— 

was available to UMIA during the claims-adjustment period;? (2) he has no expertise 
in the insurance industry; and (3) he makes unauthorized legal conclusions.’  (Doc. 
199 at 17).  Ona separate basis to strike his testimony, Plaintiffs assert Mr. Sullivan’s 
opinions are “identical” and “substantially similar” to the opinions offered by his 
predecessor, Mr. Mercer.  (/d. at 18). 
      The reliability determination has three components: (1) the expert must base 
the opinion “on sufficient facts or data”; (2) the expert must ground the opinion in 
“reliable  principles  and  methods”;  and  (3)  the  expert’s  opinion  must  reflect  “a 
reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”  Fed. R. 
Evid.  702(b){d).   When non-scientific expert testimony is proffered, “reliability 
depends  heavily  on the  knowledge  and experience  of the  expert,  rather than the 
methodology or theory behind it.”  United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d  1160,  1169 
(9th Cir. 2000). 

2 The Court addresses Plaintiffs’ challenge in its analysis on after-acquired evidence. 
3 The Court has already ruled that experts may not express an opinion on a conclusion of law but 
may esuty to ultimate issues of fact.  (Doc. 168 at 15-16).  Mr. Sullivan is bound by the Court’s

     Here,  Mr.   Sullivan’s  knowledge  and  experience  make  his  opinions 
sufficiently  reliable.   The  Court  examined Mr.  Sullivan’s  experience  above  and 

reintegrates those findings here.  His opinions provide the legal backdrop for the 

DOJ’s investigations into Dr. Arguelles and Plaintiffs’  initial lawsuits.  With four 

years  of prosecutorial  experience  as  an  AUSA  and  seven  years  of experience 
defending healthcare providers and entities in DOJ/government fraud investigations, 
Mr.  Sullivan has demonstrated the requisite knowledge and experience to provide 
such an opinion. 
     Further, the Court will not exclude Mr. Sullivan’s opinions against Plaintiffs’ 
allegations that he “simply adopt[ed]” Mr. Mercer’s report.  (See Doc.  199 at 18). 
According to Mr.  Sullivan, he “read  [Mr. Mercer’s]  report initially,  but then  ..  . 
conducted [his] own investigation, reviewed the materials, and prepared [his] own 
opinion.”  (Doc.  199-3 at 4).  Though Plaintiffs tell the Court that the two opinions 
are “identical” and “substantially similar,” Plaintiffs fail to show the Court where 
these similarities exist.  (See Doc.  199 at 18). 
     For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion to exclude Mr. 
Sullivan’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 
     C.    After-Acquired Documents and Evidence 
     Plaintiffs next argue that Mr. Sullivan’s opinions are based on after-acquired 
documents  and  evidence,  making  his  opinions  and  the  underlying  information 

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inadmissible.  (Doc. 199 at 19).  Plaintiffs seek to exclude Mr. Sullivan from relying 

on six documents he reviewed and related facts he considered to prepare his report, 
arguing that none  of the  identified  information  was  available  to  UMIA when  it 

adjusted Plaintiffs’ claims.  (/d. at 6-12).  The documents include: 
     (1)the search warrant application, affidavit in support, and related filings in 
        Case No. MJ-17-27-BLG-TJC; 
     (2)a  letter from Stewart Kirkpatrick to Montana Board of Medical Examiners, 
        dated June 6, 2019; 
     (3)attorney  materials  prepared  by  Davis  Wright  Tremaine  LLP  for  U.S. 
       Attorney’s Office for the District of Montana, dated December 4, 2017 and 
       April 27, 2020; 
     (4)a  letter  from  AUSA  Michael  Kakuk  to  Davis  Wright  Tremaine  LLP 
        counsel, dated March 3, 2021; 
     (5)the settlement agreement between DOJ and the Arthritis and Osteoporosis 
       Center (“AOC”) and Dr. Arguelles, dated July 14, 2021; 
    (6)the HHS Office of Inspector General investigative memoranda, dated May 
        18, 2017—September 21, 2021 
(Doc. 199-1 at 3-4). 
    The facts include: 
    (1)information regarding HHS OIG Special Agent Kelsi Larsen’s application 
       for a search warrant for AOC  on March 29,  2017,  relating to potential 
       violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 287, 1343, 1347, and 1035; 
    (2)information  that  Judge  Timothy  J.   Cavan  unsealed  in  part  the 
       government’s search warrant application and ordered the government to 
       provide a redacted version of the search warrant affidavit to Dr. Arguelles 
       on November 23, 2020; 

                                    11 

(3)information contained in the search warrant affidavit including: 

     a.  allegations of fraud against Dr. Arguelles under Title 18, including 
        conspiracy to defraud the government with respect to false claims, 
        false fictitious or fraudulent claims, false statements related to health 
        care matters, wire fraud, and healthcare fraud; 
     b.  details of the federal investigation of Dr. Arguelles, starting in April 
        2024 when he was identified as the highest paid Medicare physician 
         in Montana,  that he was  ranked number one  in  charges billed to 
        Medicare in a comparison against his peers in a 14-state region, and 
        that his total Medicare reimbursement for 2012 exceeded the median 
        reimbursement for rheumatologists by more than 40 times; 

      c.  information  regarding  the  U.S.  Attorney’s  Office  contract  with 
        Medical Review Institute of America in September 2015, to provide 
        an external peer review of the records obtained from the AOC.  That 
        review  identified a number of issues,  including duplicate billing, 
        undocumented  procedures  bills  to  Medicare,  unbundling  or 
        overbilling, medically unnecessary imaging, and many others; and 
     d.  witness interviews, including of a rheumatologist in Montana who 
        had been “bombarded” with former patients of Dr. Arguelles who 
        were diagnosed with diseases “that they did not actually have,” of 
        former employees of AOC who expressed concerns about upcoding, 
        excessive MRIs, and insufficient medical documentation to support 
        charges, and former patients who described their medical treatment 
        by Dr. Arguelles; 
(4)information  that  while  the  search  warrant  executed  on  AOC  in  2017 
  pertained  to  a  criminal  investigation,  the  government  pursued a  civil 
  investigation of Dr. Arguelles and AOC under FCA. AUSA Kakuk alleged 
  Dr. Arguelles misdiagnosed patients, made false statements in his patient 
  notes, routinely upcoded MRIs, unbundled claims for infusing billing, and  □ 
  generally  engaged  in  fraudulent  overbilling.   Kakuk  explained that the 
  government “had ample evidence to prove that Dr.  Arguelles knew the 
  falsity of the claims he submitted to Medicare, or at the very least that he 
  demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth of those claims,” resulting 
  in  what  the  government  believed  were  at  least  $1.6  million  in  single 
  damages based on Dr. Arguelles’s conduct; 
                               12 

     (5)information that Dr. Arguelles and AOC resolved the FCA allegations with 
       DOJ  on July  14,  2021.   The  government contended that Dr.  Arguelles 
       violated the  FCA  between  January  1,  2015  and  September  2018.   Dr. 
       Arguelles did not admit any liability but settled with the government for 
        $2,070,664.76, of which $1,035,332 was characterized as restitution; and 
     (6) information that following settlement between Dr. Arguelles/AOC and the 
        government, the U.S. Attorney’s Office issued a press release on July 21, 
        2021,  stating  that the  settlement  “resolves  claims  of improper medical 
       treatments  and  false  billing  to  a  federal  program”  and  over billed  and 
        unnecessary claims. 
(Id. at 6-7). 
     The Court has already determined that under Montana law, operative facts of 
Plaintiffs’ underlying medical malpractice claims, and the information available to 
UMIA during the adjustment process, are probative to the merits of the UTPA claim. 
(Doc.  169 at 5; Doc.  133 at 5).  This means that the “insurer[’s] conduct [must] be 
retrospectively  measured  against  the  standards  adopted  by  the  Legislature  in 
enacting the UTPA,” and those “UTPA standards focus on what the insurer kn[ew] 
at a particular point in time—before trial, during the investigative settlement stage.” 
Graf v.  Cont’l  W. Ins., 89 P.3d 22, 27 (Mont. 2004).  Thus, the information in an 
insurer’s  record  is  critical  in  determining  whether  a  UTPA  violation  occurred. 
Lorang v. Fortis Ins., 192 P.3d 186, 204 (Mont. 2008). 
    At the same time, under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, “[a]n expert may base 

an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or 
personally observed.”  The underlying data need not be admissible for an expert to 
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rely on it.  However, if an expert seeks to base an opinion on facts neither perceived 
by him personally nor introduced into evidence, the district court must determine, 

pursuant to Rule 104(a), that such reliance is reasonable.  For example, in Charrizosa 

v.  Chiquita  Brands  International,  Inc.,  the  district  court  did  not  allow  expert 
testimony by one of plaintiffs’ experts that paramilitary organizations had murdered 
plaintiffs’  relatives.  47 F.4th  1278,  1322-23  (11th Cir.  2022).  The opinion was 
based  partially  on  counsel’s  statement  that  “over  90%  of the  [2,000]  cases  he 
investigated were  committed  by the  paramilitaries.”  Jd.  at  1321.   The Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed, concluding: “The hearsay statement of counsel, absent independent 
investigation or verification, is not the type of evidence on which an expert... would 
reasonably rely to form an opinion.”  Jd. at 1323. 
     Here,  Mr.  Sullivan’s  expert  opinions—like  other  expert  opinions  in  this 

case—are only reasonably reliable if based on information UMIA knew at the time 
of the  claims-adjustment  process.   In  other  words,  Mr.  Sullivan’s  opinions  are 
probative only if his opinions  are based on the operative facts  of the underlying 
claims and the information available to UMIA during the investigative settlement 
stage.  Otherwise, his opinions risk misleading the jury into misusing inappropriate 
evidence for substantive purposes. 
     Mr. Sullivan is not aware whether UMIA had knowledge of or received the 
information Plaintiffs identify as after-acquired evidence.  (Doc.  199-3 at 16, 17, 18, 

                                     14 

19, 22).  Indeed, UMIA has never disclosed to the Court exactly what it knew about 

the DOJ investigation at the time it adjusted Plaintiffs’ claims.  Similarly, in response 
to the instant Motion, UMIA does not indicate which of the documents or facts Mr. 

Sullivan  reviewed  were  the  same  material  UMIA  relied  on  during  the  claims- 

adjustment period.  UMIA argues instead that Mr.  Sullivan’s opinion is primarily 
based on four items, three of which were in UMIA’s possession at the relevant time: 
(1) the issuance of subpoenas on Dr. Arguelles and AOC;  (2) the execution of a 

search warrant on AOC; (3) Plaintiffs’ allegations in their initial pleadings; and (4) 
Dr. Arguelles’s settlement with the DOJ.  This response, however, does provide the 
Court  with the  necessary  proof to  rule  on  whether  the  after-acquired  evidence 
identified by Plaintiffs is reasonably reliable or admissible. 
     Accordingly, the Court reserves its ruling on the admission of the identified 
after-acquired information pending proof, through testimony or other evidence, as 

to when UMIA possessed the documents or knew about the underlying facts. 
     D.   — Confusing and Prejudicial Opinions 
     In closing, Plaintiffs argue Mr.  Sullivan’s testimony will be confusing and 
prejudicial because  it  contradicts  UMIA’s  claims  file  and will  mislead the jury. 
(Doc. 199 at 20). 

                                     15 

    To be admissible, evidence must be relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 

402 and its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of 
misleading the jury under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 
    The Court has  determined Mr.  Sullivan’s testimony  is probative—absent a 

ruling on the after-acquired information—and further finds that his testimony will 

not risk confusing the jury  if it is tethered to information known to UMIA during the 

claims-adjustment period.  The Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion on this ground. 
IV.    Conclusion 
     IT  IS  HEREBY  ORDERED  that Plaintiffs’  Motion  to  Preclude  in Limine 
John  Sullivan (Doc.  198)  is DENIED  in  part and RESERVED FOR RULING  in 

part. 
                     SA 
    DATED this    day of October, 2025. 

                                        SUSAN P. WATTERS 
                                        United States District Judge 

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