DOUGLAS v. AMMONS

         IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                         
         FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA                          
                  COLUMBUS DIVISION                                  


MELISSA A. DOUGLAS,           :                                           
                         :                                           
          Plaintiff,     :                                           
                         :    NO. 4:24-cv-70-CDL-AGH                 
     VS.                 :                                           
                         :                                           
Judge G. WAYNE AMMONS         :                                           
                         :                                           
              Defendant.  :                                          
________________________________  :                                       

                 ORDER OF DISMISSAL                                  

Plaintiff Melissa A. Douglas, an immigration detainee in the Stewart Detention 
Center in Lumpkin, Georgia, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
and moved to proceed in forma pauperis.  ECF Nos. 4; 7.  The Court previously granted 
her motion to proceed in forma pauperis.  ECF No. 6.  Following review of Plaintiff’s 
complaint, it is determined that her action must be DISMISSED with prejudice.   
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW                                                
Pursuant  to  28  U.S.C.  §  1915(e)(2)(B),  the  Court  is  required  to  conduct  a 
preliminary screening when the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and dismiss the 
case if it determines that the action “is [1] frivolous or malicious; [2] fails to state a claim 
on which relief may be granted; or [3] seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 
immune from such relief.”                                                 
A claim is frivolous when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual 
allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless.”  
Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).  A complaint 
fails to state a claim when it does not include “enough factual matter (taken as true)” to 

“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests.”    Bell  Atlantic  Corp.  v.  Twombly,  550  U.S.  544,  555-56  (2007)  (noting  that 
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” 
and that the complaint “must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that 
merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”) (quotations and 
citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (explaining that 

“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 
statements, do not suffice”).                                             
In making the above determinations, all factual allegations in the complaint must be 
viewed as true.  Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004).  Moreover, 
“[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys 

and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”  Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 
1263 (11th Cir. 1998).                                                    
In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) an 
act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution 
or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law.  Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1581 (11th Cir. 
1995).  If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations 
in support of his claim or claims, then the complaint is subject to dismissal.  See Chappell 
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v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court’s dismissal 
of a § 1983 complaint because the plaintiff’s factual allegations were insufficient to support 

the alleged constitutional violation).                                    
II. STATEMENT AND ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS                                 
A. Allegations                                                       
Plaintiff states that six Stewart Detention Center detainees assaulted her on January 
15, 2024.  ECF No. 7 at 5.  She alleges that these detainees planned the assault days in 
advance and “one-third of [her] hair was pulled out from the roots.”  Id.  The investigators 

sent the necessary documents and statements to the Stewart County authorities.  Id. at 3.  
Chief Magistrate Judge G. Wayne Ammons reviewed the evidence several times and 
determined the detainees were engaged in “mutual combat” and no criminal warrants 
would be issued.  Id. at 5, 6; ECF No. 1-1 at 1-2.   Plaintiff asks this Court “to look into 
the incident and state whether charges should have been filed” and award “monetary 

compensation” against Chief Magistrate Judge G. Wayne Ammons for “look[ing] the other 
way” and refusing to file charges against her assailants.  ECF No. 7 at 6.     
B. Analysis                                                          
Judge Ammons is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for acts he 
takes while acting in his judicial capacity unless he acts “in the clear absence of all 

jurisdiction.”  Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  In Georgia, magistrate judges have “discretion to determine whether 
or not probable cause exists for the issuance of an arrest warrant based on his own 
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knowledge or on the information of others given to him under oath.”  Chisholm v Cofer, 
448 S.E.2d 369, 369 (Ga. 1994) (per curiam) (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-4-40).  Thus, Chief 

Magistrate Judge Ammons was acting in his judicial capacity and had jurisdiction to 
determine whether or not criminal warrants would be issued for individuals involved in the 
January 15, 2024 incident at the Stewart Detention Center.  While Plaintiff might disagree 
with his decision, Judge Ammons has judicial immunity from damages even if his actions 
were “in error, malicious, or . . . in excess of his . . . jurisdiction.”  Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1234.    
This Court cannot investigate the incident and determine if charges should be 

brought against the individuals who assaulted Plaintiff.  The decision to prosecute rests 
with the proper prosecuting authority for Stewart County or other relevant county, and 
relief from this Court in the form of an investigation and prosecution is not available.  See 
Otero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 832 F.2d 141, 141 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) (finding that 
district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice because “a private 

citizen has no judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of 
another”); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citations omitted).   
In  conclusion,  it  is  ORDERED  that  Plaintiff’s  action  is  DISMISSED  with 
prejudice because Chief Magistrate Judge G. Wayne Ammons is absolutely immune from 
monetary damages under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).    Neitzke v. Willaims, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) 
(citation omitted) (stating a claim seeking relief from defendants who are immune from 

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suit stands frivolous as a matter of law).1                               
SO ORDERED this 13th day of August, 2024.                            


                              S/Clay D. Land                         
                              CLAY D. LAND                           
                              U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE              
                              MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA             










1 Normally  before  dismissing  with  prejudice,  the  Court  must  allow  the  plaintiff  an 
opportunity to amend her complaint.  But, in this case, no amendment could overcome 
Plaintiff’s obstacles to recovery.  A dismissal with prejudice without allowing amendment 
is, therefore, appropriate.  Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(citing Burger King Corp. v. C. R. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding 
no need to allow amendment before dismissing with prejudice if amendment would be 
futile); Simmons v. Edmondson, 225 F. App’x. 787, 788-89 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding 
district court did not err in dismissing complaint with prejudice without first giving the 
plaintiff an opportunity to amend because no amendment could overcome the defendants’ 
immunity and amendment would, therefore, be futile).                      


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