DRIGGS v. SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORPORATION

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                        
           FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA                      


WALESKA DRIGGS and RAUL                                                  
DRIGGS,                         Case No.  5:19-cv-03476-JDW              

     Plaintiffs,                                                         

     v.                                                                  

SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORP.,                                                

     Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,                                    

     v.                                                                  

SERVICE ACCESS AND                                                       
MANAGEMENT, INC.,                                                        

     Third-Party Defendant.                                              


                         MEMORANDUM                                      

    Schindler Elevator Corp. and Service Access and Management, Inc. (“SAM”) entered into 
a “Schindler Secure Plus” agreement (the “Agreement”) that includes a broad indemnity provision. 
But while the indemnity provision is broad, it is not broad enough to waive the even broader 
immunity that Pennsylvania’s Workers Compensation Act provides to employers to protect them 
against legal actions based on workplace injuries. Because the claims against Schindler in this case 
arise from a workplace injury that a SAM employee suffered, the Workers Compensation Act bars 
Schinder’s claims against SAM.                                            
I.   FACTUAL BACKGROUND                                                   
    On September 26, 2017, Waleska Driggs tripped and fell while exiting an elevator on 
SAM’s property. At the time, she was a SAM employee. SAM and Schindler were parties to the 
Agreement. Paragraph 10 of the Terms and Conditions of the Agreement provides:  
    You [SAM] agree that you will defend, indemnify and hold us [Schindler] harmless 
    from and against any such claims, and from any and all claims arising out of or in 
    connection with this Agreement, and/or the Equipment, unless caused directly and 
    solely by our established fault.                                     

(ECF No. 26-4, Ex. C, p. 6 ¶ 10)                                          

    After her fall, Ms. Driggs sued Schindler in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas. 
Schindler removed the case to this Court and then filed a third-party complaint against SAM for 
contribution or indemnity. SAM has moved for summary judgment on Schindler’s claims against 
it.                                                                       
II.  LEGAL STANDARD                                                       
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) permits a party to seek, and a court to enter, summary 
judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “[T]he plain language 
of Rule 56[(a)] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and 
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986) (quotations omitted).  In ruling on a 
summary judgment motion, a court must “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences ‘in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.’”  Scott v. Harris,
550 
U.S. 372, 378
(2007) (quotation omitted).  However, “[t]he non-moving party may not merely 
deny the allegations in the moving party’s pleadings; instead he must show where in the record 
there exists a genuine dispute over a material fact.”  Doe v. Abington Friends Sch.,
480 F.3d 252
, 
256 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).  The movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when 
the non-moving party fails to make such a showing.  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist.,
767 F.3d 
247, 265
(3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).                               
III.  ANALYSIS                                                            
    The Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Act bars legal claims against an employer for 
workplace injuries, including claims for contribution or indemnity, “unless liability for such 
damages, contributions or indemnity shall be expressly provided for in a written contract entered 
into by the party alleged to be liable prior to the date of the occurrence which gave rise to the 

action.” 77 Pa. C.S.A. § 481(b). Because SAM employed Ms. Driggs and she suffered her injuries 
in the course of her employment, the provision bars Schindler’s claims against SAM unless SAM 
has waived its immunity.                                                  
    General indemnity language in a contract does not waive the exclusive remedy provision 
of the Workers Compensation Act. See Bester v. Essex Rental Corp.,
619 A.2d 304, 307
(Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1993) (citing Pittburgh Steel Co. v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, Inc.,
171 A.2d 185
(Pa. 
1961)). Instead, the “intent to indemnify against claims by employees of the alleged indemnitor . 
. . must clearly appear from the terms of the agreement.”
Id.
“[I]ndemnification contracts in this 
context are not favored in the law and every intendment must be construed against the party 

seeking protection from liability or indemnification from the employer.” Snare v. Ebensburg 
Power Co.,
637 A.2d 296, 298
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). Thus, language that does not “constitute an 
express provision for the employer to assume an indemnity obligation for injury to its own 
employees” will not effect a waiver. Bester,
619 A.2d at 308
. Pennsylvania courts have even held 
that agreements in which an indemnitor provides indemnity for its own conduct are not sufficient 
if they do not “expressly say that [the] employer agreed to forego its statutory protection and to 
assume unlimited liability for damages arising from harm suffered by its own employees.”
Id.
(citing Remas v. Duquesne Light Co.,
537 A.2d 881, 883
(Pa. Supert. Ct. 1988)).  
    The indemnification provision in the Agreement does not waive SAM’s immunity under 
the Workers Compensation Act.  It does not say that it effects a waiver of immunity, reference the 
Workers Compensation Act, or mention claims that SAM’s employees might file. It only contains 
the general language of “any and all claims.” (ECF No. 26-4, Ex. C, p. 6 ¶ 10.) It does not evince 
SAM’s intent to waive its immunity under the Workers Compensation Act. To the extent there is 

any question about its scope, the Court will construe it narrowly.        
    To the extent Schindler seeks contribution, as opposed to indemnification, its claim fares 
even worse. The Schindler Service Agreement does not mention contribution at all. Schindler has 
no argument that SAM waived its immunity from a contribution claim.       
IV.  CONCLUSION                                                           
    Schindler’s  pre-printed  contract  does  not  include  an  express  waiver  of  the  Workers 
Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy provision. The Act bars Schindler’s claims as a matter of 
law. The Court will therefore grant SAM’s motion. An appropriate Order follows. 
                                  BY THE COURT:                          


                                  /s/ Joshua D. Wolson                   
                                  JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.                   
July 1, 2020