El-Nahal v. Yassky

14‐405‐cv  El‐Nahal v. Yassky, et al.    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT    August Term 2014    (Argued: December 11, 2014    Decided: August 26, 2016)    No. 14‐405‐cv    ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––    HASSAN EL‐NAHAL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,  Plaintiff‐Appellant,    ‐v.‐    DAVID YASSKY, COMMISSIONER MATTHEW DAUS, MICHAEL BLOOMBERG, THE CITY  OF NEW YORK,  Defendants‐Appellees.    ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––    Before: POOLER, LIVINGSTON, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.    Appeal  from  a  judgment  of  the  United  States  District  Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York  (Forrest,  J.),  granting  summary  judgment  to  Defendants‐Appellees,  the  City  of  New  York  and  various  of  its  employees,  on  Plaintiff‐Appellant  Hassan  El‐Nahal’s  42  U.S.C.  §  1983  claim  that  Defendants‐ Appellees  violated  his  Fourth  Amendment  rights  by  mandating  the  installation  of tracking systems in taxicabs, thereby trespassing or physically intruding upon  property for the purposes of gathering information.  Because we find no genuine  issue of material fact as to whether a trespass or physical intrusion occurred with  1    respect  to  any  property  of  El‐Nahal,  we  conclude  that  summary  judgment  was  appropriate, and therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.      Judge POOLER concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.     DANIEL  L.  ACKMAN, Law Office of Daniel L. Ackman,  New York, N.Y., for Plaintiff‐Appellant.    ELIZABETH  S.  NATRELLA,  for  Zachary  W.  Carter,  Corporation Counsel of the City of New York (Richard  Dearing,  Pamela  Seider  Dolgow,  on  the  brief),  New  York, N.Y., for Defendants‐Appellees.    DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judge:    Plaintiff‐Appellant  Hassan  El‐Nahal  (“El‐Nahal”),  a  New  York  City  taxi  driver, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit in the United States District Court for the  Southern  District  of  New  York  (Forrest,  J.),  principally  alleging  that  the  New  York  City  Taxi  and  Limousine  Commission  (“TLC”)  —  through  Defendants‐ Appellees  Matthew  Daus,  a  former  chairman  of  the  TLC;  David  Yassky,  then‐ chairman of the TLC; Michael Bloomberg, then‐Mayor of New York City; and the  City of New York (collectively, “Defendants”) — had deprived him of his Fourth  Amendment rights in various ways.  As relevant to this appeal, El‐Nahal argued  that  the  TLC’s  mandate  that  all  New  York  City  taxicabs  install  technology  systems  equipped  with  Global  Positioning  System  (“GPS”)  tracking  abilities  amounted to a property‐based search pursuant to United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.  2    945  (2012),  and  that  this  search  violated  his  Fourth  Amendment  rights.    The  District  Court  granted  summary  judgment  to  Defendants  on  all  of  El‐Nahal’s  Fourth  Amendment  claims,  including  his  Jones  claim,  which  is  the  only  issue  before us on appeal.  Because the record is devoid of evidence as to whether El‐ Nahal  had  any  interest  in  a  taxi  at  the  time  of  an  alleged  trespass  or  physical  intrusion, El‐Nahal failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of  his  property‐based  Fourth  Amendment  claim  and  Defendants  were  entitled  to  summary  judgment.    Accordingly,  we  AFFIRM  the  district  court’s  grant  of  summary judgment to Defendants.    I.  A. Background    The  TLC  is  an  agency  of  the  City  of  New  York  that  is  tasked  with  the  “regulation  and  supervision  of  the  business  and  industry  of  transportation  of  persons by licensed vehicles for hire in the city.”  N.Y.C., N.Y., Charter ch. 65, §  2303a.  Its duties include the regulation of “rates,” “standards and conditions of  service,”  “[r]equirements  of  standards  of  safety  and  .  .  .  efficiency  in  the  operation of vehicles and auxiliary equipment,” and the “establishment of . . . [a]  uniform  system  of  accounts,”  which  entails  “the  right  .  .  .  to  inspect  books  and  3    records  and  to  require  the  submission  of  such  reports  as  the  commission  may  determine.”  Id. § 2303b.  Pursuant to the New York City Administrative Code,  the TLC may promulgate rules as necessary to implement its authority.  N.Y.C.,  N.Y., Code § 19‐503(a).    In  2004,  the  TLC  promulgated  a  rule  requiring  that  all  New  York  City  taxicabs  begin  to  use  a  Taxicab  Technology  System  (“TTS”),  a  physical  device  located in the backseat of taxicabs that would, among other things, provide credit  and  debit  card  payment  services  for  customers,  as  well  as  transmit  to  the  TLC  electronic data about trips made by taxi drivers gathered by means of GPS.  See  N.Y.C., N.Y., Rules tit. 35, § 1‐01 (2010).  Through the TTS, the TLC would collect  —  only  when  drivers  were  on  duty  —  “the  taxicab  license  number;  the  taxicab  driver’s license number; the location of trip initiation; the time of trip initiation;  the  number  of  passengers;  the  location  of  trip  termination;  the  time  of  trip  termination;  the  metered  fare  for  the  trip;  and  the  distance  of  the  trip.”  Id. § 3‐ 06(b).  Prior to the implementation of the TTS rule, the TLC required drivers to  provide this same information in the form of handwritten trip records.  The TTS  rule  mandated  that  taxicab  medallion  owners  procure  TTSs  in  their  taxis  by  August 1, 2007.  Id. § 1‐11(g).  4    Around the same time as the TLC promulgated the TTS rule, the TLC also  established  a  new  system  for  taxi  fare  “rate  codes,”  corresponding  to  different  types of fares a taxi driver may charge.  Rate Code 1, for instance, is the standard  New  York  City  rate and  is  used for  fares  from  point‐to‐point  within  New  York  City.  Rate Code 4, meanwhile, doubles the fare for each additional unit driven,  and  may  be  engaged  by  a  taxi  driver  only  under  certain  circumstances  upon  entering Nassau or Westchester County.    In  March  2010,  the  TLC  issued  a  press  release  announcing  that  it  had  discovered  that  some  taxicab  drivers  were  using  the  Rate  Code  4  setting  to  overcharge passengers.  “Using GPS technology installed in taxicabs,” the press  release  explained,  the  “TLC  has  discovered  1,872,078  trips  where  passengers  were illegally charged the higher rate” by 35,558 drivers for a total of $8,330,155  in  alleged  overcharges.    J.A.  135.    The  press  release  qualified  this  finding  by  noting  that  “there  were  361  million  taxi  trips  during  that  time  period,  so  the  illegal fare was only charged in 0.5% of all trips,” and that the alleged “scam was  primarily  perpetrated  by  a  small  number  of  drivers,  with  3,000  drivers  overcharging more than 100 times.”  Id.    5    Two months later, in May 2010, the TLC issued a second press release that  modified  its  initial  findings,  announcing  that  the  “TLC’s  completed  analysis”  revealed  that  “21,819  taxicab  drivers  overcharged  passengers  a  total  of  286,000  times . . . for a total estimated overcharge of almost $1.1 million.”  J.A. 146.  The  press  release  added  that  the  TLC  believed  that  13,315  out  of  the  21,819  drivers  had “engaged in overcharging just one or two times,” but that it expected “to be  able to  prove  that  some drivers  engaged  in 1,000  or  more overcharges.”    Id.    In  response  to  the  scandal,  the  Manhattan  District  Attorney’s  office  arrested  59  drivers “for defrauding and stealing from their customers,” J.A. 150, and the TLC  programmed  passenger  screens  to  display  “a  highly  visible  alert  that  advises  riders  when  the  higher,  out  of  town  rate  is  activated,”  J.A.  151.    The  TLC  also  brought administrative actions against many drivers.  Among those who faced administrative charges was El‐Nahal, who at that  point had been a taxi driver for more than twenty years.  On January 3, 2012, the  TLC sent El‐Nahal a letter directing him to appear for a settlement conference in  reference to allegations that he overcharged passengers on 10 occasions between  November 20, 2009 and February 22, 2010 by improperly using the Rate 4 code.   El‐Nahal contested the allegations.  On May 7, 2012, an administrative law judge  6    found, based on trip records the TLC allegedly obtained via GPS, that El‐Nahal  violated  the  TLC’s  rules  on  six  occasions.    The  administrative  law  judge  thus  imposed upon El‐Nahal $550 in penalties and revoked El‐Nahal’s TLC license to  drive  taxis.    On  appeal,  the  Office  of  Administrative  Trials  and  Hearings  Taxi  and Limousine Tribunal Appeals Unit (“Appeals Unit”) overturned the penalty,  ruling  that  the  administrative  law  judge’s  decision  was  “not  supported  by  substantial  evidence.”    J.A. 187.    The  TLC  then re‐filed  regarding  one violation,  and  the  administrative  law  judge  found  El‐Nahal  not  guilty.    Undeterred,  the  TLC  re‐filed  five  other  charges  against  El‐Nahal,  and  a  different  administrative  law  judge  once  again  found  El‐Nahal  guilty,  imposed  a  fine,  and  revoked  his  license.    El‐Nahal  again  appealed,  and  the  Appeals  Unit  again  overturned  the  administrative  law  judge’s  decision  on  the  ground  that  the  administrative  law  judge’s  findings  with  respect  to  El‐Nahal’s  alleged  intent  to  overcharge  were  insufficient.  Nonetheless, the TLC re‐filed charges against El‐Nahal once more.   An  administrative  law  judge  yet  again  found  El‐Nahal  guilty,  based  in  part  on  GPS trip records and Google maps, and the Appeals Unit yet again reversed the  decision  on  appeal.    In  reversing,  the  Appeals  Unit  dismissed  the  charges  with  prejudice and emphasized that the GPS evidence used to convict El‐Nahal could  7    not,  by  itself,  show  that  El‐Nahal  “intended  to  overcharge,  only  that  he  did  overcharge.”  J.A. 216.    B. Procedural History    On  May  31,  2013,  El‐Nahal  filed  his  complaint.1    As  relevant  here,  the  complaint  alleged  that  “[t]he  installation  and  use  of  [the]  GPS  device  [through  the  TTS]  .  .  .  constitutes  a[n  unlawful]  search  under  the  Fourth  Amendment.”   J.A.  34.    The  complaint  also  alleged  violations  of  the  New  York  Constitution,  Article  78  of  the  New  York  Civil  Practice  Laws  and  Rules,  the  New  York  City  Charter, and New York common law.   On  August  21,  2013,  Defendants  moved  to  dismiss  El‐Nahal’s  complaint  pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  Attached to  the motion were seventy‐two pages of exhibits.  At an initial pretrial conference  held  on  September  13,  2013,  Judge  Forrest  converted  Defendants’  motion  to  dismiss  into  a  motion  for  summary  judgment  and  directed  El‐Nahal  to  file  his  opposition  to  Defendants’  motion  for  summary  judgment  and  his  own  motion  for summary judgment by September 24, 2013.  On September 24, 2013, El‐Nahal  cross‐moved for partial summary judgment with respect to his § 1983 and New                                                                Although El‐Nahal filed the complaint on behalf of himself and similarly  1 situated individuals, he at no point in the district court proceedings sought class  certification.    8    York  Constitution  claims,  and  opposed  Defendants’  motion  for  summary  judgment.    By  order  dated  January  29,  2014,  the  district  court  granted  Defendants’  motion  for  summary  judgment  on  El‐Nahal’s  §  1983  claim,  and  dismissed  the  state claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.  El‐Nahal v. Yassky, 993 F. Supp.  2d  460,  469–70  (S.D.N.Y.  2014).    The  district  court  held  that  the  installation  and  use  of  the  TTS  did  not  constitute  a  search  for  the  purposes  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.    As  to  whether  the  challenged  conduct  intruded  on  El‐Nahal’s  reasonable expectation of privacy, the district court, citing our decision in Buliga  v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 324 F. App’x 82, 82 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming a  district court’s ruling that the TLC rule requiring the installation of a TTS in all  taxis did not invade the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy), concluded  that  El‐Nahal  had  no  “reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  in  any  of  the   information collected” by the TTS.  El‐Nahal, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 465.  Regarding  El‐Nahal’s claim that the mandatory installation of the TTS was a search because  it  involved  a  physical  intrusion  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  information,  the  district court rejected the claim on the grounds that “taxi drivers are aware of the  system, the system is installed pursuant to regulations, and the taxicabs in which  9    the system is installed are not truly private vehicles.”  El‐Nahal, 993 F. Supp. 2d at  467.    The  district  court  further  reasoned  that  even  assuming,  arguendo,  that  the  mandatory installation of the TTS did constitute a search for Fourth Amendment  purposes, the search was justified pursuant to the “special needs” doctrine.  Id. at  469.  El‐Nahal timely appealed.  II.    “We  review  an  award  of  summary  judgment  de  novo.”    F.D.I.C.  v.  Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994).  Upon proper motion, Rule 56(c) of the  Federal  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  mandates  the  entry  of  summary  judgment  “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence  of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the  burden of proof at trial.”  Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 743 (2d Cir.  2003)  (quoting  Celotex  Corp.  v.  Catrett,  477  U.S.  317,  322‐23  (1986)).    “In  such  a  situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete  failure  of  proof  concerning  an  essential  element  of  the  nonmoving  party’s  case  necessarily  renders  all  other  facts  immaterial.”    Celotex,  477  U.S.  at  322–23  (quoting  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  56(c)  (1963)  (current  version  at  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  56(a)  (2010))).  Thus, “[t]he moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law’  10    because  the  nonmoving  party  has  failed  to  make  a  sufficient  showing  on  an  essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.”   Id. at 323 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (1963) (current version at Fed. R. Civ. P.  56(a) (2010))); see also Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18  (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that “the movant’s burden will be satisfied if he can point  to  an  absence  of  evidence  to  support  an  essential  element  of  the  nonmoving  party’s claim”).  *     *     *    El‐Nahal  argues  that  the  district  court  erred  by  granting  summary  judgment on his Fourth Amendment claim because pursuant to Jones, “[p]hysical  placement of a tracking device on a private vehicle in order to obtain information  is . . . a search,” so that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when “[t]he  TLC  mandated  the  physical  placement  of  tracking  devices  in  privately  owned  taxicabs.”  Appellant’s Br. at 29.   El‐Nahal has not argued on appeal that he was  subjected to a search by virtue of an intrusion on any reasonable expectation of  privacy he had regarding the installation and use of the TTS.2  Instead, he asserts                                                                 The  reasonable‐expectation‐of‐privacy  approach  for  deciding  whether  a  2 search has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment derives from  Justice  Harlan’s  concurrence  in  Katz  v.  United  States,  389  U.S.  347  (1967),  which  affirms  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  protects  against  invasions  upon  an  11    here that he “explicitly ‘rejected the premise’ of defendants’ argument below that  he  was  required  to  demonstrate  an  invasion  of  privacy”  and  that  his  Fourth  Amendment claim “does not depend on whether his expectation of privacy was  violated.”  Appellant’s Br. at 31–32.  Accordingly, we address the only argument  El‐Nahal has presented on appeal:  namely, his contention that the district court  erred  in  concluding  that  summary judgment  was  warranted  as to  his  property‐ based  Fourth  Amendment  claim.    Assuming,  arguendo,  that  the  TLC‐mandated  installation and use of TTS devices in taxicabs in New York City may constitute a  search  as  to  those  with  sufficient  property‐based  interests  in  a  taxicab,  we  conclude  that  the  district  court  nevertheless  properly  granted  summary  judgment because there is no evidence in the record as to an essential element of  El‐Nahal’s  claim  on  which  he  bears  the  burden  of  proof:    namely,  that  he  had  such a property interest in a taxicab at the time a TTS was installed.3                                                                                                                                                                                                      individual’s  “reasonable  expectation  of  privacy.”    Id.  at  360  (Harlan,  J.,  concurring);  see  Smith  v.  Maryland,  442  U.S.  735,  740  (1979)  (“Consistently  with  Katz,  this  Court  uniformly  has  held  that  the  application  of  the  Fourth  Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a  ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been  invaded by government action.” (citing cases)).      3 We thus affirm on an alternative ground and do not consider the district  court’s  conclusions:    (1)  that  Defendants’  actions  “did  not  constitute  a  search  within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment . . . under . . . the Jones physical‐ 12      Jones  itself  demonstrates  that  a  plaintiff  such  as  El‐Nahal  must  establish  such a property‐based interest.  In Jones, the Supreme Court made clear that the  reasonable‐expectation‐of‐privacy  test  did  not  supplant,  but  merely  supplemented  the  earlier,  property‐based  approach  to  defining  the  circumstances  in  which  a  “search,”  for  Fourth  Amendment  purposes,  has  occurred.    132  S.  Ct.  at  949–50.    There,  the  Government  placed  a  GPS  tracking  device  on  the  undercarriage  of  a  Jeep  that  was,  as  the  Government  acknowledged,  exclusively  driven  by  Jones.4    Id.  at  948–49  &  n.2.    The  Government  then  tracked  the  Jeep’s  movements  for  28  days,  using  information  gleaned from the tracking in Jones’s prosecution for several drug offenses.  Id. at  948–49.    The  Jones  Court  instructed  that  pursuant  to  the  property‐based  approach,  a  Fourth  Amendment  search  “undoubtedly  occur[s]”  when  the  Government  acts  to  “obtain[]  information  by  physically  intruding  on  a                                                                                                                                                                                                   trespass analysis;” and (2) that assuming, arguendo, that a search occurred, “that  search  was  reasonable  under  the  special‐needs  analysis  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.”  El‐Nahal, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 468–69.      4 Because the Government conceded that Jones was “the exclusive driver”  of the Jeep, Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 n.2 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d  544, 555 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Jones,  132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)), even if Jones was “not the owner” of the Jeep, the Supreme  Court noted, he “had at least the property rights of a bailee,” id.      13    constitutionally protected area,” id. at 950 n.3 — that is, on individuals’ “persons,  houses,  papers,  and  effects,”  as  enumerated  in  the  Fourth  Amendment’s  text,  U.S. Const. Amend. IV.5        Because  Government  agents  had  physically  intruded  on  Jones’s  Jeep,  which  was  “beyond  dispute  .  .  .  an  ‘effect’  as  that  term  is  used  in  the  [Fourth]  Amendment,” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949, to plant and employ a tracking device, the  Supreme  Court  concluded  that  it  need  not  consider  the  reasonable‐expectation‐ of‐privacy approach in determining whether Jones was subject to a search, see id.  at  950–53.    Applying  the  property‐based  approach,  the  Court  held  “that  the  Government’s  installation  of  a  GPS  device  on  a  target’s  vehicle,  and  its  use  of  that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”  Id. at 949.   Thus,  Jones  was  subject  to  a  search  because  the  Government  installed  a  GPS  device  on  his  vehicle  in  order  to  obtain  information  —  on  a  vehicle  that,  while  registered to his wife, he exclusively drove and in which (as the Court took pains  to  note)  he  “had  at  least  the  property  rights  of  a  bailee”  at  the  time  the  Government installed the tracking device.  Id. at 949 n.2.                                                                 The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that “[t]he right of the  5 people  to  be  secure  in  their  persons,  houses,  papers,  and  effects,  against  unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. Const. Amend.  IV.    14      The  centrality  of  some  property  interest  to  a  property‐based  Fourth  Amendment  claim  is  also  evident  in  the  manner  in  which  the  Jones  Court  distinguished United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), and United States v. Karo,  468 U.S. 705 (1984).  In Knotts and Karo, the Government had installed beepers —  “radio transmitter[s], usually battery operated, which emit[] periodic signals that  can be picked up by a radio receiver,” Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277 — into containers of  chemicals  that  were  thereafter  tracked,  and  that  the  Government  suspected  would be used in connection with the manufacture of illegal drugs, see id. at 278– 79; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 708–09.  The Government argued in Jones that Knotts  and Karo “foreclose[d] the conclusion that what occurred [to Jones] constituted a  search”  because  in  these  earlier  cases,  the  Court,  employing  the  reasonable‐ expectation‐of‐privacy approach, had determined that using a beeper to track the  movement of the containers on public roads did not constitute a search.  132 S.  Ct. at 951.  The Jones Court disagreed, concluding that the outcomes in Knotts and  Karo were “perfectly consistent” with its property‐based approach to the Fourth  Amendment’s scope.  Id. at 952.      As  Jones  explained,  the  Government  in  Knotts  had  installed  the  beeper  in  the container at issue “before it came into Knotts’[s] possession, with the consent of  15    the  then‐owner”  of  the  container.    Id.  (emphasis  added).    Knotts  did  not  challenge  the  installation,  and  the  Court  “specifically  declined  to  consider  its  effect.”  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.  Similarly, the Jones court explained that in Karo,  “[a]s  in  Knotts,  .  .  .  [t]he  Government . . . came  into  physical  contact  with  the  container only before it belonged to the defendant Karo” and with the consent of its  then‐owner:  “Karo accepted the container as it came to him, beeper and all, and  was therefore not entitled to object to the beeper’s presence, even though it was  used  to  monitor  the  container’s  location.”    Id.  (emphasis  added).    Jones,  meanwhile, was on “much different footing” than Knotts or Karo:  he “possessed  the Jeep at the time the Government trespassorily inserted the information‐gathering  device.”    Id.  (emphasis  added);  see  also  Wayne  R.  LaFave,  Search  &  Seizure:  A  Treatise  on  the  Fourth  Amendment  §  2.7(f)  (5th  ed.  2012)  (noting  that  “the  date  of  the  requisite  trespass”  rather  than  the  “period  of  surveillance”  is  critical  to  assessing  whether  a  search  has  occurred  pursuant  to  Jones’s  property‐based  approach).  Because the physical intrusion was upon a constitutionally protected  area  and  was  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  information,  the  Government’s  conduct  amounted  to  the  type  of  property‐based  search  that  the  Fourth Amendment protects against.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.    16    To  be  clear,  because  there  was  no  dispute  in  Jones  that  the  defendant  lawfully  possessed  the  Jeep  at  the  time  it  was  trespassed  upon,  nor  did  the  Government  challenge  the  D.C.  Circuit’s  determination  “that  the  vehicle’s  registration  did  not  affect  [Jones’s]  ability  to  make  a  Fourth  Amendment  objection,”  the  Jones  Court  had  no  occasion  fully  to  consider  the  nature  of  the  property  interest  that  is  sufficient  to  make  out  a  property‐based  Fourth  Amendment claim.  Id. at 949 n.2.  Neither need we do so here.  Because we can  discern no evidence at all that El‐Nahal had any interest in a particular taxicab at  the time of an alleged trespass or physical intrusion, we find no genuine issue of  material fact warranting a trial.  Summary judgment in favor of Defendants was  therefore wholly proper.    During  the  proceedings  that  led  to  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  Defendants,  Defendants  repeatedly  stated  that  the  property‐based  approach  in  Jones was predicated upon physical intrusion on property, and emphasized how  Jones  differed  from  Knotts  and  Karo.    For  instance,  Defendants’  opening  memorandum of law explained that, unlike the defendant in Jones, there was no  physical  occupation  of  El‐Nahal’s  property  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  information because, as in Knotts and Karo, “the initial placement of the monitor  17    was  not  at  issue.”    Defs.’  Mem.  of  L.  in  Supp.  at  11,  El‐Nahal  v.  Yassky,  993  F.  Supp.  2d  460  (S.D.N.Y.  2014)  (No.  13‐cv‐3690  (KBF)),  ECF  No.  13.    Since  the  “physical placement of the GPS device” was not at issue, Defendants continued,  Jones had “little relevance in Plaintiff’s claim.”6  Id.  It logically followed from that  statement  that  if  Jones  was  to  have  any  relevance,  El‐Nahal  had  to  put  the  placement of the GPS device at issue — a point he implicitly acknowledged in his  own  papers  in  opposition  to  Defendants’  motion  and  in  support  of  his  cross  motion  for  summary  judgment  by  stating  that  “[t]he  Court’s  decision  [in  Jones]  was  based  on  a  traditional  understanding  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  tied  to  common law trespass” and “the physical attachment of the device,” Pl.’s Mem. of  L. in Supp. at 15‐16, El‐Nahal v. Yassky, 993 F. Supp. 2d 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No.  13‐cv‐3690  (KBF)),  ECF  No.  22,  and  that  Jones  “focused  on  the  [G]overnment’s  trespass on Jones’[s] vehicle,” id. at 19 (emphasis added).                                                                 Defendants reiterated this crucial aspect of Jones in their opposition to El‐ 6 Nahal’s cross‐motion for summary judgment on the search claim.  Defs.’ Mem. of  L.  in Opp.  at  12, El‐Nahal v.  Yassky,  993 F.  Supp. 2d 460, 469–70  (S.D.N.Y.  2014)  (No.  13‐cv‐3690  (KBF)),  ECF  No.  30.    They  did  so  yet  again  in  their  reply  memorandum in support of their own motion for summary judgment, devoting  an  entire  section  of  their  brief  specifically  to  the  a  that  “[t]here  [w]as  [n]o  [t]respass  on  Plaintiff’s  [p]erson  or  [p]roperty  [c]onstituting  a  [s]earch.”    Defs.’  Reply  Mem.  of  L.  in  Supp.  at  7,  El‐Nahal  v.  Yassky,  993  F.  Supp.  2d  460,  469–70  (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 13‐cv‐3690 (KBF)), ECF No. 36.    18    Defendants thus “point[ed] out to the district court . . . that there [was] an  absence of evidence,” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, to support “an essential element”  of  El‐Nahal’s  Jones  claim,  id.  at  323.    It  then  fell  to  El‐Nahal  to  “come  forward  with  specific  evidence  demonstrating  the  existence  of  a  genuine  dispute  of  material  fact”  as  to  that  element  of  his  Fourth  Amendment  claim.    Brown  v.  Eli  Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,  477  U.S.  242,  249  (1986));  see  also  Tovar  v.  KLM  Royal  Dutch Airlines,  No.  98  Civ.  5178(LAP),  2000  WL  1273841,  at  *5–6  (S.D.N.Y.  Sept.  6,  2000)  (in  converting  defendants’  motion  to  dismiss  to  a  motion  for  summary  judgment,  noting  that  defendants may satisfy their burden by “point[ing] to an absence of evidence to  support an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim,” at which point the  burden “shifts to the [plaintiff] to come forward with ‘specific facts showing that  there is a genuine issue for trial’” (quoting Goenaga, 51 F.3d at 18; Fed. R. Civ. P.  56(e))).  Yet, El‐Nahal adduced no evidence as to the circumstances surrounding  any  alleged  trespass  or  physical  intrusion  on  a  taxicab  in  which  he  had  a  property‐based interest.    Here,  El‐Nahal  emphasizes  that  he  drives  a  taxicab  and  that  the  TLC  mandated the physical placement of a TTS in all privately owned cabs.  But this  19    is  not  enough  to  show  that  the  physical  placement  of  a  TTS  intruded  on  a  constitutionally protected area of El‐Nahal.  Even if El‐Nahal at some point drove  a taxicab installed with a TTS, this fact, standing alone, is no more relevant than  the fact that Knotts and Karo at some point possessed containers installed with  beepers.    As  Jones  makes  plain,  the  possibility  that  the  Government  may  have  trespassed  or  physically  intruded  on  someone’s  property  does  not  necessarily  entitle someone else who later acquires an interest in that property to claim that the  Government trespassed or physically intruded on her property.        El‐Nahal provided no evidence describing his interest in a taxi at the time  of  an  alleged  trespass  or  physical  intrusion.    Beyond  stating  that  he  has  been  a  taxicab  driver  for  more  than  20  years,  El‐Nahal  leaves  it  a  mystery  whether  he  owns  a  taxicab  medallion  (and  it  is  the  owners  of  such  medallions  that  TLC  regulations require to equip their taxicabs with a TTS, N.Y.C., N.Y., Rules tit. 35,  §  1‐11(f)–(g)  (2010)),  rents  a  taxi  from  a  corporate  owner  on  a  daily  or  weekly  basis, or alternates driving shifts with another driver who rents a cab.  Moreover,  he has said nothing at all as to what interest he had in a particular taxi (if any) at  the time it was installed with a TTS.  Thus, so far as the record here discloses, El‐ Nahal  may  have  rented  a  taxi  after  its  owner  contracted  with  a  third‐party  20    provider  to  install  a  TTS,  fully  cognizant  of  the  presence  of  the  TTS  in  the  cab,  and  even  taking  custody  of  the  cab  on  the  condition  that  he  properly  maintain  the TTS while operating the taxi.  Cf. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring)  (noting  that  “the  [Jones]  theory  would  provide  no  protection”  if  “the  Federal  Government  required  or  persuaded  auto  manufacturers  to  include  a  GPS  tracking  device  in  every  car”).    Jones  leaves  no  doubt  that  in  such  a  case,  a  property‐based search claim would be lacking.        That the parameters of the property‐based search theory outlined in Jones  were  not  fully  explicated  in  that  case  makes  it  all  the  more  remarkable  that  El‐ Nahal has failed to adduce evidence on one aspect of Jones that is clear:  to claim  that  the  Government  trespassed  or  physically  intruded  upon  one’s  constitutionally  protected  area  for  the  purposes  of  gathering  information,  a  plaintiff must establish a property interest in a constitutionally protected area at  the  time  of  the  intrusion.    Here,  El‐Nahal  has  provided  no  evidence  tending  to  show  that  he  had  an  interest  in  any  taxi  at  the  time  of  an  alleged  trespass  or  physical  invasion  —  an  element  that,  whether  dependent  on  or  divergent  from  common‐law  tort  principles,  we  have  described  as  “the  touchstone  for  the  analysis  in  Jones.”    See  United  States  v.  Aguiar,  737  F.3d  251,  261  (2d  Cir.  2013)  21    (Pooler,  J.).    No  reasonable  jury  could  find  for  El‐Nahal  on  his  claim  that  the  Government’s conduct constituted a search under Jones, and there is nothing for  us  to  do  but  to  affirm  the  district  court’s  grant  of  summary  judgment  to  Defendants.  Accordingly, finding no genuine issue of material fact warranting a  trial, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.      22    1 POOLER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 2 3 I concur in the majority’s excellent analysis of the line between United States v. 4 Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), on the one hand, and United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 5 (1983), and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), on the other hand. Indeed, had 6 Defendants pressed the same analysis before the district court, I would join the majority 7 in holding that Defendants had successfully shifted the burden to El-Nahal to “come 8 forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of 9 material fact” on the issue of El-Nahal’s property interest in the taxi at the time of the 10 alleged trespass, Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011), and that El- 11 Nahal failed to meet this burden. 12 I disagree, however, that Defendants “point[ed] out to the district court . . . an 13 absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 14 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The majority relies on Defendants’ statements that “the initial 15 placement of the monitor was not at issue,” Defs.’ Mem. of L. in Supp. at 11, El‐Nahal v. 16 Yassky, 993 F. Supp. 2d 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 13‐cv‐3690 (KBF)), ECF No. 13; 17 Defs.’ Mem. of L. in Opp. at 12, El‐Nahal v. Yassky, 993 F. Supp. 2d 460, 469–70 18 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 13‐cv‐3690 (KBF)), ECF No. 30, that because the “physical 19 placement of the GPS device in the vehicles is not at issue” Jones “has little or no 20 relevance in Plaintiff’s claim,” Defs. Mem. of L. in Supp. at 11, and the analysis 21 following the heading “There Was No Trespass on Plaintiff’s Person or Property 22 Constituting a Search,” the only even arguably relevant portion of which merely again 1 stated that “the physical placement of the GPS device in the vehicles is not at issue.” 2 Defs.’ Reply Mem. of L. in Supp. at 7, El‐Nahal v. Yassky, 993 F. Supp. 2d 460, 469–70 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 13‐cv‐3690 (KBF)), ECF No. 36. Thus, in 64 pages of briefing by 4 Defendants, the only statement referring to an absence of evidence on the point of El- 5 Nahal’s interest in the taxi at the time of the trespass is that “the physical placement of 6 the GPS device in the vehicles is not at issue.” I, quite frankly, do not know what this 7 statement means. While the majority draws nuanced lines between Jones and Knotts and 8 Karo, showing the importance of an ownership interest at the time of the trespass, at most 9 Defendants implicitly hint at such a distinction. I do not think this was sufficient to shift 10 the burden to El-Nahal to provide evidence of his property interest in the taxi. 11 It is evident, moreover, that the district court did not read these statements in the 12 same manner as does the majority, as the district court held that Jones did not control on 13 the grounds that the trespass in Jones was surreptitious, that taxis are not truly private 14 property, and that the system was installed pursuant to regulations. See El-Nahal v. 15 Yassky, 993 F. Supp. 2d 460, 467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Although I agree that the majority 16 need not reach these issues, see Maj. Op. at 12 n.3, in my view, they were decided 17 incorrectly. 18 As an initial matter, I cannot agree that the surreptitious nature of the intrusion 19 was a critical factor to the holding in Jones. Beyond the fact that the Jones majority never 20 characterized the intrusion in this manner, its reasoning expressly disclaimed any reliance 21 on the target’s expectations regarding the possibility of surveillance. The physical 22 invasion of a constitutionally protected area is no less actionable under the Fourth 2 1 Amendment merely because it is conspicuous. See, e.g., United States v. Isiofia, 370 F.3d 2 226, 232-33 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a warrantless home search was unconstitutional 3 where the defendant witnessed the search and gave consent, later found to be 4 involuntary).1 To hold otherwise would allow the government to conduct unreasonable 5 searches merely by announcing them. But the government could not, for instance, 6 eliminate the Fourth Amendment’s protection of “homes, papers, and effects” if it “were 7 suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be 8 subject to warrantless entry.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979). 9 Accordingly, El-Nahal’s awareness of the GPS does not preclude the finding that the 10 surveillance entailed a search. 11 Nor, in my view, is the fact that the GPS was installed pursuant to an 12 administrative rule dispositive. On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has addressed 13 statutes and regulations implicating Fourth Amendment rights. For instance, in Grady v. 14 North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015), the Supreme Court applied Jones’s reasoning in 15 evaluating a state statute mandating the satellite-based monitoring of certain categories of 16 recidivist sex offenders. By unanimous opinion, the Court concluded that “a State . . . 17 conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person’s body, without consent, for the 1 Indeed, this point is illustrated by Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765), a case the Supreme Court has described as “undoubtedly familiar to every American statesman at the time the Constitution was adopted, and considered to be the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law with regard to search and seizure.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Entick, the plaintiff prevailed in an action for trespass after the King’s messengers, acting under the claimed authority of a general warrant, “with force and arms” entered and searched his dwelling “against his will.” 3 1 purpose of tracking that individual’s movements,” id. at 1370, a decision not changed by 2 the fact that this search was conducted pursuant to statute. See id. at 1371 (rejecting 3 argument that this was not unconstitutional because the “State’s monitoring program is 4 civil in nature”); see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968-69 (2013) 5 (considering the constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment of DNA swabs taken 6 pursuant to Maryland statute). Most recently, in City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 7 2443 (2015), the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance requiring hotels to permit 8 the warrantless inspection of their guest records on the basis that it authorized a regime of 9 unreasonable searches without opportunity for precompliance review. Id. at 2447-48, 10 2451-53. Plainly, the government’s physical intrusion on a constitutionally protected area 11 is subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even if the intrusion is authorized by municipal 12 regulations. 13 With respect to whether the taxi was constitutionally protected property, the 14 district court answered in the negative, reasoning that “[t]he pervasive regulation of taxis 15 and their openness to public use distinguishes them from the truly private property at 16 issue in Jones.” El-Nahal, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (emphasis added). Although I agree 17 that taxicabs differ from noncommercial vehicles in important respects, in my view, these 18 distinctions do not strip them of all Fourth Amendment protections. If the taxi was El- 19 Nahal’s private personal property, Jones dictates that such property qualifies as “an 20 ‘effect’ as that term is used in the [Fourth] Amendment.” 132 S. Ct. at 949 (“It is 21 important to be clear about what happened in this case: The Government physically 22 occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”). As such, it was 4 1 entitled to special “Fourth Amendment significance” as “one of those protected areas 2 enumerated” in the constitutional text. Id. at 953. At bottom, the Court must “assur[e] 3 preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 4 Amendment was adopted.” Id. at 950 (alteration in original) (quoting Kyllo v. United 5 States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). “The Framers would have understood the term ‘effects’ 6 to be limited to personal, rather than real, property.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 7 170, 177 n.7 (1984). The term was not limited, however, to personal property of a 8 noncommercial nature. It included “the goods of a merchant [or] tradesman.” Altman v. 9 City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 201 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Dictionarium Britannicum 10 (Nathan Baily ed., 1730)). 11 To recount now familiar history, “one of the primary evils intended to be 12 eliminated by the Fourth Amendment was the massive intrusion on privacy undertaken in 13 the collection of taxes pursuant to general warrants and writs of assistance.” G. M. 14 Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 355 (1977). “The hated writs of assistance 15 had given customs officials blanket authority to search where they pleased for goods 16 imported in violation of British tax laws.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 n.21 17 (1980). The “particular offensiveness” engendered by these general warrant “was acutely 18 felt by the merchants and businessmen whose premises and products were inspected for 19 compliance with the several parliamentary revenue measures.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, 20 Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (emphasis added). 21 Consistent with this purpose, “[o]ur prior cases have established that the Fourth 22 Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches applies to administrative 5 1 inspections of private commercial property.” Spinelli v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 160, 2 167 (2d Cir. 2009). The Fourth Amendment is therefore implicated by searches 3 conducted by regulatory authorities involving the unlicensed “physical entry” on a 4 business’s private property. See G. M. Leasing Corp., 429 U.S. at 354 (indicating that 5 Fourth Amendment would be implicated by “warrantless seizure of property, even that 6 owned by a corporation, situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise 7 available for the seizing officer”). 8 The conclusion that TLC’s rule worked an unlicensed physical intrusion on a 9 constitutionally protected effect is not altered by the taxicab’s “openness to public use.” 10 El-Nahal, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 467. “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 11 in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Katz v. 12 United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). An implied license therefore permits regulatory 13 officials to do what “any private citizen might do,” without implicating the Fourth 14 Amendment. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013) (quoting Kentucky v. 15 King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011)). A government agent, in the same manner as a 16 private person, may hail a taxi when it is on duty and physically occupy it for the duration 17 of a trip. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985). But, without the driver’s 18 leave, a typical passenger may not dust the car’s interior for fingerprints, mount a camera 19 on the dashboard, or rifle through the vehicle’s glove compartment to peruse the tips that 20 other passengers have paid. “[T]here is no basis for the notion that because a retail store 21 invites the public to enter, it consents to wholesale searches and seizures that do not 22 conform to Fourth Amendment guarantees.” Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 6 1 329 (1979). The Supreme Court explored a related issue in Jardines, where law 2 enforcement officers invited a narcotics-detecting canine to sniff around a suspect’s front 3 porch. The Court held that a Fourth Amendment search occurred because the detectives 4 had gathered information by “physically entering and occupying” the constitutionally 5 protected curtilage of the house, in order “to engage in conduct not explicitly or 6 implicitly permitted by the homeowner.” Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. The dog’s 7 investigation amounted to an “unlicensed physical intrusion,” despite the fact that custom 8 extended an implicit license “to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, 9 wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.” Id. at 10 1415. “The scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a particular 11 area but also to a specific purpose.” Id. at 1416. The detectives’ conduct was therefore a 12 search under the Fourth Amendment because they engaged in behavior that objectively 13 exceeded the scope of their implicit license to enter while occupying a constitutionally 14 protected area. Id. at 1416-17. Here as well, the implied license all taxis extend to the 15 public does not encompass an invitation to install surveillance technology in their 16 vehicles. 17 *** 18 Accordingly, I join the majority’s analysis of Jones, Knotts, and Karo. Because I 19 do not believe that Defendants properly put at issue El-Nahal’s interest in the taxi at the 20 time of the trespass, and because I disagree with the district court’s analysis of the 21 physical trespass-based Fourth Amendment claim, I would vacate and remand for further 22 factual development. I therefore concur in part and respectfully dissent in part. 7 


[by Livingston]

 Judge POOLER concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion. DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff-Appellant Hassan El-Nahal (“El-Nahal”), a New York City taxi driver, brought a ’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Forrest, /.), principally alleging that the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (“TLC”) — through Defendants-Appellees Matthew Daus, a former chairman of the TLC; David Yassky, then-chairman of the TLC; Michael Bloomberg, then-Mayor of New York City; and the City of New York (collectively, “Defendants”) — had deprived him of his Fourth Amendment rights in various ways. As relevant to this appeal, El-Nahal argued that the TLC’s mandate that all New York City taxicabs install technology systems equipped with Global Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking abilities amounted to a property-based search pursuant to United States v. Jones, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 945 , 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012), and that this search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all of El-Nahal’s Fourth Amendment claims, including his Jones claim, which is the only issue before us on appeal. Because the record is devoid of evidence as to whether El-Nahal had any interest in a taxi at the time of an alleged trespass or physical intrusion, El-Nahal failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his property-based Fourth Amendment claim and Defendants were entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s *250 grant of summary judgment to Defendants. I. A. Background The TLC is an agency of the City of New York that is tasked with the “regulation and supervision of the business and industry of transportation of persons by licensed vehicles for hire in the city.” N.Y.C., N.Y., Charter ch. 65, § 2303a. Its duties include the regulation of “rates,” “standards and conditions of service,” “Requirements of standards of safety and ... efficiency in the operation of vehicles and auxiliary equipment,” and the “establishment of ... [a] uniform system of accounts,” which entails “the right ... to inspect books and records and to require the submission of such reports as the commission may determine.” Id. § 2303b. Pursuant to the New York City Administrative Code, the TLC may promulgate rules as necessary to implement its authority. N.Y.C., N.Y., Code § 19-503(a). In 2004, the TLC promulgated a rule requiring that all New York City taxicabs begin to use a Taxicab Technology System (“TTS”), a physical device located in the backseat of taxicabs that would, among other things, provide credit and debit card payment services for customers, as well as transmit to the TLC electronic data about trips made by taxi drivers gathered by means of GPS. See N.Y.C., N.Y., Rules tit. 35, § 1-01 (2010). Through the TTS, the TLC would collect — only when drivers were on duty — “the taxicab license number; the taxicab driver’s license number; the location of trip initiation; the time of trip initiation; the number of passengers; the location of trip termination; the time of trip termination; the metered fare for the trip; and the distance of the trip.” Id. § 3-06(b). Prior to the implementation of the TTS rule, the TLC required drivers to provide this same information in the form of handwritten trip records. The TTS rule mandated that taxicab medallion owners procure TTSs in their taxis by August 1, 2007. Id. § l-ll(g). Around the same time as the TLC promulgated the TTS rule, the TLC also established a new system for taxi fare “rate codes,” corresponding to different types of fares a taxi driver may charge. Rate Code 1, for instance, is the standard New York City rate and is used for fares from point-to-point within New York City. Rate Code 4, meanwhile, doubles the fare for each additional unit driven, and may be engaged by a taxi driver only under certain circumstances upon entering Nassau or West-chester County. In March 2010, the TLC issued a press release announcing that it had discovered that some taxicab drivers were using the Rate Code 4 setting to overcharge passengers. “Using GPS technology installed in taxicabs,” the press release explained, the “TLC has discovered 1,872,078 trips where passengers were illegally charged the higher rate” by 35,558 drivers for a total of $8,330,155 in alleged overcharges. J.A. 135. The press release qualified this finding by noting that “there were 361 million taxi trips during that time period, so the illegal fare was only charged in 0.5% of all trips,” and that the alleged “scam was primarily perpetrated by a small number of drivers, with 3,000 drivers overcharging more than 100 times.” Id. Two months later, in May 2010, the TLC issued a second press release that modified its initial findings, announcing that the “TLC’s completed analysis” revealed that “21,819 taxicab drivers overcharged passengers a total of 286,000 times ... for a total estimated overcharge of almost $1.1 million.” J.A. 146. The press release added that the TLC believed that 13,315 out of *251 the 21,819 drivers had “engaged in overcharging just one or two times,” but that it expected “to be able to prove that some drivers engaged in 1,000 or more overcharges.” Id. In response to the scandal, the Manhattan District Attorney’s office arrested 59 drivers “for defrauding and stealing from their customers,” J.A. 150, and the TLC programmed passenger screens to display “a highly visible alert that advises riders when the higher, out of town rate is activated,” J.A. 151. The TLC also brought administrative actions against many drivers. Among those who faced administrative charges was El-Nahal, who at that point had been a taxi driver for more than twenty years. On January 3, 2012, the TLC sent El-Nahal a letter directing him to appear for a settlement conference in reference to allegations that he overcharged passengers on 10 occasions between November 20, 2009 and February 22, 2010 by improperly using the Rate 4 code. El-Nahal contested the allegations. On May 7, 2012, an administrative law judge found, based on trip records the TLC allegedly obtained via GPS, that El-Nahal violated the TLC’s rules on six occasions. The administrative law judge thus imposed upon El-Nahal $550 in penalties and revoked El-Nahal’s TLC license to drive taxis. On appeal, the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings Taxi and Limousine Tribunal Appeals Unit (“Appeals Unit”) overturned the penalty, ruling that the administrative law judge’s decision was “not supported by substantial evidence.” J.A. 187. The TLC then re-filed regarding one violation, and the administrative law judge found El-Nahal not guilty. Undeterred, the TLC re-filed five other charges against El-Nahal, and a different administrative law judge once again found El-Nahal guilty, imposed a fine, and revoked his license. El-Nahal again appealed, and the Appeals Unit again overturned the administrative law judge’s decision on the ground that the administrative law judge’s findings with respect to El-Nahal’s alleged intent to overcharge were insufficient. Nonetheless, the TLC re-filed charges against El-Nahal once more. An administrative law judge yet again found El-Nahal guilty, based in part on GPS trip records and Google maps, and the Appeals Unit yet again reversed the decision on appeal. In reversing, the Appeals Unit dismissed the charges with prejudice and emphasized that the GPS evidence used to convict El-Nahal could not, by itself, show that El-Nahal “intended to overcharge, only that he did overcharge.” J.A. 216. B. Procedural History On May 31, 2013, El-Nahal filed his complaint. 1 As relevant here, the complaint alleged that “[t]he installation and use of [the] GPS device [through the TTS] ... constitutes a[n unlawful] search under the Fourth Amendment.” J.A. 34. The complaint also alleged violations of the New York Constitution, Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules, the New York City Charter, and New York common law. On August 21, 2013, Defendants moved to dismiss El-Nahal’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Attached to the motion were seventy-two pages of exhibits. At an initial pretrial conference held on September 13, 2013, Judge Forrest converted Defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and directed El-Nahal to file his opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and *252 his own motion for summary judgment by September 24, 2013. On September 24, 2013, El-Nahal cross-moved for partial summary judgment with respect to his § 1983 and New York Constitution claims, and opposed Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. By order dated January 29, 2014, the district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on El-Nahal’s § 1983 claim, and dismissed the state claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. El -Nahal v. Yassky, 993 F.Supp.2d 460, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The district court held that the installation and use of the TTS did not constitute a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. As to whether the challenged conduct intruded on El-Nahal’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the district court, citing our decision in Buliga v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 324 Fed.Appx. 82 , 82 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming a district court’s ruling that the TLC rule requiring the installation of a TTS in all taxis did not invade the plaintiffs reasonable expectation of privacy), concluded that El-Nahal had no “reasonable expectation of privacy in any of the information collected” by the TTS. El-Nahal, 993 F.Supp.2d at 465 . Regarding El-Nahal’s claim that the mandatory. installation of the TTS was a search because it involved a physical intrusion for the purpose of obtaining information, the district court rejected the claim on the grounds that “taxi drivers are aware of the system, the system is installed pursuant to regulations, and the taxicabs in which the system is installed are not truly private vehicles.” El-Nahal, 993 F.Supp.2d at 467 . The district court further reasoned that even assuming, arguendo, that the mandatory installation of the TTS did constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, the search was justified pursuant to the “special needs” doctrine. Id. at 469 . El-Nahal timely appealed. II. “We review an award of summary judgment de novo.” F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51 , 54 (2d Cir. 1994). Upon proper motion, Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s ease, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733 , 743 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (1963) (current version at Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2010))). Thus, “[t]he moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law1 because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Id. at 323 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (1963) (current version at Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2010))); see also Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that “the movant’s burden will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim”). El-Nahal argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on his Fourth Amendment claim be *253 cause pursuant to Jones , “[p]hysical placement of a tracking device on a private vehicle in order to obtain information is ... a search,” so that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when “[t]he TLC mandated the physical placement of tracking devices in privately owned taxicabs.” Appellant’s Br. at 29. El-Nahal has not argued on appeal that he was subjected to a search by virtue of an intrusion on any reasonable expectation of privacy he had regarding the installation and use of the TTS. 2 Instead, he asserts here that he “explicitly ‘rejected the premise’ of defendants’ argument below that he was required to demonstrate an invasion of privacy” and that his Fourth Amendment claim “does not depend on whether his expectation of privacy was violated.” Appellant’s Br. at 31-32. Accordingly, we address the only argument El-Nahal has presented on appeal: namely, his contention that the district court erred in concluding that summary judgment was warranted as to his property-based Fourth Amendment claim. Assuming, arguendo, that the TLC-mandated installation and use of TTS devices in taxicabs in New York City may constitute a search as to those with sufficient property-based interests in a taxicab, we conclude that the district court nevertheless properly granted summary judgment because there is no evidence in the record as to an essential element of El-Nahal’s claim on which he bears the burden of proof: namely, that he had such a property interest in a taxicab at the time a TTS was installed. 3 Jones itself demonstrates that a plaintiff such as El-Nahal must establish such a property-based interest. In Jones , the Supreme Court made clear that the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test did not supplant, but merely supplemented the earlier, property-based approach to defining the circumstances in which a “search,” for Fourth Amendment purposes, has occurred. 132 S.Ct. at 949-50 . There, the Government placed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of a Jeep that was, as the Government acknowledged, exclusively driven by Jones. 4 Id. at 948-49 & n.2. The Government then tracked the Jeep’s movements for 28 days, using information gleaned from the tracking in Jones’s prosecution for several drug offenses. Id. at 948-49 . The Jones Court instructed that pursuant to the property-based approach, *254 a Fourth Amendment search “undoubtedly occurfs]” when the Government acts to “obtainf ] information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area,” id. at 950 n.3 — that is, on individuals’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” as enumerated in the Fourth Amendment’s text, U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 5 Because Government agents had physically intruded on Jones’s Jeep, which was “beyond dispute ... an ‘effect’ as that term is used in the [Fourth] Amendment,” Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949 , to plant and employ a tracking device, the Supreme Court concluded that it need not consider the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy approach in determining whether Jones was subject to a search, see id. at 950-53 . Applying the property-based approach, the Court held “that the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’ ” Id. at 949 . Thus, Jones was subject to a search because the Government installed a GPS device on his vehicle in order to obtain information — on a vehicle that, while registered to his wife, he exclusively drove and in which (as the Court took pains to note) he “had at least the property rights of a bailee” at the time the Government installed the tracking device. Id. at 949 n.2. The centrality of some property interest to a property-based Fourth Amendment claim is also evident in the manner in which the Jones Court distinguished United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 , 103 S.Ct. 1081 , 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983), and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 , 104 S.Ct. 3296 , 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). In Knotts and Karo , the Government had installed beepers — “radio transmitterfs], usually battery operated, which emitf] periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver,” Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277 , 103 S.Ct. 1081— into containers of chemicals that were thereafter tracked, and that the Government suspected would be used in connection with the manufacture of illegal drugs, see id. at 278-79 , 103 S.Ct. 1081 ; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 708-09 , 104 S.Ct. 3296 . The Government argued in Jones that Knotts and Karo “foreclosefd] the conclusion that what occurred [to Jones] constituted a search” because in these earlier cases, the Court, employing the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy approach, had determined that using a beeper to track the movement of the containers on public roads did not constitute a search. 132 S.Ct. at 951 . The Jones Court disagreed, concluding that the outcomes in Knotts and Karo were “perfectly consistent” with its property-based approach to the. Fourth Amendment’s scope. Id. at 952. As Jones explained, the Government in Knotts had installed the beeper in the container at issue “before it came into KnottsXs] possession, with the consent of the then-owner” of the container. Id. (emphasis added). Knotts did not challenge the installation, and the Court “specifically declined to consider its effect.” Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 952 . Similarly, the Jones court explained that in Karo , “[a]s in Knotts , ... [t]he Government ... came into physical contact with the container only before it belonged to the defendant Karo” and with the consent of its then-owner: “Karo accepted the container as it came to him, beeper and all, and was therefore not entitled to object to the beeper’s presence, even though it was used to monitor the container’s location.” Id. (emphasis added). Jones, meanwhile, was on “much dif *255 ferent footing” than Knotts or Karo: he “possessed the Jeep at the time the Government trespassorily inserted the information-gathering device.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.7(f) (5th ed. 2012) (noting that “the date of the requisite trespass” rather than the “period of surveillance” is critical to assessing whether a search has occurred pursuant to Jones’s property-based approach). Because the physical intrusion was upon a constitutionally protected area and was undertaken for the purpose of obtaining information, the Government’s conduct amounted to the type of property-based search that the Fourth Amendment protects against. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949 . To be clear, because there was no dispute in Jones that the defendant lawfully possessed the Jeep at the time it was trespassed upon, nor did the Government challenge the D.C. Circuit’s determination “that the vehicle’s registration did not affect [Jones’s] ability to make a Fourth Amendment objection,” the Jones Court had no occasion fully to consider the nature of the property interest that is sufficient to make out a property-based Fourth Amendment claim. Id. at 949 n.2. Neither need we do so here. Because we can discern no evidence at all that El-Nahal had any interest in a particular taxicab at the time of an alleged trespass or physical intrusion, we find no genuine issue of material fact warranting a trial. Summary judgment in favor of Defendants was therefore wholly proper. During the proceedings that led to summary judgment in favor of Defendants, Defendants repeatedly stated that the property-based approach in Jones was predicated upon physical intrusion on property, and emphasized how Jones differed from Knotts and Karo . For instance, Defendants’ opening memorandum of law explained that, unlike the defendant in Jones , there was no physical occupation of El-Nahal’s property for the purpose of obtaining information because, as in Knotts and Karo , “the initial placement of the monitor was not at issue.” Defs.’ Mem. of L. in Supp. at 11, El-Nahal v. Yassky, 993 F.Supp.2d 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 13-cv-3690 (KBF)), ECF No. 13. Since the “physical placement of the GPS device” was not at issue, Defendants continued, Jones had “little relevance in Plaintiffs claim.” 6 Id. It logically followed from that statement that if Jones was to have any relevance, El-Nahal had to put the placement of the GPS device at issue — a point he implicitly acknowledged in his own papers in opposition to Defendants’ motion and in support of his cross motion for summary judgment by stating that “[t]he Court’s decision [in Jones] was based on a traditional understanding of the Fourth Amendment tied to common law trespass” and “the physical attachment of the device,” Pl.’s Mem. of L. in Supp. at 15-16, El-Nahal v. Yassky, 993 F.Supp.2d 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 13-cv-3690 (KBF)), ECF No. 22, and that Jones “focused on the [Gjovernment’s trespass on JonesXs] vehicle,” id. at 19 (emphasis added). *256 Defendants thus “point[ed] out to the district court ... that there [was] an absence of evidence,” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 825 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , to support “an essential element” of El-Nahal’s Jones claim, id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 . It then fell to El-Nahal to “come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact” as to that element of his Fourth Amendment claim. Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)); see also Tovar v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, No. 98 Civ. 5178, 2000 WL 1273841 , at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000) (in converting defendants’ motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, noting that defendants may satisfy their burden by “pointing] to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim,” at which point the burden “shifts to the [plaintiff] to come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial’ ” (quoting Goenaga, 51 F.3d at 18 ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e))). Yet, El-Nahal adduced no evidence as to the circumstances surrounding any alleged trespass or physical intrusion on a taxicab in which he had a property-based interest. Here, El-Nahal emphasizes that he drives a taxicab and that the TLC mandated the physical placement of a TTS in all privately owned cabs. But this is not enough to show that the physical placement of a TTS intruded on a constitutionally protected area of Elr-Nahal. Even if El-Nahal at some point drove a taxicab installed with a TTS, this fact, standing alone, is no more relevant than the fact that Knotts and Karo at some point possessed containers installed with beepers. As Jones makes plain, the possibility that the Government may have trespassed or physically intruded on someone’s property does not necessarily entitle someone else who later acquires an interest in that property to claim that the Government trespassed or physically intruded on her property. El-Nahal provided no evidence describing his interest in a taxi at the time of an alleged trespass or physical intrusion. Beyond stating that he has been a taxicab driver for more than 20 years, El-Nahal leaves it a mystery whether he owns a taxicab medallion (and it is the owners of such medallions that TLC regulations require to equip their taxicabs with a TTS, N.Y.C., N.Y., Rules tit. 35, § 1-11(f)-(g) (2010)), rents a taxi from a corporate owner on a daily or weekly basis, or alternates driving shifts with another driver who rents a cab. Moreover, he has said nothing at all as to what interest he had in a particular taxi (if any) at the time it was installed with a TTS. Thus, so far as the record here discloses, El-Nahal may have rented a taxi after its owner contracted with a third-party provider to install' a TTS, fully cognizant of the presence of the TTS in the cab, and even taking custody of the cab on the-condition that he properly maintain the TTS while operating the taxi. Cf. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that “the [Jones] theory would provide no protection” if “the Federal Government required or persuaded auto manufacturers to include a GPS tracking device in every car”). Jones leaves no doubt that in such a case, a property-based search claim would be lacking. That the parameters of the property-based search theory outlined in Jones were not fully explicated in that case makes it all the more remarkable that El-Nahal has failed to adduce evidence on one aspect of Jones that is clear: to claim that the Government trespassed or physically intruded upon one’s constitutionally pro *257 tected area for the purposes of gathering information, a plaintiff must establish a property interest in a constitutionally protected area at the time of the intrusion. Here, El-Nahal has provided no evidence tending to show that he had an interest in any taxi at the time of an alleged trespass or physical invasion — an element that, whether dependent on or divergent from common-law tort principles, we have described as “the touchstone for the analysis in Jones.” See United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 261 (2d Cir. 2013) (Pooler, J.). No reasonable jury could find for El-Na-hal on his claim that the Government’s conduct constituted a search under Jones , and there is nothing for us to do but to affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants. Accordingly, finding no genuine issue of material fact warranting a trial, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. . Although El-Nahal filed the complaint on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals, he at no point in the district court proceedings sought class certification. . The reasonable-expectation-of-privacy approach for deciding whether a search has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment derives from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), which affirms that the Fourth Amendment protects against invasions upon an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 360 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (“Consistently with Katz , this Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can. claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by government action.” (citing cases)). . We thus affirm on an alternative ground and do not consider the district court’s con-elusions: (1) that Defendants' actions "did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment ... under ... the Jones physical-trespass analysis;” and (2) that assuming, arguendo, that a search occurred, "that search was reasonable under the special-needs analysis of the Fourth Amendment.” El-Nahal, 993 F.Supp.2d at 468-69 . .Because the Government conceded that Jones was "the exclusive driver” of the Jeep, Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949 n.2 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 , 555 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Jones,-U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 945 , 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012)), even if Jones was "not the owner” of the Jeep, the Supreme Court noted, he "had at least the property rights of a bailee,” id. . The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. . Defendants reiterated this crucial aspect of Jones in their opposition to El-Nahal's cross-motion for summary judgment on the search claim. Defs.’ Mem. of L. in Opp. at 12, El-Nahal v. Yassky, 993 F.Supp.2d 460, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 13-cv3690 (KBF)), ECF No. 30. They did so yet again in their reply memorandum in support of their own motion for summary judgment, devoting an entire section of their brief specifically to the a that "[tjhere [w]as [n]o [t]respass on Plaintiff's [p]erson or [p]roperty [cjonstituting a [s]earch.” Defs.’ Reply Mem. of L. in Supp. at 7, El-Nahal v. Yassky, 993 F.Supp.2d 460, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 13-cv-3690 (KBF)), ECF No. 36. 


[Concurrence in Part by Pooler]

 POOLER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the majority’s excellent analysis of the line between United States v. Jones, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 945 , 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012), on the one hand, and United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 , 103 S.Ct. 1081 , 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983), and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 , 104 S.Ct. 3296 , 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984), on the other hand. Indeed, had Defendants pressed the same analysis before the district court, I would join the majority in holding that Defendants had successfully shifted the burden to El-Nahal to “come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact” on the issue of El-Nahal’s property interest in the taxi at the time of the alleged trespass, Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011), and that El-Nahal failed to meet this burden. I disagree, however, that Defendants “point[ed] out to the district court ... an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The majority relies on Defendants’ statements that “the initial placement of the monitor was not at issue,” Defs.’ Mem. of L. in S upp. a t 460, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 13-cv-3690 (KBF)), ECF No. 30, that because the “physical placement of the GPS device in the vehicles is not at issue” Jones “has little or no relevance in Plaintiffs claim,” Defs. Mem. of L. in Supp. at 11, and the analysis following the heading “There Was No Trespass on Plaintiffs Person or Property Constituting a Search,” the only even arguably relevant portion of which merely again stated that “the physical placement of the GPS device in the vehicles is not at issue.” Defs.’ Reply Mem. of L. in Supp. at 7, El-Nahal v. Yassky, 993 F.Supp.2d 460, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 13-cv-3690 (KBF)), ECF No. 36. Thus, in 64 pages of briefing by Defendants, the only statement referring to an absence of evidence on the point of El-Nahal’s interest in the taxi at the time of the trespass is that “the physical placement of the GPS device in the vehicles is not at issue.” I, quite frankly, do not know what this statement means. While the majority draws nuanced lines between Jones and Knotts and Karo , showing the importance of an ownership interest at the time of the trespass, at most Defendants implicitly hint at such a distinction. I do not think this was sufficient to shift the burden to El-Nahal to provide evidence of his property interest in the taxi. It is evident, moreover, that the district court did not read these statements in the *258 same manner as does the majority, as the district court held that Jones did not control on the grounds that the trespass in Jones was surreptitious, that taxis are not truly private property, and that the system was installed pursuant to regulations. See El-Nahal v. Yassky, 993 F.Supp.2d 460, 467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Although I agree that the majority need not reach these issues, see Maj. Op. at 253 n.3, in my view, they were decided incorrectly. As an initial matter, I cannot agree that the surreptitious nature of the intrusion was a critical factor to the holding in Jones . Beyond the fact that the Jones majority never characterized the intrusion in this manner, its reasoning expressly disclaimed any reliance on the target’s expectations regarding the possibility of surveillance. The physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area is no less actionable under the Fourth Amendment merely because it is conspicuous. See, e.g., United States v. Isiofia, 370 F.3d 226, 232-33 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a war-rantless home search was unconstitutional where the defendant witnessed the search and gave consent, later found to be involuntary). 1 To hold otherwise would allow the government to conduct unreasonable searches merely by announcing them. But the government could not, for instance, eliminate the Fourth Amendment’s protection of “homes, papers, and effects” if it “were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 , 740 n.5, 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). Accordingly, El-Nahal’s awareness of the GPS does not preclude the finding that the surveillance entailed a search. Nor, in my view, is the fact that the GPS was installed pursuant to an administrative rule dispositive. On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has addressed statutes and regulations implicating Fourth Amendment rights. For instance, in Grady v. North Carolina, — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct: 1368, 191 L.Ed.2d 459 (2015), the Supreme Court applied Jones’s, reasoning in evaluating a state statute mandating the satellite-based monitoring of certain categories of recidivist sex offenders. By unanimous opinion, the Court concluded that “a State ... conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person’s body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that individual’s movements,” id. at 1370, a decision not changed by the fact that this search was conducted pursuant to statute. See id. at 1371 (rejecting argument that this was not unconstitutional because the “State’s monitoring program is civil in nature”); see also Maryland v. King, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1968-69 , 186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) (considering the constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment of DNA swabs taken pursuant to Maryland statute). Most recently, in City of Los Angeles v. Patel, — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 2443 , 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015), the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance requiring hotels to permit the warrantless inspection of their guest records on the basis that it authorized a regime of unreasonable searches without opportunity for precompliance review. Id. at 2447-48, 2451-53 . Plainly, the government’s physical intrusion on a constitutionally protected area is subject to Fourth *259 Amendment scrutiny even if the intrusion is authorized by municipal regulations. With respect to whether the taxi was constitutionally protected property, the district court answered in the negative, reasoning that “[t]he pervasive regulation of taxis and their openness to public use distinguishes them from the truly private property at issue in Jones.” El-Nahal, 993 F.Supp.2d at 467 (emphasis added). Although I agree that taxicabs differ from noncommercial vehicles in important respects, in my view, these distinctions do not strip them of all Fourth Amendment protections. If the taxi was El-Nahal’s private personal property, Jones dictates that such property qualifies as “an ‘effect’ as that term is used in the [Fourth] Amendment.” 132 S.Ct. at 949 (“It is important to be clear about what happened in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”). As such, it was entitled to special “Fourth Amendment significance” as “one of those protected areas enumerated” in the constitutional text. Id. at 953 . At bottom, the Court must “assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” Id. at 950 (alteration in original) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001)). “The Framers would have understood the term ‘effects’ to be limited to personal, rather than real, property.” Oliver, v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 , 177 n.7, 104 S.Ct. 1735 , 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). The term was not limited, however, to personal property of a noncommercial nature. It included “the goods of a merchant [or] tradesman.” Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 201 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Dictionarium Britannicum (Nathan Baily ed., 1730)). To recount now familiar history, “one of the primary evils intended to be eliminated by the Fourth Amendment was the massive intrusion on privacy undertaken in the collection of taxes pursuant to general warrants and writs of assistance.” G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 355 , 97 S.Ct. 619 , 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977). “The hated writs of assistance had given customs officials blanket authority to search where they pleased for goods imported in violation of British tax laws.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 , 583 n.21, 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The “particular offensiveness” engendered by these general warrant “was acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen whose premises and products were inspected for compliance with the several' parliamentary revenue measures.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 , 98 S.Ct. 1816 , 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978) (emphasis added). Consistent with this purpose, “[o]ur pri- or cases have established that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches applies to administrative inspections of private commercial property.” Spinelli v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2009). The Fourth Amendment is therefore implicated by searches conducted by regulatory authorities involving the unlicensed “physical entry” on a business’s private property. See G. M. Leasing Corp., 429 U.S. at 354 , 97 S.Ct. 619 (indicating that Fourth Amendment would be implicated by “warrantless seizure of property, even that owned by a corporation, situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer”). The conclusion that TLC’s rule worked an unlicensed physical intrusion on a constitutionally protected effect is not altered by the taxicab’s “openness to public use.” El-Nahal, 993 F.Supp.2d at 467 . “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” *260 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). An implied license therefore permits regulatory officials to do what “any private citizen might do,” without implicating the Fourth Amendment. See Florida v. Jardines, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1416 , 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 , 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1862 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011)). A government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may hail a taxi when it is on duty and physically occupy it for the duration of a trip. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 , 105 S.Ct. 2778 , 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985). But, without the driver’s leave, a typical passenger may not dust the car’s interior for fingerprints, mount a camera on the dashboard, or rifle through the vehicle’s glove compartment to peruse the tips that other passengers have paid. “[TJhere is no basis for the notion that because a retail store invites the public to enter, it consents to wholesale searches and seizures that do not conform to Fourth Amendment guarantees.” Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329 , 99 S.Ct. 2319 , 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979). The Supreme Court explored a related issue in Jardines , where law enforcement officers invited a narcotics-detecting canine to sniff around a suspect’s front porch. The Court held that a Fourth Amendment search occurred because the detectives had gathered information by “physically entering and occupying” the constitutionally protected curtilage of the house, in order “to engage in conduct not explicitly or implicitly permitted by the home; owner.” Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1414 . The dog’s investigation amounted to an “unlicensed physical intrusion,” despite the fact that custom extended an implicit license “to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.” Id. at 1415 . “The scope of a license — express or implied — is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose.” Id. at 1416 . The detectives’ conduct was therefore a search under the Fourth Amendment because they engaged in behavior that objectively exceeded the scope of their implicit license to enter while occupying a constitutionally protected area. Id. at 1416-17 . Here as well, the implied license all taxis extend to the public does not encompass an invitation to install surveillance technology in their vehicles. Accordingly, I join the majority’s analysis of Jones, Knotts, and Karo . Because I do not believe that Defendants properly put at issue El-Nahal’s interest in the- taxi at the time of the trespass, and because I disagree with the district court’s analysis of the physical trespass-based Fourth Amendment claim, I would vacate and remand for further factual development. I therefore concur in part and respectfully dissent in part. . Indeed, this point is illustrated by Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765), a case the Supreme Court has described as "undoubtedly familiar to every American statesman at the time the Constitution was adopted, and considered to be the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law with regard to search and seizure.” Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Entick, the plaintiff prevailed in an action for trespass after the King’s messengers, acting under the claimed authority of a general warrant, "with force and arms” entered and searched his dwelling "against his will.”