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Full Opinion
Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC2024-0660
____________
ERNEST D. SUGGS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
____________
No. SC2024-0702
____________
ERNEST D. SUGGS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
September 4, 2025
GROSSHANS, J.
Ernest D. Suggs, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals
the circuit court’s orders summarily denying his third and fourth
successive motions for postconviction relief, filed under rule 3.851
of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1 We affirm.
I
In 1990, Suggs kidnapped Pauline Casey from the Teddy Bear
Bar, stabbed her repeatedly, and abandoned her body alongside a
dirt road. Suggs v. State (Suggs I), 644 So. 2d 64, 65-66 (Fla. 1994).
He also robbed the bar. Id.
For these crimes, Suggs was charged with first-degree murder,
kidnapping, and robbery. Id. at 66. After trial, the jury found him
guilty of all three offenses. Id. At the penalty phase, the jury
recommended a sentence of death by a seven-to-five vote. Id. The
trial court imposed the death sentence, finding that seven
aggravators outweighed three nonstatutory mitigators. Id. We
affirmed Suggs’ convictions and sentences. Id. at 70.
In the thirty years since, Suggs has brought numerous
postconviction challenges and habeas petitions, all without success.
See Suggs v. State (Suggs II), 923 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2005) (affirming
denial of initial postconviction motion and denying habeas petition);
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
-2-
Suggs v. Jones, No. SC16-1066, 2017 WL 1033680 (Fla. Mar. 17,
2017) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus); Suggs v. State
(Suggs III), 238 So. 3d 699 (Fla. 2017) (affirming denial of first
successive postconviction motion), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 921
(2018); Suggs v. State (Suggs IV), 234 So. 3d 546 (Fla.), (affirming
denial of second successive postconviction motion), cert. denied,
586 U.S. 846 (2018).
Suggs has now filed his third and fourth successive
postconviction motions—the denial of which is at issue in this
appeal. In these motions, Suggs raised claims under Jones v. State,
709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), as well as a stand-alone due process
claim. The majority of his claims center on six pieces of evidence he
alleges are newly discovered, namely: declarations from three
individuals that a serial killer confessed to Casey’s murder (or to the
murder of a woman fitting her description); a trial witness’s alleged
willingness to recant his testimony; deposition testimony from an
unrelated murder case that purportedly demonstrates a pattern of
prosecutorial misconduct; and statements from a law enforcement
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officer that allegedly indicate the State persuaded witnesses into
falsely testifying against Suggs.
In his stand-alone due process claim, Suggs argues that this
Court violated his due process rights during an appeal of a prior
successive postconviction motion.
The circuit court summarily denied all the claims, finding the
confession-related Jones and Brady claims to be untimely under
rule 3.851; the Jones, Brady, and Giglio claims regarding the
witness’s false testimony at trial were untimely under rule 3.851;
and the Massiah claim stemming from the trial witness’s false
testimony was procedurally barred under rule 3.851. The circuit
court also denied on the merits the confession-related Jones claim,
both Brady claims, and the Giglio and Massiah claims. Finally, the
circuit court denied the stand-alone due process claim, finding that
a postconviction motion was an improper vehicle for challenging
this Court’s ruling. This appeal follows.
-4-
II
Suggs claims that the circuit court erred in denying his
motions for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary
hearing.2 We disagree.
A summary denial will be affirmed “if the motion is legally
insufficient or procedurally barred, or if its allegations are
conclusively refuted by the record.” Sparre v. State, 391 So. 3d 404,
405 (Fla. 2024). Similarly, we will affirm the denial of claims that
fail to meet rule 3.851’s one-year time limitation. Hutchinson v.
State, No. SC2025-0517, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S71, S72, 2025 WL
1198037, at *3 (Fla. Apr. 25, 2025), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1980
(2025). We note that in some narrow circumstances, rule 3.851
excuses the failure to comply with the one-year limitation. One
such circumstance applies when a claim is predicated on newly
discovered evidence. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). However,
“it is incumbent on the defendant to demonstrate that his claims
could not have been raised in the initial postconviction motion
2. We review summary denials of successive postconviction
claims de novo. Owen v. State, 364 So. 3d 1017, 1022-23 (Fla.
2023).
-5-
through the exercise of due diligence.” Rivera v. State, 187 So. 3d
822, 832 (Fla. 2015).
As we will explain, Suggs cannot show that his claims are
based on newly discovered evidence and that his claims were raised
within one year of when they could have been ascertained with due
diligence. 3 Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2), (e)(2); see Jimenez v. State,
997 So. 2d 1056, 1064 (Fla. 2008). Accordingly, Suggs’ claims are
untimely and procedurally barred. We also reject several of Suggs’
claims on the merits.
III
We start with Suggs’ Jones claims. To receive an evidentiary
hearing on newly discovered evidence claims like these, the
defendant must allege facts that, if proven, would show two things:
First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial
court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it
must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could
not have known of it by the use of diligence. Second, the
newly discovered evidence must be of such a nature that
it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.
3. Suggs’ judgment and sentence became final in 1995.
-6-
Rogers v. State, 327 So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Long v.
State, 183 So. 3d 342, 345 (Fla. 2016)). We now turn to the
specifics of his Jones claims.
A
In his motion below, Suggs proffered declarations from three
individuals claiming that a serial killer, Mark Riebe, confessed to
Casey’s murder. Patsy Wells, Riebe’s mother, claimed that Riebe
confessed to her on two different occasions that he—and not
Suggs—murdered Casey. Randy Sheheane claimed Riebe confessed
to killing a woman from the Destin or Santa Rosa Beach area and
dumping her body off a dirt road in Walton County. And Randy Ray
Chapman declared that Riebe confessed to murdering a bartender
in Walton County. None of these declarations indicate when Riebe
allegedly confessed. We agree with the circuit court that Suggs
cannot prevail on this newly discovered evidence claim.
First, Suggs argues that his Jones claim falls within the
timeliness exception for newly discovered evidence. But Suggs is
wrong.
Suggs could have interviewed Wells and Sheheane decades
ago. Wells is the mother of Alex Wells, whom Suggs has accused of
-7-
murdering Casey since 1997. See Suggs II, 923 So. 2d at 437. And
Sheheane testified against Riebe in the 1997 trial for the murder of
Donna Callahan. Suggs has long alleged that Callahan’s murderer
also killed Casey. Suggs should have been aware that both Wells,
as the mother of Alex Wells and Mark Riebe, and Sheheane, as a
witness against Riebe in the Callahan case, may have had evidence
connecting Riebe to the Casey murder. Suggs fails to explain why
he waited nearly twenty years to interview them both.
Suggs also fails to provide any information regarding when he
discovered, or could have discovered, Chapman’s information. Nor
does Chapman’s statement indicate whether Riebe confessed
directly to Chapman or if this is information obtained from another
source.
Thus, as the circuit court properly found, Suggs failed to
exercise due diligence in discovering each of these alleged
admissions, and his Jones claim is untimely. 4 Jimenez, 997 So. 2d
4. To the extent Suggs’ Jones claim is based on Wells’ and
Sheheane’s declarations, it is also procedurally barred under rule
3.851(e)(1)(E), as he should have been aware of their relevance
years earlier and brought this claim in a prior proceeding. Bogle v.
State, 322 So. 3d 44, 46 (Fla. 2021).
-8-
at 1064; Stein v. State, 406 So. 3d 171, 174-75 (Fla. 2024), petition
for cert. filed, No. 25-5191 (U.S. July 24, 2025).
Moreover, even if we assumed Suggs’ claim was timely, we
would still affirm, as the claim also fails on the merits. This
evidence cannot satisfy the second Jones prong which requires that
the newly discovered evidence be admissible. See 709 So. 2d at 521
(“In considering the second prong, the trial court should initially
consider whether the evidence would have been admissible at
trial . . . .” (citations omitted)). We have assessed all three
declarations and conclude that each constitutes inadmissible
hearsay. See § 90.802, Fla. Stat. 5
5. Suggs claims that Riebe’s confessions could be admitted as
an unavailable declarant’s statement against interest. See
§ 90.804, Fla. Stat. We reject this argument. First, Suggs has not
shown that Riebe is unavailable. Second, Suggs offers no
corroborating circumstances as required by section 90.804(2)(c).
Suggs also argues that the declarations are admissible
pursuant to Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). He is
wrong. Chambers found the trial court’s application of Mississippi’s
evidence rules denied the defendant due process. Id. at 302-03.
But we have noted that Chambers only applies to trustworthy
evidence. Jones, 709 So. 2d at 525. Riebe has confessed and
recanted numerous times—his confessions lack any indicia of
trustworthiness.
-9-
Furthermore, even if admissible, there is no reasonable
probability that Riebe’s alleged confession would produce an
acquittal upon retrial. Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521. At trial, the State
presented significant physical evidence connecting Suggs to the
murder—including Casey’s palmprints in Suggs’ vehicle, Casey’s
fingerprints on the outside of Suggs’ vehicle, Casey’s blood on
Suggs’ shirt, and tire tracks on the dirt road where Casey’s body
was found that were consistent with those of Suggs’ vehicle. Suggs
I, 644 So. 2d at 65-66. Law enforcement found keys to the Teddy
Bear Bar and a beer glass from that bar near Suggs’ home. Id. The
State also presented testimony that Casey was last seen alive with
Suggs. Id. Based on our review of this evidence and other trial
evidence, we conclude that the alleged confessions of a serial
killer—two of which do not identify Casey as the victim—are not
likely to produce an acquittal, especially when Riebe’s confessions
have been deemed unreliable. See Jones, 709 So. 2d at 526.
B
In his second Jones claim, Suggs contends that new evidence
from two former inmates and a law enforcement officer shows that
- 10 -
the State used false testimony against him at trial. This claim is
untimely and procedurally barred.
First, Suggs fails to show that he exercised due diligence to
discover this evidence. Suggs alleges that inmate James Taylor is
willing to publicly recant his trial testimony. But Taylor’s
admission that he lied at trial is not new—Suggs has been aware of
it since 1996. 6 Taylor’s alleged willingness to now publicly recant
does not make the evidence of his false testimony “new.” See Dailey
v. State, 329 So. 3d 1280, 1287-88 (Fla. 2021) (previously known
evidence does not become newly discovered every time a new detail
emerges). Suggs fails to show that he exercised due diligence after
discovering Taylor’s earlier admissions. 7 Sparre, 391 So. 3d at 406;
Jimenez, 997 So. 2d at 1064.8
6. In 1996, Taylor informed an investigator that he and
Wallace Byars lied during their testimony in Suggs’ trial, but Taylor
refused to publicly recant or sign an affidavit. Suggs II, 923 So. 2d
at 426-27.
7. Suggs does not claim he has attempted to compel Taylor’s
testimony during the past twenty-five years. Moreover, Suggs does
not proffer an affidavit or a declaration from Taylor stating that he
is willing to publicly recant now.
8. This claim is also procedurally barred because this Court
has previously considered and rejected Suggs’ claims based on
- 11 -
Suggs next turns to the deposition of Jake Ozio to support his
Jones claim. Suggs asserts that Ozio’s 2021 deposition in an
unrelated case shows that the prosecutor and sheriff in the county
where Suggs was held regularly pressured inmates into testifying
falsely. Therefore, Suggs argues, they also compelled Suggs’ fellow
inmates Taylor and Wallace Byars to falsely testify against Suggs.
We agree with the circuit court that this argument is untimely and
meritless.
Like Taylor’s alleged willingness to recant, this portion of
Suggs’ Jones claim is untimely under rule 3.851. Rule 3.851’s
time-limit exception applies to newly discovered “facts on which the
claim is predicated.” 9 Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). And there is
an “important distinction between the facts on which . . . claims are
predicated and the evidence used to prove those facts.” Sliney v.
State, 362 So. 3d 186, 188-89 (Fla. 2023). The basis—or
Taylor’s alleged recantations. Suggs II, 923 So. 2d at 426-28; see
Bogle, 322 So. 3d at 46 (appellant “cannot use a successive 3.851
motion to litigate issues that he could have raised in his initial
postconviction motion”).
9. “Predicate” means to “found or base something on.”
Predicate, New Oxford American Dictionary (2d ed. 2005).
- 12 -
predicate—of Suggs’ claim is that his fellow inmates Taylor and
Byars gave false testimony at his trial. Suggs has previously
raised—and we have rejected—this claim. See Suggs II, 923 So. 2d
at 426-27. Here, in this Jones claim, Suggs attempts to bolster his
previous claim by offering Ozio’s deposition as ancillary evidence
that Suggs’ fellow inmates lied. However, Suggs cannot overcome a
procedural bar by simply alleging new support for old claims.
Suggs’ claim regarding Ozio’s deposition also fails on the
merits. Suggs struggles to explain how Ozio’s deposition would be
relevant or admissible10 at a new trial. See Jones, 709 So. 2d at
521. Even if the deposition were admissible, Suggs’ argument that
it shows Taylor and Byars testified falsely is speculative at best.
Ozio’s deposition testimony would not overcome the significant
evidence against Suggs or probably produce an acquittal on retrial.
See id. Thus, this claim also fails on the merits.
Finally, Suggs claims he has new evidence from Deputy
Timothy Crenshaw indicating that Taylor and Byars lied at trial.
10. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes, sets forth certain types
of admissible impeachment evidence. Suggs does not argue that
Ozio’s testimony falls within any of these categories.
- 13 -
But the evidence supporting this claim could have been discovered
decades ago. Suggs has been aware that Crenshaw was a
potentially relevant witness since 2003, when—during an
evidentiary hearing—an inmate referenced Crenshaw’s behavior as
evidence that Taylor was an informant. If he had exercised due
diligence and interviewed Crenshaw about his testimony at the
hearing, Suggs could have obtained Crenshaw’s information nearly
twenty years earlier. See Stein, 406 So. 3d at 174-75. Suggs fails
to justify the delay and, thus, fails to demonstrate why the one-year
time limit does not preclude the relief he seeks. See Mungin v.
State, 320 So. 3d 624, 626 (Fla. 2020) (“It is incumbent upon the
defendant to establish the timeliness of a successive postconviction
claim.”). 11
For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Suggs’
successive Jones claims.
11. Since Suggs should have been aware of Crenshaw’s
information since 2003, he should have raised this evidence in one
of his prior postconviction challenges. See Bogle, 322 So. 3d at 46.
- 14 -
IV
We next consider Suggs’ Brady claims. In his first claim, he
argues the State suppressed Riebe’s alleged confessions, because
the State was aware of each declarant’s information but did not
turn the information over to Suggs. But as with his Jones claim,
Suggs’s Brady claim is time-barred under rule 3.851. Suggs fails to
show that he exercised due diligence in learning that Riebe had
allegedly confessed to three people. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2);
Stein, 406 So. 3d at 175. Suggs also fails to show he could not
have brought this claim earlier. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2); Bogle,
322 So. 3d at 46. This claim is barred.
This claim also fails on the merits since Suggs does not
establish that Riebe made these alleged confessions before trial or
that the State was aware of them at the time of trial. Thus, he fails
to show that Brady applies. In re Bolin, 811 F.3d 403, 408-09 (11th
Cir. 2016) (Brady does not apply to confessions that occurred after
trial).
Suggs’ second Brady claim—which is based on Taylor’s,
Ozio’s, and Crenshaw’s information—is also barred under rule
3.851 for the same reasons discussed above. Suggs should have
- 15 -
been aware of the alleged false inmate testimony since 1996 and
2003, respectively, and Suggs could have raised this claim in one of
his prior postconviction challenges. See Hutchinson, 50 Fla. L.
Weekly at S73, 2025 WL 1198037, at *6 (barring a claim that could
have been raised in an earlier motion). The circuit court properly
denied both Brady claims.
V
Suggs’ Giglio and Massiah claims are untimely under rule
3.851 for the reasons discussed above. Suggs has accused Taylor
and Byars of lying at trial for decades. Moreover, these claims are
also barred because Suggs raised them in his initial postconviction
proceeding—and we upheld the circuit court’s rejection of them—
nearly twenty years ago. Suggs II, 923 So. 2d at 427-28; cf.
Reynolds v. State, 373 So. 3d 1124, 1126 (Fla. 2023) (claims that
have been previously raised and rejected are procedurally barred).
Specifically, in his initial postconviction motion, Suggs argued that
the State violated Giglio by presenting the false testimony of Taylor
and Byars. Suggs II, 923 So. 2d at 426-27. Accordingly, we find
Suggs’ Giglio claim to be procedurally barred and affirm the circuit
court’s denial.
- 16 -
We have also previously considered and rejected Suggs’
Massiah claim that the State used Taylor and Byars to obtain his
confession in violation of his right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 427-28.
Because Suggs is raising the same Massiah claim here, we affirm
the circuit court’s denial of this claim as procedurally barred. See
Reynolds, 373 So. 3d at 1126.
VI
Finally, Suggs asked the circuit court to grant him relief from
our decision in his second successive postconviction appeal. See
Suggs III, 238 So. 3d at 705. Suggs alleges that we violated his due
process rights by considering evidence outside the record. Even
though Suggs previously sought relief for this alleged due process
violation via the proper vehicle—a motion for rehearing, see Suggs
v. State, No. SC16-576, 2018 WL 1285546 (Fla. Mar. 13, 2018), he
has resurrected this claim in circuit court.
In an argument that stretches the bounds of credulity, Suggs
now asks us to find that the circuit court erred in determining that
it lacked authority to grant relief from our prior decision. The
circuit court is bound by decisions from this Court. See State v.
- 17 -
Lott, 286 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1973); Reiter v. Gross, 599 So. 2d
1275, 1275 (Fla. 1992); State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla.
1976). This claim is utterly meritless, and we affirm the circuit
court’s denial. 12
VII
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s
summary denials of Suggs’ third and fourth successive motions for
postconviction relief.
It is so ordered.
MUĂ‘IZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, FRANCIS, and
SASSO, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Walton County,
Kelvin C. Wells, Judge
Case No. 661990CF000338CFAXMX
Dawn B. Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern
Region, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
12. This claim is also procedurally barred under rule
3.851(e)(2) because Suggs cannot raise a claim that was already
rejected in a prior postconviction motion. Reynolds, 373 So. 3d at
1126.
- 18 -
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Janine D. Robinson,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
- 19 -
Case Information
- Court
- Fla.
- Decision Date
- September 4, 2025
- Status
- Precedential