Escobedo v. Limon

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE ESCOBEDO, Case No. 1:25-cv-00428-BAM 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 PAULA LIMON dba COSTA DORADA; DECLINING SUPPLEMENTAL REEDLEY PROPERTIES, L.P., JURISDICTION AND DISMISSING STATE 15 LAW CLAIMS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendants. 16 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 17 18 19 Plaintiff Jose Escobedo initiated this action on April 11, 2025, against Defendants Paula 20 Limon dba Costa Dorada and Reedley Properties, L.P. (Doc. 1.) The complaint alleges 21 violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 22 12101 et seq.; the California Unruh Act, California Civil Code § 51 et seq.; and California Health 23 and Safety Code §§ 19955, 19959. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks an award of statutory damages, costs of 24 suit, attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, injunctive or preventative relief, declaratory relief, and 25 interest at the legal rate from the date of filing the complaint. (Id. at 9.) Defendants have not yet 26 appeared in this action. 27 /// 28 1 On April 30, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should not 2 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and California Health & 3 Safety Code claims for the reasons stated in Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022) and Arroyo 4 v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 2021). (Doc. 5.) Plaintiff filed a response on May 14, 2025. 5 (Doc. 6.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends declining supplemental 6 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law construction-related accessibility claims and dismissing 7 those claims without prejudice. 8 I. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 9 In an action over which a district court possesses original jurisdiction, that court “shall 10 have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action 11 within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article 12 III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Even if supplemental jurisdiction 13 exists, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction: 14 The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if— 15 (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 16 (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which 17 the district court has original jurisdiction, 18 (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or 19 (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 20 declining jurisdiction. 21 22 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Supreme Court has described 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) as a “codification” 23 of the principles of “economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” that underlie the Supreme 24 Court’s earlier jurisprudence concerning pendent jurisdiction. City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of 25 Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 26 357 (1988)); see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Gibbs”). In 27 Gibbs, the Supreme Court noted that it “has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction 28 1 is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. The justification for 2 pendent jurisdiction “lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to 3 litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state 4 claims, even though bound to apply state law to them.” Id. The Court emphasized that 5 “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote 6 justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Id. 7 District courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims 8 “[d]epending on a host of factors” including “the circumstances of the particular case, the nature 9 of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the 10 state and federal claims.” City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 173. The supplemental jurisdiction statute 11 “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a 12 federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the 13 values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Id. (quoting Cohill, 484 U.S. at 14 350). 15 The Ninth Circuit does not require an “explanation for a district court’s reasons [for 16 declining supplemental jurisdiction] when the district court acts under” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1)- 17 (3), San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998), but does 18 require a district court to “articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional in addition 19 to inquiring whether the balance of the Gibbs values provide compelling reasons for declining 20 jurisdiction in such circumstances.” Executive Software N. Am. Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the 21 Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1994); Vo, 49 F.4th at 1169-1170 (“a district 22 court must: (1) sufficiently explain ‘why the circumstances of the case are exceptional’ under § 23 1367(c)(4); and (2) show that ‘the balance of the Gibbs values provides compelling reasons for 24 declining jurisdiction in such circumstances.’”). According to the Ninth Circuit, this “inquiry is 25 not particularly burdensome.” Executive Software N. Am. Inc, 24 F.3d at 1558; Vo, 49 F.4th at 26 1171. When declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4), “the 27 court must identify the predicate that triggers the applicability of the category (the exceptional 28 circumstances), and then determine whether, in its judgment, the underlying Gibbs values are best 1 served by declining jurisdiction in the particular case (the compelling reasons).” Executive 2 Software N. Am. Inc, 24 F.3d at 1558. 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 This Court concludes, as have numerous courts before it, the circumstances here are 5 exceptional. See, e.g., Garcia v. Maciel, No. 21-cv-03743-JCS, 2022 WL 395316, at *2 (N.D. 6 Cal. Feb. 9, 2022) (collecting cases). The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court properly 7 declined supplemental jurisdiction in a joint Unruh Act and ADA case based upon the heightened 8 pleading requirements California imposes upon high-frequency litigants. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1174. 9 The “high-frequency litigants” subject to those heightened pleading requirements are defined as: 10 A plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints alleging a construction- related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately 11 preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation. 12 13 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(1). The definition of “high-frequency litigant” also extends to 14 attorneys. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(2). “High-frequency litigants” are subject to a 15 special filing fee and further heightened pleading requirements. See Cal. Gov. Code § 70616.5; 16 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50(a)(4)(A). These heightened pleading requirements apply to 17 actions alleging a “construction-related accessibility claim,” which California law defines as “any 18 civil claim in a civil action with respect to a place of public accommodation, including but not 19 limited to, a claim brought under Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55, based wholly or in part on an alleged 20 violation of any construction-related accessibility standard.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1). 21 Plaintiff’s claims under Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 19955 and 19959 are “construction-related 22 accessibility claims” that are subject to the same pleading and filing requirements as Plaintiff’s 23 Unruh Act claim. See Gilbert v. Singh, No. 1:21-cv-01338-AWI-HBK, 2023 WL 2239335, at *2 24 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2023). 25 In response to the show cause order, Plaintiff acknowledges that he would be considered a 26 high-frequency litigant under California law, as he has filed more than ten construction-related 27 accessibility claims in the twelve months preceding the filing of the instant action. (Doc. 6 at 2, 28 Doc. 6-1, Declaration of Jose Escobedo ¶ 2.) Indeed, as noted in the show cause order, “A review 1 of Plaintiff Escobedo’s prior cases in this district reveals that he has filed at least ten (10) 2 construction-related accessibility cases in this district within the 12-months period immediately 3 preceding the filing of this action on April 11, 2025.” (Doc. 5 at 3.) Counsel for Plaintiff states 4 in her declaration that she does not qualify as a high-frequency litigant. (Doc. 6-1, Declaration of 5 Tanya E. Moore ¶ 2.) 6 Even if Plaintiff or counsel were not a high-frequency litigant, the Ninth Circuit has held 7 that district courts need not adjudicate this threshold matter. Forcing the district court to 8 determine if Plaintiff or counsel is a high-frequency litigant would itself run afoul of the Gibbs 9 values—especially comity. Accord Brooke v. Sarodia Suncity LLC, No. ED CV-22-1374 JGB 10 SPX, 2022 WL 17363913, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2022), citing Vo, 49 F.4th at 1173. As Gibbs 11 explains, “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to 12 promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable 13 law” by the state courts. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1173–74, citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. If the federal 14 district court is required to adjudicate these threshold matters, it will “deprive the state courts of 15 their critical role in effectuating the policies underlying those reforms.” Id., citing Arroyo, 19 16 F.4th at 1213. 17 If this Court were to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and 18 Health & Safety Code claims, then the “distinctive configuration of California-law rules—which 19 pair a damages remedy with special procedural requirements aimed at limiting suits by high- 20 frequency litigants—would be rendered ineffectual.” See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211–12. “By 21 enacting restrictions on the filing of construction-related accessibility claims, California has 22 expressed a desire to limit the financial burdens California’s businesses may face for claims for 23 statutory damages under the Unruh Act. Plaintiffs who file these actions in federal court evade 24 these limits and pursue state law damages in a manner inconsistent with the state law’s 25 requirements.” Id. at 1206-07, 1209. It is not, under the Gibbs factors, “fair” to defendants that a 26 plaintiff may pursue construction-related accessibility claims in this Court while evading the 27 limitations California state law has imposed on such claims. In addition, to allow federal courts 28 to become an “escape hatch” for plaintiffs is also an affront to the comity between federal and 1 state courts. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1169 (affirming the district court holding that allowing federal courts 2 to be an ‘escape hatch’ for plaintiffs seeking to avoid the heightened requirements would be an 3 “affront to the comity between federal and state courts”). 4 Moreover, permitting high-frequency litigants to evade California’s limitations on 5 construction-related accessibility claims places tremendous strain on the federal courts. Plaintiff 6 Escobedo has filed more than 10 construction-accessibility cases in this district within the 12- 7 month period immediately preceding the filing of this action. (Doc. 6 at 2, Doc. 6-2 ¶ 2.) The 8 multiple filings suggest that it is precisely because the federal courts have not adopted 9 California’s limitations on such claims that federal courts have become the preferred forum for 10 such claims. See generally Garibay v. Rodriguez, No. EDCV 18-9187 PA (AFMx), 2019 WL 11 5204294, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (“Indeed, those reasons, if true at all, do not explain why nearly 12 9 times more construction-related accessibility actions are being filed in the Central District in 13 2019 than were filed in 2013.”) Permitting federal courts “to become an escape hatch” to pursue 14 such claims offends the comity between state and federal courts. Declining to exercise 15 supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims early in the litigation preserves federal judicial 16 resources for the consideration of federal claims, while still allowing plaintiffs to pursue their 17 state law claims in state court. See e.g., Brooke, 2022 WL 17363913, at *5 (“Continuing to 18 exercise supplemental jurisdiction in these extraordinary circumstances would unnecessarily force 19 this Court to expend resources to resolve state law claims for relatively modest statutory damages 20 and attorneys’ fees even after the federal claim is moot.”). 21 Plaintiff Escobedo argues that declining supplemental jurisdiction and litigating his claims 22 in separate forums would be duplicative and increase burdens. (Doc. 6 at 2-3.) However, the 23 Court finds that fairness favors declining jurisdiction because Plaintiff can pursue identical 24 remedies in state court. Exercising the Court’s discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction 25 does not deprive Plaintiff of any remedies. Indeed, Plaintiff’s ADA claim for injunctive relief will 26 remain pending in this Court. Accordingly, the Court concludes that California’s enactment of 27 laws restricting construction-related accessibility claims, combined with the burden the ever- 28 increasing number of such cases poses to the federal courts, presents “exceptional circumstances” 1 and “compelling reasons” that justify the Court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental 2 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and Health & Safety Code claims under 28 U.S.C. § 3 1367(c)(4). See Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1031 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (relying on 4 Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965), for the proposition that federal courts are 5 permitted to decline supplemental jurisdiction to discourage improper forum-shopping, such as 6 ADA plaintiffs’ “use [of] federal court as an end-around to California’s pleading requirements”). 7 Moreover, the Court sees no prejudice in requiring Plaintiff Escobedo’s state-law claims be heard 8 in state court. See Garibay, 2019 WL 5204294, at *6 (“[D]eclin[ing] supplemental jurisdiction 9 does not deprive plaintiff of any remedies. Nor does it allow an ADA claim for injunctive relief 10 to go unaddressed.”). For these reasons, it will be recommended that the district court, in its 11 discretion, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and Health & 12 Safety Code construction-related accessibility claims and that any such claims be dismissed 13 without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 14 III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 15 The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to randomly assign a district judge to this action. 16 Additionally, for the reasons stated, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows: 17 1. The Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act 18 and Health & Safety Code construction-related accessibility claims; and 19 2. Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and Health & Safety Code construction-related accessibility 20 claims be dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 21 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 22 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 23 fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may 24 file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 25 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed 26 fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page 27 number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page 28 limit may not be considered. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 1 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 2 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter 3 v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 Dated: May 15, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28