Felton v. State

 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
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In the Supreme Court of Georgia



                                                   Decided: September 16, 2025


                        S25A0840. FELTON v. THE STATE.

       LAGRUA, Justice.

       Appellant Joseph A. Felton appeals his convictions for malice

murder and other crimes related to the beating and stabbing death

of his wife, Sheray Felton.1 On appeal, Felton argues that his

convictions should be reversed based on the following contentions:

(1) Felton’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing

to request a jury charge on impeachment based on a witness’s bias



                                 —————————————————————
       1 Sheray was killed on or about March 13 to 15, 2014. On July 7, 2016, a

Henry County grand jury indicted Felton for the following counts: malice
murder (Count 1); felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2);
and aggravated assault (Count 3). Felton was tried from August 2 to 12, 2021,
and the jury found Felton guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Felton
to life without the possibility of parole on Count 1 (malice murder), and the
remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. Felton filed a
timely motion for new trial, which he later amended through new counsel
multiple times. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the motion for new
trial, the trial court denied the motion on December 11, 2024. Felton filed a
timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the April
2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
for or against a party; (2) in four different instances at trial, the trial

court plainly erred by allowing witnesses to testify about testing

performed by other individuals and by allowing the admission of the

non-testifying individuals’ reports through these witnesses in

violation of Felton’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the

Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (3) the trial

court plainly erred in permitting the State to introduce evidence of

multiple knives found in Felton’s car at the time of his arrest

because the State failed to show a connection between the knives

and Sheray’s death; and (4) the cumulative harm of trial counsel’s

deficiency and the trial court’s errors requires reversal. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm Felton’s convictions and sentences.




                                    2
The evidence presented at trial demonstrates that, on the night of
March 14, 2014, Rosanna Mays, Sheray’s mother, and Josten Mays,
Sheray’s 20-year-old son, who lived in the Chicago area, were
scheduled to fly from Chicago to Atlanta to visit Sheray. Rosanna
spoke to Sheray around 8:00 p.m. on March 13 — the night before
the scheduled trip — and Sheray sounded “fine.” At 5:00 a.m. the
next morning, Felton called Rosanna and told her that “Sheray was
sick”; that he “had taken [Sheray] to the hospital”; and that they had
returned home. Rosanna asked to speak to Sheray, and Felton told
her that “Sheray was sleeping.” A couple hours later, Felton called
Rosanna again, and when Rosanna asked to speak with Sheray,
Felton told her Sheray was still “resting.” Around 11:30 a.m. on
March 14, Rosanna received another call from Felton, and this time,
he sounded “very angry and upset” and “was cursing.” Felton told
Rosanna he had “looked in Sheray’s email” and “believed that
Sheray had a boyfriend” and was cheating on him. Rosanna assured
Felton that Sheray loved him and tried to calm him down, and
Felton said he “would kill Sheray” if “she got a man” and hung up
the phone. 2
      Before leaving for Atlanta on the night of March 14, Rosanna

and Josten tried to reach Sheray, but she did not answer her phone


                        —————————————————————
      2 At trial, Rosanna testified that this kind of jealous behavior was not

out of character for Felton. The record reflects that Sheray and Felton grew up
in the Chicago area and dated briefly in high school. After reconnecting in
2011, Sheray and Felton were married and lived in Chicago. In 2013, Sheray
moved to Georgia. At the time, Felton did not move with Sheray because the
two were separated, but he later followed her to Georgia in late 2013. Rosanna
testified that, when Sheray and Felton got back together “as adults,” Felton
“was very controlling,” “clingy,” “jealous,” and “aggressive.” Additionally,
Rosanna and Josten testified that they had observed Felton act violently
towards Sheray and that he seemed “obsessed” with Sheray, calling her
“constantly,” getting angry and jealous when she socialized or spent time with
any other men — including Josten and other family members — and damaging

                                      3
or respond to text messages. Rosanna and Josten landed at the

Atlanta airport around midnight on March 14, and while they were

“expecting to see [Sheray],” she was not there to meet them and did

not answer her phone, which increased their concern “that

something had happened” to her.3 They rented a car at the airport

and drove to the house Sheray shared with Felton in Henry County

(the “Felton residence”), arriving between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on

March 15. Rosanna and Josten rang the doorbell and knocked on the

front and back doors, but no one answered. They also noted that

Sheray’s two dogs — who usually had “free reign [sic] of the house”

and would start “barking” and “jumping up on the door” when

someone came to the house — were not by the door. Instead, the dogs

were “whining” somewhere inside the house. After noting that all

the doors to the house were locked, Rosanna called the police to


                        —————————————————————
or destroying any of Sheray’s clothes that he thought were too “provocative.”
One of Felton’s co-workers, who often drove Felton to work, testified that
Felton had a “fixation” with Sheray and that she was “all he talked about.”
       3 Rosanna testified that she spoke with Sheray “on a daily basis,” so her

inability to reach Sheray on March 14 was very concerning. Josten similarly
testified that he spoke to Sheray “every day,” and he had never gone “that long
without being able to contact her.”
                                       4
request a welfare check. A police officer arrived around 5:00 a.m.,

and after checking the house, knocking on the doors, and observing

no signs of forced entry anywhere, he advised Rosanna and Josten

that he would need to wait “24 hours” prior to entering the home.

     Rosanna and Josten waited in the car and continued trying to

reach Sheray. While they were waiting, Rosanna received a call from

Felton, who said he had “been checking on [Sheray] throughout the

night” and she was “fine.” He also said he was at work, but evidence

introduced at trial from his employer DHL showed that he had not

shown up for his 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. scheduled shifts on March

14, 15, and 16. Rosanna asked Felton to please hurry to the house,

explaining that she and Josten had been there “all night trying to

get in the house” and “Sheray ha[d]n’t answered the door.” Felton

said he would be home in 15 or 20 minutes. About an hour and a half

later, when Felton still had not shown up, Rosanna “called law

enforcement again.”

     Henry County Police Officer Geoffrey Gravius arrived at the

Felton residence around 11:30 a.m. on March 15. Officer Gravius

                                 5
testified that he was already familiar with this residence because he

had previously been dispatched there on January 1, 2014 in

response to “a 911 hang up.” According to Officer Gravius, on

January 1, he and another police officer arrived at the Felton

residence, and after knocking on the door and ringing the doorbell

multiple times, they eventually made contact with Sheray, who

called for help from an upstairs window. The officers learned that

Sheray had attempted to call 911 following a physical altercation

with Felton, who prevented her from completing the call and hid the

telephone from her. The officers observed “a visible bruise . . . on

[Sheray’s] right forearm” and “a small injury to her bottom lip,”

which Sheray said occurred when Felton “shov[ed]” a pair of shorts

“into her mouth.” The officers observed no visible injuries to Felton.

     On March 15, when Officer Gravius arrived at the Felton

residence, Rosanna and Josten explained their concerns about

Sheray, and Officer Gravius attempted to make contact with

someone inside the house without success. Officer Gravius advised



                                  6
Rosanna and Josten that he could not yet enter the house, as there

were no signs of a forced entry.

     Rosanna and Josten then decided to force their way into the

house to check on Sheray, and Josten broke through one of the back

windows with a brick and “climbed inside.” As Josten walked toward

the front of the house, he saw a “smashed up TV” in the family room

and a “big desk ... blocking the front door,” which he moved to let

Rosanna inside. Rosanna and Josten were struck by a “foul odor” in

the house and discovered that Sheray’s two dogs and their puppies

had been confined — without food or water — to a bathroom and

another room downstairs, where the floors were covered with “dog

feces and urine.” Upstairs, Rosanna and Josten noticed that the

bathtub of the hallway bathroom was full of Sheray’s clothes and

other belongings; that there was “another smashed up TV” in the

master bedroom;4 and that, in the master bathroom, Sheray’s

clothes were all over the floor and inside the bathtub, and the sink

                      —————————————————————
     4 According to Josten, when Felton lived with Sheray and Josten in
Chicago, he had previously damaged televisions in their home when he got
angry with Sheray.
                                   7
was full of torn up “papers,” including Sheray’s diplomas, Josten’s

birth certificate, and Sheray’s Social Security card.

     At that point, Rosanna called Officer Gravius to inform him

that she and Josten “had made forced entry into th[e] house” out of

concern for Sheray and that they found the house in disarray.

Shortly thereafter, Officer Gravius and another police officer

arrived, and after assessing the downstairs area of the house, the

officers went upstairs. In the master bathroom, the officers observed

what they believed to be a human leg underneath a large “pile of

clothing” in the “center of the floor.” After clearing the house and

obtaining a search warrant, the officers discovered Sheray’s body

under the pile of clothes on the bathroom floor. The Henry County

coroner pronounced Sheray dead at the scene.

     The medical examiner testified that Sheray had “a minimum

of approximately 15 or so” “sharp force injuries” and “blunt force

injuries” to her head, including “a large wound complex of her face”

involving “the nose, the left eye, the left cheek, the forehead,” and

“the scalp”; “extensive facial fractures”; and a “collapsed” eye.

                                  8
Additionally, Sheray suffered “five sharp wounds of her torso” in the

chest and shoulder areas, one of which “struck the liver”; a four-inch

“sharp force injury” to her “left wrist”; and a “sharp forced injury of

her medial left lower leg below the knee,” which was “three and a

half inches in length.” The medical examiner concluded that

Sheray’s cause of death was “blunt and sharp force trauma of the

head, torso and extremities.”

     On the late afternoon of March 15, Henry County Police

detectives conducted a search of the Felton residence. One of the

detectives testified that, during their search, they smelled gasoline

in both upstairs bathrooms and noted the presence of liquid inside

the bathtubs where Sheray’s clothing and belongings had been

discarded. This liquid later tested positive for gasoline. Additionally,

detectives collected, among other items, the following: (1) a hammer

with suspected blood on it from the desk that had been blocking the

front door; (2) a pair of scissors with suspected blood on it, a red-

handled knife with a broken blade with suspected blood on it, and a

pair of gloves — similar to gloves worn by DHL employees — with

                                   9
suspected blood on them from the master bathroom; and (3) from the

kitchen, a red sheath for the broken, red-handled knife and an

orange sheath without a corresponding knife. At trial, the medical

examiner testified that the large “blunt force” injury to Sheray’s face

was “consistent with being produced by a blunt object like a

hammer,” and the “sharp force injur[ies]” and “incisions” to her head

and torso were “consistent with something sharp like a knife or

scissors.” The GBI later conducted testing of the hammer and the

broken, red-handled knife and determined that these items were

positive for blood and matched Sheray’s DNA.

     On March 15, detectives discovered that Sheray’s black 2005

Chrysler 300 was missing from the residence and that Felton’s

current whereabouts were unknown. After discovering that the cell

phone Felton used to call Rosanna on March 14 and 15 was

registered to Sheray, detectives submitted an “exigent request” to

the cell phone service provider for the corresponding cell phone

records. Upon receiving those records and reviewing the call location

data and online mapping programs, detectives determined that,

                                  10
between the early morning of March 14 and the afternoon of March

15, Felton’s cell phone traveled from Georgia to northern Michigan

and then traveled south to Chicago, Illinois, where it stopped.

     At trial, two of Felton’s cousins, Kevin and Steve Strickland,

testified that Felton showed up “out of the blue” at Kevin’s house in

Chicago on the afternoon of March 15. Felton told his cousins that

“Dee Dee” — which was Felton’s nickname for Sheray — was “dead”;

that she had fallen “down the stairs”; and that he “put her in the

bed,” hoping she would “wake up.” When Steve asked why Felton

did not call anyone for help, Felton responded that “[n]obody would

believe [him],” and he wanted to “kill[] himself.”

     At 2:55 a.m. on March 16, Felton called Rosanna and told her

“[h]ow much he loved Sheray” and that he was “sorry.” Rosanna

asked Felton why he killed Sheray, and he said, “You won’t see me

no more I’m going to kill myself too. You won’t ever see me again.”

Felton also called one of his co-workers from DHL, who testified that

he spoke to Felton around lunchtime on March 16, and Felton said

Sheray “was in a better place now”; that she “wasn’t suffering”; and

                                  11
that Felton was “going to join her.” Felton told his co-worker that

Sheray had been “making plans to leave him,” but he “took control

of the situation” and was getting ready “to kill himself.”

     Around 1:00 p.m. on March 16, Officer Angela Smith with the

Chicago Police Department received a call regarding a “wanted

individual” — later determined to be Felton — who was “involved in

a chase” with local police officers and the Illinois State Patrol. Felton

was reportedly driving a 2005 black Chrysler 300. Officer Smith

encountered Felton as he drove into the city on Lakeshore Drive.

Officer Smith testified that “it was gridlock” at the time, and

“multiple squad cars” were pursuing Felton, yelling for him to “stop,”

show his hands, and “exit his vehicle.” According to Officer Smith,

Felton did not stop, despite directives from law enforcement, and

when his car slowed because of the gridlock around him, “he began

to ram the cars, attempting to evade the police.” When Felton was

able to “squeeze his way out,” he drove “towards” Officer Smith, who

discharged her weapon, but Felton “continued flight” at “a high rate

of speed,” ultimately “T-boning another squad car” and “disabl[ing]

                                   12
both vehicles.” Law enforcement officers immediately surrounded

Felton’s car and gave him “multiple orders to exit his vehicle,” but

“he failed to comply.”

      Chicago Police Detective Hector Matias testified that he was

called to the scene to try to communicate with Felton. According to

Detective Matias, he was able to reach Felton on his cell phone, and

they spoke for several hours. Felton told Detective Matias that he

did not want to come out of the car; that he had “several knives”; and

that he wanted to “kill himself.” As the call continued, Felton agreed

to throw a few of the knives out of the car at Detective Matias’s

request, but Felton continued “threatening suicide.” Detective

Matias testified that, “towards the end of the evening, [Felton]

started to cut his wrists,”5 and he began to “shut down” and

“apologize[d] for his wife.” Felton then hung up the phone and would

not answer Detective Matias’s phone calls. At that point, “SWAT


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      5 One of the detectives positioned near the car could see that Felton was

“making movements across his wrists” with a knife. Two of Felton’s friends
testified that Felton called them during this timeframe, and he told them that
“he was stabbing himself.”

                                      13
[took] over,” and the SWAT team was eventually “able to get [Felton]

out of the car” and give him medical attention.

     After transporting Felton to the hospital and acquiring a

search warrant, Chicago Police Department investigators collected

a number of items from inside the Chrysler 300, including a black,

serrated kitchen knife and purple, green, and orange-handled

knives, which Henry County Police detectives later determined to be

“from the same set” as the broken, red-handled knife found in the

master bathroom and the red and orange sheaths found in the

kitchen of the Felton residence. While in Chicago, Felton was

arrested for Sheray’s murder and transported to Georgia.

     1. Felton first contends that he received ineffective assistance

of counsel because, at trial, his counsel failed to request a written

jury charge on impeachment based on a witness’s bias for or against

a party.6 Felton claims that such a charge was necessary in this case

because the State presented testimony demonstrating the prior

                       —————————————————————
     6   This charge does not appear in the Suggested Pattern Jury
Instructions, and in his brief, Felton does not specify what language should
have been included in such a charge.
                                    14
difficulties between Sheray and Felton, the contentious nature of

their relationship, and the negative opinions Rosanna and Josten

held about Felton and his treatment of Sheray.

     To prevail on his claim of ineffectiveness, Felton “generally

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the

deficient performance resulted in prejudice” to him. Moss v. State,

311 Ga. 123, 126 (2021) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US

668, 687–95 (1984)). If Felton “fails to meet his ... burden of proving

either prong of the Strickland test” — either deficiency or prejudice

— this Court “does not have to examine the other prong.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted). Because Felton has failed to meet his

burden of showing that his trial counsel was constitutionally

deficient by failing to request a separate impeachment for bias

charge, we need not decide the prejudice prong of the Strickland test

here. See id.

     With respect to deficiency, we have said that for a defendant to

prove that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, he “must

show that his counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way

                                  15
considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing

professional norms.” Nesbit v. State, 321 Ga. 240, 246–47 (2025)

(quotation marks omitted). “Under Strickland, decisions on requests

to charge involve trial tactics to which we must afford substantial

latitude, and they provide no grounds for reversal unless such

tactical decisions are so patently unreasonable that no competent

attorney would have chosen them.” Fuller v. State, 316 Ga. 127, 132

(2023) (quotation marks omitted).

     At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Felton’s appellate counsel

asked his trial counsel whether “there was a reason [he] didn’t

request a written jury instruction on impeachment [of a] witness by

showing evidence of bias [of] a witness,” and Felton’s trial counsel

responded that, in this case, he only requested the pattern jury

instructions, which do not include such a charge. Felton’s trial

counsel further explained that he “usually do[es]n’t go outside of the

suggested patterns unless there’s a clear and obvious issue that

doesn’t appear in the ... pattern instructions,” and based on the

evidence presented in this case, he did not determine it was

                                 16
necessary to seek any charges outside the suggested pattern jury

instructions.

     Additionally, at trial, the trial court charged the jury on the

credibility of witnesses and a witness’s interest or lack of interest,

specifically instructing the jury as follows:

     You, the jury, must determine the credibility of the
     witnesses. In deciding this[,] you may consider all of the
     facts and circumstances of the case, including the
     witness’s manner of testifying, their intelligence and
     means and opportunity of knowing the facts of which they
     testify, the nature of the facts about which they testify,
     the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
     interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case, and
     their personal credibility as you observe it.

And we have held that these “instructions given by the trial court

sufficiently covered the concept of impeachment by showing bias or

motive.” Huber v. State, 319 Ga. 78, 85 (2024).

     Because Felton’s trial counsel “articulated a reasonable

strategy in utilizing the pattern charge” after assessing the evidence

presented in this case, Fuller, 316 Ga. at 133, and because the bias

instruction was substantially covered by the instructions that were

given by the trial court, it was not objectively unreasonable to fail to

                                  17
request the additional instruction. See Huber, 319 Ga. at 85

(concluding that trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction

on impeachment concerning a witness’s bias or motive was not

deficient performance because the instructions given by the trial

court sufficiently covered “the concept of impeachment by showing

bias or motive”). Accordingly, Felton has failed to show that his trial

counsel was deficient in this respect, and this claim fails.

     2. Felton next contends that his rights under the Confrontation

Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

were violated by the testimony of several GBI analysts about the

conclusions of other non-testifying GBI analysts and by the

admission of reports generated by the non-testifying analysts. He

relies on the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Smith v. Arizona, which held that the trial testimony of an expert

witness who restated a non-testifying laboratory analyst’s factual

assertions in support of his own opinion testimony violated the

defendant’s Confrontation-Clause rights. See 602 US 779, 783–84,

795 (2024). The specific testimony and reports of which Felton

                                  18
complains are as follows:

     (a) At trial, GBI forensic biologist Ashley Hinkle testified as the

“peer reviewer” of the DNA testing, conclusions, and written report

of GBI forensic biologist Kimberly Turpin, who did not testify at

trial. Turpin conducted the “initial testing” of the orange-handled

knife found in Felton’s car and the gloves found in the master

bathroom of Sheray and Felton’s house, and she drafted the

corresponding report. Turpin determined that there were two DNA

profiles on the gloves; the major contributor was Sheray, and the

minor contributor was indeterminable. Turpin determined that the

DNA profile on the orange-handled knife matched “the DNA profile

of Joseph Felton.” At trial, Hinkle testified that, as “the peer

reviewer,” she “went back and checked [Turpin’s] data,” “her

methods, and “her notes,” and Hinkle “agreed with her conclusions.”

Turpin’s report was admitted into evidence at trial.

     (b) In the second instance, GBI forensic biologist Emily

Schmidt testified as the “peer reviewer” of the DNA testing,

conclusions, and written report of GBI forensic biologist Tashika

                                  19
Woodlum, who did not testify at trial because she was no longer

employed by the GBI. Woodlum conducted testing of a “cutting” of a

pair of shorts that were allegedly forced inside Sheray’s mouth

during that incident. Woodlum determined that the saliva on the

swab and the cutting from the shorts “matched” Sheray’s DNA. At

trial, Schmidt testified that the DNA analysis in this case and the

procedures followed were conducted “in an acceptable manner.”

Woodlum’s report was admitted into evidence at trial.

     (c) In the third instance, GBI forensic serologist Melissa West

testified that she conducted chemical testing on the gloves found in

the master bathroom of Sheray and Felton’s house to determine

whether there was any blood present, and she concluded blood was

present on the gloves. West documented those findings in a report,

which was admitted at trial. West also peer-reviewed the testing,

conclusions, and written report of GBI forensic biologist Danielle

Gibbs, who did not testify at trial because she was no longer

employed by the GBI. Gibson tested the orange-handled knife found

in Felton’s car for the presence of blood, and her testing revealed

                                20
that the orange-handled knife was positive for blood. At trial, West

testified that, as “the peer reviewer,” she “reviewed all of [Gibson’s]

notes and ... reports to see that everything was done in an acceptable

manner and followed all policies and procedures.” West testified

that, based on what she observed and the notes, methods, and

information she reviewed from Gibson, “there was blood on that

orange knife.” Gibson’s report was admitted into evidence at trial.

         (d) In the final instance, GBI forensic chemist Victoria

Oehrlein testified as the “peer reviewer” of the testing, conclusions,

and written report of GBI forensic chemist James Wadsworth, who

did not testify at trial. Wadsworth conducted testing of jars of liquid

found inside Felton’s vehicle after he was arrested and determined

that gasoline was present in those jars. Oehrlein also reviewed and

“reassess[ed]” Wadsworth’s “data and report” and issued her own

report, which supported Wadsworth’s findings and conclusions.

Oehrlein’s and Wadsworth’s reports were admitted into evidence at

trial.



                                  21
     (e) On appeal, Felton concedes that he did not object to the

testimony of these GBI witnesses or the admission of the GBI crime

lab reports at trial, and thus, we review these claims for plain error

only. See Holloway v. State, 320 Ga. 668, 670 (2025). To establish

plain error, Felton “must point to an error that was not affirmatively

waived, the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable

dispute, the error must have affected his substantial rights, and the

error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 670–71 (quotation marks

omitted).

     When we review an asserted evidentiary error under the plain-

error standard, we apply the law existing at the time of the appeal,

see Watkins v. State, 320 Ga. 862, 872 (2025) (explaining that, under

plain-error review, “[t]he current law considered is the law at the

time of appellate review rather than at trial”) (quotation marks

omitted), and “[b]ecause Smith v. Arizona was decided before the

time of this appellate review, it is current law for purposes of this



                                 22
analysis.” Id.7 However, here, we need not decide whether the trial

court committed clear or obvious error by admitting the testimonial

out-of-court statements and reports of non-testifying GBI witnesses

under Smith because Felton cannot meet the third prong of the

plain-error test to show that the admission of this evidence — which

primarily established that Felton’s blood was present on a knife

found in his vehicle and that Sheray’s DNA was present on a pair of

shorts recovered in the January 1, 2014 incident and on a pair of

gloves collected at the murder scene — affected his “substantial

rights,” particularly in light of the strong evidence of his guilt in this

case. See Jones v. State, 317 Ga. 466, 473 (2023) (holding that,

“[e]ven assuming ... it was clear error to admit” portions of the

appellant’s video-recorded interview at trial, “any error did not

affect [his] substantial rights” because the evidence “was harmless

in light of the substantial evidence of [his] guilt”). See also State v.


                        —————————————————————
      7 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that “[a] State may not introduce the

testimonial out-of-court statements of a forensic analyst at trial, unless she is
unavailable and the defendant has had a prior chance to cross-examine her,”
and “[n]either may the State introduce those statements through a surrogate
analyst who did not participate in their creation.” Smith, 602 US at 802–03.
                                       23
Johnson, 305 Ga. 237, 240 (2019) (“The third prong of the plain error

test requires that the error must have affected the appellant’s

substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must

demonstrate that it likely affected the outcome of the trial court

proceedings.”).

     The evidence of Felton’s guilt in this case was substantial and

included his own statements and admissions to multiple people,

strongly suggesting his guilt in causing Sheray’s death, as well as

evidence of (1) his aggressive and controlling behaviors towards

Sheray and his unreasonable fixation with Sheray; (2) his

dishonesty with Rosanna about Sheray’s sickness and his lies about

his whereabouts around the time of Sheray’s murder; (3) his threats

to kill Sheray if she was cheating on him; (4) his failure to report to

work as scheduled during the pertinent timeframe; (5) the lack of

any signs of forced entry into the Felton residence on March 15,

indicating that whoever caused Sheray’s death had ready access to

the house; (6) Felton’s flight to Chicago in Sheray’s car before

Sheray’s body was discovered; (7) Felton’s flight from law

                                  24
enforcement officers in Chicago when they tried to stop his vehicle;

and (8) Felton’s possession of multiple knives in his vehicle in

Chicago, some of which he used to injure himself during the police

stand-off and some of which appeared to be part of the same set as

the broken, red-handled knife found in the master bathroom of the

Felton residence, which tested positive for Sheray’s blood.

     In light of the strong evidence presented in this case, Felton

has not met his burden to show that, absent the admission of the

GBI analysts’ testimony and reports, a “reasonable probability”

exists that the “outcome of his trial would have been different.”

Johnson, 319 Ga. at 572. Accordingly, Felton’s claim of plain error

predicated on the admission of this evidence fails. See id.

     3. Felton also contends that the trial court plainly erred by

permitting the State to introduce evidence that Felton possessed

several colored-handled knives inside his vehicle in Chicago because

the knives were “not intrinsic” and were “improper character

evidence”; that the State failed to show a probative connection

between the knives and Sheray’s death; and that the prejudicial

                                 25
effect of this evidence substantially outweighed any probative

value.8 Felton concedes that he did not object to the admission of this

evidence at trial, and so, we review only for plain error.

     As noted above, plain-error review consists of four prongs. See

Holloway, 320 Ga. at 670. We need not analyze all four prongs in this

case because Felton has failed to establish that the trial court clearly

or obviously erred in admitting the knife evidence, which — as

explained below — is intrinsic evidence, or that the probative value

of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial

effect. See Roberts v. State, 315 Ga. 229, 238 (2022). We also need

not address Felton’s argument that evidence of his possession of

knives is improper character evidence because we conclude the

knives are intrinsic evidence and, thus, are not subject to OCGA §

24-4-404(b). See Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 19, 24 (2021).

     Evidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence when it is (1)
     an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction
     or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2)

                      —————————————————————
     8  We read Felton’s argument as asserting that the evidence was
inadmissible under OCGA §§ 24-4-403 and 24-4-404(b), although Felton cites
neither statute in his brief.
                                   26
     necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3)
     inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the
     charged offense. Evidence pertaining to the chain of
     events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the
     crime is properly admitted if it is linked in time and
     circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an
     integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is
     necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.
     Evidence of other acts is inextricably intertwined with the
     evidence regarding the charged offense if it forms an
     integral and natural part of the witness’s accounts of the
     circumstances surrounding the offenses for which the
     defendant was indicted. And this sort of intrinsic evidence
     remains admissible even if it incidentally places the
     defendant’s character at issue.

Heade, 312 Ga. at 24–25 (cleaned up). “[T]here is no brightline rule

regarding how close in time evidence must be to the charged

offenses, or requiring evidence to pertain directly to the victims of

the charged offenses, for that evidence to be admitted properly as

intrinsic evidence.” Harris v. State, 310 Ga. 372, 381 (2020).

     Here, evidence showing that Felton was in possession of

multiple, colored-handled knives in Chicago — where he had fled in

Sheray’s vehicle shortly before her body was discovered and in which

he was arrested the next day — was intrinsic in this case because it

was “inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the

                                 27
charged offense” and “form[ed] an integral and natural part” of the

“account of the crime.” Heade, 312 Ga. at 25. The evidence presented

at trial demonstrated that the knives with colored handles that

Felton had in the car with him when he was arrested appeared to

come from the same knife set as two items found at the scene: the

broken, red-handled knife that was found near Sheray’s body with

Sheray’s blood on it, and the orange knife sheath found in the

kitchen of the Felton residence, which appeared to match an orange-

handled knife that Felton had with him in the car. Thus, the knives

were “inextricably intertwined” with the evidence regarding

Sheray’s death by sharp-force wounds. White v. State, 307 Ga. 882,

889 (2020) (concluding that evidence of Appellant’s behavior within

several hours of the murder, including brandishing the murder

weapon while threatening to “take” someone’s life, “was integral” to

the account of “the events leading up to the killing” and was

“inextricably intertwined with the relevant evidence”). Moreover,

Felton’s possession and use of these knives to threaten the police

and his own life was connected to his flight after Sheray’s murder,

                                28
and “[e]vidence of flight is generally intrinsic” because it is evidence

of the defendant’s “consciousness of guilt.” Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga.

81, 89 (2022) (cleaned up).

     However, evidence that is intrinsic must still satisfy OCGA §

24-4-403. See Heade, 312 Ga. at 27. Although “[r]elevant evidence

may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of

time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence,” OCGA § 24-

4-403, “[t]here is no mechanical solution for this balancing test,” and

“a trial court must undertake in each case a considered evaluation

of the proffered justification for the admission of such evidence and

make an independent determination.” Heade, 312 Ga. 26–27. And

“[w]e have explained that this balance should be struck in favor of

admissibility.” Id. at 27.

     While evidence that Felton possessed multiple knives as he fled

from the crime scene was certainly prejudicial to Felton, “in a

criminal trial, inculpatory evidence is inherently prejudicial; it is

                                  29
only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value

that the rule permits exclusion.” Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 337

(2017) (quotation marks omitted). And evidence that Felton

possessed these knives in his car when he was arrested was not — on

its own — unfairly prejudicial. See Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 225, 232

(2022). Therefore, because evidence showing that Felton was in

possession of multiple, colored-handled knives at the time of his

arrest was properly admitted in this case, Felton cannot meet his

burden as to the second prong of plain-error review, and this claim

fails. See Williams, 315 Ga. at 495.

     4. Finally, Felton argues, in reliance on State v. Lane, 308 Ga.

10 (2020), that the “cumulative effect of the evidence erroneously

admitted at trial ... prejudiced Felton and denied him a fair trial.”

We disagree.

     “To establish cumulative error, a defendant must demonstrate

that at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial and

considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors

so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied the petitioner a

                                 30
fundamentally fair trial.” State v. Wood, 316 Ga. 811, 821 (2023)

(citing Lane, 306 Ga. at 21).

      Here, even if the trial court erred by allowing certain GBI

analysts to testify about the conclusions of other non-testifying

analysts and by admitting the absent analyst’s reports, Felton’s

cumulative-error claim fails. See Wood, 316 Ga. at 822. As detailed

in Division 2, the other evidence presented against Felton was

overwhelming, and in light of this overwhelming evidence, Felton

“has not demonstrated that the prejudicial effect of ... the trial court

error denied him a fundamentally fair trial.” Wood, 316 Ga. at 822.

See also Huff v. State, 315 Ga. 558, 568 (2023) (holding that the

appellant’s cumulative-error claim failed because the appellant did

not demonstrate that “the prejudicial effect of the assumed trial

court errors ... denied him a fundamentally fair trial, given the

strong evidence against him”). Accordingly, this final contention

also fails.

      Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.



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