Fox v. Kovacs

1                                                                           
2                    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
                         DISTRICT OF NEVADA                                 
3                                                                           
4  Marcella Fox,                      Case No. 2:24-cv-00047-CDS-NJK        

5                                            Plaintiff  Omnibus Order Resolving Plaintiff’s 
                                  Motions and Granting Defendants’ Motions  
6   v.                                        to Dismiss                    

7  Ryan Kovacs, et al.,                                                     
                                   [ECF Nos. 77, 80, 82, 90, 96, 100, 103, 104, 105, 
8                                            Defendants   112, 113, 123, 124] 

9                                                                           
10     Plaintiff Marcella Fox filed a first amended complaint (FAC) against defendants Ryan 
11  Kovacs, Le Croque-Mitaine LLC, Orange Reality Group LLC, HopeLink of Southern Nevada, 
12  and Jason Mattson alleging claims of (1) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (2) 
13  negligence per se; (3) retaliation in violation of the Fair Housing Act; (4) constructive eviction; 
14  (5) breach of covenant of quite enjoyment; (6) violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; 
15  (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (9) 
16  negligence; (10) breach of contract; (11) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
17  dealing; (12) tortious interference with contractual relations; (13) negligent hiring, retention, 
18  and supervision; (14) fraudulent misrepresentation; (15) unjust enrichment; and (16) 
19  discrimination based on disability in violation of the Fair Housing Act, Americans with 
20  Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See generally FAC, ECF No. 66.  
21     Defendants Ryan Kovacs, Le Croque-Mitaine, LLC, Orange Realty Group LLC, and Jason 
22  Mattson (collectively, “Kovacs defendants”) and HopeLink of Southern Nevada move to dismiss. 
23  See Kovacs defs.’ mot. to dismiss, ECF No. 77; HopeLink’s mot. to dismiss, ECF No. 82. Also 
24  pending before the court are several outstanding motions filed by Fox.1 This order resolves all 
25  pending motions.                                                         

26                                                                           
  1 Fox’s motion for sanctions (ECF No. 80) is denied. The decision of whether to stay discovery is 
  entrusted to the “wide discretion” of the district court. Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 
  1988). I find that defendants’ motion to stay was brought in good faith and is warranted, so Judge 
1  I.  Background2                                                          
2      The following allegations give rise to this action. On March 16, 2022, Fox entered into a 
3  lease for a property located at 1405 Vegas Valley Dr., Apt. 305, Las Vegas, Nevada. FAC, ECF No. 
4  66 at ¶ 4. Fox alleges that after moving in she was “met with a relentless barrage of chronic 
5  flooding, toxic mold growth and infestations of vermin[.]” Id. Despite asking for “repairs and 
6  reasonable accommodations,” defendants “turn[ed] a blind eye, allowing these dangerous 
7  conditions to fester and multiply, with catastrophic consequences.” Id. Fox says that her 
8  children were denied access to their own bedrooms for months because they were “rendered 
9  uninhabitable due to severe water damage that stripped the floors away, exposing only cold, 
10  unforgiving cement[]”and that “[m]old crept insidiously through the walls, while vermin thrived 
11  unchecked, creating a veritable toxic environment.” Id. at ¶ 6. She further alleges that 
12  “[d]efendants failed to replace . . . the drywall they removed from the master bathroom, leaving 
13  pipes exposed and further endangering the family’s safety[,]” and that defendants “neglected to 
14  provide basic security measures, such as adequate locking mechanisms on sliding doors[.]” Id. 
15  Fox alleges she has “meticulously documented” the hazardous conditions in her home which 
16  include flooding, water damage, infestations, mold, and structural damage. Id. at ¶¶ 7–11. Fox 
17  also alleges that she has suffered “lacerations from a broken window” and that the “heating and 
18  cooling systems were rendered non-functional.” Id. at ¶ 12. Fox states that the defendants are 
19  retaliating against her for complaining by issuing false “warning notices.” Id. at ¶ 13.   
20                                                                           
21                                                                          
  Koppe’s decision to grant it (see Order, ECF No. 127) was appropriate, thus there is no basis to sanction 
22                                                                           
  defendants. Further, Fox’s motion for leave to file excess pages (ECF No. 90) is denied as moot. The court 
  notes that Fox has also filed two unauthorized surreplies to both motions to dismiss. See surreplies, ECF 
23                                                                           
  No. 112, ECF No. 113. The Local Rules make clear that surreplies are “not permitted without leave of 
  court.” LR 7-2(b). Because these surreplies are unauthorized, they are stricken. Fox has also filed a 
24                                                                           
  renewed motion for judicial leniency (ECF No. 96), a motion for judicial estoppel (ECF No. 103), three 
25  motions for judicial notice (ECF Nos. 100, 104, 105) and a motion to compel a “federal audit of HopeLink 
  of Southern Nevada and demand for criminal investigation into fraudulent misuse of funds” (ECF No. 
26  123). I address these motions in the body of this order.                 
  2 Unless otherwise noted, I only cite to the FAC (ECF No. 66) to provide context to this action, not to 
  indicate a finding of fact.                                               
1  II.  Legal standard                                                      
2      The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a plaintiff to plead “a short and plain 
3  statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 
4  Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) when a pleader fails to state a claim upon which 
5  relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A 
6  pleading must give fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests, 
7  and although a court must take all factual allegations as true, legal conclusions couched as 
8  factual allegations are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(6) requires 
9  “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 
10  will not do.” Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
11  matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
12  556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility 
13  when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 
14  that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard “asks for more than a 
15  sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.           
16     If the court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should 
17  be granted unless it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 
18  amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). Under Rule 15(a), a 
19  court should “freely” give leave to amend “when justice so requires,” and in the absence of a 
20  reason such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive of the part of the movant, repeated 
21  failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed undue prejudice to the opposing 
22  party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 
23  371 U.S. 178 (1962).                                                     
24                                                                           
25                                                                           
26                                                                           
1  III.  Discussion                                                         
2      A.  Fox’s pending motions (ECF Nos. 80, 96, 100, 103, 104, 105, 123) 
3                                                                           
4                                                                           
5      Fox files a “renewed request for procedural leniency due to disability.” ECF No. 96. Fox 
6  previously filed a “request for procedural leniency due to disability” (ECF No. 86) which I 
7  denied because Fox failed to provide points and authorities to support her requests. Order, ECF 
8  No. 93. In her renewed motion, Fox cites 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) and Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 
9  (1982) to support her requests. See ECF No. 96 at 3–5. But neither citation applies to Fox’s 
10  requested relief. A federal court does not qualify as a public entity under 42 U.S.C. § 12131. A 
11  “public entity” is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12131 as “(A) any State or local government; (B) any 
12  department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local 
13  government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter 
14  authority.” Thus, federal courts or any federal entities are not explicitly included in that 
15  definition. And the MacDougall decision does not address “procedural leniency.” Rather, it 
16  addressed a mootness question regarding a civil action brought by an inmate of the Arizona 
17  Department of Corrections. Despite the lack of applicable points and authorities, I nonetheless 
18  address each request included her motion. See ECF No. 96 at 1, 6.       
19     First, Fox’s request that I grant a standing fourteen-day extension for filings “when 
20  necessary” is denied because there is no clear measure for what “when necessary” means, and the 
21  addition of fourteen days represents a seemingly arbitrary number. If Fox needs additional days 
22  to file specific motions, she can file a motion setting forth a specific request to extend the filing 
23  deadline, which should include the number of days she is requesting and the reasons for needing 
24  additional time. In the alternative, she may meet and confer with opposing counsel and enter 
25  into a stipulation to extend time. In either instance, Fox must comply with the local rules 
26  regarding such extension. See Local Rule 26-3.                           
1      Fox’s request that she be granted CM/ECF electronic filing privileges is granted on the 
2  condition that Fox fill out and file the form titled “consent for electronic service of documents.”3 
3  A review of the docket demonstrates that Fox has yet to complete this form, and Fox cannot opt 
4  in to electronic service of documents without submitting this form.      
5      Fox’s request that I provide real-time captioning and/or transcripts for all hearings is 
6  outside the scope of what this court can provide. Therefore, this request is denied. However, if 
7  ever needed, Fox may request a listening device for any in-court proceedings, and should she 
8  choose to do so, she must file a motion to request that accommodation at least 3 days in advance 
9  of any scheduled hearing to ensure the court has the proper equipment available.   
10     Fox’s request that I schedule hearings in the afternoon wherever possible is granted.  
11     Fox requests that I permit simplified exhibit formatting to accommodate her disabilities. 
12  This request is denied. It is unclear: (1) what exhibits she is referring to, (2) what changes to the 
13  standard exhibit formatting Fox wants or needs, and (3) how the exhibit formatting 
14  requirements in place impose a disproportionate burden on her. Should Fox have a specific 
15  request for the filing of a specific exhibit(s), she may file a motion setting forth her request. For 
16  those reasons, Fox’s renewed request for procedural leniency due to disability is granted in part 
17  and denied in part.                                                     
18                                                                          
19     Fox also filed a motion for judicial estoppel in which she requests that I grant the motion 
20  so as to prevent HopeLink from “boldly and blatantly deceiving” the court. ECF No. 103 at 7. Fox 
21  argues that HopeLink’s motion to dismiss “directly contradicts” its prior representations in its 
22  other filings. Id. at 5. HopeLink opposes the motion and argues that Fox has mischaracterized its 
23  motion to dismiss and that it has not directly contradicted itself. See generally opp’n, ECF No. 116. 
24  As previously explained,4 judicial estoppel “generally prevents a party from prevailing in one 
25                                                                           

26  3 For ease, I provide a link to the form here: https://www.nvd.uscourts.gov/wp-
  content/uploads/2020/04/Consent-by-Pro-Se-Non-Prisoner-to-receive-NEFs-4-15-20.pdf. 
  4 ECF No. 93 at 2.                                                        
1  phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in 
2  another phase.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 
3  U.S. 211, 217, n.8 (2000)). The court has examined Fox’s arguments and finds that HopeLink has 
4  not advanced contradictory arguments at this time, so her request is denied.  
5                                                                           
6      Fox’s motion also requests that I take judicial notice5 of (1) HopeLink’s IRS Form 990, 
7  (2) HopeLink’s 2022–23 Annual Report, and (3) HopeLink’s Signed Rapid Rehousing 
8  Agreement, which she attached to her motion. ECF No. 103 at 6; see IRS Form 990, Pl.’s Ex 2, 
9  ECF No. 103-1; 2022–23 Ann. Rep., Pl.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 103-3, Pl.’s Ex. 3, Housing agreement, ECF 
10  No. 103-2. In its opposition, HopeLink argues that these documents are outside of the pleadings 
11  and cannot be considered, Fox has mischaracterized and misinterpreted the documents, and the 
12  contents of the documents for which she requests judicial notice are reasonably in dispute. ECF 
13  No. 116 at 3–7. Indeed, at any stage of a proceeding, courts may take judicial notice of (1) facts 
14  not subject to reasonable dispute and “generally known within the trial court’s territorial 
15  jurisdiction” and (2) adjudicative facts, which “can be accurately and readily determined from 
16  sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)–(2). Fox’s 
17  request for judicial notice must be denied for several reasons. First, as to the “IRS Form 990,” 
18  HopeLink correctly asserts that the attachment is not an IRS Form 990 but is instead a report 
19  created by independent auditors so it potentially contains facts that are in reasonable dispute 
20  and its accuracy can be questioned. Accordingly, I will not take judicial notice of it.   
21     As for HopeLink’s 2022–23 Annual Report and Signed Rapid Rehousing Agreement, 
22  these documents are outside the pleadings. I previously informed Fox: “To the extent [she] 
23  wants me to take judicial notice of public filings as part of her opposition to defendants’ motion 

24                                                                           
  5 Fox is advised that her motion requesting two forms of relief violates the local rules. See Local Rule IC 2-
25  2(b) (“For each type of relief requested or purpose of the document, a separate document must be filed 
  and a separate event must be selected for that document.”). Fox is again cautioned that failure to comply 
26  with the local rules may result in sanctions. See ECF No. 93 at 2 (reminding Fox she must comply with 
  the local rules). The local rules can be found online at https://www.nvd.uscourts.gov/wp-
  content/uploads/2020/04/Local-Rules-of-Practice-Amended-2020.pdf.         
1  to dismiss, she may ask the court to do so when she files her opposition to the motion.” Order, 
2  ECF No. 93 at 2. Although Fox attached many documents to her complaint, she did not attach 
3  either of these two documents. Instead, she attached these two documents to her motion for 
4  judicial estoppel. See ECF No. 103. “When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if a 
5  district court considers evidence outside the pleadings, it must normally convert the 12(b)(6) 
6  motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, and it must give the nonmoving party an 
7  opportunity to respond.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, 
8  “there is a general rule against referencing evidence outside the four corners of the complaint.” In 
9  re Bare Escentuals, Inc. Sec. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2010). A court may take 
10  judicial notice of a document if it is not attached to the complaint if the plaintiff “refers 
11  extensively to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claims.” Ritchie, 
12  342 F.3d at 908. Because the FAC makes no mention whatsoever of the annual report or the 
13  rapid rehousing agreement, these documents cannot be incorporated into the complaint and it is 
14  not proper for me to review them while ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Additionally, because 
15  the facts within these documents are reasonably in dispute, I cannot take judicial notice of them. 
16  As such, Fox’s motion for judicial estoppel and request for judicial notice is denied.  
17     Fox also filed three additional motions for judicial notice. See ECF Nos. 100, 104, and 105. 
18  Those motions are denied for the same reasons, that is, the documents Fox asks that I take 
19  judicial notice of are outside of the complaint and therefore improper for consideration when 
20  resolving a motion to dismiss. Additionally, in these motions, Fox does not identify specifically 
21  what facts for which she would like the court to take judicial notice, she just requests that I take 
22  judicial notice of large swaths of documents and databases. See generally ECF Nos. 100, 104 and 
23  105; see also Malfavon v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71137, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 
24  2024) (denying a request for judicial notice when the party did not identify specific facts from 
25  each document that should be judicially noticed).6 Consequently, these motions are also denied. 
26                                                                           
  6 Two of Fox’s motions for judicial notice also include requests for judicial estoppel. See ECF No. 104 at 4; 
  ECF No. 105 at 6. I reviewed the filings and once again find that HopeLink has not put forth any 
1                                                                           
2      Lastly, Fox has filed a motion “to compel a federal audit of HopeLink of Southern Nevada 
3  and demand for criminal investigation into fraudulent misuse of federal funds.” Mot., ECF No. 
4  123; Errata, ECF No. 124. In the errata to her motion, Fox clarifies that the court (1) compel a 
5  forensic audit of HopeLink’s financial records as related to federal housing funds, (2) compel 
6  disclosure of relevant financial records, and (3) refer the case to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and 
7  the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Office of Inspector General for 
8  further investigation. ECF No. 124 at 2. This motion is fully briefed. See HopeLink’s resp., ECF 
9  No. 125, Pl.’s reply, ECF No. 126.                                       
10     Fox’s motion is unsupported by points and authorities and it is therefore denied. See LR 
11  7-2(a) (“The motion must be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities.”). Further, 
12  the requests that I compel a forensic audit of HopeLink’s financial records and “disclosure of 
13  relevant financial records” are vague and overbroad. Additionally, “it is well settled that private 
14  citizens lack a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution . . . of another.” Ryan v. Lopez, 2014 
15  U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71690, at *7 (D. Or. May 23, 2014) (citing Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86 
16  (1981) (per curium)) Therefore, this court to cannot “refer” the matter to the United States 
17  Attorney’s Office for investigation based on Fox’s allegations alone. See id.; see also see also United 
18  States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693–94 (1974) (finding that “the Executive Branch has exclusive 
19  authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case” and “Congress has 
20  vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States 
21  Government”). This motion is denied.                                    
22      B.  Ryan Kovacs, Le Croque Mitaine LLC, Orange Realty Group LLC, and Jason 
         Mattson’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 77) is granted.               
23                                                                           
24      In their motion to dismiss, the Kovacs defendants argue that Fox’s FAC must be 
25  dismissed because Fox fails to “provid[e] facts supporting the required elements of her claims[,]” 
26                                                                           
  contradictory arguments at this time. Fox is again reminded to follow the local rules relating to filing a 
  separate motion for each requested relief.                                
1  and the FAC “contains only mere recitations of the elements of her claims.” ECF No. 77 at 2.7 In 
2  her complaint, Fox brings both federal and state claims against the Kovacs defendants. See 
3  generally ECF No. 66. I address the federal claims first.                
4      Fox alleges that the Kovacs defendants have improperly retaliated against her in 
5  violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) because she requested the necessary repairs to her 
6  apartment. Id. at ¶ 54. Fox states, “[r]ather than addressing the severe hazards in the apartment, 
7  they responded by issuing false warning notices, further neglecting repairs, and creating an 
8  environment that was hostile, intimidating, and unbearable for Plaintiff and her family.” Id. In 
9  their motion, the Kovacs defendants argue that Fox has failed to state a claim for which relief 
10  can be granted because she provides no information in her FAC explaining what “false warning 
11  notices” and a “hostile, intimidating, and unbearable” environment means, and she provides no 
12  information detailing what form the retaliation took. ECF No. 77 at 8. Additionally, the Kovacs 
13  defendants point out that Fox does not provide any information as to “whom she made repair 
14  requests, who began sending false warning notices,” and “how close these notices were in time 
15  to the repair requests.” Id.                                            
16     Under 42 U.S.C. § 3617, it is unlawful to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with 
17  any person in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected by [the FHA]. “As 
18  with any retaliation claim, [courts must] apply the familiar burden-shifting analysis established 
19  by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Scoggins v. Falcon Ct., 
20  2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59060, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2025) (quoting Walker v. City of Lakewood, 
21  272 F.3d 1114, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001)). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FHA, 
22  a plaintiff must allege (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) the defendant(s) subjected her to 
23  an adverse action; and (3) “a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse 
24  action.” Walker, 272 F.3d at 1128 (citing Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th 
25  Cir. 1994)). “Protected activity” covers many types of actions but must relate to a plaintiff 
26                                                                           

  7 This motion is fully briefed. See Pl.’s Resp., ECF No 101; Kovacs defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 106.  
1  exercising her rights “granted or protected” by the FHA. Macon v. Proud Ground Org., 2021 U.S. 
2  Dist. LEXIS 143910, at *17–18 (D. Or. July 30, 2021) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3617). 
3      Fox fails to adequately allege that the alleged retaliation was caused by her repair 
4  requests. The court does find that Fox broadly alleges that as a result of her alleged disability,8 
5  defendants failed to address the numerous issues with her housing situation. But Fox provides 
6  no information about where or whom she submitted the repair requests, nor any identification 
7  of who issued the “false warning notices,” or how close in time said notices were issued in 
8  relation to the repair requests. Without this information, I cannot properly ascertain whether 
9  there is a causal link between the protected activity and the alleged retaliation, and I would be 
10  forced to speculate as to the existence of that causal link. See Rick-Mik Enters. v. Equilon Enters. LLC, 
11  532 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 2008) (granting motion to dismiss when the complaint lacked 
12  “factual specificity require to ‘raise a right to relieve above the speculative level’”) (citing 
13  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Moreover, defendants cannot properly defend against the case if the 
14  complaint fails to set forth the allegations against them. See Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 
15  F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that although the Federal Rules set forth a flexible 
16  pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice to each defendant of the factual allegations 
17  against them and tie these specific factual allegations with each of the elements of each legal 
18  claim, stated plainly and concisely.). Because Fox has failed to comply with the requirements of 
19  Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this claim against the Kovacs defendants 
20  must be dismissed.9                                                      
21                                                                          
22                                                                           
  8 As explained further herein however, I do not find Fox has properly alleged her disability. 
23                                                                           
  9 Fox’s claim also contains conclusory allegations that cannot survive a motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 66 
  at ¶ 54 (“defendants engaged in malicious retaliation” and created an environment that was “hostile, 
24                                                                           
  intimidating and unbearable”); see also Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Conclusory 
25  allegations . . . are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that 
  offers ‘labels and conclusions’ . . . ‘will not do.’’’ (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). Because Fox’s claim 
26  contains legal conclusions and because it lacks sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face. 
  So, the retaliation claim is dismissed without prejudice on this ground as well.  
1      Fox also alleges that the Kovacs defendants discriminated against her based on 
2  disability. ECF No. 66 at ¶¶ 123–40. Fox claims to bring this cause of action under “the [FHA], 
3  42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and 
4  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.” Id. at ¶ 124. Liberally construing the 
5  complaint, I find that Fox fails to properly allege her disability. Rather, the FAC merely alleges 
6  “disabled.” Id. at ¶¶ 3, 17, 26, 29, 126, 145. Fox does not however allege specifically what her 
7  disability is, how it affects her, or how she is qualified as a person in a protected class. To 
8  properly allege the element of disability, a plaintiff must allege their disability falls within the 
9  ADA, and some factual “specificity.” See Bresaz v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1136 
10  (N.D. Cal. 2015). The ADA defines disability as: (1) a physical or mental impairment that 
11  substantially limits one or more major life activities, (2) a record of having such an impairment, 
12  or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102. 
13     Fox also fails to allege how each defendant allegedly discriminated against her, what 
14  reasonable accommodations she requested, when those requests were made, nor does she 
15  explain how such requests were, in fact, reasonable. Without this information, the FAC lacks 
16  “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
17  liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
18  Consequently, Fox has failed to state a claim of disability discrimination, so this claim is 
19  dismissed without prejudice.                                            
20      Remaining are Fox’s claims against the Kovacs defendants for breach of the implied 
21  warranty of habitability; negligence per se; constructive eviction; breach of the covenant of quiet 
22  enjoyment; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; 
23  negligence; breach of contract; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 
24  tortious interference with contractual relations; negligent hiring, retention, and supervision; 
25  fraudulent misrepresentation; and unjust enrichment. Federal courts are courts of limited 
26  jurisdiction, and they may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that “are so 
1  related to claims in the action” that they form the same case or controversy with the claims over 
2  which the court has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Once a plaintiff’s federal claims are gone, 
3  the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims. Id. 
4  at § 1367(c)(3); Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is generally 
5  preferable for a district court to remand remaining pendent claims to state court.”). Because I 
6  have dismissed Fox’s federal claims against the Kovacs defendants, I decline to exercise 
7  supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against them at this time, so I 
8  dismiss them without prejudice. The court may reconsider dismissal if Fox files a second 
9  amended complaint, that complies with this order, that sufficiently alleges federal claims. 
10  Accordingly, the Kovacs defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted, so Fox’s claims against them 
11  are dismissed without prejudice.                                        
12     C.  HopeLink’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 82) is granted.            
13     Fox brings the same claims against HopeLink as she does against the Kovacs defendants. 
14  See generally ECF No. 66. Additionally, Fox alleges that HopeLink violated § 504 of the 
15  Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. at ¶¶ 71–76. I address the federal claims first.  
16     Fox’s claims that HopeLink retaliated against her in violation of the FHA, and generally 
17  “discriminated against her based-on disability” are both dismissed without prejudice for the 
18  same reasons  explained above, that is, she fails to properly allege her disability with any 
19  specificity, how it affects her, or how she is qualified as a person in a protected class, nor what 
20  sort of or when she made request for reasonable accommodations. See supra, pg. 12.Accordingly, 
21  this claim against HopeLink is dismissed without prejudice.             
22      Fox also alleges that HopeLink violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act  by “placing 
23  Plaintiff in a rental unit that was uninhabitable and failing to provide the accommodations 
24  necessary to safeguard her health[.].” ECF No. 66 at ¶ 72. She further alleges that “[t]he 
25  persistent plumbing issues, rampant mold, and vermin infestations created a living environment 
26  that was not only unsafe but actively dangerous to Plaintiff’s disability and pregnancy.” Id. 
1  HopeLink argues that Fox fails to state a claim for breach of § 504 because she does not allege 
2  that she was denied any benefit by HopeLink solely by reason of her disability. Mot to dismiss, 
3  ECF No. 82 at 11. I agree.                                               
4      Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “no otherwise qualified individual 
5  with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 
6  participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program 
7  or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794. To bring a § 504 claim, Fox 
8  must show (1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified to receive 
9  benefits; (3) she was denied benefits of the program solely by reason of her disability; and (4) the 
10  program receives federal financial assistance. Updike v. Multnomah Cnty., 870 F.3d 939, 949 (9th 
11  Cir. 2017).                                                             
12     A review of the complaint demonstrates that Fox’s claim falls short of the Rule 8 
13  pleading standard. Fox again fails to describe what her disability is or how it is a qualifying 
14  disability; she also fails to allege how she is otherwise qualified to receive benefits, what benefits 
15  she was allegedly denied, and how any alleged benefit denial was because of her disability. Fox 
16  has failed to plead the basic elements of a § 504 claim. Therefore, her claim is dismissed without 
17  prejudice.                                                              
18     I also dismiss without prejudice the state law claims against HopeLink for the same 
19  reasons I dismissed them against the Kovacs defendants, that is, I decline to exercise 
20  supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims at this time. The court may 
21  reconsider dismissal if Fox files a second amended complaint, that complies with this order, and 
22  sufficiently alleging her federal claims.                                
23      D.  Leave to amend                                                   
24      If the court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should 
25  be granted unless it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 
26  amendment. DeSoto, 957 F.2d at 658. As it is not wholly clear that amendment would be futile, I 
1  grant Fox leave to amend all her claims against all defendants. Should Fox choose to file a 
2  second amended complaint (SAC), she must do so no later than May 29, 2025. Further, if Fox 
3  elects to file a SAC, she may not bring any new claims or defendants. Fox is cautioned that her 
4  failure or inability to offer specific facts to support each element of her claims against each of the 
5  defendants will likely result in the dismissal of the case with prejudice.   
6  IV.  Conclusion                                                          
7      IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants Ryan Kovacs, Le Croque-Mitaine, LLC, 
8  Orange Realty Group LLC, and Jason Mattson’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 77] is GRANTED.  
9      IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that HopeLink of Southern Nevada’s motion to dismiss 
10  [ECF No. 82] is GRANTED.                                                
11     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Fox’s claims are dismissed without prejudice and 
12  with leave to amend. Should Fox choose to file a second amended complaint she must do so by 
13  May 29, 2025. If Fox does not file a second amended complaint by this deadline, or her amended 
14  complaint fails to state a cognizable claim against the defendants, this action may be dismissed 
15  with prejudice. If Fox elects to file a SAC, she may not bring any new claims or new defendants. 
16     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Fox’s motion for sanctions for bad faith litigation 
17  conduct [ECF No. 80] is DENIED.                                         
18     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Fox’s motion for leave to file excess pages [ECF No. 
19  90] is DENIED as moot.                                                  
20      IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Fox’s renewed request for procedural leniency [ECF 
21  No. 96] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as set forth in this order.  
22      IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Fox’s motion for judicial estoppel and judicial notice 
23  [ECF No. 103] is DENIED.                                                 
24      IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Fox’s motions for judicial notice [ECF Nos. 100, 104, 
25  and 105] are DENIED.                                                     
26      IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Fox’s surreplies [ECF Nos. 112, 113] are STRICKEN.  
 1        IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Fox’s motion to compel a federal audit of HopeLink of 
     Southern Nevada and demand for criminal investigation into fraudulent misuse of federal funds 
     [ECF Nos. 123, 124] is DENIED.                         
4        Dated: April 30, 2025                     /, / 
                                          LL 

                                       Ung District Judge 
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