Gaines v. Greigore

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JACOBI GAINES, Case No. 23-cv-06195-RMI 8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION 9 v. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 KARL GREIGORE, Re: Dkt. No. 24 Defendant. 11 12 13 Now pending before the court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. 24), 14 seeking summary judgment in favor of Defendant Greigore (as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 15 Amendment excessive force claim) on the merits and on qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiff has 16 not filed an opposition, or otherwise communicated with the Court, despite being provided a 17 reminder and an extension. (dkt. 29). The Court will still look to the merits of the Motion and for 18 the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion is granted. 19 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 20 BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff, at detainee at Santa Rita Jail, sued Alameda County Sheriff’s Office Correctional 22 Deputy Gregoire pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for excessive force. Plaintiff alleges that on 23 September 10, 2022, Gregoire searched his cell after observing what appeared to be the 24 ingredients to make homemade alcohol. (dkt. 10 at 1). Gregoire then escorted Plaintiff out of the 25 cell where he repeatedly squeezed Plaintiff’s neck despite Plaintiff telling him to stop. (Id.) Upon 26 arriving at a different holding cell, Gregoire slammed Plaintiff against the wall while handcuffed 27 and placed his body against Plaintiff with Plaintiff’s arm at an awkward angle. (Id. at 2). Gregoire 1 two pops in his shoulder. (Id.) Gregoire told Plaintiff to comply and stop moving as he yanked 2 Plaintiff’s arm and Plaintiff felt it pop out for a second. Gregoire then removed the handcuffs. (Id. 3 at 3). 4 Undisputed Facts 5 The salient facts are undisputed. Defendant has submitted video evidence in support of the 6 motion and Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to address the evidence or arguments. During the 7 relevant time, Plaintiff was a maximum-security detainee. Def. Mot. (dkt. 24) Gregoire Decl. ¶ 4. 8 Maximum-security level detainees generally consist of violent offenders. Id. On September 10, 9 2022, Gregoire was conducting a walk-through of A-Pod where Plaintiff was housed. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. 10 Gregoire observed in Plaintiff’s cell the possible makings of a prohibited alcoholic drink. Id. 11 Gregoire entered the cell which housed Plaintiff and his cellmate and smelled smoke within the 12 cell. Id. 13 Gregoire escorted Plaintiff’s cellmate out of the cell to a temporary holding cell and 14 returned to escort Plaintiff to a separate temporary holding cell in order to search their cell for 15 contraband. Id. ¶ 7; Ex. D, Gregoire Body Worn Camera footage 9:25-12:00. Gregoire explained 16 to Plaintiff that he was conducting an investigation and Plaintiff needed to “cuff up,” a command 17 to alert the detainee that they will be placed into handcuffs. Gregoire Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. D 12:00-12:50, 18 14:15-14:20. Plaintiff did not comply with the order to be handcuffed, but Gregoire was 19 eventually able to handcuff Plaintiff. Ex. D 14:30-14:50. 20 Gregoire then escorted Plaintiff out of the cell and down the stairs. Id. 15:00-15:28. 21 Gregoire had one hand on Plaintiff’s left shoulder area and his other hand on Plaintiff’s right arm, 22 to guide him down the stairs. Id. Once down the stairs, Gregoire put his hand on the back of 23 Plaintiff’s neck for approximately two or three seconds. Id. 15:29-31. Plaintiff asked, “(w)hy the 24 [expletive] [are] you grabbing my neck like that?” Id. Plaintiff did not appear in distress or injured. 25 Id. 26 Gregoire continued to walk with Plaintiff and then placed him inside a temporary holding 27 cell. Id. 15:53. Gregoire removed the handcuffs from Plaintiff’s left wrist and told Plaintiff to put 1 his side. Id. Gregoire attempted to put Plaintiff’s left hand on top of his head, while still holding 2 Plaintiff’s right hand and repeatedly told him to comply and put his left hand on top of his head. 3 Id. 16:00-1620. Plaintiff again did not comply. Id. Gregoire twisted Plaintiff’s arms around his 4 body, in order to get Plaintiff to comply. Id. Gregoire then leaned Plaintiff on the wall and told 5 him to put his hand on top of his head. Id. 16:14-16:20. Plaintiff finally raised his left hand to his 6 head and permitted Gregoire to remove the handcuffs from his right wrist. Id. 1620-16:26. 7 Plaintiff did not have any visible injuries, did not state that he was injured, or request any 8 medical care. Id. 16:20-16:35. 9 LEGAL STANDARD 10 Summary judgment on a claim or defense is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is 11 no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 12 law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show the 13 absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving 14 party’s claim, or to a defense on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of persuasion at 15 trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this 16 showing, the burden then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to identify “specific facts 17 showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The party opposing summary judgment must then 18 present affirmative evidence from which a jury could return a verdict in that party’s favor. 19 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). 20 On summary judgment, a court will draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the 21 nonmovant. Id. at 255. In deciding summary judgment motions, “[c]redibility determinations, the 22 weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 23 functions, not those of a judge.” Id. However, conclusory or speculative testimony or allegations 24 do not raise genuine issues of fact and are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See e.g., 25 Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). 26 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a post-arraignment, 27 pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Graham v. Connor, 1 excessive force claim under Section 1983, a pretrial detainee must show only that the “force 2 purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 3 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). “A court must make this determination from the perspective of a 4 reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 5 vision of hindsight.” Id. “A court (judge or jury) cannot apply this standard mechanically.” Id. 6 “[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Id. 7 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396). 8 A nonexhaustive list of considerations that may bear on the reasonableness of the force 9 used include “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; 10 the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount 11 of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the 12 officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. 13 Because the Kingsley standard applicable to excessive force claims by pretrial detainees is 14 purely objective, it does not matter whether the defendant understood that the force used was 15 excessive or intended it to be excessive. Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th 16 Cir. 2016) (en banc). A pretrial detainee can prevail by providing “‘objective evidence that the 17 challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or 18 that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.’” Id. (quoting Kingsley at 397-98)). 19 DISCUSSION 20 The undisputed facts demonstrate that Gregoire did not use excessive force and is entitled 21 to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint are refuted by the video 22 evidence from the body warn camera. Gregoire escorted Plaintiff out of his cell and down the 23 stairs and kept his hands on Plaintiff’s shoulder and arm. Gregoire placed his hand on Plaintiff’s 24 neck for two to three seconds, but did not squeeze Plaintiff’s neck, contrary to Plaintiff’s 25 allegations. This brief touch was not excessive force. 26 Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, Gregoire did not slam Plaintiff into the wall while 27 handcuffed when they entered the temporary holding cell. It is undisputed that Gregoire was 1 Plaintiff’s left wrist, but Plaintiff did not comply with repeated instructions to put his left hand on 2 his head. Gregoire did twist Plaintiff around, while holding his arms, in order to have Plaintiff 3 comply, but this was a de minimis amount of force. This was also so Gregoire could remove the 4 handcuffs from Plaintiff’s right hand. While Plaintiff was leaned against the wall, he was not 5 slammed and there was no force. At the time of the incident, Plaintiff did not say that he was 6 injured or needed medical care. 7 A review of the undisputed facts and the factors set forth in Kingsley, support Gregoire’s 8 argument that he is entitled to summary judgment and the minor amount of force used did not 9 violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Gregoire only used a small amount of force, the twisting of 10 arms with a maximum-security detainee who ignored repeated commands to comply, in order to 11 have his handcuffs removed. The video evidence did not show any injury, nor did Plaintiff 12 complain of any injury at that time. “An inmate who complains of a ‘push or shove’ that causes no 13 discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 14 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010); Baker v. Clearwater County, 2023 WL 3862511, at *3 (9th Cir. 2023) (A 15 deputy’s use of an “arm bar” was not excessive force even where a suspect offers no active 16 resistance and poses no immediate security threat. An officer is entitled to use a reasonable degree 17 of force to handcuff a suspect). Gregoire did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth 18 Amendment and is entitled to summary judgment. 19 Qualified Immunity 20 The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for 21 civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 22 constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 23 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or 24 those who knowingly violate the law.’” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (quoting Malley 25 v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Defendants can have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about 26 the facts or about what the law requires in any given situation. Id. at 205. A court considering a 27 claim of qualified immunity must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an 1 clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. See 2 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (overruling the sequence of the two-part test that 3 required determining a deprivation first and then deciding whether such right was clearly 4 established, as required by Saucier). The Court may exercise its discretion in deciding which 5 prong to address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each case. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 6 236. 7 A right is clearly established if it was “sufficiently clear [at the time of the conduct at 8 issue] that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that 9 right.” Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015). The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned 10 that courts should not define clearly established law at a high level of generality. See White v. 11 Pauly, 58 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam); see, e.g., Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104-08 12 (2018) (per curiam) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a woman who was armed 13 with a large knife, was ignoring officers’ orders to drop the weapon, and was within striking 14 distance of her housemate; prior cases on excessive force did not clearly establish that it was 15 unlawful to use force under these circumstances, where officer may not have been in apparent 16 danger but believed woman was a threat to her housemate). 17 The Court has not found a constitutional violation, and even if there was a violation, 18 Gregoire would be entitled to qualified immunity. It would not be clear to a reasonable deputy that 19 the de minimis use of force in this situation would be a constitutional violation, when a maximum- 20 security detainee was not complying with instructions. See Brown v. Baudino, 840 F. App’x 263 21 (9th Cir. 2021) (brief use of pepper spray followed by immediate medical attention was 22 objectively reasonable when detainee was a high security detainee and did not actively resist 23 deputies but refused to get off the floor and went limp when they tried to lift him); Brown v. Los 24 Angeles Sheriff Dept., Case No. 15-0843 RMO (JEM), 2021 WL 1554921, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25 29, 2021) (deputies’ use of force was objectively reasonable when high risk detainee was verbally 26 resisting, and then his knee gave out and deputies pushed him against a wall and then had to use 27 force to put detainee in his cell); O’Neal v. Smith, Case No. 11-803 DDP (MAN), 2015 WL 1 when he bent a detainee’s wrist in to handcuff detainee who was resisting), aff'd, 714 F. App’x 2 || 754 (9th Cir. 2018). The facts of the instant case are not as egregious as the above cases. Gregoire 3 || is entitled to qualified immunity. 4 CONCLUSION 5 Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 6 (dkt. 24) is GRANTED. A separate judgment shall issue and the Clerk is requested to close this 7 case. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: December 20, 2024 11 ROBERT M ILLMAN 12 United States Magistrate Judge 15 16 = 17 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28