Gordon v. Vaughn

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN DONTRELL GORDON, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 24-cv-1469-bhl AMY VAUGHN et al., Defendants. DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff Dontrell Gordon, who was incarcerated when he brought this action but has since been released, is representing himself in this 42 U.S.C. §1983 case. On June 23, 2025, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Gordon failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies before he filed this lawsuit. Dkt. No. 31. The Court notified Gordon that his response materials were due by July 24, 2025. The deadline has passed, and Gordon did not respond to the motion. Accordingly, as Gordon was warned, the Court will assume all facts asserted by Defendants are undisputed and will decide the motion without his input. See Civil L. R. 56(b)(4). LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Parker v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 845 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 2017)). In response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must “submit evidentiary materials that set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “The nonmoving party must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. Summary judgment is properly entered against a party “who fails to make a showing to establish the existence of an element essential to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Austin v. Walgreen Co., 885 F.3d 1085, 1087–88 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). ANALYSIS The Prison Litigation Reform Act, which applies to this case because Gordon was a prisoner when he filed his complaint, provides that an inmate cannot assert a cause of action under federal law “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit applies a “strict compliance approach to exhaustion,” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006), and expects inmates to adhere to “the specific procedures and deadlines established by the prison’s policy,” King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2015). The Court has reviewed Defendants’ motion, brief in support, and the undisputed facts, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), and concludes that they are entitled to summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). Based on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Defendants and deemed true as a result of Gordon’s failure to respond, the Court finds that, although Gordon properly initiated the exhaustion process by filing grievances, he never appealed the decisions on those grievances to higher levels as required by the Waukesha County Jail’s procedures. Accordingly, Gordon failed to exhaust the administrative remedies, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on Gordon’s failure to exhaust the administrative remedies (Dkt. No. 31) is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly. Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin on August 6, 2025. s/ Brett H. Ludwig BRETT H. LUDWIG United States District Judge This order and the judgment to follow are final. Plaintiff may appeal this Court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by filing in this Court a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 3, 4. This Court may extend this deadline if a party timely requests an extension and shows good cause or excusable neglect for not being able to meet the 30-day deadline. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A). If Plaintiff appeals, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the appeal’s outcome. If Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, he must file a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis with this Court. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1). Plaintiff may be assessed another “strike” by the Court of Appeals if his appeal is found to be non- meritorious. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(g). If Plaintiff accumulates three strikes, he will not be able to file an action in federal court (except as a petition for habeas corpus relief) without prepaying the filing fee unless he demonstrates that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Id. Under certain circumstances, a party may ask this Court to alter or amend its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or ask for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Any motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) must be filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment. Any motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) must be filed within a reasonable time, generally no more than one year after the entry of judgment. The Court cannot extend these deadlines. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). A party is expected to closely review all applicable rules and determine, what, if any, further action is appropriate in a case.