Hall 931685 v. Carl

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
                 WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN                           
                      SOUTHERN DIVISION                                 
                            ______                                      

ANTONIO HALL,                                                             

             Petitioner,         Case No. 1:21-cv-1074                  

v.                                 Honorable Sally J. Berens              

BECKY CARL,                                                               

             Respondent.                                                
____________________________/                                             


                           OPINION                                      
   This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  
Petitioner has consented to the conduct of all proceedings in this case, including entry of a final 
judgment and all post-judgment matters, by a United States magistrate judge.   
   Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a 
preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the 
petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district 
court.”  Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243.  If so, the petition must be 
summarily dismissed.  Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court 
has the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face).  A dismissal under Rule 4 
includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual 
allegations that are palpably incredible or false.  Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436–37 (6th Cir. 
1999).  After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must 
be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.       
                          Discussion                                    
I.   Factual allegations                                                  
   Petitioner Antonio Hall is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections at the 
St. Louis Correctional Facility (SLF) in St. Louis, Gratiot County, Michigan.  On June 29, 2018, 
following a four-day jury trial in the Berrien County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of 
armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 

750.529, and first-degree murder, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316.  On August 20, 
2018, the court sentenced Petitioner as a second habitual offender, Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.10, 
to prison terms of 25 to 100 years on the robbery offenses and life imprisonment for the murder 
conviction.1                                                              
   The Michigan Court of Appeals described the facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions as 
follows:                                                                  
   This case arises out of the shooting death of the victim at the River Terrace 
   apartment complex in Benton Harbor, Michigan.  The victim was sitting in his car 
   with Uniqua Jones in the complex’s parking lot.  Jones testified at trial that 
   defendant and another man approached the car and asked the victim if he wanted 
   to purchase a bottle of liquor.  The victim agreed.  He pulled out a two-inch stack 
   of money from his back pocket to pay.  Defendant and the other man saw the money 
   and walked away.  Later, a man that Jones identified as “Chub” approached on a 
   bicycle and started shooting at the car.  Jones ran from the car to a nearby building 
   to notify security.  Denzeil Dade, who testified at trial, explained that defendant 
   and another man approached him about a robbery.  Defendant stated that he sold 
   the victim liquor.  Dade agreed to participate in the robbery, but instead of 
   attempting to rob the victim, he simply walked by the victim’s car.  He then heard 
   gunshots and hid in a nearby bush.  Shortly thereafter, he met with defendant, 
   “Chub,” and another man after he saw them walking in the park area near the office.  
   Law enforcement discovered the victim lying face down in front of his car in the 
   parking lot.  He had been shot twice in the abdomen, and he died at the hospital. 

1 The armed robbery and murder sentences are to be served consecutively to a sentence of 2 years, 5 months, to 15 
years for unarmed robbery—an offense for which Petitioner was on parole when he committed the armed robbery and 
murder offenses.  See https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/otis2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=931685 (visited Dec. 23, 
2021).                                                                    
People v. Shamontae-Hall, No. 345861, 2020 WL 359649, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2020) 
(footnote omitted).                                                       
   “The facts as recited by the Michigan Court of Appeals are presumed correct on habeas 
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).”  Shimel v. Warren, 838 F.3d 685, 688 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(footnote omitted).  Although Petitioner may contest many of the facts described by the court of 

appeals, he does not claim that the court’s description of the evidence is inaccurate.  Moreover, 
Petitioner’s  habeas  claims  do  not  depend  on  a  determination  that  the  court  of  appeals’ 
determinations of fact, as set forth above, were unreasonable on the record.  To the contrary, 
Petitioner’s claims relate to the selection of the jury, evidence the trial judge refused to admit, and 
a claim that a juror was sleeping.  Because Petitioner does not challenge the facts as described by 
the court of appeals and quoted above—and does not offer any evidence to overcome the 
presumption of correctness—the Court will presume those facts to be correct. 
   The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s challenges to his convictions and 
affirmed the trial court.  Petitioner then filed a pro per application for leave to appeal to the 

Michigan Supreme Court.  That court denied leave by order entered September 29, 2020.  People 
v. Hall, 506 Mich. 918, 948 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. 2020).  This timely petition followed.   
        The petition raises three grounds for relief, as follows:       
   I.   Mr. Hall was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel.  Trial counsel 
        Jason Engram was ineffective when trying to argue the grounds for a Batson 
        challenge.  He did not quote the proper case; he argued a Brady violation.  
        Nor did he request that the trial judge [conduct] a hearing to fully determine 
        the meritorious grounds to his objection.                       
   II.  Mr. Hall was denied the constitutional right to pursue a defense in violation 
        of  [the]  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  and 
        Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  The issue was preserved by 
        counsel’s  challenge  to  the  prosecution’s  peremptory  removal  of  the 
        African-American jurors in the venire.  (TT pg. 188).  Whether there was 
        an equal protection violation under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 
        [S.]Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), is a constitutional question with factual 
        components.                                                     
   III.  Mr. Hall was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel violating clearly 
        established state and federal law.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 628 
        (1984).  There was a member of the jury who had fallen asleep during 
        testimony of [a] witness and defense counsel should have made an objection 
        to try and remove this potential juror.  The court[] does not stipulate how 
        long and when the juror fell asleep and does not indicate what parts of trial 
        testimony was missed.  That would prevent a reasonable juror from making 
        an unbiased decision regarding Defendant’s guilt.               
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6–9.)                                            
   Based upon the Michigan Court of Appeals’ opinion, it appears that Petitioner may have 
inadvertently merged a couple of issues.  In the appellate court, Petitioner raised a Batson issue 
along with a claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly present the Batson issue 
and the issue relating to the sleeping juror.  And Petitioner raised a claim that the trial court denied 
Petitioner the constitutionally guaranteed rights to pursue a defense and confront the witnesses 
against him, but that claim did not relate to the Batson challenge as Petitioner’s habeas ground II 
states.  It related to the trial court’s refusal to permit Petitioner’s counsel to explore a prior 
inconsistent statement from witness Uniqua Jones.  To ensure that Petitioner’s grounds are fully 
addressed, the Court will consider Petitioner’s claims relating to Batson—the claim that the trial 
court denied Petitioner his rights and counsel rendered ineffective assistance in presenting the 
Batson claim—as habeas ground I.  The Court will consider Petitioner’s claims regarding the right 
to  present  a  defense  and  confront  witnesses  and  the  trial  court’s  refusal  to  permit  certain 
questioning of Uniqua Jones as habeas ground II.  The Court will address Petitioner’s third habeas 
ground, regarding the sleeping juror, as it is presented in the petition.      
II.  AEDPA standard                                                       
   The AEDPA “prevent[s] federal habeas ‘retrials’” and ensures that state court convictions 
are given effect to the extent possible under the law.  Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693–94 (2002).  
An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a 
state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in 
state court unless the adjudication:  “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  
“Under these rules, [a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas 
relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.”  
Stermer v. Warren, 959 F.3d 704, 721 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 
86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  This standard is “intentionally difficult to meet.”  Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 
312, 316 (2015) (internal quotation omitted).                             
   The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court.  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  In determining whether federal law is clearly established, the Court may not 

consider the decisions of lower federal courts.  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381–82 (2000); 
Miller v. Straub, 299 F.3d 570, 578–79 (6th Cir. 2002).  Moreover, “clearly established Federal 
law” does not include decisions of the Supreme Court announced after the last adjudication of the 
merits in state court.  Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 37–38 (2011).  Thus, the inquiry is limited to 
an examination of the legal landscape as it would have appeared to the Michigan state courts in 
light of Supreme Court precedent at the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits.  Miller 
v. Stovall, 742 F.3d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Greene, 565 U.S. at 38). 
   A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to” clause if the state court 
applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court’s cases, or if it 
decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable 
facts.  Bell, 535 U.S. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06).  “To satisfy this high bar, a 
habeas petitioner is required to ‘show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 
federal  court  was  so  lacking  in  justification  that  there  was  an  error  well  understood  and 
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Woods, 575 

U.S. at 316 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103).                        
   Determining whether a rule application was unreasonable depends on the rule’s specificity.  
Stermer, 959 F.3d at 721.  “The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching 
outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”  Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664.  “[W]here the precise 
contours of the right remain unclear, state courts enjoy broad discretion in their adjudication of a 
prisoner’s claims.”  White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 424 (2014) (internal quotations omitted). 
   The AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings.  Herbert v. Billy, 160 
F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1998).  A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is 
presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and 

convincing evidence.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(en banc); Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2003); Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 
652, 656 (6th Cir. 2001).  This presumption of correctness is accorded to findings of state appellate 
courts, as well as the trial court.  See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546–47 (1981); Smith v. Jago, 
888 F.2d 399, 407 n.4 (6th Cir. 1989).                                    
   Section 2254(d) limits the facts a court may consider on habeas review.  The federal court 
is not free to consider any possible factual source.  The reviewing court “is limited to the record 
that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”  Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 
U.S. 170, 180 (2011).  “If a review of the state court record shows that additional fact-finding was 
required under clearly established federal law or that the state court’s factual determination was 
unreasonable, the requirements of Section 2254(d) are satisfied and the federal court can review 
the underlying claim on its merits.  Stermer, 959 F.3d at 721 (citing, inter alia, Brumfield v. Cain, 
576 U.S. 305 (2015), and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954 (2007)). 
   If the petitioner “satisfies the heightened requirements of § 2254(d), or if the petitioner’s 

claim was never ‘adjudicated on the merits’ by a state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),”—for example, 
if he procedurally defaulted the claim—“AEDPA deference no longer applies.”  Stermer, 959 F.3d 
at 721.  Then, the petitioner’s claim is reviewed de novo.  Id. (citing Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d 
433, 436 (6th Cir. 2003)).                                                
III.  Discussion                                                          
   A.   Batson                                                          
   In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986), the Supreme Court articulated a three-step 
analysis to be applied to an Equal Protection Clause claim that purposeful discrimination occurred 
in the selection of the petit jury based solely on the prosecutor’s exercise of his peremptory 
challenges at trial.  See United States v. Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 2002).  First, 
the Defendant must establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.  See United States v. 

Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 599 (6th Cir. 2003).  This requires an initial showing that “the defendant 
. . . is a member of a cognizable racial group . . . and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory 
challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race.”  Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 
(citation omitted).  “[T]he defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no 
dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits ‘those to 
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.’”  Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 
562 (1953)).  Ultimately, the Defendant, relying on this presumption and other facts, must “raise 
an inference that the prosecutor used [the practice of peremptory challenges] to exclude the 
veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.”  Id.             
   Second, once the Defendant has raised the necessary inference, “the burden shifts to the 
State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging [potential] jurors.”  Id. at 97.  
“The government is not required to persuade the court that its reasons for dismissing the juror were 

well-founded; rather, it need only demonstrate that its reasons were race-neutral.”  Copeland, 321 
F.3d at 599.  More specifically, “[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation 
that is persuasive, or even plausible.  ‘At this . . . step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity 
of the prosecutor’s explanation.  Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s 
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’”  Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–
68 (1995) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991)).      
   Third, the party opposing the strike must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s purported 
explanation is merely a pretext for racial motivation.  See McCurdy v. Montgomery County, 240 
F.3d 512, 521 (6th Cir. 2001) (describing Batson test), overruled on other grounds by Barnes v. 

Wright, 449 F.3d 709 (6th Cir. 2006).  Ultimately, the court must determine “whether the defendant 
has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.”  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359.  In 
making this determination, the Court presumes that the facially valid reasons proffered by the 
prosecution  are  true.    Id.  at  359–60.    Racially  discriminatory  purpose  or  intent  must  be 
affirmatively shown by the opponent of the strike.  Id. at 360.  The ultimate burden of persuasion 
always remains with the opponent of the strike.  See United States v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952, 955 
(6th Cir. 1998).                                                          
   Notwithstanding this three-part test, the Supreme Court has held that the question of 
whether a prima facie case has been established becomes moot once a court rules on the ultimate 
question under Batson of whether there was purposeful discrimination.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 
360; Lancaster, 324 F.3d at 432–33.  “Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation 
for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional 
discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing 
becomes moot.”  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359; Lancaster, 324 F.3d at 433.  The juror selection 

proceedings in Petitioner’s case must be evaluated against that backdrop. 
   The court of appeals described the relevant trial court proceedings as follows: 
   Defendant objected to the prosecution’s dismissal of an African-American juror.  
   The parties approached for a bench conference, and the following ensued: 
        The Court[:] You [referring to defense counsel] want to make a Brady 
      [sic] motion?[4]  You [now referring to the prosecutor] kicked two off.  
      What are you doing?                                               
                             * * *                                      
      You’d  [still  referring  to  the  prosecutor]  better  be  able  to  articulate 
      something very significant.                                       
                            *   *   *                                   
        Ms.  Wilkinson  [the  prosecutor]:  Judge,  whether  or  not  what  [the 
      excused juror] says, your Honor, the fact of the matter is her son has been 
      convicted on an armed robbery, did a serious stint in prison for that.  I 
      think the (indiscernible) of the same type of accomplice co-defendant 
      situation that we’re dealing with in this case, your Honor.  I understand 
      from what she articulated on the record, your Honor, but I think there is a 
      sufficient non-race reason to challenge her on a peremptory challenge. 
        The Court[:] Okay.  Do you [referring to defense counsel] want . . . to 
      be heard on the record outside the presence of the jurors or the potential 
      jurors?                                                           
        Mr. Engram [defense counsel][:] We’re on the record now; right? 
        The Court: Yes.                                                 
                            *   *   *                                   
Defense counsel: —(indiscernible) at this point, I don’t—I mean, I 
just—I don’t think—I mean, we’ve got a mostly white jury at this point.  
See where I'm going with this?  There’s one black person.         
The Court: Well, we have—okay.  So are you making an objection  
under Brady [sic], is my question.                                
Defense counsel: Yeah.                                          
The Court: Okay.                                                
Defense counsel: That’s what I—                                 
The Court: Well, that’s fine, because you’ve got to preserve the record. 
Defense counsel: Okay.                                          
The Court: So, I—is there anything further that you want to put on the 
record?                                                           
Defense counsel: I—I have, no—you know, other than that I have  
nothing  else.  Right  now  I  can’t  put  my  finger  on  anything  to  say 
(indiscernible).[5]                                               
                    *   *   *                                   
The Court: Okay.  All right.  Well, I don’t want to have her sit around 
here all—all day.  We’ll let the Court of Appeals decide whether you’ve 
gone too far, [prosecutor].  I think articulating a basis other than race by 
the fact that this—in spite of her answers under oath on the record that her 
son was involved in an armed robbery that was—also involved multiple 
defendants, I suppose, articulates a—what might be considered, without 
doing further research, articular base—articular—articulable basis beyond 
race.  I will say that given her answers on under [sic] oath on the record 
that I have a concern, but I—but we’ll let the Court of Appeals decide that 
one.  All right.                                                  
____________                                                      
4 Although defendant argues that defense counsel erred by “objecting on the grounds of 
a Brady challenge” (presumably referring to Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83; 83 S Ct 1194; 
10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963)), it was actually the trial court that made this mistake.  At any 
rate, it was clear to both parties and the trial court that defendant was raising a Batson 
challenge.                                                        

5 Defendant asserts in his Standard 4 brief that “[t]he trial court did not allow the defense 
to articulate or give any arguments to their claim which it is required to do[.]”  This claim 
is factually incorrect and does not warrant further discussion.   
People v. Shamontae-Hall, 2020 WL 359649, at *3 (footnotes in the court of appeals’ opinion).   
   The  court  of  appeals  applied  the  following  standard  to  resolve  Petitioner’s  Batson 
challenge:                                                                
   “Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a party may not 
   exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror solely on the basis 
   of the person’s race.”  People v. Knight, 473 Mich. 324, 335; 701 N.W.2d 715 
   (2005).  The constitutionality of a peremptory challenge requires a three-step 
   analysis: (1) “the opponent of the peremptory challenge must make a prima facie 
   showing of discrimination;” (2) “if the trial court determines that a prima facie 
   showing has been made, the burden shifts to the proponent of the peremptory 
   challenge to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the strike;” and (3) “if the 
   proponent provides a race-neutral explanation as a matter of law, the trial court 
   must then determine whether the race-neutral explanation is a pretext and whether 
   the opponent of the challenge has provided purposeful discrimination.”  Id. at 336–
   338.                                                                 
People v. Shamontae-Hall, 2020 WL 359649, at *3.  Although the court of appeals cited state 
authority, the standard it applied was functionally identical to the Batson standard.  Indeed, the 
Knight case derives the standard directly from Batson.  People v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 715, 722–
24 (Mich. 2005).  It cannot be said that the appellate court applied the wrong standard.  Therefore, 
Petitioner can only prevail if the court applied the standard unreasonably.   
   The court of appeals applied the Batson standard as follows:         
   Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s ruling on any of Batson’s three steps, 
   but instead argues that the trial court improperly applied Batson’s three steps as a 
   whole.  We disagree.  Parts of the trial court’s ruling are unclear, so we “must 
   determine on the basis of a fair reading of the record what the trial court has found 
   and ruled.”  Knight, 473 Mich at 339.                                
   It appears that the trial court, without so stating, found that defendant satisfied 
   Batson’s first step and made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination.  At any 
   rate, “[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory 
   challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional 
   discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima 
   facie showing becomes moot.”  Hernandez v. New York, 500 US 352, 359; 111 S 
   Ct 1859; 114 L Ed 2d 395 (1991).  Thus, we turn to whether the other two steps of 
   a Batson challenge were satisfied.                                   
   The prosecution offered a race-neutral explanation for dismissing the objected-to 
   juror; the prosecution stated that it dismissed the juror because her son had been 
   convicted of an armed robbery involving multiple defendants, which was a similar 
   scenario to defendant’s case.  This Court, in similar circumstances, has found such 
   an explanation to be a sufficient race-neutral reason for dismissal.  See People v. 
   Howard, 226 Mich. App. 528, 535; 575 N.W.2d 16 (1997) (concluding that the 
   prosecutor’s dismissal of a potential juror in a murder case on the basis that he had 
   an uncle with whom he was close who had been tried for murder was a race-neutral 
   reason).  Thus, the prosecution satisfied the second Batson step.    
   The trial court, although somewhat hesitant, accepted the prosecution’s race-neutral 
   explanation and concluded that it was not a pretext for racial discrimination.  
   Contrary to defendant’s characterization of the trial court’s ruling, we do not read 
   its decision as leaving “[it] up to the court of appeal [sic] basically because he didn’t 
   want a juror sitting there.”  Rather, under a fair reading of the trial court’s ruling, 
   we believe that the trial court made a ruling, but acknowledged that, without doing 
   additional research, its ruling could be wrong and so invited appellate review.  
   Thus, the trial court satisfied the final step of a Batson challenge, and, taken as a 
   whole, we conclude that the trial court properly applied the Batson framework.  As 
   defendant  does  not  challenge  the  trial  court’s  ultimate  ruling  on  the  Batson 
   challenge, and limits his argument only to whether the proper procedure was 
   followed, his argument does not warrant appellate relief.6           
   ____________                                                         
   6 If we were to review the trial court’s ruling itself, we would conclude that defendant has not shown 
   that the prosecution’s challenge to the objected-to juror was based on race.  The prosecution 
   exercised 11 p[er]emptory challenges.  From the record, it appears that two of those jurors were 
   African American.  Defendant did not object to the first dismissal.  As already stated, the 
   prosecutor’s explanation with respect to the second juror was a race-neutral reason for dismissal.  
   See Howard, 226 Mich App at 535.  Further, at the time of the Batson challenge, defense counsel 
   stated that there was one African American juror, but the record does not indicate the racial makeup 
   of the individuals in the galley or the final jury.  Considering the record and the prosecution’s 
   explanation, defendant has not shown that the p[er]emptory challenge to the juror was the result of 
   racial discrimination.  See Knight, 473 Mich at 344–345.  We would therefore conclude that the trial 
   court did not clearly err in determining that the prosecution provided a race-neutral reason for using 
   a peremptory challenge.  See id. at 337–338 (explaining that appellate courts review for clear error 
   a trial court’s decision that the prosecution offered a race-neutral reason for dismissing a juror). 
People v. Shamontae-Hall, 2020 WL 359649, at *4.                          
   Petitioner  does  not  contend  that  the  appellate  court’s  interpretation  of  the  record  is 
unreasonable nor does he cite any clearly established federal law to which the court of appeal’s 
analysis is contrary or that the court of appeals unreasonably applied.  Petitioner simply cites 
Batson.  Whether or not this Court agrees with the trial court’s or the court of appeals’ analysis of 
the Batson issue, the Court concludes that those analyses follow the path laid out in Batson and 
are not unreasonable.  Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his claim that the 
prosecutor violated Petitioner’s equal protection rights when he exercised a peremptory challenge 
to remove a second African-American juror.                                
   Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim relating to the Batson challenge fares no better.  In 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two-prong test 
by which to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  To establish a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the petitioner must prove (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome.  Id. at 687.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffective assistance must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Id. at 689.  The 
defendant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy.  Id. (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)); see also 

Nagi v. United States, 90 F.3d 130, 135 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that counsel’s strategic decisions 
were hard to attack).  The court must determine whether, in light of the circumstances as they 
existed at the time of counsel’s actions, “the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide 
range of professionally competent assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  Even if a court 
determines that counsel’s performance was outside that range, the defendant is not entitled to relief 
if counsel’s error had no effect on the judgment.  Id. at 691.            
   Moreover, as the Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized, when a federal court reviews 
a  state  court’s  application  of  Strickland  under  Section  2254(d),  the  deferential  standard  of 
Strickland is “doubly” deferential.  Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (citing Knowles v. Mirzayance, 
556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)); see also Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013); Cullen v. Pinholster, 
563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122 (2011).  In those circumstances, 
the question before the habeas court is “whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel 
satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.”  Id.; Jackson v. Houk, 687 F.3d 723, 740–41 (6th Cir. 
2012) (stating that the “Supreme Court has recently again underlined the difficulty of prevailing 

on a Strickland claim in the context of habeas and AEDPA . . . .”) (citing Harrington, 562 U.S. at 
102).                                                                     
   The court of appeals applied the following standard to resolve Petitioner’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims:                                             
   To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
   establish that “(1) the performance of his counsel was below an objective standard 
   of  reasonableness  under  prevailing  professional  norms  and  (2)  a  reasonable 
   probability  exists  that,  in  the  absence  of  counsel’s  unprofessional  errors,  the 
   outcome of the proceedings would have been different.”  People v Sabin (On 
   Second Remand), 242 Mich. App. 656, 659; 620 N.W.2d 19 (2000).  Effective 
   assistance is “strongly presumed,” People v Vaughn, 491 Mich. 642, 670; 821 
   N.W.2d  288  (2012),  and  the  defendant  bears  the  heavy  burden  of  proving 
   otherwise, People v Dixon, 263 Mich. App. 393, 396; 688 N.W.2d 308 (2004). 
People v. Shamontae-Hall, 2020 WL 359649, at *5.  Once again, although the court of appeals 
cited state authority, the standard it applied was functionally identical to the Strickland standard.  
Indeed, the Sabin case derives the standard directly from Strickland.  People v. Sabin (On Second 
Remand), 620 N.W.2d 19, 22 (2000).  Thus, it cannot be said that the appellate court applied the 
wrong standard.                                                           
   Petitioner presents two ways that his counsel provided ineffective assistance with regard 
to presentation of the Batson claim:  first, Petitioner claims that counsel did not argue Batson at 
all—instead he argued Brady, presumably Brady v Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and second, 
Petitioner claims that counsel did not request a hearing to establish that the prosecutor’s proffered 
race neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge was a pretext.      
   The court of appeals rejected the first claim as factually unsupported by the record.  The 
court explained that it was the trial judge, not defense counsel, that misidentified the relevant 
authority.  People v. Shamontae-Hall, 2020 WL 359649, at *3 n.4.  Moreover, review of the 
arguments of defense counsel and the prosecutor, and the analysis of the trial judge, make clear 
that everyone understood that the challenge at issue was a Batson challenge, not a Brady challenge.  

Id.  The court of appeals’ conclusion that defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance in 
that regard is eminently reasonable, entirely consistent with Strickland, and cannot support habeas 
relief.                                                                   
   The court of appeals resolved Petitioner’s claim regarding counsel’s failure to request a 
hearing as follows:                                                       
   Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 
   hearing for the trial court to address the Batson challenge.  However, as already 
   discussed,  defense  counsel  objected  to  the  dismissal  of  the  juror;  the  parties 
   approached the trial court and discussed the challenge at a bench conference; and 
   the trial court listened to the parties’ arguments, ensured that those arguments were 
   included in the record, and ultimately overruled defendant’s challenge.  This is all 
   that is required to address a Batson challenge.  Any motion made by defense 
   counsel for a hearing on this issue would have been meritless.   “Ineffective 
   assistance of counsel cannot be predicated on the failure to make a frivolous or 
   meritless motion.”  People v. Riley, 468 Mich. 135, 142; 659 N.W.2d 611 (2003). 
People v. Shamontae-Hall, 2020 WL 359649, at *5.  Petitioner does not indicate what more might 
have been presented at the hearing that was not already presented or apparent by way of the bench 
conference.  The Supreme Court has identified several areas that might provide be relevant to show 
racial discrimination at a Batson hearing, e.g., “statistical evidence about the prosecutor’s use of 
peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors as compared to white prospective jurors in the 
case; evidence of a prosecutor’s disparate questioning and investigation of black and white 
prospective jurors in the case; side-by-side comparisons of black prospective jurors who were 
struck  and  white  prospective  jurors  who  were  not  struck  in  the  case;  a  prosecutor’s 
misrepresentations of the record when defending the strikes during the Batson hearing; relevant 
history of the State’s peremptory strikes in past cases; or other relevant circumstances that bear 
upon the issue of racial discrimination,” Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2243 (2019).  But 
Petitioner has not shown that any such evidence was at issue here.  Indeed, where the non-
discriminatory reason—the prospective juror had a close relative who had been convicted of a 

similar crime—has already been accepted as valid by the Michigan courts, People v. Howard, 575 
N.W.2d 16, 22 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), and no other evidence of discriminatory intent is identified, 
seeking a hearing would have been meritless.  As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, “[o]mitting 
meritless arguments is neither professionally unreasonable nor prejudicial.”  Coley v. Bagley, 706 
F.3d 741, 752 (6th Cir. 2013).                                            
   Petitioner fails even to allege that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland when it 
denied his claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a Batson hearing.  Accordingly, 
Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on that claim.                
   B.   Violation of Petitioner’s rights to present a defense and confront witnesses 
        At trial, Petitioner’s counsel asked Uniqua Jones whether the victim was at the 

River Terrace apartment complex to participate in a drug deal.  The prosecutor objected and the 
trial judge excused the jury.  Petitioner’s counsel then argued that Jones had previously testified 
that the victim was at the River Terrace apartment complex to change his clothes; thus, counsel 
argued, an affirmative answer to the drug deal question would show that Jones’s earlier testimony 
was a lie.  On appeal, Petitioner expanded that argument.  He claimed an affirmative answer would 
have also established that Jones was biased.  He claimed further that sustaining the objection 
prevented Petitioner from presenting a defense and from effectively confronting Jones as a witness.  
The court of appeals sifted through each of Petitioner’s arguments and concluded that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the objection and foreclosing Petitioner’s counsel’s 
inquiry.                                                                  
        The  extraordinary  remedy  of  habeas  corpus  lies  only  for  a  violation  of  the 
Constitution.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  As the Supreme Court explained in Estelle v. McGuire, 502 
U.S. 62 (1991), an inquiry whether evidence was properly admitted or improperly excluded under 

state law “is no part of a federal court’s habeas review of a state conviction . . . [for] it is not the 
province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”  
Id. at 67–68.  Rather, “[i]n conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether 
a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”  Id. at 68.  “Generally, 
state-court evidentiary rulings cannot rise to the level of due process violations unless they 
‘offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.’”  Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Montana 
v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996)); see also Wilson v. Sheldon, 874 F.3d 470, 475–76 (6th Cir. 
2017).  This approach accords the state courts wide latitude in ruling on evidentiary matters.  

Seymour, 224 F.3d at 552 (6th Cir. 2000).  Moreover, under the AEDPA, the court may not grant 
relief if it would have decided the evidentiary question differently.  The court may only grant relief 
if Petitioner is able to show that the state court’s evidentiary ruling was in conflict with a decision 
reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decided the evidentiary 
issue differently than the Supreme Court did on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.  Sanders 
v. Freeman, 221 F.3d 846, 860 (6th Cir. 2000).                            
        Not every part of Petitioner’s claim elevates the evidentiary “drug deal” question 
to the level of a constitutional violation.  Whether or not the inquiry was proper impeachment or 
bias evidence under state law are really only focused on whether the evidence was relevant which, 
without more, raises only state law issues.  It is only by virtue of Petitioner’s invocation of his 
constitutional right to present a defense and his constitutional right to confront witnesses that his 
claim is even cognizable on habeas review.                                
        The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives the accused the right “to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  U.S. Const., Am. VI; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 

400, 403–05 (1965) (applying the guarantee to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).  
The Supreme Court long has read this right as securing an adequate opportunity to cross-examine 
adverse witnesses.  United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 557 (1988) (citing Mattox v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895), and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)).  As the 
Supreme Court early held,                                                 
   “The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent 
   depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, 
   being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-
   examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of 
   testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling 
   him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge 
   by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony 
   whether he is worthy of belief.”                                     

Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242–43, quoted in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157–58 (1970).  While 
the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, it does not 
guarantee “‘cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the 
defense might wish.’”  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (quoting Delaware v. 
Fensterer,  474  U.S.  15,  20  (1985)).    “[T]rial  judges  retain  wide  latitude  insofar  as  the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based 
on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ 
safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”  Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 
679; see also United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 834 (6th Cir. 2013); King v. Trippett, 192 
F.3d 517, 524 (6th Cir. 1999).  “No matter how central [a witness’s] credibility is to a case[,] . . . 
the Constitution does not require that a defendant be given the opportunity to wage a general attack 
on credibility by pointing to individual instances of past conduct.”  Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 
740 (6th Cir. 2000).                                                      
        In Petitioner’s case, the crux of the court of appeals’ decision is that the limitation 

on cross-examination was harmless.  The appellate court noted first that even if the question had 
been permitted and even if the witness answered in the affirmative, it would not have impeached 
her:                                                                      
   Jones testified that the victim told her that he had to stop at River Terrace to change 
   his clothes, but Jones did not testify that this was the only reason that the victim 
   was at River Terrace.  Thus, even if the victim was at the apartment complex to 
   participate in a drug deal, it does not make Jones’ testimony that the victim told her 
   that he had to stop at River Terrace to change his clothes untrue.   
People v. Shamontae-Hall, 2020 WL 359649, at *2.  The court of appeals reached a similar 
conclusion with regard to witness bias:                                   
   Defendant claims that if Jones agreed that the victim was waiting in his car to 
   consummate a drug deal, it would support a finding that Jones’ testimony was 
   biased because her prior testimony sought to protect her stepfather.  But it is unclear 
   how Jones’s testimony protected her stepfather, who was never identified by name 
   or otherwise involved in the case.  Moreover, defendant does not explain how Jones 
   protecting her stepfather made her biased against defendant or otherwise influenced 
   her testimony.  See People v. Petri, 279 Mich. App. 407, 413; 760 N.W.2d 882 
   (2008) (stating that the defendant “may not leave it to this Court to search for a 
   factual basis to sustain or reject his position”) (quotation marks and citation 
   omitted).  In short, defendant has failed to establish that the answer to defense 
   counsel’s  question  involving  a  possible  drug  deal,  even  if  answered  in  the 
   affirmative, would show the existence of bias.                       
People v. Shamontae-Hall, 2020 WL 359649, at *2.  Likewise, the court of appeals determined 
that excluding the “drug deal” testimony did not deny Petitioner the opportunity to pursue a 
defense:                                                                  
   The theory of the prosecution was that the motivation for the robbery was the 
   victim’s “stack” of cash that defendant observed during the liquor sale.  Defendant, 
   in response, argued that he was not present or involved in the robbery or murder.  
   The actual reason for the victim’s presence would not affect either of these theories, 
   and the jury was entitled to believe defendant’s version of events.  Moreover, Jones’ 
   testimony concerning defendant’s involvement in the incident was corroborated by 
   the testimony of three other witnesses, including Dade.  Defendant has not shown 
   that the trial court’s refusal to allow Jones to answer a question about an alleged 
   drug deal denied him his constitutional right to present a defense . . . . 
Id.                                                                       
        The court of appeals expressed its conclusion regarding the trial court’s exclusion 
of the testimony in terms of Petitioner’s failure “to show plain error affecting his substantial 
rights.”  Id.  That is simply another way to say that the trial court’s decision, if it was error, was 
harmless error.   In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734–35 (1993), the Supreme Court 
explained that determining the presence of “plain error” or “harmless error” involves the same 
analysis:  does the error affect substantial rights.  When the Supreme Court held that habeas 
petitioners are not entitled to relief based on “harmless error,” it noted that the existing body of 
federal case law would apply to the standard.  Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993).  
Thus, the habeas “harmless error” analysis is the same as the Olano analysis.  Manning v. Huffman, 
269 F.3d 720, 726 n.3 (6th Cir. 2001).  The plain error test applied by the state court is also the 
same as the Olano analysis.  See People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 597 N.W.2d 130 (Mich. 1999) 
(cited by the court of appeals in Petitioner’s case); People v. Grant, 445 Mich. 535, 520 N.W.2d 
123 (Mich. 1994).  Thus, the absence of prejudice that prompted the state appellate court’s 
conclusion with respect to plain error indicates that the alleged error did not have a “substantial 
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict[,]” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, and, 
therefore, was harmless.  See Wright v. Burt, 665 F. App’x 403, 410 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he state 
court considered only the third portion of the plain-error analysis, i.e., whether [the alleged error] 
affected substantial rights. . . .  It determined that Wright had not established that [the alleged error] 
affected the outcome of the case. . . . The portion of the plain-error analysis the Michigan court 
undertook in this case was analogous to a harmless-error analysis because its conclusion that the 
error did not affect the outcome of the case is another way of saying that the error was not 
harmful.”) (emphasis added, citations omitted).                           
        Under  Wright,  the  state  court’s  harmless  error  determination  would  be  an 
adjudication on the merits entitled to AEDPA deference.  Id., citing Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257 

(2015).  More recently, however, the Sixth Circuit has stated that a habeas court must assess 
harmlessness under the standard set forth in Brecht, as opposed to the Brecht standard coupled 
with an evaluation of the state-court’s application of the Chapman standard2 under the AEDPA 
standard.  Davenport v. MacLaren, 964 F.3d 448, 454– 59 (6th Cir. 2020)3 (citing Davis, 576 U.S. 
at 268 (holding that the Brecht test subsumes the limitations imposed by AEDPA) (citing Fry v. 
Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119–20 (2007))).                                    
        No matter what standard this Court applies, it concludes that the trial court’s 
exclusion of Ms. Jones’s answer to the “drug deal” question was harmless.  Petitioner has certainly 
failed to even allege that the appellate court’s determination of harmlessness was unreasonable in 

any way and this Court concludes the determination was patently reasonable.  Accordingly, 
Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.                




2 The Chapman standard is the standard of harmlessness typically associated with direct review—“harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt”—rather than collateral review.  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also Brecht, 
507 U.S. at 622.  Under the AEDPA, where a state court has concluded that a constitutional error was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt, in accordance with Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), “‘a federal court may not award 
habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable.’”  Davis, 576 U.S. at 269 
(quoting Fry, 551 U.S. at 119 (emphasis in original)).                    
3 The Supreme Court has recalled the mandate in Davenport, see Brown v. Davenport, 141 S. Ct. 1288 (2021), and 
granted a writ of certiorari, see Brown v. Davenport, 141 S. Ct. 2465 (2021). 
   C.   Sleeping juror                                                  
        Finally, Petitioner claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance because 
counsel should have objected to and tried to remove a sleeping juror.  The court of appeals 
addressed the claim as follows:                                           
        Defendant also claims that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting 
   when a juror fell asleep during the trial. his claim, however, is not supported by the 
   record. It appears that defendant’s assertion that a juror fell asleep occurred during 
   defense counsel’s cross-examination of Vanessa Lloyd.  Lloyd’s boyfriend at the 
   time, Jerail Lamont Porter, testified that he was staying with Lloyd near where the 
   shooting took place, and that, after hearing gunshots, he went to a window and saw 
   three men beating another man in the parking lot.  Porter identified defendant as 
   one of the three men doing the beating.  While cross-examining Lloyd, defense 
   counsel asked Lloyd what she told officers, as recounted in a police report, about 
   Porter’s actions when she left the room.  The following exchange occurred: 
      Q. Okay. This is my question: When the officer interviewed you, did you 
      tell him that you remained in the room that you ran out of and cannot say 
      what Porter was doing after you left?                             
      Ms. Wilkinson [the prosecutor]: I'm sorry, Judge.  Did she—he say that 
      she remained in the room or who remained in the room?             
      Mr. Engram [defense counsel]: She. She remained in the room that she 
      ran—remained in the room that she ran—actually I think it should be ran 
      to, and can’t—                                                    
      The prosecutor: This whole thing is confusing, Judge.             
      The Court: Yeah. What—where—step up.                              
      (At 3:58 p.m., bench conference)                                  
      The Court: So, you’ve got a lousy police report, it sounds like.  Not—it 
      wasn’t very precise language he used.  Why don’t you just ask what do 
      you think—I mean is the confusion that—that the witness (indiscernible)? 
      Defense counsel: Yeah.                                            
      The Court: But—but you have a jury here that’s, you know, falling asleep. 
      Defense Counsel: Yeah.                                            
      Trial Court: You do what you want to do.                          
      Defense Counsel: Right.                                           
      Trial Court: But it sounds to me like that is a confusing statement in that 
      police report and I can’t tell what that—frankly, I didn’t think her answer 
      the first time you read that to her sounded inconsistent with anything she 
      said.  She—she doesn’t know what Porter was doing when she wasn’t in 
      the room with him, if that’s where you’re trying to go.  Yeah.  See if you 
      can figure out a way of doing it without—                         
      Defense Counsel: Yeah.                                            
      Trial Court: —confusing folks.  Okay?  All right.                 
   Thus, the record does not support the inference that a juror actually fell asleep.  
   Instead, the trial court was cautioning defense counsel that his line of questioning 
   was tedious and confusing, and suggested that he attempt another tactic or rephrase 
   his question to keep the jury’s full attention.  Because there was no sleeping juror, 
   there was nothing . . . to which defense counsel could object.  See Riley, 468 Mich. 
   at 142.                                                              
People v. Shamontae-Hall, 2020 WL 359649, at *5–6.                        
        Petitioner does not allege that the court of appeals’ determination that there was no 
sleeping juror was not supported by the record.  He simply assumes, presumably based on the trial 
judge’s statement quoted above, that there was a sleeping juror and then he faults counsel for not 
addressing the matter.  The appellate court’s determination that the record does not support the 
inference that a juror was actually sleeping is presumed correct.   Petitioner has the burden of 
rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Davis, 658 
F.3d at 531; Lancaster, 324 F.3d at 429; Bailey, 271 F.3d at 656.  He offers nothing. 
        Because this Court must accept that there was no sleeping juror, it necessarily 
follows that any objection or attempt to remove the juror would have been meritless.  “Omitting 
meritless arguments is neither professionally unreasonable nor prejudicial.”  Coley, 706 F.3d at 
752.  Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show that the court of appeals’ rejection of Petitioner’s 
“sleeping juror” ineffective assistance claims are contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 
Strickland.  Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.   
IV.  Certificate of Appealability                                         
        Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of 
appealability should be granted.  A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a 

“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”  28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).   
        The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of 
a certificate of appealability.  Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).  
Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine 
whether a certificate is warranted.  Id.  Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth 
by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).  Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467.  
Consequently, this Court has examined each of Petitioner’s claims under the Slack standard.  
Under  Slack,  529  U.S.  at  484,  to  warrant  a  grant  of  the  certificate,  “[t]he  petitioner  must 
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 
claims  debatable  or  wrong.”    Id.    “A  petitioner  satisfies  this  standard  by  demonstrating  

that  jurists  of  reason  .  .  .  could  conclude  the  issues  presented  are  adequate  to  deserve 
encouragement to proceed further.”  Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).  In applying 
this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its examination to a 
threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner’s claims.  Id.   
        The  Court  finds  that  reasonable  jurists  could  not  conclude  that  this  Court’s 
dismissal of Petitioner’s claims was debatable or wrong.  Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner 
a certificate of appealability.  Moreover, although Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is in 
custody in violation of the Constitution and has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial 
of a constitutional right, the Court does not conclude that any issue Petitioner might raise on appeal 
would be frivolous.  Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).  
                          Conclusion                                    
        The Court will enter a judgment dismissing the petition and an order denying a 
certificate of appealability.                                             


Dated: January 25, 2022                   /s/ Sally J. Berens             
                                      SALLY J. BERENS                   
                                      U.S. Magistrate Judge