Hardman v. State

[[COURTLISTENER_SUBOPINION {"id":"10513735","type":"010combined","part":"opinion","author":null,"source_field":"html_with_citations"}]]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ANTHONY HARDMAN,                          §
                                          §     No. 443, 2023
   Defendant Below,                       §
   Appellant,                             §     Court Below—Superior Court
                                          §     of the State of Delaware
      v.                                  §
                                          §     Cr. ID No. 2210007890(N)
STATE OF DELAWARE,                        §
                                          §
   Appellee.                              §

                           Submitted: August 14, 2024
                           Decided:   August 21, 2024

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

                                     ORDER

      On this 21st day of August 2024, it appears to the Court that:

      (1)    Appellant Anthony Hardman was found guilty of carrying a concealed

deadly weapon after a jury trial in the Superior Court. He was sentenced to one year

of Level V imprisonment suspended for one year of Level II probation. On appeal,

Hardman argues that the trial court violated his right to present a defense of choice

of evils. He also contends that presenting a redated version of his police interview

to the jury violated D.R.E. 106. We disagree and affirm.

      (2)    On October 18, 2022, Corporal Jared Balan of the Delaware State

Police stopped a vehicle driven by Hardman for suspicion of texting while driving.

Because Hardman displayed extreme nervousness during the stop, Corporal Balan
removed Hardman from the vehicle. Upon exiting the vehicle, Hardman disclosed

voluntarily that he was carrying a firearm. Corporal Balan searched Hardman and

uncovered a 9-millimeter handgun in a body wrap holster worn under Hardman’s

sweatshirt. Corporal Balan then searched Hardman’s vehicle. There, he found

marijuana and ammunition magazines. Hardman was arrested and taken to the

police station.

      (3)    During a post-arrest interview, Hardman waived his Miranda rights and

told Corporal Balan that he worked as a food delivery driver and that he had been

using his phone for directions. As for the gun under his sweatshirt, Hardman

admitted that the firearm was registered to him, but he did not have a license to carry

the firearm in a concealed manner. Despite not having a license, Hardman said that

he carried the gun under his sweatshirt for safety reasons. Hardman’s concerns were

based on the locations of his deliveries, which took him to dangerous areas.

Hardman also noted that he was homeless and living in his car.

      (4)    The State indicted Hardman on charges of carrying a concealed deadly

weapon (“CCDW”), possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, possession of

marijuana, and driving a motor vehicle on any highway while using an electronic

communication device. Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to bar

Hardman from arguing a choice-of-evils defense and to exclude any evidence related

thereto, including Hardman’s housing status, employment status, and his reasons for


                                          2
carrying a concealed weapon. The Superior Court granted the motion.1 The court

held that a defendant cannot assert a choice-of-evils defense to a charge of CCDW.2

The court found that “the statute is very specific in spelling out defenses to the charge

of [CCDW]” and that the choice-of-evils defense was not among the permissible

enumerated defenses.3 According to the court, “[a]ny testimony tending to show the

purpose of carrying a concealed deadly weapon is irrelevant and immaterial” and

“[a]ny statements relating to a defense . . . not listed in the statute must be redacted.”4

For completeness, the court also noted that “no emergency situation exist[ed] in this

case” that would have entitled Hardman to the choice-of-evils defense.5

           (5)   With the choice-of-evils defense unavailable, Hardman’s case

proceeded to a jury trial. During trial, the State introduced evidence of Hardman’s

inculpatory statements from his interview with Corporal Balan. In accordance with

the court’s decision on the motion in limine, Hardman’s statements regarding his

housing and employment, as well as his reasons for concealing the firearm, were

redacted. The jury would later find Hardman guilty of CCDW, and not guilty of




1
    See Opening Br., Ex. A at 3 [hereinafter “Super. Ct. Order”].
2
    Id. at 2 (citing State v. Ingram,
84 A. 1027
(Ct. Gen. Sess. 1912)).
3
    Super. Ct. Order at 2.
4
Id.
5
    Id. at 3.

                                                   3
driving a motor vehicle on any highway while using an electronic communication

device.6

       (6)     On appeal, Hardman argues that trial court violated his Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights to testify and present a defense because, in his view, the choice-

of-evils defense is available to those charged with CCDW and there was credible

evidence to support it. Hardman also argues that letting the State play his police

interview while redacting the portions related to his housing and employment status

violated D.R.E. 106. We address each argument in turn.

       (7)     First, the choice-of-evils defense was not available to Hardman as a

matter of law, and the court’s decision granting the State’s motion in limine therefore

did not violate Hardman’s rights. We review claims of constitutional error and

questions of law de novo.7 Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, criminal

defendants have the right to testify and to present a defense.8 But these rights are

not absolute.9 We have held that trial judges may, consistent with the Fifth and Sixth


6
 The State entered a nolle prosequi on the charges of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited
and possession of marijuana.
7
 Panuski v. State,
41 A.3d 416, 419
(Del. 2012) (citing Zebroski v. State,
12 A.3d 1115, 1119
(Del. 2010)).
8
  See Rock v. Arkansas,
483 U.S. 44, 52
(1987); Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683, 687
(1986)
(citing California v. Trombetta,
467 U.S. 479, 485
(1984)).
9
  Williams v. State,
86 A.3d 1119
,
2014 WL 708445
, at *2 (Del. Feb. 19, 2014) (ORDER) (citing
United States v. Scheffer,
523 U.S. 303, 308
(1998)); see also Rock,
483 U.S. at 55
(“Of course,
the right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation. The right ‘may, in appropriate
cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.’”) (quoting
Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 295
(1973)).

                                                 4
Amendments, foreclose the presentation of a justification defense where “it is

apparent that the defendant’s proffered evidence is inadequate to support the

defense” or it is otherwise unavailable to them as a matter of law.10

           (8)   Here, Hardman is correct that defendants charged with CCDW under

11 Del. C. § 1442 are not per se foreclosed from asserting the choice-of-evils

defense.11 Nevertheless, the defense was not available to him because his evidence

was inadequate as a matter of law. The choice-of-evils defense is appropriate when

the defendant’s otherwise criminal conduct was objectively “necessary as an

emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to

occur . . . through no fault of the defendant.”12 An emergency measure is one taken

in response to an unexpected situation.13 An imminent harm is one that will occur

in “close proximity to the time of the possession of the weapon.”14 “Arming oneself

in anticipation that a confrontation may occur in the future” meets neither of these

requirements because the danger is both speculative and remote.15 Hardman’s

evidence—that he carried a concealed weapon because he believed he may be
10
     Williams, 2014
WL 708445, at *2–3 (citing Johnson v. State,
379 A.2d 1129, 1132
(Del. 1977)).
11
     See State v. Ramos,
2013 WL 4718104
, at *2–4 (Del. Super. Aug. 22, 2013).
12
  11 Del. C. § 463; see also Moye v. State,
988 A.2d 937
,
2010 WL 376872, at *2
(Del. Jan. 20,
2010) (ORDER).
13
     Ramos,
2013 WL 4718104
, at *4.
14
Id.
15
Id.
5
attacked sometime in the future while delivering food in a dangerous

neighborhood—is simply not enough. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s pre-trial

foreclosure of Hardman’s desired choice-of-evils defense did not violate his

constitutional rights.

          (9)      Turning to Hardman’s second argument, we hold that the State’s

presentation of a redacted version of his police interview, excluding portions related

to Hardman’s housing and employment status, did not violate D.R.E. 106. This

Court reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.16 D.R.E. 106 states that

“[w]hen a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an

adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or any other

writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered

contemporaneously with it.”17 The admission of another part of a recorded statement

will not be considered fair where its probative value is outweighed by the potential

for prejudice.18

          (10). Here, fairness would not require the admission of Hardman’s recorded

statements to police discussing his homelessness and nature of employment. This

evidence is probative only of Hardman’s desired choice-of-evils defense. Because
16
     Williams, 2014
WL 708445, at *2 (citing Coles v. State,
959 A.2d 18, 24
(Del. 2008)).
17
     D.R.E. 106.
18
     See Williamson v. State,
707 A.2d 350, 361
(Del. 1998) (citing D.R.E. 403).

                                                  6
Hardman had no right to such a defense as a matter of law, the redacted parts of his

interview are irrelevant and have no probative value. The potential prejudice to the

State due to jury sympathy was relatively high. Accordingly, the Superior Court did

not violate D.R.E. 106 by excluding portions of Hardman’s police interview.

      NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Superior Court’s judgment

is AFFIRMED.

                                             BY THE COURT:

                                             /s/ N. Christopher Griffiths
                                             Justice




                                         7