Hashim v. Kern County Hospital Authority

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JIHAD AKIL HASHIM, Case No. 1:21-cv-00773-JLT-CDB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUPPLEMENTAL 13 v. JURISDICTION; AND PERMITTING SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING 14 KERN COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, a California Public Entity; (Doc. 32) 15 and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 16 Defendant. 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Jihad Hashim, a male, African American travel nurse who worked at a facility operated by 20 Defendant Kern County Hospital Authority, advances three claims against Defendant: a state law 21 race and color employment discrimination claim under California’s Fair Employment and 22 Housing Act (Doc. 1 at 117–18), a state law defamation claim (id. at 118–20), and a single federal 23 constitutional due process claim arising under 48 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 120–22.) Before the Court 24 is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to all claims in this case. (Doc. 34.) Plaintiff 25 opposes the motion (Doc. 36), and Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. 41.) On June 17, 2025, the 26 Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to withdraw certain deemed admissions (Doc. 48), which has 27 somewhat narrowed the disputes before the Court. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 28 tentatively GRANTS Defendant’s motion as to the sole federal claim in the case but will permit 1 supplemental briefing. Assuming the Court finalizes its tentative ruling, it will DECLINE TO 2 EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION over the remaining state law claims. 3 II. BACKGROUND1 4 Kern County Hospital Authority (“KCHA”) is a local government entity that owns and 5 operates Kern Medical Center. (KCHA’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“KSF”) ## 69, 6 84, with Plaintiff’s responses, Doc. 36-1.) In May 2019, KCHA entered into a Supplier Managed 7 Services Client Terms and Conditions Agreement with RightSourcing, Inc. to supply contingent 8 labor to KCHA. (KSF ## 1, 60, 70.) Trustaff Travel Nurses, LLC (“Trustaff”) is a staffing agency 9 in RightSourcing’s supplier network and, pursuant to KCHA’s Agreement with RightSourcing, 10 provides contingent labor to KCHA. (KSF ## 2, 61, 71.) RightSourcing and Trustaff are 11 responsible for paying the wages for the contingent labor that they provide to KCHA pursuant to 12 the Agreement. (KSF ## 3, 72.) 13 On February 5, 2019, Mr. Hashim executed a Healthcare Worker Agreement with Trustaff 14 to serve as a staff nurse in the NICU at Kern Medical Center. (KSF ## 4, 62, 73.) The assignment 15 was set to last for 13 weeks from February 18, 2019 to May 25, 2019. (KSF ## 4, 62, 73.) After 16 Mr. Hashim completed his 13-week assignment, Hashim executed another Healthcare Worker 17 Agreement with Trustaff to serve as a nurse in the NICU at Kern Medical Center from May 26, 18 2019 to August 23, 2019, and then another from August 31, 2019 through November 29, 2019. 19 (KSF ## 4, 62, 73.) 20 According to the Defense, in 2019 parents twice complained that Mr. Hashim was rough 21 with a baby in his care; his supervisor’s own observations confirmed at least one of those 22 allegations; and Mr. Hashim did not react well to being counseled about the issue. (KSF ## 20– 23 29.) Mr. Hashim disputes that he rough-handled a baby and at least arguably denies being 24 counseled at all. (KSF ## 34, 42.) It is undisputed, however, that supervisory staff informed 25 RightSourcing’s onsite coordinator about the allegations. (KSF #35.) On September 11, 2019, 26 Trustaff terminated Hashim’s assignment to Kern Medical Center. (KSF #36.) 27 28 1 The facts relevant to the Court’s decision herein are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Because of the disposition 1 Mr. Hashim admits that Kern Medical Center’s statements to RightSourcing did not affect 2 his ability to get subsequent jobs through Trustaff. (KSF No. 47.) Following the termination of 3 his assignment a Kern Medical Center, Trustaff continued to place Hashim in other NICU nursing 4 positions as early as October 2019. (KSF No. 48.) Trustaff never told Hashim he was disqualified 5 from any jobs because of what happened at Kern Medical Center and in fact Trustaff had no 6 problems placing Hashim in another NICU position at a different hospital. (KSF No. 49.) Nor has 7 anyone asked Hashim about the reasons he left Kern Medical Center during any subsequent job 8 interviews. (KSF No. 50.) 9 III. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 11 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In addition, 12 Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication, or partial summary judgment, when there 13 is no genuine issue of material fact as to a particular claim or portion of that claim. Id.; see also 14 Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 56 authorizes a summary 15 adjudication that will often fall short of a final determination, even of a single claim...”) (internal 16 quotation marks, citation omitted). 17 The “purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in 18 order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith 19 Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). Summary judgment should be entered 20 “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 21 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 22 party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 23 The moving party bears the “initial responsibility” of demonstrating the absence of a genuine 24 issue of material fact. Id. at 323. An issue of fact is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for 25 a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, and a fact is material if it “might affect 26 the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 27 248 (1986); see also Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). A 28 party demonstrates summary judgment is appropriate by “informing the district court of the basis 1 of its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to 2 interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,’ which it believes 3 demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 5 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to 6 present specific facts that show genuine issue of a material fact exists. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e); 7 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. An opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 8 some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. at 587. The party must tender evidence of 9 specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its 10 contention that a factual dispute exits. Id. at 586 n.11; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Further, the opposing 11 party is not required to establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient 12 that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ 13 differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 14 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). However, “failure of proof concerning an essential element of 15 the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 16 323. 17 IV. DISCUSSION 18 A. Due Process Claim 19 Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges that Defendant violated his due process rights 20 under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because Defendant failed to afford 21 him a “name clearing hearing.” (Doc. 1 at 120–22.) In order to state a cognizable procedural due 22 process claim in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) a liberty or property interest 23 protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; and (3) lack of 24 process.” Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citation and quotation 25 omitted). In cases where a public employee is “terminated for reasons ‘sufficiently serious to 26 stigmatize or otherwise burden the individual so that he is not able to take advantage of other 27 employment opportunities,’ and the public employer publicizes those stigmatizing charges,” the 28 “process” that must be afforded to the employee is a “name-clearing” hearing. Perez v. City of 1 Roseville, 926 F.3d 511, 523 (9th Cir. 2019). 2 Defendant moves for summary judgment on this claim, arguing that (1) “because Hashim 3 cannot establish that he was a public employee of KCHA, Hashim was not legally entitled to any 4 name-clearing hearing by KCHA”; and (2) the claim fails for the independent reason that it is 5 undisputed Mr. Hashim never requested a name clearing hearing. (Doc. 32 at 24–26.) Though the 6 Defense suggests the legal standards are clear on these two points, they are at least debatable. For 7 example, the Ninth Circuit has not ruled out the possibility that independent contractors can have 8 a constitutionally protected property interest in their continued independent contractor positions 9 with the government. Blantz v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., Div. of Corr. Health Care Servs., 10 727 F.3d 917, 923–24 (9th Cir. 2013) (assuming without deciding that independent contractors 11 can have a property interest in their continued positions for purposes of due process but finding 12 “the mere fact of an independent contractor relationship with the state . . . insufficient, on its own, 13 to create a constitutionally protected property interest,” without “some source, recognized under 14 state law, for [the plaintiff’s] claimed entitlement to her position, not merely her unilateral 15 expectation that it would continue”). In addition, as a district judge in this Court explained 16 relatively recently, there is a split in authority as to whether a Plaintiff must request a name- 17 clearing hearing before bringing a due process claim based on the failure to receive such a 18 hearing. 19 The majority of federal circuits addressing this question have determined a plaintiff is required to request a name-clearing hearing 20 prior to filing a deprivation of liberty interest claim. See Winskowski v. City of Stephen, 442 F.3d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 21 2006); Quinn v. Shirey, 293 F.3d 315, 322 (6th Cir. 2002); Gillum v. City of Kerrville, 3 F.3d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1993). However, 22 neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have required plaintiffs to do so, and the district courts within the Ninth Circuit 23 are almost evenly split on this issue. See Howard v. Contra Costa Cty., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26908, at *38-39, 2014 WL 824218 24 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014) (recognizing conflict and collecting cases); Caraway v. Town of Columbus, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25 54770, *22-23, 2018 WL 1582550 (D. Mont. Mar. 30, 2018) (same). 26 Fitzgerald v. City of Fresno, No. 1:21-cv-01409 AWI SAB, 2022 WL 1204707, at *11 (E.D. Cal. 27 Apr. 22, 2022). 28 1 The Court finds it unnecessary to resolve those somewhat nuanced questions because 2 there is a far more obvious defect in this claim: Defendant’s actions had no impact on Plaintiff’s 3 employability in his chosen profession and therefore did not deprive him of any liberty interest. 4 As Defendant explained in reviewing the factual record (Doc. 32-1 at 13) and referenced again in 5 the context of moving for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s defamation claim (id. at 21): 6 Hashim admits that Kern Medical Center’s statements did not affect his ability to get subsequent jobs through Trustaff. (KSF No. 47.) 7 Following the termination of his assignment at Kern Medical Center, Trustaff continued to place Hashim in other NICU nursing 8 positions as early as October 2019. (KSF No. 48.) Trustaff never told Hashim he was disqualified from any jobs because of what 9 happened at Kern Medical Center and in fact Trustaff had no problems placing Hashim in another NICU position at a different 10 hospital. (KSF No. 49.) Nor has anyone asked Hashim about the reasons he left Kern Medical Center during any subsequent job 11 interviews. (KSF No. 50.) 12 (Doc. 32-1 at 17.) Plaintiff does not even attempt to dispute any of these facts. (Doc. 36-1, ## 47– 13 50.) “A public employer can violate an employee’s rights by terminating the employee if in so 14 doing, the employer makes a charge that might seriously damage the terminated employee’s 15 standing and associations in his community or imposes on a terminated employee a stigma or 16 other disability that forecloses his freedom to take advantage of other opportunities.” Blantz, 727 17 F.3d at 925 (internal quotation and citation omitted). However, “the liberty interests protected by 18 the Fourteenth Amendment are implicated only when the government’s stigmatizing statements 19 effectively exclude the employee completely from her chosen profession. Stigmatizing statements 20 that merely cause reduced economic returns and diminished prestige, but not permanent exclusion 21 from, or protracted interruption of, gainful employment within the trade or profession do not 22 constitute a deprivation of liberty.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). Thus, regardless 23 of whether Plaintiff is an independent contractor or (as he asserts) an employee of Defendant, and 24 even if he did not have to request a name-clearing hearing under the circumstances, the name 25 clearing claim is not viable on this record because Mr. Hashim has failed to produce any evidence 26 suggesting his standing in his profession was harmed, let alone that such harm excluded him 27 completely from his chosen profession. See Carbonell v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 3:17-CV-64- 28 CAB-BLM, 2017 WL 5176986, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2017) (dismissing name-clearing due 1 process claim brought by psychologist who, even though she was barred from further child 2 welfare psychology work, did not allege she could not find work as a psychologist more 3 generally). 4 In an abundance of caution, because this ground was raised by Defendant most directly in 5 the context of the defamation claim, not the due process claim, the Court will afford Plaintiff an 6 opportunity to file a brief supplemental opposition directing the Court’s attention to any record 7 evidence or caselaw demonstrating why the Court’s conclusion is inappropriate 8 B. Supplemental Jurisdiction 9 When a federal court has original jurisdiction over a claim, the court “shall have 10 supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action ... that 11 they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). State claims are part of the 12 same case or controversy as federal claims “when they derive from a common nucleus of 13 operative fact and are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them in one judicial 14 proceeding.” Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Assoc., 387 F.3d 850, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation 15 marks and citation omitted). 16 Supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right,” and district 17 courts “can decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent claims for a number of valid reasons.” 18 City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997) (internal quotation marks, 19 citations omitted). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court may “decline supplemental 20 jurisdiction over a claim” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” 21 and need not state its reasons for dismissal. San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 22 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998); Parra v. PacifiCare of Ariz., Inc., 715 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 23 2013) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion for declining to exercise 24 supplemental jurisdiction and for dismissing remaining state law claims after it “dismissed the 25 only claim over which it had original jurisdiction” at an “early stage of the litigation”). 26 Here, though this case has been pending since 2021 and the pending motion is one for 27 summary judgment, this Court has thus far not engaged in the merits of this case in depth, so it 28 will decline supplemental jurisdiction if it finalizes the above ruling on the due process claim. 1 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 For the reasons set forth above, 3 1. The Court tentatively finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on 4 | Plaintiff's due process claim. 5 2. Within 21 days of the date of this order, Plaintiff may file a supplemental 6 | opposition no longer than seven pages in length directing the Court’s attention to any record 7 | evidence or caselaw demonstrating why the Court’s conclusion is inappropriate. If Plaintiff files a 8 | supplemental opposition, within 14 days of that filing, Defendant may file a response of equal or 9 | lesser length. Alternatively, the parties may stipulate to remand this action. 10 3, Assuming the above tentative ruling is finalized, the Court will decline 11 || supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 12 B IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ June 26, 2025 Cerin | Tower TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28