Howard v. Colvin

 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 SHAUNDRA HOWARD, CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00022-RAJ 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 CAROLYN COLVIN, in her official 13 capacity as Head of the United States Social Security Administration; and JOHN 14 DOES 1-10; 15 Defendants. 16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Carolyn Colvin 18 (“Defendant”)’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. # 39.1 Pro se Plaintiff Shaundra 19 Howard filed a Response to Defendant’s Motion, to which Defendant replied. Dkt. ## 41, 20 42. 21 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion in its 22 entirety. 23 24 25 26 1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the Court automatically substituted Defendant as the successor to Defendant Martin O’Malley, who was the successor to 27 Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi. See Fed R. Civ. P. 25(d). 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 This is an employment discrimination and retaliation action against Defendant, 3 named in her official capacity as Head of the United States Social Security Administration. 4 Plaintiff is an African American woman who worked at the Social Security 5 Administration (“SSA”) for over five years. Dkt. # 1 at ¶ 11. She originally brought claims 6 under both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to alleged discrimination and retaliation 7 by her employer. See generally id. Plaintiff alleges she experienced a hostile work 8 environment where coworkers engaged in derogatory and demeaning name-calling toward 9 her based on her race and sex. Id. at ¶¶ 15-52. In 2014, Plaintiff filed a formal U.S. Equal 10 Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) complaint regarding the alleged 11 harassment. Dkt. # 9-1 at 2-5. She claims that the harassment continued after she filed the 12 EEOC complaint; specifically, coworkers would place candy bars on her desk, glare at her 13 often, and block exits out of the building to intimidate her. Dkt. # 1 at ¶¶ 12, 30, 48. She 14 further states that her supervisors also engaged in discrimination and retaliation based on 15 her EEOC activity by failing to stop the ongoing harassment, refusing to provide adequate 16 assistance for her workload, and delaying a leave request. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 22, 32-33, 42, 52. 17 In October 2021, the EEOC issued a decision and entered judgment in favor of the 18 SSA, concluding that Plaintiff was unable to establish that she was discriminated against 19 or subjected to a hostile work environment because of her race, her sex, or reprisal. Dkt. # 20 9-2 at 2-12. On January 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this Court suing 21 Defendant, as Acting Secretary of the SSA, for alleged violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 22 § 1983. See generally Dkt. # 1. On March 28, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss 23 based on insufficient service, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. 24 Dkt. # 8. Plaintiff filed a response to the Motion that did not comply with the Court’s filing 25 deadlines. Dkt. # 13. 26 The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ruling 27 that (1) Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 were preempted by Title VII and (2) the Court 1 lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim under Title VII because she 2 failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, thus requiring dismissal. Dkt. # 16. 3 Defendant now moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s remaining claims, which fall 4 into the following three categories: (1) disparate treatment; (2) retaliation; and (3) hostile 5 work environment. Dkt. # 39. 6 III. LEGAL STANDARD 7 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material 8 fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 9 The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue 10 of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving 11 party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no 12 reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Soremekun v. Thrifty 13 Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue where the nonmoving party 14 will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by pointing out 15 to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s 16 case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets the initial burden, the 17 opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for 18 trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 19 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 20 party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Reeves v. Sanderson 21 Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). 22 However, the court need not, and will not, “scour the record in search of a genuine 23 issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see White v. 24 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 904 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 1990) (the court need not 25 “speculate on which portion of the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obliged to 26 wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the 27 nonmoving party’s claim.”). The opposing party must present significant and probative 1 evidence to support its claim or defense. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 2 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). Uncorroborated allegations and “self-serving 3 testimony” will not create a genuine issue of material fact. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, 4 Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). 5 IV. DISCUSSION 6 A. Disparate Treatment 7 Defendant first moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims relating to 8 disparate treatment. As elucidated by Title VII, employees cannot discriminate against any 9 individual “with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 10 employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . 11 .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Claims of disparate treatment brought under Title VII must 12 include an alleged act of discrimination that “affect[s] the terms and conditions of 13 employment.” Burlington N. and Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006). The 14 removal of or substantial interference with work facilities important to the performance of 15 an employee’s job constitutes a material change in the terms and conditions of employment 16 and thus is an “adverse employment action” under Title VII. Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. 17 Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000). Conversely, an employer’s failure 18 to respond to grievances does not qualify as an adverse employment action. Id. 19 Defendant identifies four areas of consideration for the Court when adjudicating 20 Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claims: (1) allegations of increased workload; (2) denial of 21 leave requests; (3) a letter of reprimand; and (4) assertions that Defendant “did nothing” in 22 response to Plaintiff’s reports of harassment. Dkt. # 42 at 3-6. The Court will analyze 23 these specific events or allegations in conjunction with the facts of the case. 24 Plaintiff claims she “was forced to endure an unbearable workload.” Dkt. # 1 at ¶ 25 50. The Court agrees with Defendant’s admission that “overloading an employee and 26 denying them help could perhaps constitute ‘substantial interference with work facilities 27 important to the performance of the job.’” Dkt. # 39 at 15. However, the Court concurs 1 with Defendant that the actions of Plaintiff’s supervisors show there is no genuine dispute 2 of material fact. Defendant has provided the Court with a series of emails showing that 3 help was available to Plaintiff. Specifically, the emails reference another employee 4 assisting with Plaintiff’s workload while Plaintiff was out of the office and Plaintiff’s 5 supervisor delegating work to another employee after Plaintiff took issue with having to 6 assist a coworker. Dkt. # 40-16 at 2, 13. Plaintiff’s Response fails to offer any 7 counterargument regarding the evidence presented. In fact, the Response constitutes an 8 almost verbatim recitation of her Complaint.2 Because Plaintiff cannot refute the evidence 9 that she was offered help regarding her workload, she cannot show that there was an 10 adverse employment action. 11 Plaintiff’s allegation that she was denied leave to pursue her EEOC proceeding lacks 12 merit, and the evidence plainly shows as much. Plaintiff’s supervisor approved her request 13 within three hours. Dkt. # 40-17 at 8. Moreover, Plaintiff does not show how an official 14 reprimand letter she received on January 12, 2016, had any adverse consequences for her. 15 Dkt. # 40-21 at 8; see Staples v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., No. 2:07-cv-05443-RJB, 16 2009 WL 442074, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 17, 2009) (finding that a letter of reprimand, 17 by itself, is not an adverse employment action). 18 Finally, Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that Defendant “did nothing” in response to her 19 reports of harassment. Dkt. # 41 at 13, 24, 30-33. Defendant has provided a plethora of 20 evidence to show that it looked into all of Plaintiff’s reports and counseled employees when 21 appropriate. When Plaintiff informed Defendant that a coworker was “glaring” at her, 22 management interviewed and advised the coworker about his perceived behavior. Dkt. ## 23 40-11 at 6-7; Dkt. # 40-18 at 10-11, 15-17. Furthermore, when Plaintiff complained that 24 her own supervisor had intentionally bumped into her with a wheelchair, the supervisor 25 escalated the complaint to Defendant’s in-house counsel, who then assigned another 26 2 Plaintiff’s Response also violates Local Rule 7(e)(3), as it is ten pages over the twenty- 27 four page limit prescribed by the Rule. See LCR 7(e)(3). 1 manager to investigate the incident. Id. at 17-23. In light of the evidence provided and 2 Plaintiff’s failure to refute it, the Court finds that Defendant took appropriate action in 3 investigating these incidents, and any claims of disparate treatment are unfounded. 4 Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff could indeed show an adverse employment 5 action, her disparate treatment claims would fail nonetheless, as none of Defendant’s 6 actions was pretextual. If a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination can make out a 7 prima facie case, then the burden of production shifts to the defendant, who then must 8 articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Tex. 9 Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 US. 248, 253 (1981). If the defendant can establish 10 a legitimate reason for his actions, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must “put 11 forward specific and substantial evidence challenging the credibility of the employer’s 12 motives.” Mayes v. WinCo Holdings, Inc., 846 F.3d 1274, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). 13 Here, there is no evidence to show that any of Defendant’s actions were pretextual. 14 For example, Howard was not the only individual to complain about her workload, as 15 White, Black, and Asian employees voiced similar concerns about their own dockets. Dkt. 16 # 40-16 at 2-3, 6, 47-48. Plaintiff’s Response fails to address this fact. Regarding 17 Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed with her EEOC action, she does not respond to 18 Defendant’s argument that her union contract called for managers to grant such time upon 19 reasonable request only, which was based on the stage of the case and nature of the activity. 20 Dkt. # 40-26 at 4-6. To cinch the matter, Plaintiff fails to identify a single instance in which 21 management responded differently to her complaints than it did for other individuals. 22 The Court will conclude this section by briefly addressing Plaintiff’s statement that 23 “the agency’s quest for dismissal, at its core, is asking this tribunal to make credibility 24 determinations” and her cited contention that “[a] decision without a hearing is 25 inappropriate when there are genuine issues as to credibility . . . .” Dkt. # 41 at 3. The 26 Court is not making a credibility determination, but rather analyzing the evidence provided 27 by the parties to evaluate the legality of Defendant’s actions and how Plaintiff’s failure to 1 act affects the merit of her claims. As stated in this section and pursuant to the McDonnell 2 Douglas burden-shifting framework, if Defendant can establish a legitimate reason for the 3 SSA’s actions, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff, who must “put forward specific and 4 substantial evidence challenging the credibility of the employer’s motives.” Mayes, 846 5 F.3d at 1282 (emphasis added). Moreover, the case cited by Plaintiff in her Response does 6 not even include the words “credibility” or “hearing” and is inapposite to this matter. See 7 generally Wellington v. Lyon Cnty. Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1999) (concerning 8 an action brought by a plaintiff who alleged that the defendants violated the Americans 9 with Disability Act by terminating his employment due to his carpal tunnel syndrome). 10 Accordingly, Plaintiff does not meet her burden of producing “specific and 11 substantial evidence” to rebut Defendant’s reasons for the SSA’s actions, which Defendant 12 avers were not pretextual. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion on Plaintiff’s 13 disparate treatment claims. 14 B. Retaliation 15 Defendant next moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. To 16 assert a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity, 17 (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) there was a causal link between 18 the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, 19 Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002). 20 The Court summarily grants Defendant’s Motion on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims, 21 as they are, in this specific case, duplicative of and contingent upon her disparate treatment 22 claims. There is no dispute that Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, as she was 23 pursuing EEOC claims during the course of her employment with Defendant. However, 24 the Court explained in exhaustive detail, supra, that she did not suffer any adverse 25 employment action. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim therefore fails based on the second prong 26 of analysis, and the Court need not determine whether there was a causal link between the 27 protected activity and the adverse employment action. 1 The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. 2 C. Hostile Work Environment 3 Finally, Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile work 4 environment claims. To establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim 5 based on race under Title VII, an employee must raise a triable issue of fact as to whether: 6 (1) the defendant subjected the plaintiff to verbal or physical conduct based on her race; 7 (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive 8 to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive working 9 environment. Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 Defendant asserts a reasonable care affirmative defense in response to Plaintiff’s 11 allegations. Employers “may avoid liability by asserting a ‘reasonable care’ defense.” 12 Craig v. M&O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007). When attempting to 13 establish this defense, the employer must prove that (1) it “exercised reasonable care to 14 prevent and correct promptly any [ ] harassing behavior” and (2) “the plaintiff employee 15 unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities 16 provided by the employer.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 17 The Court finds that Defendant took prompt, corrective actions to prevent 18 harassment, and Plaintiff failed to take advantage of these actions by refusing to cooperate 19 with Defendant’s investigation into the alleged conduct. At the time of the allegations, 20 Defendant had an anti-harassment policy that required all employees to undergo certain 21 training every two years. Dkt. # 40-29. Although Plaintiff repeatedly makes the 22 conclusory allegation that Defendant “did nothing” to respond to her reports of harassment, 23 Defendant verified that the employees in Plaintiff’s department had taken their training 24 course. Dkt. # 40-28 at 2-4. 25 As previously outlined in this Order, Defendant provided evidence that it promptly 26 responded to Plaintiff’s reports of harassment. The Court repeats the following: 27 When Plaintiff informed Defendant that a coworker was “glaring” at her, management interviewed and advised the 1 coworker about his perceived behavior. Dkt. ## 40-11 at 6-7; 2 Dkt. # 40-18 at 10-11, 15-17. Also, when Plaintiff complained that her own supervisor had intentionally bumped into her with 3 a wheelchair, the supervisor escalated the complaint to Defendant’s in-house counsel, who then assigned another 4 manager to investigate the incident. Id. at 17-23. 5 See Order at 5-6. Plaintiff offers nothing to counter this evidence. 6 Finally, the emails provided by Defendant show that whenever management tried 7 to obtain more information from Plaintiff, she refused to cooperate and stated she was 8 going to add the alleged incidents to her EEOC proceedings. Dkt. # 40-18 at 6. The Ninth 9 Circuit has found a plaintiff’s failure to participate in the investigation of her allegations 10 relevant when evaluating the availability of a defendant’s reasonable care defense. Wallace 11 v. San Joaquin Cnty., 58 F. App’x 289, 291 (9th Cir. 2003). The exhibits demonstrate that 12 management did all it could to prevent employee misconduct and promptly investigated all 13 of Plaintiff’s complaints. Defendant’s reasonable care affirmative defense is valid. 14 The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment 15 claims. 16 V. CONCLUSION 17 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Carolyn Colvin’s 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. # 39. 19 20 Dated this 14th day of January, 2025. 21 A 22 23 The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge 24 25 26 27