HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Mahon

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2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U
SECOND DIVISION
                                                                             February 11, 2025
                                        No. 1-23-2462


NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                            IN THE
                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                      FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
HSBC BANK USA, N.A. as Trustee for Wells Fargo              )   Appeal from the Circuit Court
Asset Securities Corporation Home Equity Asset-Backed       )   of Cook County.
Certificates, Series 2006-3,                                )
                                                            )
       Plaintiff-Appellee,                                  )
                                                            )
v.                                                          )   No. 07 CH 21012
                                                            )
CHIQUITA MAHON,                                             )   Honorable
                                                            )   William B. Sullivan,
       Defendant-Appellant.                                 )   Judge Presiding.



       PRESIDING JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices McBride and Howse concurred in the judgment.

                                           ORDER


¶1   Held: The circuit court did not err in finding that the conveyor’s signature was forged in
     a deed that purported to transfer real property to another individual. Because the signature
     was forged, the property did not transfer, and the subsequent mortgage that the conveyor
     executed against the same property was valid.
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¶2     In 1994, Chiquita Mahon and Bobby Binion (not a party to this appeal) jointly purchased

real estate property. In 2001, Binion purportedly transferred his interest in the property to Mahon

through a warranty deed. In 2006, Binion executed a mortgage against that same property. In 2007,

Binion defaulted on the loan, and the lender, HSBC Bank USA (HSBC), filed a complaint against

him seeking to foreclose the mortgage. In 2014, Mahon intervened in the litigation and sought to

void the mortgage by claiming that Binion did not have an interest in the property when he

executed the 2006 mortgage because he transferred his interest to Mahon in 2001. In 2015, Mahon

filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that (1) she was the sole owner of the property

from 2001 onward, and (2) the 2006 mortgage was void or voidable. In 2018, HSBC filed its

second amended complaint to add Mahon as a defendant and include a claim for an equitable lien

against the property. In 2019, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of HSBC, finding that

the 2001 property transfer was fraudulent because Binion’s signature was forged. Accordingly,

Binion retained his interest in the property at the time he executed the 2006 mortgage, and

therefore, the mortgage was valid as to both Binion and Mahon. Mahon appeals. For the following

reason, we affirm.

¶3                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶4     The operative complaint in this appeal is HSBC’s two-count second amended complaint,

which it filed on October 26, 2018. HSBC brought count I, mortgage foreclosure, against Binion,

Mahon, and others. HSBC alleged that Binion executed a mortgage against the subject property

on August 18, 2006, and defaulted on the monthly mortgage payments beginning in April 2007.

HSBC requested the court enter a judgment of foreclosure and sale, and an order granting it

possession of the property. Under count II, brought in the alternative, HSBC sought an equitable

lien against Mahon, alleging that it had paid property taxes and hazard insurance from April 2007


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onward. HSBC alleged that Mahon, as an individual with an interest in the property, was unjustly

enriched in the amount of $108,499.01. Thus, HSBC requested a lien for this amount if Mahon

would be successful in voiding the 2006 mortgage, as it would have no adequate remedy at law.

On November 20, 2018, Mahon answered the second amended complaint. As to count I, Mahon

denied that the mortgage was valid and legally enforceable. She admitted being the current owner

of the property. Mahon did not respond substantively to the allegation that she would be unjustly

enriched by HSBC’s payment of taxes and insurance. On December 5, 2018, the court set the

matter for a bench trial.

¶5                                       A. Trial Testimony

¶6     The central issue at trial was whether Binion signed the 2001 warranty deed. Mahon’s only

witness was herself, as the court had stricken her proposed expert prior to trial. The court’s decision

to strike Mahon’s expert is not at issue here. HSBC called two fact witnesses and Diane Marsh, a

forensic document examiner. The two fact witnesses’ testimony is also not at issue in this appeal.

Binion did not testify. Mahon challenges the court’s determination as to her credibility and Marsh’s

qualifications and methodology. Accordingly, we review only Mahon’s and Marsh’s trial

testimony.

¶7                                       1. Chiquita Mahon

¶8     On direct examination, Mahon explained that she had a long romantic and professional

relationship with Binion, predating the 1994 purchase of the subject property. She averred having

ended her relationship with Binion in both 2001 and 2007, and that she was in a relationship with

him in 2011. She testified that she believed that her name had been on the title of the subject

property since 2001. She stated that she personally observed Binion sign the 2001 warranty deed,

remembered the notarization of the deed, and was familiar with Binion’s signature. She executed


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a reverse mortgage on the property in 2017. On cross-examination, Mahon was asked about

deposition testimony she gave in May and July 2017. Mahon confirmed that she had testified

during those prior depositions that she was not familiar with Binion’s signature, and did not know

whether his signature was on the 2001 deed. On redirect, Mahon stated that now that she had

reviewed the documents again she realized that she “did know these documents and [she] was

familiar with these documents.” She testified that she knew she was familiar with these documents

because she was “there when [Binion] signed the Warranty Deed.”

¶9     On cross-examination, Mahon admitted that she provided different years for when her

relationship with Binion ended, but did not explain the discrepancies. She also admitted to

providing different times regarding when Binion moved out of the subject property.

¶ 10                                     2. Diane Marsh

¶ 11   HSBC called Marsh to testify as an expert witness as to whether the signature on the

warranty deed was Binion’s. Marsh described herself as a forensic document examiner, having

been involved in the study of questioned documents for 37 years. She has worked for banks, law

firms, corporations, insurance companies, security firms, public defenders, prosecutors, and

government entities. She had testified more than 200 times in state and federal courts. She

belonged to several document examiner organizations, including the Independent Association of

Questioned Document Examiners and the World Association of Document Examiners, and

lectured at some of them. She received specialized training under two forensic document

examiners, attended 70 training seminars, and engaged in over 4,800 hours of self-study. She has

written 25 articles on questioned documents. On cross-examination, opposing counsel elicited

testimony that Marsh did not become a full-time document examiner until 1990 (meaning she had

28 years of full-time experience rather than 37); did not become certified by the American Board


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of Forensic Document Examiners; studied under individuals who may have been graphoanalysts

rather than document examiners; and has only been a self-employed document examiner (rather

than working in a supervised environment).

¶ 12   As to her methodology, Marsh testified having used the American Society for Testing and

Materials International’s guidelines to determine whether Binion’s signature was authentic. She

described her methodology in detail. Marsh received a copy of Binion’s voter registration records

from the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners. The signature on those reecords was the

starting point of her analysis. Rather than paraphrasing Marsh’s description of her methodology

that followed, we reproduce it here:

       “I first examined all of the known [samples of Binion’s handwriting] to see if they were all

       signed by the same person. If they were consistent with each other. And I did determine

       they were all written by the same person. All the handwriting [samples]. And then I

       examined the [2001 warranty deed], the signature on it. I went through. I examined it with

       my microscope. And after I did a thorough examination of the signature on the warranty

       deed, then I did a side-by-side comparison. I went through each handwriting characteristic

       in the known [samples] in comparison to the handwriting characteristics in the questioned

       signature. And After I did all that, then I was able to arrive at an opinion.

       ***

       My opinion is that the person that wrote the known exemplars, Bobby Binion, is not the

       same individual that signed the [warranty] deed, the questioned signature.

       ***

       My conclusions are based on a number of fundamental differences that exist between the

       questioned signature and the known signature. And some of these are beginning strokes,


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       spacing, letter design, slant, connecting strokes, ending strokes, that are fundamentally

       different from the known signatures in comparison to the warranty deed signature.”

Based on this methodology, Marsh concluded that Binion did not sign the warranty deed.

¶ 13    On cross-examination, opposing counsel elicited testimony that Marsh used enlarged

photocopies of the samples rather than an original signature sample; photocopies are not as reliable

as originals; and there was variation among the samples that Marsh analyzed.

¶ 14                              B. The Trial Court’s Decision

¶ 15   On May 21, 2019, the court issued a detailed written opinion and order in favor of HSBC.

The court explained that the key issue in the case was whether the signature on the 2001 warranty

deed was in fact Binion’s. As relevant here, the court believed that Mahon attempted to testify in

good faith but found her not credible because of the significant inconsistences between her

testimony at trial and prior deposition testimony. Most notably, the court emphasized that, on direct

examination, Mahon stated on several occasions that she was familiar with Binion’s signature and

that she specifically remembered eye witnessing Binion sign the 2001 warranty deed. On cross-

examination, she admitted that she testified under oath at her July 2017 deposition that she did not

know if Binion’s signature was on the warranty deed and that she was not familiar with Binion’s

signature. Because of this inconsistency, the court did not rely on Mahon’s testimony.

¶ 16   Further, the court found Marsh’s qualifications and methodologies sufficient to allow her

to testify as an expert witness. As to her qualifications, the court noted that Marsh has been (1)

certified by several reputable and professional document examiner organizations; (2) qualified as

an expert by state and federal courts in Illinois; (3) involved in the study of questioned documents

for 37 years, having worked for banks, law firms, corporations, insurance companies, security

firms, prosecutors, public defenders, and other governmental entities; (4) trained by two certified


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forensic document examiners; (5) an attendee at more than 70 individual training seminars (for a

total of 1,800 hours); and (6) engaged in substantial self-study totaling over 4,800 hours. However,

the court also noted that Marsh (1) has only ever been a self-employed document examiner and

has never worked in a supervised environment; (2) is not a member of, nor certified by, the

American Board of Forensic Document Examiners; and (3) did not become certified by the

American Board of Forensic Document Examiners because she did not complete two years of full-

time training under a governmental agency. Based on a holistic consideration of the foregoing, the

court concluded that Marsh was qualified to serve as an expert witness.

¶ 17   The court found Marsh’s methodology credible. It stated that another Illinois court found

Marsh’s testimony to be “extremely credible, thoroughly articulated, and well supported.” The

court noted that Marsh testified in detail regarding the processes she undertook in analyzing the

handwriting and signatures. The court explained that the potential shortcomings of Marsh’s

methodology, such as using enlarged photocopies rather than originals in her analysis and having

fewer than an optimal number of signatures samples, were minimal and therefore insufficient to

disqualify her expert testimony. The court found that the 2001 signature purported to be Binion’s

was forged.

¶ 18   On August 6, 2019, the court entered the judgment for foreclosure and sale. On June 5,

2023, it entered an order approving HSBC’s report of sale and distribution. On June 26, 2023,

Mahon petitioned the court to set aside the sale and moved to stay the eviction. The court denied

Mahon’s petition and motion.

¶ 19   Mahon appeals.




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¶ 20                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21   On appeal, Mahon argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that the 2001 warranty

deed was forged because (1) Mahon offered “uncontroverted eyewitness testimony” that she

witnessed Binion sign the deed, and (2) HSBC’s handwriting expert lacked the requisite

qualifications and used a faulty methodology in forming her opinion.

¶ 22   At the outset, we note that Mahon does not identify the applicable standard of review on

appeal. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(3) requires the appellant to include a “concise

statement of the applicable standard of review for each issue, with citation to authority, either in

the discussion of the issue in the argument or under a separate heading placed before the discussion

in the argument.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(3) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Second, Mahon does not include a

jurisdictional statement as required by Rule 341(h)(4). Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(4) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

Third, Mahon does not include citations to the record on appeal as required by Rule 341(h)(6). Ill.

S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Finally, Mahon does not support her arguments with citation

to relevant authority as required by Rule 341(h)(7). Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 23   Our supreme court rules are not mere suggestions; they have the force of law, and the

parties must abide by them. Rosestone Investments, LLC v. Garner,
2013 IL App (1st) 123422, ¶

18
. We have the inherent authority to dismiss an appeal where the appellant’s brief fails to comply

with supreme court rules. North Community Bank v. 17011 South Park Avenue, LLC,
2015 IL App

(1st) 133672
, ¶ 14. However, we recognize that dismissing an appeal or striking a brief is a harsh

sanction. In re Detention of Powell,
217 Ill. 2d 123, 132
(2005). Although Mahon’s noncompliance

with our supreme court rules complicates our review, it does not frustrate it completely, so we will

supply the standard of review and consider the merits.




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¶ 24    The standard of review following a bench trial is whether the trial court’s order or judgment

is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Wade v. Stewart Title Guaranty Company,
2017 IL

App (1st) 161765, ¶ 59
. “A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an

opposite conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not

based on the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id.
(quoting Eychaner v. Gross,
202

Ill. 2d 228, 252
(2002)). Under this standard, we afford great deference to the trial court because

it is in the best position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe their

demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony.
Id.
(citing People v. Jones,
215 Ill. 2d 261, 268
(2005)).

¶ 25    In this case, the court was required to decide whether the signature on the 2001 warranty

deed was authentic or forged. A forgery is a false writing or alteration of a writing, which must be

capable of defrauding, and there must be an intent to defraud. In re Estate of Bontkowski,
337 Ill.

App. 3d 72, 76
(2003). A party alleging forgery of a notarized document must prove its allegation

by clear and convincing evidence from a disinterested witness. Id.; Finley v. Felter,
403 Ill. 372,

378
(1949). “Clear and convincing” evidence is the level of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt

in the mind of the factfinder as to the truth of the proposition. Bazydlo v. Volant,
164 Ill. 2d 207,

213
(1995).

¶ 26    Here, Mahon challenges the court’s determination that the 2001 warranty deed was forged

because, according to Mahon, she was a credible, uncontroverted witness, and Marsh was not

qualified to testify as an expert.

¶ 27                            A. Credibility of Mahon’s Testimony

¶ 28    Mahon argues that her testimony of witnessing Binion sign the 2001 warranty deed was

“uncontroverted and unimpeached” and that the court erred in finding her not credible. This


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assertion is inaccurate. When questioned about witnessing Binion sign the deed on cross-

examination, Mahon answered as follows:

       “Q. Now, you testified that you personally witnessed Bobby Binton [sic] sign this Warranty

       Deed, correct?

       A. Yes.

       Q. But you previously testified that you don’t recall ever seeing this document, correct?

       A. Yes.”

Based on the foregoing, it is unclear to this court how Mahon could contend that her testimony

regarding whether she witnessed Binion sign the 2001 deed was uncontroverted and unimpeached.

Mahon also testified that she was familiar with Binion’s signature. However, at a prior deposition,

she stated she did not know his signature. Additionally, HSBC specifically identifies several other

portions of Mahon’s testimony that impeached her credibility.

¶ 29   Mahon cites Jones v. Jones,
406 Ill. 448
(1950), to suggest that the circuit court should

have relied on her testimony. In that case, the court discounted the expert’s opinion where two

disinterested witnesses’ uncontradicted testimony showed that the testatrix signed the will in

question.
Id. at 451
. Mahon’s reliance on that case is misplaced for two reasons. First, she is not a

disinterested witness, as her liability for damages hinges on whether the 2001 conveyance was

valid. Second, her testimony was contradicted, as shown above. Mahon also cites Fekete v. Fekete,
323 Ill. 468
(1926), for the proposition that expert opinions on handwriting are of little value if

they are “mere opinions.” While that may be true, it has nothing to do with Mahon’s contention

that the court erred in finding her not credible. The court did not err in finding Mahon not credible,

as her testimony was inconsistent regarding the threshold issue of whether Binion signed the deed.




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¶ 30                                    B. Diane Marsh’s Expertise

¶ 31    As noted above, HSBC retained Diane Marsh, a forensic document examiner, as its expert

witness to determine whether the signature on the 2001 warranty deed was actually Binion’s.

Mahon challenges Marsh’s opinion on two grounds: (1) her qualifications, and (2) her

methodology. 1

¶ 32                                     1. Marsh’s Qualifications

¶ 33    As an initial matter, we note that the decision whether to admit expert testimony is within

the sound discretion of the trial court. Thompson v. Gordon,
221 Ill. 2d 414, 428
(2006). A court

will allow a person to testify as an expert if her experience and qualifications afford her knowledge

that is not common to laypeople, and where her testimony will aid the trier of fact in reaching its

conclusions.
Id.
“An expert whose qualifications and experience give him or her knowledge which

is beyond the ken of the average fact finder and whose testimony will aid, and not invade, the

province of the fact finder in reaching its decision, should be allowed to testify.” People v. Masor,
218 Ill. App. 3d 884, 887
(1991). “There is no predetermined formula for how an expert acquires

specialized knowledge or experience and the expert can gain such through practical

experience, scientific study, education, training or research.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Thompson,
221 Ill. 2d at 428
-29 (quoting People v. Miller,
173 Ill. 2d 167, 186
(1996)). Formal

academic training or specific degrees are not required to qualify a person as an expert; rather,

practical experience in a field may suffice. Id. at 429. An expert must only have knowledge beyond




        1
         It appears that Mahon challenges the content of Marsh’s opinion based on lack of qualifications
and faulty methodology. She does not appear to challenge the admissibility of Marsh’s testimony. In any
case, we would review admissibility under an even more deferential standard, abuse of discretion, and as
explained below, Marsh was qualified to testify as an expert. In re Commitment of Simons,
213 Ill. 2d 523,
530-31
(2004) (stating that the decision as to whether an expert witness is qualified to testify is in the sound
discretion of the trial court).

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that of an average person.
Id.
Accordingly, expert testimony is admissible “if the proffered expert

is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, and the testimony will assist

the trier of fact in understanding the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id.
(quoting

Snelson v. Kamm,
204 Ill. 2d 1, 24
(2003)).

¶ 34   At the time of trial, Marsh had worked in the study of questioned documents for 37 years.

She trained under two certified forensic document examiners, attended more than 70 individual

training seminars for a combined total of 1,800 hours, and over 4,800 hours of self-study. She

passed examinations with the Association of Forensic Document Examiners, the Independent

Association of Forensic Document Examiners, the American Board of Forensic Examiners, and

the World Association of Document Examiners. She is board certified by the Independent

Association of Questioned Document Examiners, the World Association of Document Examiners,

and the American Board of Forensic Examiners. Marsh is a member of the Association of Forensic

Document Examiners, the American Society for Testing and Materials International, the Illinois

Association for Identification, and the American College of Forensic Examiners. In another

mortgage fraud case, this court declined to disqualify Marsh as a handwriting expert, noting that

the trial court in that case found Marsh’s testimony “extremely credible, thoroughly articulated,

and well-supported.” Gambino v. Boulevard Mortgage Corp.,
398 Ill. App. 3d 21, 48
(2009).

¶ 35   Mahon contends that Marsh is unqualified because she (1) received her training under

graphoanalysts, (2) has never trained in a government or laboratory setting, and (3) gained

certification by two organizations that later became defunct. Mahon does not cite to any authority

to support that any of these three contentions render Marsh unqualified to testify as an expert.




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¶ 36   As to Mahon’s first contention, she argues that Marsh conceded that she did not train under

two certified document examiners but rather graphoanalysts. 2 This contention has no merit, as the

record shows that Marsh explained, on cross-examination, as follows:

       “Q. And Ms. Schneider and Ms. Garage are what are called graphoanalysts, correct?

       A. No. They were forensic document examiners. They were both certified as forensic

       document examiners by the Independent Association of Questioned Document Examiners.

       Q. So, you’re saying that these ladies were never graphoanalysts. Is that your testimony?

       A. They may have studied graphoanalysts[sic] at one time but they – in 1969 when the

       Independent Association of Questioned Document Examiners was formulated, they were

       both charter members of that group.”

As Mahon’s contention is wholly contrary to the evidence on the record, we must reject it.

¶ 37   Taken together, Mahon’s second and third contentions are essentially a challenge to

Marsh’s certifications by three organizations. First, Mahon contends that, because Marsh is not

certified by the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners, she is unqualified. As an initial

matter, Mahon does not cite any authority to suggest that certification by this particular

organization is a threshold requirement for qualifying an individual as an expert in this field.

Further, Mahon argues that Marsh could not qualify under the standards of that organization

because it requires two years of full-time training. However, as Marsh explained, that organization

also accepts the equivalent of two years of full-time training. As we noted above, Marsh logged at

least 6,600 hours of seminars and self-study, which could very well exceed two years of full-time

training. As Marsh explained, she was not certified by that organization because she never applied



       2
         According to Marsh, graphoanalysts are individuals who analyze handwriting to gain insight into
one’s personality; they do not compare and analyze handwriting samples.

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for certification, not because she necessarily fell short of its standards. Therefore, we will not

assume Marsh would not have been certified if she had applied, as Mahon seems to urge us to do.

¶ 38   Second, Mahon takes issue with Marsh’s certifications by two other organizations, the

Independent Association of Questioned Document Examiners and the World Association of

Document Examiners, because they are no longer active. Mahon does not dispute that Marsh is

certified by both organizations. Rather, she appears to argue that Marsh’s certification under now-

inactive organizations somehow disqualifies Marsh. We are unsure what the relevance of these

organizations’ inactive status is, as Mahon does not challenge the standards that these

organizations used while they were active to certify individuals.

¶ 39   To receive The Independent Association of Questioned Document Examiners’

certification, Marsh had to show she completed the equivalent of at least three years of full-time

training. To qualify under the World Association of Document Examiners, she was required to

pass an examination and appear before that organization’s board for questioning as she presented

a document case. Even assuming for the sake of argument that certification by the American Board

of Forensic Document Examiners was somehow a threshold requirement for qualification as an

expert, the requirements Marsh had to fulfill for certification by the other two organizations (the

equivalent of three years’ full-time training and examinations) exceeded what would have been

required by the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners (two years of full time-time

training and examination). Clearly, Marsh’s background indicates that she has knowledge beyond

the ken of the average factfinder. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s decision to admit

Marsh as an expert was wholly supported by the evidence.

¶ 40                                2. Marsh’s Methodology




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¶ 41   In Illinois, the Frye standard governs the admission of expert testimony. In re Commitment

of Simons,
213 Ill. 2d 523, 529
(2004) (citing Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923)).

Also known as the “general acceptance” test, the Frye standard provides that scientific evidence

is admissible only if the methodology or scientific principle upon which the opinion is based has

gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Id. at 529-30. This does not

require universal acceptance nor that the methodology in question be accepted by unanimity or

even a majority of experts. Id. at 530. Rather, it is sufficient that the underlying method used to

generate an expert opinion is reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Id.

¶ 42   Marsh examined several samples of Binion’s handwriting, including his signatures on two

quit claim deeds, four mortgages, an affidavit, an occupancy declaration, and voter registration

records. She determined that all were written by the same person and consistent with each other.

She examined the 2001 deed under a microscope and compared it side-by-side with these samples.

She “went through each handwriting characteristic in the known samples in comparison to the

handwriting characteristics in the questioned signature.” Based on this comparison and analysis,

Marsh concluded that the signature on the 2001 deed was not Binion’s.

¶ 43   Mahon contends that Marsh utilized a faulty methodology in that she (1) used photocopies

to evaluate the signature on the 2001 deed, (2) enlarged the documents she used in her analysis,

and (3) failed to use “requested writing samples.” Again, Mahon fails to cite any authority in

support of these contentions.

¶ 44   As to Mahon’s first contention, we note that Marsh used photocopies of Binion’s signature

samples rather than Binion’s original signature. HSBC states that there was no practical way to

obtain an original signature because Binion did not participate in the trial or litigation. Mahon

takes issue with the use of photocopies because Marsh testified that the American Board of


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Forensic Examiners’ guidance provides: “Photocopies pose an inherent limitation that can interfere

with the examination procedure.” That is, photocopies can interfere with the examination

procedure, but there is no indication that they inherently do so. Here, Mahon does not argue that

the photocopies interfered with the examination process, let alone explain how they interfered.

This is likely because Marsh testified that the photocopies were both “clear” and “very legible.”

She also testified that the photocopies were likely first- or second-generation copies based on their

clarity. Because Mahon has not argued anything contrary to Marsh’s testimony that the

photocopies were clear and very legible, we find no reason to call into question Marsh’s use of

photocopies in her analysis.

¶ 45   Mahon also takes issue with Marsh enlarging the photocopies. We are unclear where this

allegation originates, as it, again, directly contradicts Marsh’s testimony, which provided that her

“specific findings were based on the actual photocopies themselves, and not based on [her]

enlargement.” Because Mahon’s argument is again based on a misstatement of the record, we find

her challenge entirely meritless.

¶ 46   Lastly, Mahon argues that Marsh’s methodology was unsound because Marsh did not

collect or have access to Binion’s writing samples that were requested for this litigation. Mahon

contends that this was problematic because a person’s handwriting is “ever changing.” Even

assuming that this unsupported contention is true, the record indicates that Marsh analyzed more

than 30 samples of Binion’s signatures over a “long period of time.” Although Marsh did not have

access to newly requested samples, her analysis relied on signature samples from the time of the

deed, as well as an extended period of time thereafter. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence

showed that Marsh employed a sound methodology in reaching her opinion, and the trial court did

not err in admitting her testimony.


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¶ 47   As the evidence amply supported the trial court’s judgment, it was certainly not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 48                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 49   For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 50   Affirmed.




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