In re A.D-C.

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2024 UT App 150
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

           STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF A.D.-C.,
            A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.


                            A.D.-C.,
                           Appellant,
                               v.
                         STATE OF UTAH,
                           Appellee.

                             Opinion
                         No. 20221120-CA
                      Filed October 24, 2024

       Fourth District Juvenile Court, Provo Department
              The Honorable F. Richards Smith
                          No. 1208680

          Douglas J. Thompson and Margaret P. Lindsay,
                      Attorneys for Appellant
                  Sean D. Reyes and Emily Sopp,
                      Attorneys for Appellee

    JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1     A.D.-C. (ADC), a sixteen-year-old juvenile, borrowed his
father’s Cadillac Escalade one night and took it for a spin,
accompanied by a friend. At the time, ADC had a learner permit
but not a driver license. The ride ended when ADC took a turn
too fast, rolled the vehicle, and crashed through a backyard fence.
The State filed a delinquency petition against ADC, alleging that
he had taken actions constituting the crimes of reckless driving
and driving without a license. ADC admitted that he had been
driving without a license, but he contested the reckless driving
                           In re A.D.-C.


charge. After a bench trial, however, the juvenile court found that
ADC had indeed been driving recklessly, and it adjudicated him
delinquent on that charge.

¶2     ADC now appeals that determination, asserting that some
of the testimony offered by responding police officers was
improperly admitted, and that the evidence was insufficient to
support a determination that he violated the reckless driving
statute. We reject ADC’s assertions and affirm his adjudication.


                         BACKGROUND

¶3     One evening after dark, police received a report that there
had been a vehicle “rollover” near the local high school. Two
officers arrived at the scene, and they found a Cadillac Escalade
that had come to rest “in someone’s yard,” “right where a fence”
used to be, right-side up but “turned the opposite direction of the
travel.” The vehicle had extensive “damage to [its] top and sides,”
and had “scraping” on its chrome hubcaps. Officers also observed
damage to nearby shrubbery, trees, and fences. And on the
pavement, the officers observed “scrape marks from the vehicle”
as well as “extensive skid marks,” which they deduced were
“from the tires” because there was “rubber residue on the road.”

¶4     The accident occurred at a relatively large intersection, and
the posted speed limit on the more arterial of the two intersecting
roads was 45 miles per hour. Both of the intersecting roads had at
least one lane of travel in each direction as well as a shared turn
lane in the middle. The officers located ADC at the scene, who told
them that he had been “traveling southbound” on the busier road
and that the vehicle’s “steering” or “front tire” had “locked up,”
causing him to lose control of the vehicle. The officers also learned
that ADC did not have a driver license, although he did have a
learner permit. Fortunately, neither ADC nor his passenger was
seriously injured, despite the severity of the crash.




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¶5      From ADC’s statements and their own observations at the
crash scene, the officers concluded that ADC had been traveling
southbound at or near 45 miles per hour and had attempted to
turn left (eastbound) onto the cross-street, but that he had not
successfully navigated the turn and had rolled the vehicle over
and crashed through a fence and into the yard. At the scene,
officers cited ADC for “reckless driving” and for “violation of
[his] learner’s permit.”

¶6     One month later, the State filed a delinquency petition
against ADC, asserting that he had taken actions that constituted
the crimes of reckless driving and driving without a license. As
the case proceeded, ADC admitted to the unlicensed driving
charge, but he elected to contest the reckless driving charge, and
the case moved toward trial.

¶7      A few months later, the juvenile court held a half-day
bench trial to consider the reckless driving charge. At the outset,
ADC’s attorney (Counsel) indicated that the State had told him
that it would not be offering any expert testimony and that he
intended to object to any testimony that he thought constituted
expert testimony.

¶8      In support of its case, the State called only two witnesses:
the officers who had responded to the crash scene. The first officer
(Officer 1) offered his observations of the scene, including a
description of the location and positioning of the vehicle, the skid
marks on the road, the statements ADC had made, and the
general layout of the intersection. Officer 1 also testified that when
the vehicle was pulled onto a tow truck, the wheels appeared
intact and were not locked in any position, leading him to
conclude that the vehicle “had not locked up.” Counsel lodged no
objection to any of this testimony.

¶9    At one point, the State asked Officer 1 how, in his opinion,
the vehicle could have come “to rest on its wheels” facing the
wrong direction in the yard. At this, Counsel objected, arguing


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that the question called for expert testimony. The court overruled
the objection, stating that it would “allow the . . . testimony as to
what was observed and reasonable conclusions from those
observations based upon training and [experience].” Officer 1
then testified that, in his view, ADC had attempted to take a turn
that “had exceeded the speed limit” and that the vehicle had
“rolled, hit the curb, and then flipped itself back upright” and
came to rest in the yard. And he noted “the velocity that must
have occurred in order for that vehicle to roll and crash through
trees, fences and end up in somebody’s backyard.”

¶10 Later, the State asked Officer 1 which individual traffic
citations could have been issued to ADC under the circumstances.
Officer 1 stated that, among other things, ADC could have been
cited for speeding, failing to maintain lane of travel, making an
improper turn, failing to maintain control of the vehicle, and
driving carelessly. While Officer 1 acknowledged on cross-
examination that he did not observe ADC speeding, he clarified
that “the skid marks and the totality [of the circumstances] would
suggest [ADC] was speeding.”

¶11 Officer 2 likewise offered his observations of the accident
scene, which testimony came in without objection. Later, though,
Officer 2 testified about the particulars of the skid marks he
observed on the pavement, stating that some of the marks were
“yaw marks.” He explained that yaw marks are a type of skid
mark that “almost look like half-moons” and that these marks
indicate that “the vehicle is sliding sideways,” usually as a result
of “excessive speed.” At this point, Counsel objected, asserting
that this testimony about yaw marks was expert testimony that
had not been previously disclosed and for which insufficient
foundation had been laid. The court overruled this objection.
Officer 2 then added that he had learned about yaw marks from
instruction he had received “in the police academy.”




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¶12 Shortly thereafter, the State asked Officer 2 for his opinion
about “what [he thought] happened.” Counsel lodged no
objection to this question. In response, Officer 2 stated, “I believe
the vehicle was trying to make a left-hand turn to go eastbound
on [the cross-street] and was going at a high rate of speed and
couldn’t control the vehicle and rolled.”

¶13 The State also asked Officer 2 whether drivers have less
control over their vehicles at higher speeds. When Officer 2
answered in the affirmative, Counsel objected, arguing that the
State was once again calling for expert testimony. In response to
this objection, the State asked a series of questions intended to
offer additional foundation for Officer 2’s response, and Counsel
did not thereafter renew the objection. The court was therefore
never asked to make an ultimate ruling on the objection. Officer 2
eventually offered a response to the original question, testifying
that it “[a]bsolutely” becomes more difficult to turn a vehicle at
high speed.

¶14 As with Officer 1, the State also asked Officer 2 what
individual citations could have been given to ADC, and Officer 2
responded that his “three top ones would be speeding, improper
turn, and failure to maintain control of the vehicle.”

¶15 After eliciting testimony from the two officers, the State
rested its case. ADC then called his parents as defense witnesses,
and he attempted to elicit testimony aimed at demonstrating that
the vehicle was mechanically unreliable. The parents testified that
the family had owned the vehicle since 2006 and that about “[f]our
years ago” the vehicle’s “steering wheel became very stiff,”
making it difficult to turn. To fix this problem, ADC’s father had
replaced the power steering pump twice, most recently the year
before the crash. He acknowledged, however, that since the latest
pump replacement, the vehicle’s steering had been working just
fine as far as he knew. And just two weeks before the crash, ADC’s
father had replaced the rear brakes and brake discs. He further



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testified that at the time of the accident one of the vehicle’s four
tires was a spare tire.

¶16 In its closing argument, the State argued that ADC had
committed reckless driving in two different ways. First, it asserted
that ADC had been driving the vehicle in general “willful and
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” See Utah
Code § 41-6a-528(1). Second, the State contended that ADC had
committed at least three separate traffic violations during the
incident. See id. § 41-6a-528(2)(b). The State argued that these
violations included speeding, not staying in a lane, making an
improper turn, and not remaining in control of the vehicle.

¶17 In response, Counsel argued that ADC had not been
driving with a general “willful and wanton disregard” for the
safety of others and that he had not committed three “separate
and distinct” traffic violations. In particular, Counsel argued that
all the alleged individual traffic violations occurred at roughly the
same time and during the same set of acts, and that the State’s
asserted violations were therefore “all the same thing.”

¶18 At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court concluded
that ADC had committed three separate traffic violations in rapid
succession, stating as follows:

       [T]he reasonable inference that is drawn is that there
       was excessive speed for the circumstances. [ADC]
       [m]ay have only been traveling the speed limit
       which is not a problem. You can travel the speed
       limit. But if you’re trying to make a turn at 45 miles
       an hour (the speed limit there), that is excessive. So
       with . . . all of that evidence it becomes obvious that
       . . . speed was involved, that there was an attempt to
       make a turn improperly, and a failure . . . to remain
       in the lane of travel.




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The court found “no evidence whatsoever that there was any . . .
problem caused by having a spare tire” on the vehicle, and it
rejected ADC’s assertion that a steering problem caused the
accident. The juvenile court explained that “having a problem
with the turning mechanism . . . does not explain why the vehicle
would have flipped, rolled, [and] traveled as it did.”

¶19 On this basis, the court adjudicated ADC delinquent on the
reckless driving charge; the court did not address whether ADC
had exhibited a general “willful or wanton disregard for the safety
of persons or property.” See Utah Code § 41-6a-528(1). That same
day, the court sentenced ADC to probation and ordered him to
complete twenty hours of community service.


            ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶20 ADC now appeals, and he raises two issues for our
consideration. First, ADC challenges the juvenile court’s decision
to overrule his objections to the officers’ trial testimony, lodged
on the ground that the officers were offering improper expert
testimony. We review a trial court’s determination that a witness’s
testimony was not expert testimony for “abuse of discretion.”
State v. Rothlisberger,
2006 UT 49, ¶ 8
,
147 P.3d 1176
. “Abuse of
discretion occurs only if it can be said that no reasonable person
would take the view adopted by the [trial] court.” State v. Sanchez,
2017 UT App 229, ¶ 2
,
409 P.3d 156
(quotation simplified).

¶21 Second, ADC asserts that the evidence was insufficient to
support the court’s determination that he committed reckless
driving. “When reviewing a juvenile court’s decision for
sufficiency of the evidence, [an appellate court] must consider all
the facts, and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn
therefrom, in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s
determination,” and we reverse “only when it is against the clear
weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches




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a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In
re V.T.,
2000 UT App 189, ¶ 8
,
5 P.3d 1234
(quotation simplified).


                            ANALYSIS

                    I. The Officers’ Testimony

¶22 ADC’s first challenge is to the juvenile court’s decision to
overrule his objections to portions of the officers’ trial testimony
that he asserts was undisclosed expert testimony. Officer 2’s
challenged testimony about “yaw marks” may well have been
expert testimony. But even assuming that this testimony was
improperly admitted, we reject ADC’s challenge, because the rest
of the officers’ testimony was properly admitted lay testimony
and because ADC has not shown a reasonable probability of a
different result in the absence of the yaw mark testimony. We
discuss ADC’s challenges to each officer’s testimony in turn.

                     A. Officer 1’s Testimony

¶23 ADC challenges the admission of only one part of Officer
1’s trial testimony: his opinion as to how the vehicle could have
ended up turned the wrong way in a residential yard. ADC
contends that this testimony constituted improper and
undisclosed expert testimony. We disagree.

¶24 “[T]he test for determining whether testimony must be
provided by an expert is whether the testimony requires that the
witness have scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge;
in other words, whether an average bystander would be able to
provide the same testimony.” State v. Rothlisberger,
2006 UT 49,
¶ 34
,
147 P.3d 1176
. Indeed, a “lay witness may testify in the form
of fact or opinion to information within her personal knowledge
or perception when it is helpful to the finder of fact and it is ‘not
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.’”
State v. Sellers,
2011 UT App 38, ¶ 26
,
248 P.3d 70
(quoting Utah R.



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Evid. 701). Thus, the admissibility of lay opinion testimony often
turns on whether the opinion falls “within the ken of the average
bystander.” Rothlisberger,
2006 UT 49, ¶ 34
.

¶25 Applying these principles, Utah courts have deemed lay
opinions within the ken of the average bystander, and therefore
admissible, in various circumstances, including opinions about
whether a person is intoxicated, whether moans sound as though
they were associated with sexual pleasure, whether footprints and
shoeprints appear to be similar, and whether a victim’s wounds
are fresh. See State v. Ellis,
748 P.2d 188
, 190–91 (Utah 1987)
(similarity of footprints); State v. Garcia-Lorenzo,
2022 UT App 101
,
¶¶ 66–67,
517 P.3d 424
, cert. granted,
525 P.3d 1263
(Utah 2022)
(moans of pleasure or pain); State v. Hulse,
2019 UT App 105, ¶ 35
,
444 P.3d 1158
(freshness of wounds); State v. Yalowski,
2017 UT
App 177, ¶¶ 32, 39
,
404 P.3d 53
(similarity of shoeprints); Sellers,
2011 UT App 38, ¶ 26
(intoxication).

¶26 In this case, Officer 1 testified, based on his observations at
the crash scene, that ADC had attempted to take a turn that “had
exceeded the speed limit” and that the vehicle had “rolled, hit the
curb, and then flipped itself back upright” and came to rest in the
yard. He further made note of “the velocity that must have
occurred in order for that vehicle to roll and crash through trees,
fences and end up in somebody’s backyard.”

¶27 The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by deeming
this testimony an admissible lay opinion, because the opinion
Officer 1 gave is within the ken of the average bystander. Just as
most people have sufficient experience with intoxicated people or
footprints, most people have sufficient experience with car travel
and accidents to offer basic opinions, based on their observations,
about how a car ended up in a particular location. Although the
juvenile court mentioned, in passing, that Officer 1’s opinions
may have been based on his “training and [experience],” Officer




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1 did not actually so testify and, in our view, the testimony in
question did not require any specialized training or experience. 1



1. In this vein, ADC complains that the State relied on Officer 1’s
“training and experience” in resisting Counsel’s objection to the
testimony, and notes that the juvenile court mentioned Officer 1’s
“training and [experience]” in overruling the objection. In
particular, ADC asserts that Officer 1’s “considerable experience”
operates to “legitimate” the lay testimony and might cause a
factfinder to “give those conclusions weight beyond what would
normally be given to a lay witness’s opinion testimony.” In our
view, ADC raises a legitimate concern: litigants ought not be able
to unfairly cloak a lay opinion in expert witness garb by
emphasizing the “lay” witness’s extensive training and
experience. By the same token, however, the proponent of the
testimony should be allowed to introduce at least some
foundation that the lay witness has sufficient facility with the
subject matter to be able to offer a credible opinion. In the end,
however, ADC’s concern does not go to the opinion’s
admissibility; a lay opinion is admissible if it meets the
requirements of rule 701 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, regardless
of whether it comes from a high-information witness. See State v.
Sellers,
2011 UT App 38, ¶ 26
,
248 P.3d 70
(stating that a police
detective’s “testimony regarding [the defendant]’s state of
intoxication . . . could properly come in under rule 701 as lay
opinion testimony so long as it was helpful to the jury and based
on her own perceptions”). The remedy in these situations is
therefore not wholesale exclusion of the testimony but, instead, a
careful assessment—with the principles of rule 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence in mind—of how much foundation the
proponent of lay testimony should be allowed to offer, and
evaluation of whether to instruct the jury that the witness is
testifying as a lay witness and not as an expert based on “training
and experience.” In this case, ADC lodged no separate objection—
                                                     (continued…)


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¶28 It is important to our conclusion here that Officer 1’s
testimony was fairly cursory and non-technical, and—as the
juvenile court noted—was a far cry from “the realm of [accident]
reconstruction” testimony. When a vehicle has damage to its side
and top and to its chrome wheels, and when there are skid marks
and scrape marks on the pavement, it does not require any
specialized training or experience to conclude that the vehicle was
traveling too fast, lost control, rolled over and ended up in its
terminal location.

¶29 On this basis, we reject ADC’s challenge to the
admissibility of Officer 1’s lay opinion about how the vehicle
came to rest in the residential backyard.

                     B. Officer 2’s Testimony

¶30 ADC challenges the admission of two parts of Officer 2’s
testimony: (1) his opinion that drivers have less control over their
vehicles at higher speeds than they do at lower speeds, and (2) his
opinion that some of the skid marks were “yaw marks” that
indicated the vehicle had been “sliding sideways” as a result of
“excessive speed.” We discuss these challenges in turn.

¶31 The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
Officer 2 to offer the opinion that drivers have less control over
their vehicles at higher speeds. In this context, this opinion is
permissible lay testimony, because most people have sufficient
experience with car travel to be able to intuit that it is easier to
control a vehicle and keep it in the proper lane of travel when
moving at slow speeds than when moving at high speeds. This




apart from his objection to the admissibility of the testimony—to
the specific emphasis of Officer 1’s “training and experience” and,
in this case that was tried to the bench, we discern no prejudice
from that language in any event.


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opinion was within the ken of the average bystander and was
therefore not objectionable. 2

¶32 We resolve ADC’s challenge to Officer 2’s “yaw marks”
testimony on a different ground. ADC asserts—with considerable
force—that this testimony constitutes expert testimony because
average bystanders do not have much knowledge about the
specifics of skid marks, including yaw marks. But even
assuming—without deciding—that the juvenile court abused its
discretion by allowing Officer 2 to opine about yaw marks, any
such error was harmless on this record.

¶33 Not every trial error regarding the admission of evidence
requires reversal. Indeed, such errors “require[] reversal only if a
review of the record persuades the appellate court that without
the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the defendant.” State v. Jones,
2020 UT App 161, ¶ 14
,
478
P.3d 1055
(quotation simplified); see also State v. Ellis,
2018 UT 2,
¶ 42
,
417 P.3d 86
(“Prejudice analysis is counterfactual. To decide
whether a trial affected by error is reasonably likely to have
turned out differently we have to consider a hypothetical—an
alternative universe in which the trial went off without the
error.”). Thus, to assess whether the admission of Officer 2’s yaw


2. We assume, for purposes of this discussion, that ADC
preserved this issue for our review on appeal. As noted, ADC
initially lodged an objection to Officer 2’s opinion about higher
speeds but did not renew the objection after the State laid
additional foundation, and the juvenile court never actually made
a ruling on the objection. But we need not further concern
ourselves with preservation here because we reject ADC’s
challenge to this specific testimony on its merits. See State v.
Kitches,
2021 UT App 24, ¶ 28
,
484 P.3d 415
(stating that where
“the merits of a claim can easily be resolved in favor of the party
asserting that the claim was not preserved, we readily may opt to
do so without addressing preservation” (quotation simplified)).


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mark testimony can constitute reversible error, we must imagine
an alternative trial in which all of the rest of the evidence came in
as in the actual trial, but with one difference: the juvenile court
did not hear Officer 2’s yaw mark testimony. And with that trial
in mind, we must consider whether it is reasonably likely that the
court would have reached a different conclusion.

¶34 On this record, a different conclusion is not reasonably
likely, even in the absence of the yaw mark testimony. The other
evidence indicating that ADC had rolled his vehicle due to
excessive speed and inexperience was overwhelming. After all,
the vehicle had sustained severe damage, including to its top and
sides, and had ended up in a yard resting in the opposite direction
than it had been traveling. The court did not need Officer 2’s yaw
mark testimony to reach the rather intuitive conclusion that the
vehicle had rolled over while making a turn at excessive speed
and that it had therefore at some point been moving sideways. We
also note that, in its explanation of its conclusions, the juvenile
court made only passing mention of yaw marks—in the context
of commenting on the presence of skid marks on the pavement—
and does not appear to have meaningfully relied on Officer 2’s
specific opinion about the yaw marks.

¶35 Accordingly, for these reasons, we reject ADC’s challenges
to Officer 2’s testimony.

                  II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶36 Finally, ADC brings a sufficiency-of-the-evidence
challenge, asserting that the evidence presented does not support
the juvenile court’s determination that ADC violated the reckless
driving statute. That statute states, as a general matter, that “[a]
person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle in
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.”
Utah Code § 41-6a-528(1). And the statute goes on to specify that
“‘willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or
property’ includes . . . committing three or more traffic violations


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. . . in a series of acts occurring within a single continuous period
of driving covering three miles or less in total distance.”
Id.
§ 41-
6a-528(2). Thus, as applicable here, there are two possible
pathways by which ADC could be deemed to have committed the
crime of reckless driving: (1) by exhibiting a general “willful or
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property,” or (2) by
committing at least three separate traffic violations in a single
continuous period within three miles. See § 41-6a-528; see also State
v. Young,
2015 UT App 286
, ¶¶ 14–15,
364 P.3d 55
(affirming a
conviction for reckless driving due to a general willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property). Indeed, the State
argued to the juvenile court that ADC should be considered
delinquent under both of these pathways. But the juvenile court
relied entirely on the second theory—that ADC had committed
three traffic violations—and made no finding about general
willful or wanton disregard. Specifically, the court found that
ADC had been speeding, had made an improper turn, and had
failed to remain in his lane of travel.

¶37 ADC challenges the juvenile court’s determination that he
committed three separate traffic violations. The State responds by
asserting that ADC violated at least three traffic laws during the
rollover accident, and alternatively invites us to affirm on the
ground that ADC “committed reckless driving through willful
and wanton disregard.”

¶38 We elect to affirm on the alternative basis suggested by the
State. We can, of course, affirm a trial court’s decision on any
“legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be
the basis of its ruling or action.” Bailey v. Bayles,
2002 UT 58, ¶ 10
,
52 P.3d 1158
(quotation simplified). And this principle rings
especially true in juvenile delinquency cases, because in such
cases the court is not required to make any findings at all. See Utah
R. Juv. P. 44(a) (stating that “findings of fact shall not be
necessary” in “cases concerning any minor who has violated any



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federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance”); see also In re
J.R.H.,
2020 UT App 155
, ¶ 8 n.4,
478 P.3d 56
(observing that the
juvenile court had not made any findings beyond simply
adjudicating the juvenile delinquent, but citing rule 44(a) and
noting that “none were required”). Indeed, in this case, the
juvenile court—presumably referring to rule 44(a)—recognized
that it was “not required to make findings,” but it indicated that
it wanted to “try and explain” its decision anyway. We applaud
the court’s effort, in furtherance of procedural fairness, to offer an
explanation to the parties of the basis for its decision, and we
observe that this will often turn out to be a useful practice even in
cases where it is not required. But because the juvenile court was
not required to make findings, our review of the record is plenary
and is not cabined by the bonus explanation the court gave as the
basis for its ruling. As already noted, our review takes into
account “all the facts, and all reasonable inferences which may be
drawn therefrom,” and construes those facts and inferences “in a
light most favorable to the juvenile court’s determination,” and
we reverse only when the court’s decision “is against the clear
weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In
re V.T.,
2000 UT App 189, ¶ 8
,
5 P.3d 1234
(quotation simplified).
In other words, if the evidence presented at trial, coupled with
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, supports the conclusion
that ADC operated his vehicle “in willful or wanton disregard for
the safety of persons or property,” then we will affirm the juvenile
court’s adjudication, even if we end up arriving at that conclusion
by a somewhat different path than the juvenile court did.

¶39 And when we examine the evidence presented, it supports
the conclusion that ADC committed reckless driving. Although
ADC was a relatively inexperienced driver, his age as well as his
possession of a learner permit demonstrate sufficient experience
to impute to him an understanding that a car cannot safely make
a 90-degree turn on a city street while moving at 45 miles per hour.
Thus, even if he was not driving in excess of the posted speed limit



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as he drove down the street, he was driving too fast for the
existing conditions when he approached and made the left-hand
turn onto the cross-street at or near 45 miles per hour. See Utah
Code § 41-6a-601(1) (stating that a “person may not operate a
vehicle at a speed greater than what is reasonable and prudent
under the existing conditions,” including when “approaching and
going around a curve”). Largely because of his choice to take the
turn at an excessive speed, he was unable to control his vehicle,
and he rolled it through a fence and into a nearby resident’s yard.
These actions obviously created a real risk of danger not only for
ADC and his friend, but also for other motorists as well as the
residents of the property where the vehicle came to rest. Under
these circumstances, the evidence supports the conclusion that
ADC was operating his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for
the safety of persons or property, and thus supports the juvenile
court’s determination that ADC committed reckless driving.

¶40 On this basis, then, we conclude that the juvenile court’s
ultimate adjudication was not against the clear weight of the
evidence and is therefore not subject to reversal on appeal.


                         CONCLUSION

¶41 For the most part, the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in overruling ADC’s objections to portions of the
officers’ testimony. And ADC has not demonstrated that he was
prejudiced by admission of Officer 2’s testimony about yaw
marks. Finally, the record contains sufficient evidence to support
the juvenile court’s ultimate delinquency adjudication.

¶42   Affirmed.




 20221120-CA                    16
2024 UT App 150